Parliament is the sine qua non of democracy. Legislative developments in Asia have contributed to the general perception that we now live in the age of Parliaments. Accordingly, parliamentary democracy deserves much greater scholarly attention than it has so far received. This research endeavour attempts to enquire into the ineffectiveness of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh. It starts with the hypothesis that effectiveness of the Parliament depends upon the empowerment of the individual Member of Parliament (MP). According to existing law of the country, a people’s representative or an MP has little or no scope to play an independent and effective role in the House. Article 70 of Bangladesh’s Constitution does not allow any party-MP to express his independent opinion in the Parliament. In fact, with a very few exceptions of non-party MP(s), all members of Parliament must abide by the decisions of their concerned parties, even if they go against the interests of their electorates. The members of the Parliament should speak and act according to the “general will” of their respective electorates, however, they cannot go beyond their party directives and its interests. In contrast to the democratic norm, according to the current practice of Bangladesh, party-MPs are under the strong dictates of their party Chief. Without the approval of the party Chief vis-à-vis party, a party-MP is not allowed to speak in the Jatiya Sangshad (Parliament). Absence of independent deliberations by the MPs is resultant into absence of lively debates, which in turn further aggravates the problems of institutionalization of the Parliament. Those, altogether, lead to an ineffective Parliament in Bangladesh. Thus, enquiring into and removal of the causes of ineffective Parliament are the primary task of the time to make parliamentary democracy institutionalized and effective in all respect.