

**DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE OF PAKISTAN: A CASE STUDY OF
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRATIC PERIOD 1988-1999**

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requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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DECLARATION

I Muhammad Afzal Sajid S/O Bashir Ahmed do solemnly affirm that this thesis titled ‘Democratic Experience of Pakistan: A Case Study of Parliamentary Democratic Period 1988-1999’ is the result of my own research work, and has never been submitted for any degree in my University.

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DEDICATED TO

My Beloved Late Father MIAN BASHIR AHMAD & Mother,

& My Venerated Teacher PROF. DR. IRAM KHALID

&

My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIML	All India Muslim League
AKMC	Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference
AL	Awami League
ANP	Awami National Party
APC	All Party Conference
APMO	All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organization
APNS	All Pakistan Newspapers Society
BNM	Balochistan National Movement
BNM (H)	Balochistan National Movement (Hasil Group)
BNM (M)	Balochistan National Movement (Mengal Group)
BNP	Balochistan National Party
CBR	Central Board of Revenue
CCI	Council of Common Interests
CDNS	Council of Defense and National
CEC	Chief Executive Committee
C-in-C	Commander in Chief
CJCSC	Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff Committee
CM	Chief Minister
CML	Conventional Muslim League
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
Con ML	Council Muslim League
Conv ML	Conventional Muslim League
COP	Combine Opposition Party
CPNE	Council of Pakistan Newspapers Editors
CWOG	Common Wealth Observer Group
DAC	Democratic Action Committee
DG	Director General
DMG	District Management Group
EBDO	Elective Bodies Disqualification Order
ECMT	European Community Monitoring Team
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
FGCM	Field General Court Martial

FIA	Federal Investigation Agency
FSF	Federal Security Force
GDA	Grand Democratic Alliance
GHQ	General Head Quarters
IB	Intelligence Bureau
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Ithad
IJM	Islami Jamhoori Mahaz
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JCSC	Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat Ullama Islam
JUI(F)	Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman Group)
JUI (H)	Jamait ul Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi Group)
JUI(H)	Jamait ul Ulema-i-Islam (Haqiqi Group)
JUI (S)	Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Samiul Haq Group)
JUP	Jamiat Ullama Pakistan
JUP(N)	Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani Group)
JWP	Jamhoori Wattan Party
LFO	Legal Framework Order
ML	Muslim League
ML(Q)	Muslim League (Qaiyum Group)
MNA	Member of National Assembly
MPA	Member of Provisional Assembly
MQM	Mohajir Qaumi Movement
MQM(A)	Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Altaf Group)
MQM(H)	Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Haqiqi)
MRD	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
NA	National Assembly
NAP	National Awami Party
NAP(W)	National Awami Party (Wali Group)
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDF	National Democratic Front
NFC	National Finance Commission
NIP	Nizam-i-Islam Party
NPP	National Peoples Party

NPT	National Press Trust
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PAI	Pakistan Awami Ittehad
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tahreek
PCO	Provisional Constitutional Order
PDF	Pakistan Democratic Front
PKMAP	Pakhtun Kawah Milla Awami Party
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PML(J)	Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo)
PML(N)	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
PML(P)	Pakistan Muslim League (Pagaro)
PML(Q)	Pakistan Muslim League (Qasim Group)
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PODA	Public Offices (Disqualification) Order
PONAM	Pakistan Oppressed Nation Movement
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PPP(SB)	Pakistan People's Party (Shaheed Bhutto)
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf
PTV	Pakistan Television
RCO	Revival of 1973 Constitution Order
RP	Republican Party
TI	Tahreek-I-Istiqlal
TNFJ	Tahrik-e-Nafazi Fiqah Jafria
UDF	United Democratic Front
UF	United Front
USA	United State of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ABSTRACT

The focus of the thesis is on the history of Pakistan that stands witness to the repeated dissolution of assemblies before completion of their respective constitutional terms, the intermittent breakdown of the constitutions, take-over of military, disintegration and perpetual bad governance. The study attempts to unfold the conflicts behind the crunch of democracy that did not allow democracy to take roots in the period 1988 to 1999. The research is qualitative and descriptive-analytical method is used to analyze the data collected. The thesis titled “Democratic Experience of Pakistan: A Case Study of Parliamentary Democratic Period 1988-1999” presents a broad canvas of four elected governments of PPP and PML (N) during the period of 1988 and 1999. The study attempted to analyze the role of leadership in the persons of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif in their respective terms in office as the head of the government and head of the opposition that how they played their role in the crisis of democracy in the period under study as well as the role of the President in persons of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, and General Pervaiz Musharruf. The focus is on working relationship between elected and nonelected institutions as well as on functioning of elected institutions. The process of democratization could not be successful unless the attributes of democracy are properly examined and addressed. In Pakistan, the authoritarian regime had introduced controlled democracy whereas the political regimes had neglected the basic concept of democracy. During the era under study, instead of owing the credibility of the constitution, the attention is spayed to personal power gaining strategy which had weakened the process of democracy in Pakistan. The popular and semi-academic discussion regarding civil-military tension and crisis of democracy generally lead to a conclusion that the institution of military is the main cause and politicians are the main victims in the

derailment of democracy. The research concluded the complex process of power struggle and internal conflicts among the power elites.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

People's centric government established in Pakistan after independence in the form of Democracy played dynamic and vibrant role in the institutional development and foundations of the country. A very few states after the World War-II appeared on the map of the world encompassing democratic variants with the soul to establish democratic institutions, but, Pakistan. Movement for Pakistan, the base of which was laid down after the war of independence by Muslim leadership of Sub-continent got popularity and recognition from all school of thoughts also integrated the people at the plate form of Muslim League for independent, democratic and sovereign separate homeland. All India Muslim League played significant role in materializing the Iqbal's nightmare of separate homeland for the Muslims of Sub-continent. All India Muslim League won a significant victory in the elections due to which the demand of Pakistan was grudgingly accepted by the British Rulers and congress.

In the elections of 1946 Muslim League put forward two main issues on the basis of which the Muslims representative political party participated in the election. Firstly, the Muslims of united India are distinct and separate nation corresponding to all definitions of 'nation' and the Muslim League is their only archetypical and custodian political party of the Muslims of India. Secondly, there is no other solution to the prevailing problems and issues faced by the Muslims of India without partition and an independent separate sovereign state for the Muslim. The partition of subcontinent into India and Pakistan, however, provoked many historical events which cast a powerful shadow of historical reconstruction of post-colonial subcontinent. All India Muslim league, through its narrative, isolated the unpleasant glitches seen by British Empire on transition from colonial rule to independence.

Creation of Pakistan subjugates an important place for the historians, as independence not only marked the partition of subcontinent rather a democratic sovereign state for the Muslim community of India.

In Pakistan, political leaders were determined to establish a democratic system in the state. As Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the draughtsman of Pakistan as early as 1943 stated: “democracy is in our blood, it is in our marrow”(M. Khalid, 1968, p. 126). The Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah wished-for the Constitution of Pakistan as a perfect combination of democratic principles and of Islamic values but progress of democracy in the state has not been suave and immaculate. A strong democratic culture could not be established because an unceasing rumpus of power started amongst the politicians and institutions.

Democracy is an alluring notion. In democracy, the public can hold governments accountable for their policies and prevent an abuse of power. Democracy can promote economic growth, human rights and protect people from the vindictiveness of an autocratic regime and from the effects of social and economic disasters. Democracy encourages the governments to be alert to the needs of their citizens and to promote the health, education, and overall well-being of the people, which enriches life of people by promoting harmony, both between states and within them. Moreover, it helps the people in the societies to learn from one another through public discussion, thereby facilitating the definition of needs, priorities, and duties, and enrich the lives of citizens by recognizing their dignity as human beings. This brand of democracy can be found in most developed democratic societies. Developing democracies like Pakistan suffered a lot due to continuous interference of undemocratic forces in the political process. The main objective of democracy is to overcome the despotism or rule of an individual.

Pakistan is considered a democratic state however, democratic rule has been fickle and shallow. The history of Pakistan is a troubled, marked by engaging troika of power struggle amongst President, Prime Minister and army chief. Most observers agree that Pakistan has no sustained history of an effective Constitutionalism and Parliamentary democracy. Pakistan was struggling for the Constitution since 1947. The Pakistani leaders failed to grasp the new realities of the emerging state. New Constitution was drafted in 1956 and Pakistan was declared democratic state. It was decided that all state affairs should be resolved in a democratic manner and all the institutions would carry out their affairs in their domain but in reality, the history took a paradigm shift and things happened in another way. State institutions functioned inappropriately and contravened the democratic traditions to be nurtured in the newly born state.

In the process of Constitutional development and democratization of institutions of state first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan was slayed and before imposition of Martial Law on October 7, 1958, six Prime Minister (Khawaja Nazmiuddin, Muhammad Ali of Bogra, Chaudhuri Muhammad Ali, H. S. Suhrawardhy, I. I. Chundrigar and Feroz Khan Noon) had served the country while the office of Governor General was held by Ghulam Muhammad (October 1951- August 1955), and Major General (Retired.) Iskandar Mirza (August 1955- October 1958) in succession (Rizvi, 2013, pp. 325–326). Political instability was seen in between the assassination of first Prime Minister in 1951 and the imposition of Martial Law in 1958. The removal or resignations of Prime Minister during the decade of 1950s resulted in delaying in Constitutional development and halted democratic process of Pakistan.

Prime Ministers, during this period were on the disposal and forbearance of Governor General and then President after the enforcement of 1956 Constitution. The removal of premier from the office of Prime Minister according the Constitution of 1956, was made by the President by manipulation and in connivance with members of the Assembly and patronage of bureaucracy. The state became puppet in the hands of one man and democratic process of the country hijacked in rear in an antithesis of democratization and Constitutional development. Convergence of powers in the hands of one person derailed the democratic process on the one hand and instability of state institutions added fuel to the furry on the other. Due to instability and short lifespan of political governments in this period, political maneuvering by the central powers negated the political development, stability and management of state affairs. Hence, political and democratic concerns of the state were not managed properly(Ahmad, 1971, p. 11).

Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad served the country initially was inducted as finance minister after the creation of Pakistan and was elevated to position of third Governor General. After coming to power, Ghulam Muhammad started dominating powers and affairs of the state. During his term, a strong autocratic rule emerged with all powers in hands of Governor- General and widespread misuse of political and Constitutional powers. With the domination of all powers of the country he ordered to curtail powers of Prime Minister. His self-appointed Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra who was an Ambassador to Pakistan in United States of America was dismissed by him. Governor-General Malik Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the legislative Assembly of Pakistan when he smelled that the assembly was trying to curtail and denude Governor General from his discretionary powers.

Civil military bureaucracy played key role in political affairs of the state and powers of bureaucrats-military elites strengthened. The Constitutional coup was dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin on April 17, 1953 despite the fact and statistics that the Prime Minister enjoyed the support of the Constitutional Assembly and legislature. Subsequently, first Constitutional Assembly was also dissolved on 24th October, 1954. The Governor General's office became a hub of power and more influential in the political affairs of the country (S. N. Kaushik, 1985). After overthrowing the government of Khawaja Nazimuddin, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad formed another government with a cabinet named as "Cabinet of Talents" and Mohammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister of Pakistan. A unique feature of this government was that the most of the Ministers were not members of the Assembly. A ten members Cabinet was formed for benefits of parliament on 24th October, 1954 with inclusion of Ayub Khan Commander in Chief of Army and Major General Iskander Mirza. This cabinet of talents can be viewed as a step towards the inclusion of military in politics of Pakistan (Callard, 1957a, p. 23). Ayub Khan's inclusion in the politics of the country opened doors for military role in politics of Pakistan.

Constitution of 1956 was passed by Constituent Assembly and Iskandar Mirza renounced the office of Governor General by assuming as President of Pakistan. After implementation of first Constitution, Iskandar Mirza assumed the office as first President of Pakistan. Due to lack of political consensus among ethnonational groups and political parties, the Constitution of 1956, failed to arrest the political instability and maneuvering by the civil and military bureaucracy and flattened grounds for Martial Law under military rule. During the presidency of Iskandar Mirza (1955-1958) political instability and overthrow of Prime Ministers from office was on its peak. Prime Ministers were kept on changing frequently and during the era of

September 1956 to October 1958, three coalition governments changed hands at the Centre, because no political party at the center enjoyed majority. The coalition government further provided an opportunity to Iskandar Mirza for more political powers.

Four federal ministries were changed by Iskandar Mirza by using his powers as President according to the Constitution of 1956. Due to the political manipulation, military got its influence enhanced by 1958 and resultantly the country was steered by military government under the Martial Law of October 1958 by General Ayub Khan. Military influence in politics augmented during this period. Sir Alexander Symon, the British High Commissioner in Karachi informed about the probability of direct supposition of political powers by the military in Pakistan. Sir Symon was told by Iskandar Mirza in September 27, 1958 that “democracy would not work in Pakistan” and that “time had come for him to act”. On October 7, 1958, Iskandar Mirza proclaimed Martial Law in the country even when elections were scheduled for February 1959 (Haqqani, 2006, pp. 116–117).

Due to be expired in 1959 and then Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon was reluctant to authorize the extension in the tenure of Army Chief for another term. Relations between them were strained as well with Iskandar Mirza and resultantly hostilities in political and military relations led to the first Martial Law in 1958 (Siddiq, 2017, p. 71). The reign of power shifted to the shoulder of military leadership (S. N. Kaushik, 1985, pp. 47–48). It was observed that right through the occupancies of Malik Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza, a vice-regal system of government prevailed in Pakistan (Haqqani, 2006, pp. 115–116), political confusion, bewilderment and instability continued to exist and bureaucracy was used as a tool in facilitating transformation of governments by President as well as Governor General before

imposition of Martial Law. With the imposition of Martial Law, the political power was completely in the hands of military which enjoyed the complete support from bureaucracy, landlords and business community.

Ayub Khan (October 1958- March 1969) after taking office, decided to run the state according to his own wishes. He introduced system of basic democracy and presidential form of government. He promulgated the 1962 Constitution including indirect elections for President and Assemblies. Ayub was of the opinion that there should be a centralized government with extended role of military and civilian bureaucracy; considered people as uneducated, divided and unsophisticated to have democratic institutions; and showed disregard towards politicians and political parties. Ayub Khan installed a guided democracy under the domination of military bureaucracy (V. Grover & Arora, 1995).

The Praetorian rule being an exclusive political thespian positioned to determine and silhouette sequels of a transition that commenced with Ayub Khan continued during Yahya Khan's military regime (1969-1971). The praetorian rule was not mere a bystander nor a neutral observer in the case of Pakistan and momentous political and institutional changes were materialized in the country after the imposition of Martial Law. The army rule proved more consequential actor in the political and democratic history of Pakistan. When martial law government under Ayub was in power, nationwide agitation started against him during his term of office and he was forced to resign on 25th March, 1969. Ayub handed over the powers to General Yahya Khan instead to the Speaker of National Assembly according the rules set in Constitution of 1962 which was also a product of Martial Law regime.

General Yahya Khan assumed the office of Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and later became President of Pakistan. Yahya Khan deferred the 1962

Constitution of and imposed Martial Law in the country. Ayub Khan, during his term of office had appointed a Service Reorganization Commission under the Chairmanship of Chief Justice A.R. Cornelius. The Commission submitted its report in 1962, suggesting substantial changes and amendments in the structure of services and proposed to abolish the privileged position of Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP) in bureaucracy. Due to the influence of top bureaucracy of Pakistan, report of the Commission was not made public. In 1969 the report was declassified; Yahya Khan intended to implement the recommendations, but due to opposition of powerful bureaucracy against the report, nothing happened(H. A. Rizvi, 2013, pp. 186–187).

Elections are the beauty of democratic system but in Pakistan, although presidential elections were held in 1965 which were won by Ayub Khan with the help of basic democrats, not a single general elections could be held since 1947 to 1969. First general elections were held in 1970. Awami League of Sheikh Mujeeb won 169 seats and Pakistan Peoples Party of Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto won 81 seats out of 300 seats of national assembly. Due to the personal interest and lack of political vision of the politicians, they could not understand the situation and Pakistan had to face the tragedy of East Pakistan.

After tragedy of East Pakistan, Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto took office as Civil Martial law administrator. Bhutto remained in power from 1971-1977. He tried to curtail the power of the army. Changes were made in the structure of military high command such as the designation of commander in chief (C-in-C) to Chief of army staff (COAS), C-in-C navel to Chief of naval and C-in-C Air Force to chief of air staff. All three chiefs were put under chairman Joint chief of staff committee (JCSC). The officer which were involved in 1971 war had to face strict action by Bhutto. He even removed officers like Lt. General Gul Hassan Khan the then COAS. This was

the period in the history of Pakistan when military accepted supremacy of a civilian ruler because at that time situation was completely changed and army was facing severe criticism of public and was demoralized due to shameful defeat. But to get personal interest and to achieve political goals, he (Bhutto) involved military in political matters and thus he failed to establish civilian supremacy on military. Initially, army was pushed to barracks but after 1976 it succeeded in regaining its earlier upper position. Bhutto locked himself in confrontation with opposition and could not strengthen the institutions.

Second general elections were held in 1977. Bhutto's PPP won 155 seats and Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) won 36 out of 200 seats of national assembly. PNA did not accept the results and demanded fresh elections. Situation became worse and Zia Ul Haq (the then COAS) imposed martial law in the state which lasted till 1985. The Martial Law by Zia, in 1977 had once again led Pakistan to be a Praetorian state. In the period of Zia, the bureaucracy became stronger. Zia postponed those reforms which were introduced by Bhutto and this decision was appreciated by bureaucracy as they were against these reforms. To run functions of the state, military was dependent on civil bureaucracy because it had no experience to deal with matter of the public. when military joined hands with civil bureaucracy it (civil bureaucracy) consolidated its position and power. During the period of Zia, military officers were installed/appointed in civil bureaucracy especially in police and district management(H. Khan, 2005, pp. 272–273).

From 1947 to 1988, political system was interrupted three time by martial laws. First martial law administrator Ayub Khan took control of the state and abrogated the Constitution of 1956 and introduced his own Constitution of 1962. Then Chief of Army Staff General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan imposed martial

law in 1969 which lasted till 1971 and he abrogated the Constitution. The third martial law was imposed by General Zia Ul Haq on 1977 and he put the Constitution in abeyance. Successive disruption weakened political system and a strong democratic culture could not be established. Democracy was a new system for the state and people of Pakistan because earlier this part of the world was ruled by colonial forces. Democracy needed time to take its roots and to make it functional but the strong and well organised civil-military bureaucracy blocked its development. Repeated martial laws strengthened the roots of despotism. Every time when martial law was imposed, they very firstly strengthened their hands by introducing their own laws, Constitution or by making amendments in the Constitution which tilted power in the hands of the president. Thus, whenever civilian government get in power, the Prime Minister who was supposed to be powerful in Parliamentary government, remained vulnerable.

In parliamentary democratic period from 1988-1999 elections were held in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 and Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), PPP and Pakistan Muslim League N (PMLN) formed the government in center respectively. But not a single party could complete its tenure of five years. Pakistan has a diverse history with a few breaks of democratic rule throughout the 72 years of existence. Parliamentary democracy was dismantled four times generally due to maladministration, the lopsided development of institutional matrix. Repeated disposition of the governments and of Prime Ministers from power shows that there was an imbalance of power tilted in favor of persistent and Army chief or establishment at cost of elected governments. Role of military bureaucracy and intelligence agencies is very much apparent in state politics. Discontinuity of

democratic practice had initiated threat to future of democracy. The elected governments had been being toppled on one pretext or the other.

In this context the period from 1988 to 1999 which was a sandwich between two long military rules is a significant for research. Many factors can be linked to this situation like Pakistan's lack of democratic experience through which it could initiate an effective process of democratization. In Pakistan, the success of Parliamentary Democracy was limited because of continuous power struggle between elected and non-elected institutions. Throughout this decade (1988-1999) institutions remained in conflict with each other in order to attain or acquire power. There are several reasons due to which Democracy did not deliver in Pakistan. Although, not a single government could complete its five years term and it were dismissed every time by presidents in 1990, 1993, 1996 and by army chief in 1999 however encouraging is this that it was replaced by another elected government.

A great deal of research has been done on the failure of Democracy in Pakistan. But in this research the researcher has critically evaluate those reasons with reference to the role of establishment and power hungry politicians which proved destructive for the growth of Democracy in the era of 1988-1999. This research is also an attempt to highlight the performance of democratic rule, its problems and prospects and causes of its failure in Pakistan.

1.1 Literature Review

Lawrence Ziring's book *Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History* (Ziring, 2003) provides an impartial explanation of Pakistan's leaders and its people and about political history of Pakistan. The writer even points out that how Pakistan's own leaders have abused and misused their authority and mislead the Pakistani people. Those in power, who sought to do well for their country, confronted challenges unlike

any other leader in the world. This book is an excellent account on the history of Pakistan from its origin to War on Terror.. In current scenario Pakistan has become world's focus and interest area. It is necessary to understand the convoluted history and complexity of Pakistani people. The author finds that Pakistan has been in the comb of political strength since its inception and, due to continuous political uncertainty, "the army has assumed primary responsibility for the preservation of the country." He further discusses the ins and outs that culminated in the association between civil and military bureaucracies and finally disrupted the statutory road map for the state. Thus, according to him, Pakistan still finds itself at the crossroads of history, not sure which way to choose while keeping historical problems and challenges in view.

Maya J. Tudor's *The Promise of power: the origin of democracy in India and autocracy in Pakistan* (Tudor, 2013) is a fine piece of narrative that explores comparative historical analysis and further puts forward a way of understanding the intricate process of post-colonial democratization. This work seeks to understand how democracy is institutionalized in India, while despotism in Pakistan has strengthened its roots. The resulting "divergent democracies" are rooted in economics classes and political setups that led to colonialism. It describes how the middle class and the "subordinate" political system played an important role in India, while the democratic foundations of Pakistan were affected by the hereditary feudal class and by big names of Pakistani politics and entrenched anomalies within the military and civil bureaucracy.

Stephan Philip Cohen's "The Idea of Pakistan" (Cohen, 2004) is an interesting account of Pakistani society and state. It is a critical study on the political development and civil military relations in Pakistan. The study systematically

examines different aspects of social and political development, though not in chronological order. The book covers military, Islam, economy, regionalism, demography and politics. It does not discuss much about the Idea of Pakistan than about its performance. The book highlight the process through which changes in power structure occurred, with military, bureaucracy and landlords being hub of the political power. He believes that military is one of the component of “oligarchy” or “establishment” of approximately 500 individuals that deal with affairs of state. He defines establishment as an amalgamation of top military brass, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the other elites that share a world view. The writer opined that the army perceived itself to be the true guardian of the state. He analysed the role of Pakistan's army as the state's protector cum ruler. The book discusses the generals' attitude towards civilians, defends their own interests, and are more valuable than democracy. It considered the civilian political leaders to be dishonest and incompetent. The army viewed itself as being competent and well-disciplined and more patriotic. These qualities make them different from the politicians. Cohen opined that autocratic politics had given rise to separatist tendencies in the state. Both civilian military regimes were of an authoritarian nature. He thinks that in civilian rule, the military actually remained politically more powerful than elected representatives. He explains the influence and role of military in politics comprehensively. He stated that army itself is incapable to fix the problems which Pakistan is facing on the other hand it never allows the other political institutions to flourish. The author describes that the military has zero tolerance toward others yet its own performance, when in power, has usually dug the hole deeper.

Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of Muslim League in North West and North-East India 1937-1947 of Ian Talbot (Talbot, 1988)

has observed clash that was in the provincial Muslim league. It helps to know about the conflict-ridden politics of Muslim league which the league was facing after the independence. It shows that how the Muslim League, the parent party and messenger of the idea of Pakistan failed to run the functions of the state. It shows that provincial leadership of Muslim League were out of control of the central leadership. Conflict after the creation of Pakistan was the extension of the pre-partition phenomenon. It tainted the league's performance as a political party and proved to be a major hurdle in its transition from a mass movement to an organised political party capable to run the state.

Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency (Diamond, 2019) This book is very timely, extremely well based in research, easily readable and in researcher view the most important book regarding the state of liberal democracy. In easy language, the most important thing is its insight that established democracies not only have to evolve to stay intact, but have to support those on the brink to democracy. It's important that liberal democracies work well and perform well in order to inspire. With personal insightful anecdotes this book spans from the state of American democracy to the dangers of the internet to democracy to the illiberal wave we see since 2006.

Democracy and Democratization (Moran & Parry, 2015) in this book the authors has argued about democracy and democratization. This work clears the idea and the procedure for the concept of democracy in all its different meanings and for the process of democratization through which democracy could be achieved. Its appearance is prompted by convergence in the interests of intellectuals. It contains a commentary on the maintenance and creation of democratic political practices that

has suddenly become an urgent political priority. The collection examines the theory and practice of democracy and democratization.

Ian Talbot in his work *Pakistan: A Modern History* (Talbot, 1998). In this work, the writer has critically assessed history and political development in Pakistan. In this book the writer is of the view that there are intricate reasons that constraint Pakistan in accommodating cultural diversity throughout the history of the country i.e., the tendency to regard all dissention as law and order rather than political issue, the manipulation and repression of popular forces by authoritarian regimes, and the potholed relationship between Punjab and other regions in conduct of national affairs. The writer believes that factionalism and racism (influential relationships) have beleaguered the country's political culture and have enabled rich families to play an important role in politics rather than ideology. This book additionally proved helpful for the current find out about because two chapters are totally written on the politics and political development in particular democracy, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto's relation with military from 1988 to 1999. It mentioned the flaws of political as properly as the establishment. However, the work does not discuss in detail the issues of the powerful classes that govern the country and its consequences with state institutions. For example, the account of Bhutto's reform of citizen services only covers two pages.

Lawrence Ziring's book *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A political Study* (Ziring, 1997)), this book provides an interesting account of the struggle and creation of Pakistan. The book focuses on socio-political and economic issues, political affairs, bribery, foreign interference and foreign relations that have hindered the democratization process in Pakistan. Pakistan's experiment with democracy between 1988 and 1999 is not dealt with in depth; only certain selective political and economic

developments are discussed. The style of writing is simple and articulate but details about political alliances are inadequate. Unlike most of Pakistan's political writings, not only military rulers are blamed for the weakening of Pakistan's political culture and the underdevelopment of democratic institutions. For example, he is of the opinion that Zia was not the only one who failed the "test of democracy" and that to quote him as the "singular guilty party" is a 'deliberate distortion' of history. The writer criticizes both Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto. It shows the resemblances between these two person's rules. Zaring further narrates, inevitably, the over-centralization of government and the failure to develop democratic institutions led to deep divisions in society along regional, linguistic, ethnic and religious lines. As a result, what Ziring calls 'deep-rooted frustration trends' is highlighted and eventually led to the breakdown of Pakistan in 1971. In its index, the pages related to united front (UF) and United Democratic Front (UDF) has been cited under the heading of UDF which cause confusion for a reader. If pages for the UDF have to be searched then pages about UF also appear, besides, index does not provide the information that the book contains the details about the UF. The book provides a good understanding of politics in Pakistan as a whole. It rightly argues that Pakistan is not a nation state and it has to acquire this condition so as to end political turmoil (P.614). Ziring;s argument is like the opinion of M.P Singh and Venna Kukreja that "a nation is still in the making" even after the passage of more than half of the century (p.9). The 1988-1999 period is discussed as political biography of Benazir and Nawaz rather than political history of Pakistan. This book does not discuss the reasons for the dissolution of elected governments. In fact, it is a collection of scholarly opinions on the democratization of Pakistan. The book talk more about pre1988 than the topic under study. In fact this book covers political history of Pakistan but it is unable to

focus on any of the area and its development. The writer has not discussed that why democracy failed and what was the experience of democracy in detail. Only some issues are narrated. This research will bridge this gape completely.

Peter R.Blood wrote a book, Pakistan: A Country study In his book attention has given to the detail description and analysis of different system of Pakistan, for instance, political, economic, social and national security system and influence of cultural factors on these various systems which shaped it. It has focused on the Pakistani society, government, politics and national security. The writer although not discussed in complete detail but has touched all the important events of Pakistan's history. While telling about the democratic period of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments he has not discussed in detail the experience of their period and its impact on future politics of the state. For instance, on page 38 he wrote that while siding with Nawaz Sharif, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the then president dismissed the Benazir government in a single line and same line is repeated while telling about Nawaz Sharif's government dismissal.

Nazir Ahmed, political parties in Pakistan: A long Way Ahead. (Ahmad, 2004) In this book the author has discussed some key aspects about government and opposition relations. It is cited in the work that the ruling and opposition parties need a democratic framework to play their role equally. But, in Pakistan, political parties have largely worked out of power as an opposition force within the anti-system framework and are often in a state of extreme subjugation. He says that in early years of Pakistan's political history opposition was weak. Pakistan Congress was the only noteworthy opposition party in the early years with a questioned allegiance to Pakistan. It is mainly because of the lack of active opposition that we find one party rule well entrenched in the political system at that time, while criticism on the

government has been linked from time to time to betrayal. The writer has described in this book that opposition parties played an active role during Bhutto era in and outside the parliament. In the business of national and provincial assemblies, opposition played an effective role. However, the attitude of governments towards opposition has remained most of the time problematic. The government of Z.A Bhutto was very aggressive toward opposition. During parliamentary democratic period under study, the writer says that political victimization of opposition was on full swing. The opposition parties remained engaged in destabilizing the government rather than taking part in the legislative process.

Saeed Shafqat, in *Contemporary Issues in Pakistan Studies* promotes the topic of consensus on the relationship between the government and the opposition, which provides an interesting awareness of understanding of Pakistan's political system. The writer Establishes relations between repeated military interferences and bitter relations in Pakistan's political system and lack of consensus between the party in opposition and the party in government. The subject of government and opposition relations could provide a very fertile framework for a realistic analysis of political developments in Pakistan. The author is optimistic about the future of democracy in Pakistan on the basis of his suggested consensus.

Maya Chadda's work *Building democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal and Pakistan* (Chadda, 2000) The author discusses politics in Pakistan from the point of view of elitism, which is primarily identified as a force capable of using even powerful measures for democratic republic, solidity and consolidate the state in Pakistan. One wonders if the elite, Civil Military Bureaucracy, politicians had consolidated the country in 1971? This approach is defective because it gives rise to the myths of a single-class leadership riding over a massive nationalism. Further, it

can more or less ignore the public's role in shaping political development in the country. In addition, it explicitly encouraged the armed forces to apply unnecessary violence in the name of national stability to fulfill its institutional and organizational interests. In this book, about democracy, there are two chapters, India, Pakistan and Nepal's democratic experience is covered in one chapter. This chapter explains how mass protests paved the way for a brief but effective experience of democracy. Soon it was disrupted, but the taste of popular power made it interestingly troublesome for despotism in Nepal and Pakistan to stifle public opinion. The conflict between the state and democracy has been severe in Pakistan. Chadda has clearly stated on page 25 that in the absence of institutions and rules the civil governments performed poorly and due to the conflicts between civilian leadership gave a reason to the military establishment to interfere. These interventions prevented the establishment of democracy. The relationship of president and Prime Minister is discussed in chapter three.

Tan Tai Yong's *The Garrison State the Military, Government and society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947* (Yong, 2005) discusses the colonial military and its politics in Punjab from 1849-1947. The author, however, has established a link between the feudal class and the British army, which shaped the dastardly empire to achieve political and economic interests. Yong has narrated that military class has a significant impact on Pakistani politics after independence. Yong also highlighted the Punjab's militancy culture before colonial rule. Punjab was the sword arm of the Raj. Thus, the military class was influential and it has a significant impact on Pakistan after the colonial state.

Christopher Jaffrelot's book *A History of Pakistan and its origins* (Jaffrelot, 2004) is an edited book, there are many parts in it. The first part deals with the

Islamic identity and ethnic tensions, East Bengal: between Islam and Regional identity and a fruitless search for democracy focuses the priority of state construction in the regions of Pakistani authoritarianism and gives the comprehensive details about all democratic and military regimes from 1947-2002 and highlights that how governments were dissolved prematurely.

Brain Cloughley's book *A History of Pakistan army: wars and Insurrections* Pakistan military's history has been discussed in this book in a descriptive way which provides a very good account of the military. It is highlighted in this book that how weak political leadership and political culture paved the way for military interventions. How military by getting in power further strengthened their rule and position. The author explores in depth the wars waged by the Pakistan Army, the tactics that have been adopted in the process and the outcomes that have arisen. In particular, he addresses the wars of 1965 and 1971, discussing the conditions that led to them, their outcome that lasted in the aftermath.

Saeed Shafqat in *Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Shafqat, 2019). In this work, the author highlights the transition from a dictatorial or military government to a democratic discipline. It focuses on elements of change and various variables such as political leadership, elite's classes, groups and political opposition that determine future politics in Pakistan. Adopting a comparative ideological approach, he conducts a comprehensive investigation of civil-military relations in Pakistan. Beginning with the history of military supremacy in this unstable South Asian country and then examining the breakdown of military control, Pakistan assesses the rise of the PPP and the changing order of party-military relations.

Crossed Swords by Shuja Nawaz is a thoughtful, multi-layered historical analysis of the nature and role of the Pakistan army in the politics of the state as well as its tempestuous relations with the United States. Nawaz examines the army and Pakistan in both peace and war. Using many unpublished materials from the archives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army, as well as interviews with key military and political figures in Pakistan and the United States, he sheds light not only on the Pakistan Army and its US connections but also on Pakistan as a key Muslim country in one of the world's toughest neighborhoods. This innovative work offers exceptional intuitions into Pakistan's most important and powerful institution

Military intervention in politics: A case study of Pakistan in this book the author Veena Kukreja gives a distant observer view of Pakistan's political discourse and its impact on state behaviour. This book broadly discusses the political processes in contemporary Pakistan with the aim of understanding the crisis the country is facing. The author gives an insight into Pakistan's distressing political history – one that characterizes the long-standing struggle between totalitarianism and Constitutionalism, and the everlasting ideological conflict between regionalism and elite pluralism. The author points out that the army has been the adjudicator of Pakistan's destiny since its existence. The army, she asserts, characterises its hegemony of Pakistani politics not only as a right, but as a duty. As a result, security forces has taken precedence over the need to establish participatory political processes and institutions. It seems that the writer is biased in writing about the Pakistan Army. She criticised the army more than to find out why the army had meddled in politics time and time again. While examining the military intervention in politics the writer has not discussed the factors that why democracy could not

flourished in Pakistan. Because since 1973 to 1977 there was a strong democratic government of Mr.Z.A. Bhutto.

Contemporary Pakistan: Political processes, conflicts and crises(Kukreja, 2003) an Indian author gives a distant observer view on political discourse of Pakistan and its impact on the behavior of the state. This book discusses the political processes in contemporary Pakistan in a comprehensive manner with the means of understanding the crises which nation is facing. The author gives bits of knowledge into Pakistan's shocking political history - one that embodies a long drawn conflict among dictatorship and Constitutionalism and a continuing ideological conflict among regionalism and elite pluralism. The writer narrates that the military has been the mediator of Pakistan's fate. The military, she respects its strength of Pakistani governmental issues not as a privilege but as a duty. As a result, state security has taken precedence over the need to create participatory political processes and institutions. It appears that essayist is one-sided while expounding on Pakistan armed force. She has condemned the military more than to discover the reasons because of which armed force interceded in governmental issues again and again.

Sreedhar, Nilesh Bhagat in his work, "Pakistan: Benazir's Dismissal to Election", in which an attempt has been made to examine various developments during the 90 days of between Benazir Bhutto's government dismissal and the election. Author gives his own interpretation of various political reforms made by caretaker government. He gives detailed discussion on council for defense and national security, and amended representation of the people's act 1975 clause of deformation. Besides this he gives short clips of the PML-N, the PPP and the PTI manifestoes. At the end author analyses election results.

Tariq Amin Khan's book *Genealogy of the post-colonial state in India and Pakistan* (Amin-Khan, 2012). The author emphasizes on the nation building in post-colonial societies. It unfavorably explores the political and economic arrangements of India and Pakistan, which share a common colonial heritage, but has taken different paths and needs to be viewed as "diametrical opposite ". This research examines why and how India emerged as a developing capitalist state, while Pakistan needed to be viewed as a "proto-capitalist" and client-oriented state. Economic growth has never been allowed without various obstacles.

Omar Noman's *Pakistan: Political Economy of Pakistan 1947-1985* it's a very interesting study of Pakistan's political culture. It says that the nature of the leadership of both civilian and military rulers was random and dictatorial. It discusses the reason that why Pakistan could not develop strong democratic institutions. This book has three parts, in the first part has two chapters, first chapter includes an explanation for the failure in Pakistan to develop the kind of democratic structure established in India. Second chapter deals with Ayyub Khan Era. Second part deals with the Bhutto era and explains the failure of PPP to retain power in spite of favorable circumstances. Third part is covering the Zia and Benazir Bhutto's government. It highlights that how Zia controlled the system and how Benazir made a struggle to get in power and why Benazir could not complete its term in office.

Aqil Shah's *The Army and Democracy* traces a comprehensive study of the ongoing military interferences in Pakistan since creation of the state. The main assumption of the study is military's beliefs and norms, a legacy of its influential practice under conditions of geopolitical insecurity and nation-building problems, have greatly formed its political interferences by mitigating the dictatorial enlargement of its role in the state and society. It inspects that how the seeds of

military defiance were sown at the start of the state and how they blemished Pakistan's succeeding political culture through random action. The optimistic feature of the study is that it sets out a programme to avoid extra-Constitutional military interferences from Pakistan's political nomenclature.

Hassan Askari's *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997*, this book throws light on the factors due to which establishment take part in the politics of the state. The prominent feature of this book is statistics about the tenures of Prime Minister, president, governor, chief Ministers, and chief of armed force etc. from 1947-1997. The period mentioned in the title of the book needs to be reviewed as the book provides satisfactory information on the period 1947-1985, while the later years (1986-1997) are curiously discussed. At several places wrong dates are mentioned. The number and explanation of Constitutional articles are incorrect. However, the book is a valuable source of knowledge on martial laws (1958-1969, 1969-1971 and 1977-1988 and their impact on politics and society.

Muhammad Waseem wrote a comprehensive book on the elections of 1993(Waseem, 1994) as the title of the book is *The 1993 Elections in Pakistan*. This work provides a historical and structural perspective on the phenomena of electoral process in Pakistan. It has also provided a statistical analysis of the results of the election for the national and provincial assemblies in 1993. It proved helpful for the understanding of electoral politics in Pakistan which is the essential fragment of democracy. In this work the author provides the detail about the problems and remedies of election till the era of 1993.

Muhammad Waseem's book *politics and the state in Pakistan 1989*(Waseem, 1994). This book is about the authority structure of the state and the argument developed here is that the structural dynamics of the state are primarily responsible

for shipping the political events throughout the post-independence period. There are definite political trends in the politics of Pakistan which can be explained only with reference to the goals of the core institutions of the state, the military and bureaucracy. This book covers four decades of country's history. Much focus is on the structural evolution of the state in Pakistan. The subject is examined from two prospective: First, the state's development from colonial times as structural relationship between economic power and public authority; second, the state as a focus of power struggle between various group and classes.

Khalid Mehmood Arif's working with Zia: Pakistan's power politics 1977-88(Arif, 1995) is a detailed account on the fall of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and elevation of Zia ul Haq to the power echelons K.M. Arif served as Vice-Chief of Army staff under Zia for seven years and gives an interpretation to the events that occurred during Zia's role. The book addresses the internal politics of Zia and his foreign policy in terms Afghan Jihad, also gives a detailed account on the dismissal of Junejo's government and its impact on the domestic politics.

1.2 Significance of the Study

The period of 1988-1999 of Pakistan's political history is very rich in content. There were deep political events and developments in this era which will explore various elements of parliamentary democracy as yet unanswered questions, why democracy has not been stable in this period. This research tries to reply questions in the light of political experience of Pakistan and political history is described from a historian's eye. It forms a model for understanding the power struggle between elected and non-elected entities.

A great deal of researches have been done on the failure of democracy but democratic experience of this era is not discussed in detail. The present study is an

endeavor to bridge this gap. In this democratic era the role of establishment in destabilization the democracy is a proven fact. This research moves a step forward to highlight the impact of that role. In the selected era of research, Pakistan witnessed four elected governments in eleven years. Most important point is this that after the dismissal of elected government, system was controlled by caretaker governments. In this period establishments or nonelected elements were not directly running the system. So, the researcher has gauged those steepchases with reference to the role establishment and power voracious politicians which proved destructive for the development of democracy in the era of 1988-1999.

1.3 Hypothesis

In a parliamentary form of system allocation of authority means a sense of duty but here, in Pakistan, the given authority was misused time and again. In the presence of weak political leadership made establishment more effective in the arena of politics. The establishment had ruled the state completely since 1958 to 1971 and then from 1977 to 1988. The establishment took a blurry view of restoration of democracy in 1988 which implied limiting its direct participation in activities of government. Instead of all this practice established remain a hub of political activities. Even the political institutions and politicians were compelled to become a part of their game plans.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objectives of this research are as follow;

1. To understand working of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan.
2. To discuss the party politics, the working of parliament and civil military relations during the years 1988-1999.

3. To understand issue of legitimacy during 1988-1999 in Pakistan under parliamentary democracy.

1.5 Research Questions

1. How the political parties adverse the politics of Pakistan and what policies they adopted to acquire power?
2. How mutual controversies related to power emerged among political personalities and institutions and what were their outcomes?
3. How civilian governments were being deprived from their legitimacy during the years 1988-1999?
4. How judiciary has played its role during 1988-1999 about dissolution of National Assemblies?
5. How the involvement of establishment affected the political system and what were the causes of their involvement?

1.6 Research Methodology

The research methodology used for the research is qualitative research work with case study approach in particular. Our research was a case study of the parliamentary democratic period of Pakistan 1988-1999. The political activities, decisions, actions and reactions of political elite of Pakistan have been studied. A case study method helped to answer the why and how questions (Johnson & Reynolds, 2012). It was a qualitative case study employing content-based historical research and document analysis. The focus of qualitative research was to understand a social setting by helping to observe the themes and general behaviors in detail with the interpretations of related data. The objective description of research events in which the researcher gradually became aware of a social phenomenon through

comparison, replication, collating and classification of the subject was adopted. It has therefore helped scientifically to find the trends and patterns of governments.

Written content, such as books, journals, newspapers, magazines, interviews and autobiographies of the important personalities of the related time period were consulted, as well as the Archival Documents, government papers, and records. Newspapers were the last source to examine the missing data and were used frequently. Newspapers in studies of information, speeches, statues and judicial decisions are important source (Johnson & Reynolds, 2012, 303).

Political scientists turned to the written record when the political phenomena that interested them could not be measured through individual interviews, through questionnaires or direct observation (Johnson & Reynolds, 2012,P 278). As individuals who were politically active were dead or out of the country like Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Ahmed Leghari, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif therefore, direct information could not be obtained.

1.7 Delimitation/ Limitation of the Study

The researcher do not have the access to (Late) Benazir Bhutto, (late) Ghulam Ishaq Khan, (late) Farooq Ahmed Laghari etc and other related significant individuals. Because some of them are dead and others are out of country. Therefor to study their role the researcher had to study secondary sources such as books, articles etc. The research is confined to the parliamentary democratic experience of Pakistan from 1988-1999.

1.8 Organization of the study

This research is divided in six chapters including introduction and conclusion.

1: Introduction

Introduction consists on a concrete sketch of the whole study plan has been described in a systematic way in order to perceive the pros and cons of the study.

2: Democracy in Pakistan from 1947-1988.

This chapter provides a historical overview of those challenges which democracy had to face from 1947-1988 till the death of Zia-ul-Haq. In this chapter problems of different civil and military rulers have been critically discussed which proved harmful for the decade of democracy 1988-1999.

3: Government under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (First Tenure)

In this chapter first tenure of Benazir's government 1988-1990 and Nawaz Sharif's government 1990-1993 had been discussed critically. Their style of government, policies and attitude of government towards opposition has been discussed in a descriptive way.

4: Challenges to Democratic Leadership of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif (Second Tenure)

The forth chapter attempts to analyze critically the role of leadership in the person of Benazir Bhutto and of Nawaz Sharif in their respective term in office as the head of the government and the head of the opposition as well as Ghulam Ishaq Khan (late), Farooq Laghari (Late) and of Pervez Musharraf who had rivalled for power. Consequently, democracy was suffered and governments as well as assemblies were dissolved before their allocated period in the Constitution.

5: Role of Institutional Confrontation and Political Instability

In this chapter causes of political instability have been described that why not a single government could complete its five years term. Such as 8th amendment, role of president, military's role and political of confrontation had been discussed.

6: Conclusion

Last chapter is conclusion in which the whole study is summed up with findings and recommendations.

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CHAPTER 2

DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN FROM 1947-1988.

This chapter provides a historical overview of those challenges which democracy had to face from 1947-1988 till the death of Zia-ul-Haq. In this chapter, problems of different civil and military rulers have been critically discussed which proved harmful for the decade of democracy 1988-1999. Pakistan, like many other third world nations, came into being as a subtle nation state. There was a wide ideological and racial difference between its two wings; East and West and it was very difficult to administer its governance. Pakistan's struggle, headed by Quaid-e-Azam, was also managed single-handedly by him, backed by his commitment, hard work, sense of mission and confidence in democratic norms, and these were his leadership's key qualities. The first year of democracy, which lasted until his death on September 11, 1948, can be said to be a strong reliance on his charismatic leadership, reputation and command and supreme recognition, leaving behind a leadership crisis. Since the creation of Pakistan, democracy has botched to establish its roots and a strong democratic culture could not be established in Pakistan.

It was claimed in the movement of Pakistan that Pakistan would be a democratic state. Pakistani leaders were also determined to establish a democratic system in the state but this could not become true. Pakistan had to face a number of problems which become a challenge for democracy but wish for democracy and democratic culture remained in mind and hearts of Pakistani people. Along with other institutional and behavioral challenges there were some other elements due to which true democratic norms could not be established like sectarianism, illiteracy, price rises and poverty which proved an obstacle in the way of democracy. Pakistan inherited these all bad indicators. Instead of these problems, Pakistani politicians and people

expressed their desire for democracy and had shown their love for democratic culture. Pakistan is one of those states where people dislike military dictatorship and interference of these non-democratic institutions in political matters(Mumtaz et al., 2002, p. 209). Instead of this desire for democracy after the establishment of Pakistan, hope of a solid democracy has not yet come true.

Table 2.1: Key Terms and their Dimension/Measurement

Concepts	Operationalization	Dimension/Measurement
Crises of Democracy	There were certain types of conflicts between the leadership that have been recurrent and became a reason of conflicts due to which an assimilated faction of leaders played their part in escalating the crisis. As a result, a strong democratic culture could not be established and during the period 1988-1999 democracy had to face problems.	Feuds with the relevant cases
Leadership	The role of leadership in persons of Liaqat Ali Khan, Nazimuddin, Ch.Muhammad Ali, Muhammad Ali Bogra, Hussain Shaeed Sohrwardy, I.I.Chundri Gar, Malik Feroz Khan Noon, Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto and Muhammad Khan Juneju as Prime Ministers from 1947-1988 and as well as the role of Governor General/president/CMLA Nazimuddine, Ghulam Muhammad, Iskandar Mirza, Muhammad Ayub Khan, Muhammad Yahya Khan, Z.A.Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq has been analysed.	Their role in political crises

Factors	A group of democratic and non-democratic, political and nonpolitical elites influenced the political structure due to which a strong and stable political system could not be established. Different practices were made such as parliamentary and presidential under constitutions 1947 (Independence act), 1956, 1962 and 1973. As a result, political system of the state suffered during the period 1947-1988.	Role in the crunches

Source: Researcher's own constructed

2.1 Conceptual Framework

To understand challenges which democracy had to face during 1947-1988 it is important to understand the notion of democracy. As form of government, democracy as a concept can be traced back to Greek Philosophers. Word democracy is the combination of two Greek words demos (people) and Kratos (rule) mean rule of the people (Miller & Bogdanor, 1992 p,187). Hence in modern times democracy does not mean that people's rule but they choose their rulers or control rulers i. e. not direct democracy but representative democracy (Arat & Crone, 1994). Different thinkers had defined differently to democracy. Diamond defined democracy as system of government that meets three essential conditions; meaningful, extensive, fair and unrestricted competitions among political parties for all effective positions of government power at regular intervals; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies through regular and fair elections; and a level of civil and political liberties-freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations (Diamond, 1995).

Huntington has defined it as “most powerful decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidate freely compete for votes and virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote(Huntington, 1993 p,07)”. Lipset defines democracy as “... as a political system which supplies regular Constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political offices(Symon Martin Lipset, 1960 p,27)”. So it means that democracy is a system of government where people have the right to choose their representatives who will protect their fundamental rights. People will cast their vote without any pressure and with free will and the politicians will compete without any pressure as well. After the elections there would be rule of law. It means democracy is a system of government that is enriched with the qualities of freedom and egalitarianism for all.

Although the idea of democracy was coined by the Greek Philosophers in the Greek city states but today it has become very popular among the nations of modern world. After 2nd world war democracy started to replace the dictatorship in many countries like Japan and Italy. The second half of the century experienced wide spread decolonization following struggles for self-rule and independence. In the Beginning of 1960s, more than 120 episodes of democratization took place in about 90 countries. The conditions were same under which democracy was introduced in Europe and Asia(K. K. Aziz, 2007, p. 249).

In Pakistani politics, theory of Roland Pennock rightly stated that the world of theory and the world of practice have always been roaming in dissimilar orbits(Pennock, 2015 p,xvii). This assumption proves correct in Pakistani politics as at the time of elections, politicians talked about democracy in their election

campaigns but when they come into power they act like despots rather than democrats. As K.K.Aziz has said the “Democracy could not exist without a democratic culture(K. K. Aziz, 2001, p. 6).” In democracy Empowerment of the people is the important object. People have the right to choose their representatives and on the other hand it is obligatory for those representatives to protect the interest of those who had elected them. So it is a system of give and take in a sense that people give vote and elect a person in reply that elected person protects their right under the law. The representative/elected person must look after the needs of their electorates(Grigsby, 2012, p. 165). In democracy government is answerable to the people and public can criticize the policies made by the government(Parenti, 2010, p. 1). In democracy laws are made for the protection of the people not to snub their rights.

The Prime purpose of democracy is to overcome tyranny, or rule of an individual or small group, by giving significant political power to the people. It averts the centralization of power in one hand or a group of few and discourage the thread of the rise of despotism or other form of totalitarian rules. There are some conditions due which democracy can flourish such as democratic norms, tolerance, respect of law and mutual harmony on the part of public as well as political institutions. But as democracy cannot flourish in a society having malady, self-centeredness, dissection and incompetent government(Mill, 1974). Faith in democratic rule is its pre-requisites of democracy. Democracy assist peoples to acclimatize vary values and beliefs. It improves the involvement of peoples in policy making, gives combined way in public actions and builds institutional apparatus(Braibanti & Cornelius, 1999, pp. 90–95) Democracy allows the people to express their frustrations or problems and can demand from government representatives to address their problems. If any state

tries to quash the voice of the people or deprive them from any kind of freedom such as freedom of thought, speech and expression then here democracy loses its genuine spirit. It can be defined that “democracy is a system of government in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege(Pennock, 2015, p. 3).”

Keeping in view the definition of U.S. President Abraham Lincoln that democracy of the people, by the people for the people then democracy becomes more important for the third world countries as it is wished-for to promote human standards and happiness through such features as good governance, justice, security, tolerance, equality of man and opportunities, human rights, freedom of ideas, press and speech. “Democratic governments are those where the people and the government are connected through the process of elections as these elections are only possible way through which people can freely express their opinions(Grigsby, 2012, p. 166)”. So it can be demarcated that “democracy is a system of government in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege(Pennock, 2015, p. 3)”. So there is no idea of inborn policy in democracy as in the monarchy. The highest value of democracy is individual’s independence and this value is considered to come from all individuals, without rating, power and class, each must be considered equally.

People can elect their representatives through their right of participation which democracy ensures. The procedure of participation become promising when free and fair elections are held and the electorates are free to cast their vote with their own will and there is no restriction on them about their election’s campaign. In a democratic society, people have full rights to use their voting power, and countries in which the electorate enjoys this right are fully democratic in their political structure. In contrast,

low turnout voters are expected to have false or corrupt elections in which certain parties have undue leverage or a dominant faction controls the whole electoral scenario it indicate low levels of democracy from standpoint of participation (Grigsby, 2012, p. 166). Democracy guarantees that any individual, political party or association in a democratic society has complete freedom to contest for recognition and public interest through use of equal means. When any views and organisations are seeking to suppress, the degree of democracy is going down. The Constitution is an essential aspect of a democratic country, which is generated by general majority of the people and also depicts their mutual interests and prospects for future. A Constitution that fails to meet the wishes of the people can hardly serve as the basis of a democratic system(S. Mahmood, 2000, p. 349).

The law of the people can be established by the voting process, adult citizens can vote on the principle of "one person, one vote" without prejudice, such that certain rational reasons, such as mentally ill people, cannot be allowed to vote(Pennock, 2015, p. 7). Any party or coalition that has the vote of the electorate to form a new government until the upcoming election. Acceptance is the centre of democratic system, and therefore it is important that the losing side values the election results and needs to play a constructive role in forming the government of the successful party. Opposition should play a proactive role in the establishment of a true state of democracy by constructive criticism (Rizvi, 2013, p. 62). Some of the essential criteria for the establishment of democracy in its true form as described above.

Pakistan is based on democratic ideals, expressing common will of people for an independent homeland but its history is full of intermittent and sustained military rule and authoritarian regime. Although Constitutional laws have been susceptible to

non-democratic interference, foundation of Pakistan is embedded in democratic principles as it reflects the collective will of the people for a separate homeland. Its history is replete with periodic and prolonged military rules and autocratic governments. Even democratic rules were subjected to non-democratic interventions. There are several aspects that can be related to this case. Pakistan lacked parliamentary expertise to start a successful democratic process(Mumtaz et al., 2002, p. 212). Initially, there was no optimistic progress in politics, as political development relies on non-existent, weak, and dysfunctional political structures and practices.

Efficient leadership aims to build an effective structure of government in line with the state's prerequisites(Nayak, 1984, p. 166). In a multi-party political system, two or more parties take part in elections and after the elections the winning party formed the government and the defeated party then takes its part in the political system of the country in the capacity of an opposition. Opposition must also play a proactive role in the establishment of a true state of democracy by valuable suggestions or criticism (Rizvi, 2013, p. 62). The constructive growth of democracy is not an easy task; it needs patience, time and most importantly, a harmony among powerful groups, political leadership, the elite in a society, and most importantly the consensus of the people. But in Pakistan the role of politicians had remained not up to the mark due to the repeated interferences of non-democratic characters, mutual confrontations of politicians and lack of cooperation and harmony. After a short summary of the philosophy, aspects and requirements of democracy, it is now easy to grasp the problems that democracy has had to confront in Pakistan.

2.2 Historical Background of Political History of Pakistan (1947-1988)

The secession of British India gave rise to two sovereign countries, India and Pakistan, in August 1947. The new state of Pakistan was established by the provinces and regions with Muslim majorities in the western and eastern parts of India. The goal of Pakistan's founders was to create a democratic Muslim country, but it has become exceedingly hard to establish and stabilize state institutions. Pakistan saw a dramatic deterioration of aspirations to make the new country's democracy in first decade of independence. In Pakistan, a parliamentary form of government was adopted as it was visualized in Indian Independence Act of 1947(H. Malik, 2001, p. 127). The Independence Act of 1947 allowed the Constituent Assemblies and the Legislators to wield the full powers of the Federal Legislature, alongside the authority to frame the new Constitution. But since independence of Pakistan, democratic institutions could not be effectively implemented till 1988.

Democracy could not established its strong roots and why a democratic culture could not be established in Pakistan as some experts viewed it as a failed experience of democracy. It is pertinent to know the historical background of politics of Pakistan because in that era, people of Pakistan were totally disappointed with democracy because it gave hopes of democratic government but did not meet that hope. However, only the governments could not be given the whole liability for the failure of democracy. It is pertinent to know about the faults of earlier military and civil governments which ceased the route of democracy just to secure their own interests. They set the tradition that country is not important, but the major thing is self-interest and that type of "mind-set" has also influenced the mechanism of process of democracy beyond that particular era.

The circumstances under which Pakistan emerged were not well suited for the development of democracy, although there was a willingness on the part of Pakistani leaders to establish democracy. The challenges faced by the new state were huge. They included the inheritance of limited military and financial capital, the settling of migrants, establishment of a central government from birth, the outbreak of warfare with India shortly just after partition on the Kashmir issue, etc. The state had to see the unfortunate death of its founders, Jinnah, as early as 1948, and then the first Prime Minister in 1951. Pakistan became independent by democratic means, as the revolution of Pakistan was a mass revolution, comprising civic participation. The campaign made people conscious of the influence of mass organisation. “For the first time the common man became a participant by playing a part in a struggle in which he felt his own future was involved (Yusuf, 1999, p. 19)”.

Indian independence Act of 1947 was for a short period and it could be replaced with a new Constitution which would be framed by the new constituent assembly (H. Malik, 2001, p. 127). In the Provisional arrangement which were provided under the Act (Ahmad, 1971, p. 27) The Governor-General had significant authority, such as recruitment of senior government officials (political, judicial and military), the dissolution of the Federal Government, and enforcement of emergency powers in the country. As being the head of the state, Governor General had to deal lot of matters so for its assistance a council of Minister was formed to advise the governor general (Choudhury, 1963, pp. 33–34).

The issue of the effective introduction of democracy arose when, after independence, Muslim League, a nationalist party, could not effectively turn it into a progressive political party because a sense of hostility and struggle for power began amongst politicians. One of the significant reasons for this was that the bulk of the

members of the party came from Indian Territory (Waseem, 1994, p. 31). After partition, those areas did not become a part of Pakistan. So those politicians did not have a strong base in the areas which came under Pakistan after independence, so their influence in these areas was low. The Constituent Assembly was created, which also included those representatives who were voted from constituencies that did not become part of Pakistan after partition. Elections were also necessary for the transition of authority to the elected officials of the country. Consequently, those leaders who came from Indian Territory, since elections may have proven suicide for their rule and they had no means to win the elections, they were not in favour of holding elections after independence. Therefore, elections were required to shift authority to the country's elected politicians (Palmer, 1975, p. 11). However, no general elections were held in the first decade, which proved to be one of the early hurdles to democratic development. Therefore, democracy did not flourish and for these reasons, the most significant aspect of democracy was refuted (Waseem, 1994, p. 32).

2.3 Earliest Manipulation with Democracy (1947-1958)

The educated middle class, which is true basis of democracy, didn't even exist in Muslim League. It was governed by politicians who were simply landowners and with little political ability, who worked only to protect their rights, or who had little regard for the development of Pakistan. While the nation achieved independence, a genuine democratic culture could not be developed since most politicians had no schooling and little relevant work experience, they held vital positions in government. The oppressive feudal culture that influenced the political life of the western wing proved to be a major obstacle to the growth of democratic system because they knew if it once established there then people would get awareness about their rights and it

would prove to be a danger for their hegemony. How could the renters afford this? Though politicians played a pivotal role throughout the Struggle of Pakistan, the administration was run by civil bureaucracies and that in the initial era often played an important role in political affairs. Many of the Ministers were inexperienced among provincial ministers since they had been elected for the first time. The three provinces' governors were British and retired civil servants: East Pakistan (East Bengal), Western Punjab and NWFP. Governors and bureaucrats had significant powers over ministers in provinces. As Governor General and Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah handled all relevant issues in the Centre (Lawrence, 1980, pp. 72–73). But Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-e-Azam) the first governor General of Pakistan never used those powers to counter democratic traditions. He assured the people that democracy had no danger from his office (Ahmad, 1993, p. 73).

When Pakistan was established at that time the political leadership was weak and inexperienced. Most of them 13 out of 23 members of central working Committee, came from those areas which did not become part of Pakistan (Waseem, 1994, p. 31). In the presence of weak politicians/leadership, civil-military bureaucracy was strong and organized. Politicians, due to lack of administrative experience, remained dependent on bureaucracy to run functions of the state. After the death of Quaid-Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan, there was a vacuum of leadership. In the presence of strong bureaucracy, the existing leadership was vulnerable. Muslim League lost its popularity soon after independence because the party had no inspiring program for the welfare of the state.

Due to lack of political norms, any criticism on the policies of government which was led by Muslim League was assumed to be criticism on Pakistan and even

Liaquat Ali Khan promoted this tendency. As Hassan Askari has stated that Liaquat Ali Khan was against the existence of any party except Muslim League. He said that Liaquat Ali Khan promoted this tendency in these words “the formation of new political parties in opposition to the Muslim League is against the best interests of Pakistan. If the Muslim League is not made strong and powerful and the mushroom growth of parties is not checked immediately, I assure you that Pakistan which was achieved after great sacrifices, will not survive”(H. A. Rizvi, 2013, p. 63). He further said that “if you destroy Muslim League you destroy Pakistan(Callard, 1957b, p. 38)”.The real crises Began when Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan died on 11 September 1948 and 16th October 1951 respectively and no visionary leader was there to fulfil the vacuum. After Quai-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan, although there were many politicians, neither of them could make up for their shortcomings. With their passing, vision of representative democracy was collapsed. Nazimudine became Prime Minister and Ghulam Muhammad who was serving as Minister in Liaquat’s cabinet as finance minister assumed the office of governor general(Ahmad, 1970, p. 27).It didn't take too long for the civil bureaucracy to turn the governor general's office into a tool of bureaucratic intervention. The inability of Liaquat Ali Khan to create an effective Constitution turned out to be a setbacks to political stability.

On the other hand, Pakistan Muslim League (PML) the founding party of Pakistan could not run the functions of the state effectively and lost its popularity. Bureaucracy was a trained and structured institution made up of Indian civil servants, policemen and accountants. So when prestige and power of PML reduced, bureaucracy emerged as a major institution. Later, it also obtained encouragement from military bureaucracy. Ghulam Muhammad, a retired bureaucrat, rose to power with the help and approval of (General) Ayub Khan(Abdul Malik, p. 499). As a result,

factionalism began within the party, and new political groups formed to protect the interests of the politician. In the words of Hassan Askari “this was not the result of ideological conflicts but was caused by personality clashes, jealous and the desire to gain power” (Rizvi, 2013, p. 63). So the action of politicians affected the democratic process in the state badly.

The political role of bureaucracy became possible due to flaws in political leadership. It is reported that nomination of Ghulam Muhammad was due to the plot drawn by Ghulam Muhammad, Khawaja Shahabudin, Gurmani and the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Ayub Khan (Bashir, 2015, p. 51). Ghulam Muhammad's qualification was this that he was ex. civil servant. When he became Governor General, civil-military bureaucracy got more strength. He also made Ayub Khan Member of the cabinet in 1954 as a defence minister. Ayub Khan revealed that Ghulam Mohammad had repeatedly asked him to take over the country.

In the game of power politics, process of Constitution making was lost. A game of power politics started soon after the creation of Pakistan between politician and institutions which delayed the Constitution making process for almost nine years. This was the need of the time that after the creation of Pakistan, Constitution should be made as soon as possible but it did not happen. Constitution which was a basic need to run the system of the state but the Constituent Assembly was unable to frame the Constitution in time. To run the functions of the state, Pakistan adopted the government of India Act 1935 with some amendments as an interim Constitution. But, how a country could be run democratically where its Constitution was not formed for at least nine years. Objective resolution was the first step in Constitution making. The basic purpose of this Resolution was to define the aims and objectives of the Constitution and it was moved by Liaquat Ali Khan in 1949. But unfortunately, the

further work of Constitution making lost its worth and became complicated in the game of power among different powerful groups(Choudhury, 1959, p. 35).

Table 2.2: Governor Generals of Pakistan 1947-1956

Name	Period
Muhammad Ali Jinnah	15-08-1947 to 11-09-1948
Khawaja Nazimuddin	11-09-1948 to 17- 10-1951
Malik Ghulam Muhammad	17- 10- 1951 to 07- 08- 1955
Iskandar Mirza	07-08-1955 to 23-03-1956 (then president)

Source: Illhan Niaz, Article History p.01

The powers of the Governor General were in direct conflict with the administrative authority accumulated by civilian and military bureaucracy. In the presence of such a strong civil-military bureaucracy Nazimudine took the office as 2nd Prime Minister but his period was cut short by Ghulam Muhammad and he removed Nazimuddine on 17th of April 1953. Undemocratic attitude was seen that six out of 13 Ministers were ready to work in the new cabinets(Kiran, 2012, pp. 208–209). Politicians showed no resistance on non-democratic act of Governor General, and this fortified him to continue that type of dictatorial acts further. Bureaucracy became more strong and authority moves to the hands of bureaucracy as Ayesha Jalal says that “some seven years before the first military takeover, the political power had slipped off the rails....“Pakistan’s third Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad, was a hardened bureaucrat who has no appetite for democratic practices”(A. Jalal, 1995, p. 52).

The internal deficiency of the Muslim League has given power to the bureaucracy over the political arms of the state. The political parties could not fight/resist with civil-military bureaucracy, who were trained under the colonial bureaucratic traditions and they better knew how to handle state machinery. Ghulam Muhammad by using his power appointed Muhammad Ali Bogra who was an ambassador of Pakistan to USA was asked to come back to Pakistan and sit in the office of Prime Minister. All these moves of Ghulam Muhammad had the blessings of civil-military bureaucracy. So, after independence, the important positions went to bureaucracy. Bogra's cabinet was selected by Ghulam Muhammad. Out of total 10 Ministers 6 were those who were in the previous cabinet and only one member was from east wing (Javaid & Latif, 2017, p. 5).

Table 2.3: Muhammad Ali Bogra Formula

Units	Upper House	Lower House
East Pakistan	10	165
Balochistan, Bahawalpur and Karachi	10	17
Sindh and Khairpur	10	19
NWFP and Tribal Area	10	24
Punjab	10	75
Total	50	300

Source: Hamid Yousaf, Pakistan: A Study of Political Development 1947-1997

Major work of Bogra's period was announcement of his formula (also known as Bogra formula in the Constitutional history of Pakistan) which was presented in the constituent Assembly on 7th October 1953 about the allocation of seats on the basis of population while in Senate there was equal representative for all five units (Javaid & Latif, 2017, p. 5). Bogra's period was cut short by Ghulam Muhammad and on 24th of

October 1954 when he dissolved the Constituent Assembly. The speaker of the Constituent Assembly Maulvi Tameezuddine filed a petition against this order in Sindh Chief Court. The court gave its decision in favour of Maulvi Tameezuddin Khan and said that the act of Governor General was unconstitutional. In fact, the act of 1947 did not authorize governor general to dissolve the assembly(Waseem, 1994, p. 32). Ghulam Muhammad challenged this decision in federal court (Now Supreme Court) where a bench of Federal Court headed by Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Muhammad Munir turned down the decision of Sindh Chief Court and validated the order of governor general under the doctrine of “law of necessity”. This verdict of Justice Munir opened the ways for civil and military political adventurers in Pakistan and thus, country has been suffering since then(Hassan, 2011, p. 84). Ghulam Muhammad’s practice of making and breaking of governments had weakened the democratic process. As Aziz says that “The political history of Pakistan and the way the game of politics has been played so far have ensured a weakening of the democratic spirit and a corresponding strengthening of the dictatorial ghost(K. K. Aziz, 2001).” Justice Alvin Robert Cornelius was the only dissenting voice in the bench.

Second constituent assembly meet on 7th July 1955. At this time party position in assembly was changed. ML due to its weaknesses had lost confidence of the people. After the indirect election of East Pakistan it lost its majority in Constituent Assembly as well. United Front and Awami League emerged as another political force in the Assembly. During the process, Ghulam Muhammed was sent on two months leave and then he resigned. Major General (retd) Iskandar Mirza, another bureaucrat, became Governor-General on 07th August 1955. As no party in the Assembly had clear majority, so Governor-General was able to put his influence on

the members. Iskandar Mirza himself on 12th August 1955 nominated Chaudhry Muhammed Ali (another former bureaucrat) for Prime Minister ship(Sayeed, 1958). On 11 August Abdul Wahhab Khan, a United Front member was unanimously elected as the Speaker of the Constituent Assembly”(S. Ahmed, 2004, p. 144).

The second Constituent Assembly did two remarkable works: first, declaration of One Unit and; second, formation of Pakistan’s first Constitution. One unit scheme was implemented on 14th October 1955 and reasons were given to National Assembly for this Act that it would reduce the expenses, swearword of biases between provinces and it would give maximum autonomy to East and West Pakistan(Kelly, 2005). The formation of first Constitution of Pakistan was a remarkable work of Muhammad Ali’s government. The Constitution of 1956 was structured to respond to all problems posed by various challenges over the time span. This Constitution extracted a number of provisions from the interim Constitution of 1947. The Constitution was ratified on 23 March 1956. As far as the Quantum of Supremacy was concerned, the Constitution ratified thirty subjects at the centre and ninety-four subjects were granted to the federating units.

The National Monetary Council and the Finance Committee were both set up. The role of the Monetary Council was to advise the government on development of financial policies, and the task of the Finance Commission was to oversee the allocation of taxes and the sanctioning of loans(I. Khalid, 2020, p. 5). In this Constitution, the issue of national language was also resolved by declaring Urdu and Bengali as National language. After the promulgation of the Constitution, Iskandar Mirza was made first President of the Republic of Pakistan on purpose; his own insistence and bureaucracy’s interest to be close to power since elections for the National Assembly were near and it had no intention to abdicate power fully in favour

of the public representatives(Bashir, 2015, Pp. 34–35) whereas, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, became the Prime Minister(A. Jalal, 1995, p. 53).

In the 50s, the Center and the Provinces suffered from the ministry problem and Ministers did not remain in control for a substantial amount of time. The PML was the main party, controlling political arena from 1947 to 1954 but it had Baigun to lose ground. The causes for this were: political maneuvering amongst the leaders, absence of charismatic leadership, lack of a rational party programme and groups within the party(Syed, 1989, p. 22). Due to constant shifts in the Prime Minister's office during 1956-1958, political environment worsened.

Table 2.4: Prime Ministers of Pakistan from 1947-1958

Name	Period
Liaqat Ali Khan	15 August 1947- 16 October 1951
Khawaja nazimuddin	17Oct.1951- 17 April 1953
Muhammad Ali Bogra	17April 1953- 11 th August.1955
Chaudhry Muhammad Ali	12 th August 1955-12 th September 1956
Hussain Shaheed Soharwardy	12 th Sep.1956- 17 th October 1957
Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar	17 th Oct.1957- 16 th December 1957
Feroz Khan Noon	16 th Dec.1957- 07 th Oct.1958

Source: *Illhan Niaz's article History of Pakistan p,01*

Despite the fact that political process in Pakistan displayed willingness of politically elected individuals to continue with democratic institutionalism but interaction with powers of Governor General Office became a major challenge. Conflicts of interests and disputes between power sharing and democratic institutionalism became a major source of termination of PMs in less than ten years. Four men Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Suhrawardy, I.I.Chunddrigar and Firoz Khan,

from three separate groups, took over in three years' time as Prime Minister. The frequent change of Prime Minister and that too in a short time proved that how the elected person was not allowed to complete his term. Members of the legislative assembly did not care for the government, but wished to remain in power at all costs. They were still happy for some democratic or bureaucratic faction to change their allegiances (Jaffrelot, 2004a, p. 68).

Hussain Shaid Sohrwardy assumed the office in September 1956 after resignation of Muhammad Ali with the support of Republican Party (RP) and Awami League (AL). Soharwordy wanted to work independently according to the Constitution of Pakistan because in his opinion the president had no such powers which governor general had. Knowing his policy, president Mirza gave a signal to RP and it withdrew its support from Soharwordy on 10th of October 1957. On this move Prime Minister asked the president to call the assembly because he (soharwordy) wanted to know that either he had majority in assembly or not but president rejected his request/advise. Suhrawardhy himself stated: "He [the President] immediately wrote back a letter refusing to call a meeting of the National Parliament stating that he knew about the position of the parties and called on me to resign by 2 O'clock in the morning otherwise he would take action" (Sayeed, 1958, p. 136). President Mirza forced Soharwordy to resign on 11 October 1957.

After Soharwordy, Ibrahim Ismaeel Chundrigar known as I.I.Chundrigar became the Prime Minister on 17th of October 1957 but his tenure as PM could last till 11 December 1957 and he had to resign because he wanted to work freely but in presence of Mirza it was impossible. Moreover a successful move of no confidence was also made against him. So he was forced to resign. After Chundrigar, Malik Feroz Khan Noon of Republican Party became new PM on 16th of December 1957

and remained in office till the imposition of 1st martial law. Mr.Noon also wanted to work freely and wished to run the functions of the state and took the same stance as Sohrwardy did(Jaffrelot, 2004a, p. 68). Thus, to seize power, President Mirza repealed the Constitution and, on 7 October 1958, instituted martial law instead of holding elections. Mirza took this way to proceed because he had no hope of winning the elections, which were scheduled in the Baiginning of 1959(Memon, 2003, p. 12). It was clear that why Mirza has taken the initiative as later it was revealed by Ayube himself when he stated that he (Ayub) asked the president “Are you going to act or are you not going to act? It is your responsibility to bring about change and if you do not, which heaven forbid, we shall force a change”(The Pakistan Times, October 10, 1958).

Constitution of Pakistan which was made after 9 years could not last more than 2 years and President Iskandar Mirza abrogated it and imposed martial law in the state. The Martial Law episode of 1958 was a coherent subject of military strategy. Iskandar Mirza was an initial military functionary who worked to have army brought into politics. Professor Keith Callard defined the same as, “If representative government collapse, it will be because its legs are not strong enough to sustain its own body ... Pakistan, by its Constitution, is publicly committed to the operation of democratic institutions. It is too early to say whether these institutions are likely to mature”(Callard, 1957a, p. 329). Ayub Khan forced mirza to impose martial law because he considered that the country was in trouble due to its politicians. Pakistani military rather hated the politicians due to their ceaseless wrangling and democracy did not appeal to them either.

2.4 Center-Province Relation during 1947-1958

In a society like Pakistan with linguistic diversity and tied together only by religious links, Federalism is another framework for preservation of democratic order. A federal system vesting the provinces with a distinct legal identity for the first time was provided by Government of India Act 1935. This was maintained by Pakistan Act of 1947 and federation was established. It expanded the financial powers of the provinces (Choudhury, 1959, p. 23). For the purposes of preventing any significant threat to peace or tranquilly of economic life of Pakistan or any part thereof, the federal government could provide orders to the province concerning administration of a federal act on the concurrent list.

Under original act mentioned in section 93, the provincial Governor, acting at his capacity on behalf of the governor general, may declare an emergency in event of a collapse of the provincial Constitutional machinery but independent act omitted that section. In the provisional Constitution, Jinnah added section 92A, in which the Governor-General, not Governor, took initiative to suspend the Constitution. In order to comply with situation, the Governor General could revoke section of the Constitution in the province. The governor general wielded this power on many occasions, e.g. the termination of legislative machinery and the imposition of central jurisdiction in the Punjab, Sindh and East Bengal. In lieu of 92A, 1956 Constitution reinstated article 93. With the authority to appoint and remove Governors, Centre may even dominate provinces. The balance of authority in Representative Assembly may be altered by a mere majority.

While the Independence Act swept away the Governor General's immense discretionary authority at the same time, it recognised need to confer temporary special powers on Governor General to cope with various crises that followed the

division, including powers to make amendments to provisional Constitution and to change the powers of legislatures, courts and every other authority.

Regrettably, decision of Jinnah to maintain the office of Governor-General and its broad powers set the tone for a strong and oppressive executive, while Jinnah's motives may not have been this (A. Jalal, 1995, p. 36). The earliest instance of interference in the provinces was when Jinnah disbanded the ministry of Congress led by Khan Sahib on August 22, 1947. As Congress Ministry had refused to take an oath of loyalty to the new country, Jinnah took this measure. It was placed and Khan Abdul Qayum Khan (Qayum) was made as new CM. That wasn't an illegal act yet, despite its majority in the legislature, set a precedent for the removal of a provincial ministry. Instead, the Centre should have enforced the governor's rule in the province, or mandated new elections for the provincial assembly, or establish a new ministry that enjoyed the House confidence but did not do this (Maluka, 1995, pp. 151–152). Qayum later consolidated his role as majority leader in the provincial legislature. Early in 1948, even though he enjoyed the support of the Sindh assembly, Jinnah ordered the governor of Sindh to oust Chief Minister Khuro and this action was taken because of Khuro's mismanagement. In the following years, regimes were successively removed in Sindh under excuse of mismanagement but in fact because of local lawmakers' demonstrations started against the policies of the Centre regarding federal capital, refugees, and one unit (Maluka, 1995, p. 153). Moreover, Pir Ellahi Bukhsh had plotted to take over Muhammad Ayub Khuhro's ministry. Interestingly, Sindh had five Chief Ministers during first four years from 16th august 1947 – 29th December 1951.

Liaquat Ali Khan dissolved Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Khan Mamdoot government in Punjab in January 1949 because of the revolt started by Mumtaz

Daultana and his confidants subsequent to six months of partition and Constitutional machinery was suspended under section 92A in Punjab for the first time. Several Punjab Ministers fall prey to personalised politics of center's governing politicians. Sardar Abdul Rashid was placed by the Centre on April 23, 1953 as Chief Minister of NWFP. (Maluka, 1995, 152-153). Section 92-A was invoked by the Centre to remove the united Frontier Government in East Bengal (Maluka, 1995, pp. 152–153). The Fazal-ul-Haq ministry was created in East Pakistan as an outcome of provincial elections in 1954 but Centre had dissolved his ministry just after assuming power and Governor was appointed to run province's affairs. Until May 1956, the Provincial Assembly in East Pakistan did not hold a meeting and even provincial budget was approved by executive order of President. The Centre was unnecessarily involved in provincial affairs of both wings. Cabinets were ousted by Center, Chief Ministers were imposed, it was not a positive step for the development of democracy (Rizvi, 2000, p. 69).

Free and fair elections are the beauty of democratic system but not a single general elections were held in first decade in the result, democratic norms were not established. In order to improve democracy, equal and frequent elections are an essential factor. The provincial elections conducted in four provinces, except those held in East Pakistan, were not recognised as equal and fair. As Myrdal calls the polls in the province a farce (Myrdal, 1972, p. 319).

Mushtaq Ahmed writes about these elections in these words “Elections in the provinces were conducted as an act of desperation, more so as to return a government of the choosing of the middle, by using the administration's money to bring its own men to power and weeding out the critics, often Muslim Leaguers themselves (Ahmad, 1971a, p. 4).”

2.5 Ayub Khan's Era 1958-1969

The involvement of military in politics started in the mid of 1950s. The martial law of 1953 in Punjab gave military its first taste of power and contributed to approach that politicians had no capability to control political affairs of the country efficiently (Asghar Khan, 2005, p. 9). Military always had a desire to control on scene of politics so Ayub Khan was the first person who completed that 'desire'. He justified this action as follows:

“We have been getting reports from all over the country that people were feeling uneasy that if two men were at the helm of affairs, policy would not always be clear and might consist of compromises. Besides, Mirza was too much connected with the politicians and the country's past difficulties. He was as much responsible for political deterioration as anyone else” (Ahmad, 1970, p. 178).

The citizens of Pakistan took a breath of relief from their ratification to power at the time of martial law when they believed this would get rid of the turmoil and uncertainty that politics generated throughout the first eleven years (Gauhar, 1996, p. 484). As Rizvi writes that military take overs are mostly succeeded in new states as people of new states are unorganized and their links with political institutions are fragile and they never questioned about the legitimacy of the takeover” (H. A. Rizvi, 2013, p. 22). Even Fatima Jinnah (sister of Quaid-e-Azam) prayed for the success of Ayub Khan (Javaid & Latif, 2017, p. 7).

On October 24, 1958, Sikandar Mirza declared Ayub Khan as Prime Minister of Pakistan and he (Ayub) forced Mirza to resign on October 27, 1958 and took the

charge as Martial Law administrator. This was tipping point in Pakistan's history when authoritarian government of military-bureaucracy Began the game of control. Regional movements and ethnic problems were on the rise at that point, and Ayub Khan was perceived to be impartial or without political involvement with different political powers. Ayub Khan did not respect parliamentary democracy, and for the people of Pakistan, he did not want this type of system of government, and he wanted to have influence in a modern style which he did with the creation of the Basic Democrats, a programme was initiated for rural and social growth(Javaid & Latif, 2017, p. 6).

Ayub realised that a fresh start had to be made after having developed martial law and this dual leadership could not survive. Ayub also realised that it was impossible that Mirza would let him work openly and that he could also seek to split the army in the same way as he had divided politicians. Mirza presumably gave some reasons for such distrust, even after the implementation of martial law. Making a comment on the resignation of Mirza Ayub observed, "Certain things came to my knowledge-I would not like to say what"(The Pakistan Times, October 10, 1958). Long before imposition of martial law, Ayub was dealing in political matters since Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza. Even Iskandar Mirza included Ayub on key ministry in his cabinet as well as Commander in Chief (C-n-C). When Mirza imposed martial law with backing of Ayub then within three weeks Ayub forced Mirza to resign and he (Ayub) himself became president and Martial Law administrator.


A number of senior Central and Provincial Ministers and members were jailed on the allegations of sleaze shortly after implementation of martial law. President Ayub seemed to have been involved in effectively removing leverage and control that politicians enjoyed, in addition to wiping out corruption. The Public Offices

Disqualification Order (PODA) and Elective Body Disqualification Order (EBDO) were issued in the same year 1959 officials found guilty of corruption or unethical behaviour would be barred from public service for fifteen years(The Pakistan Observer (Dacca), March 26, 1959). All offences committed since August 15, 1947 can be questioned under this order. In fact EBDO was extension of PODA. In EBDO the expression “misconduct” engulfed; bribery, corruption, nepotism, favoritism, and willful mal-administration (Von Vorys, 2015, pp. 262–274). Later these politicians were called EBDOed and further disqualified after renewal of political activities so that they would not adhere with any political party. Democracy had to face awful loss due to this act as popular leaders like Suharwordy, Khan Qayyum Khan and Ayub Khoro were forbidden from taking part in politics. EBDO was used as a tool by the military, its main object was to defame politicians in the eyes of common masses. Press was brought under control of the government by National Press trust (NPT), Fundamental rights were suspended under Press and Publication Ordinances (PPO)(Ahmad, 1971, p. 43). Only positive and constructive criticism was allowed under these orders. These ordinances empowered government to shut down the presses that printed affronted literature and also to took over the journal and newspapers.

2.5.1 Constitution of 1962

To strengthen his power and position Ayub introduced a system of Basic democracy. Election of basic democrats were held in December 1959 to January 1960 and a total of 80000 democrats were elected. Then On 14th of February 1960 he held a referendum and to legitimize his position and to formulate new Constitution he elected himself with the help of these democrats. Ayub Khan was candidate for president and got 95.6% of the total vote(Maluka, 1995, p. 182). In this system of basic democracy, the democrats had direct link with bureaucracy and as Alvi Says it strengthened the hands of bureaucracy(Alvi, 1983, p. 85).

Diagram 2.1: The B.D System



To formulate a new Constitution, Ayub Khan made a committee which was responsible to Ayub Khan instead of an elected Constitutional assembly. Sadly, the 1956 Constitution was unable to achieve practical opportunity and country switched from vice-regal regime to condition of martial law. Under hand of one man without any kind of Constitutional mentality, powers also were concentrated. Ayub Khan was infect a military bureaucrat and except of working to improve his one man government, he had no reason to introduce a parliamentary democracy. As stated in Article 1, which officially narrates the name of the state, the Constitution he instituted referred to federal structure. The relationship between federal government and units of federation was clearly defined in the preamble. Again, this Constitution bent in the favour of a dominant Centre. For setting the quantum of the power, mainly two lists were given; central list with 49 items and Concurrent list. In this Constitution President had enough powers and nobody had any power to check the highhandedness of the office of the president. In the provinces governors were powerful on behalf of the president(I. Khalid, 2020, p. 5). This Constitution was promulgated in March 1962. A council of Minister was there to assist the President under the Constitution they can participate in discussion but they could not vote(S. Kaushik, 1963, p. 384). The Constitution of 1962 was of a unitary form in which all powers were in the hands of President and Center was more powerful than the provinces(A. Jalal, 1995, p. 56).

In rule and decision making, the government of Ayub Khan was coherently centralized. Ayub Khan placed blame for malfunctioning of the 1956 Constitution on legislators in particular and society in general. He argued that, to recognize political structure and its criteria, politicians and individuals were not competent and educated sufficiently. The military government took up the challenge of writing the Constitution intimately with the genius of the people.

Ayub Khan emphasized on the development of industries and himself took the charge of planning commission in the 2nd five year plan 1960-1965 and it aimed to improve national income. Business community was happy with Ayube Khan. Due to the progress, this era is also called an era of development or decade of development. Pakistan attained a significant progress in different fields of life. Pakistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National product (GNP) growth rate was prominently high and Pakistan became example amongst underdeveloped countries. He introduced several reforms in different sectors in order to move the people to modern age like green revolution, land reforms, industrialization policy, family planning etc. For the intention of economic growth, "trickle-down effect" programme was primarily designed to improve the affluent parts of rural and urban society. The basic goal of this strategy was to initiate the work of growth from top to bottom, i.e. from upper to lower classes but the fruit of development had not reached lower level and only few families enjoyed the progress. This was confirmed at the end of Ayub era that only two-thirds of industries and 87% of banking was in the hands of few families(Jaffrelot, 2004a, p. 70). Jalal wrote about this situation that these industrial families assessed 15,000 senior civil servants of 10,000 families, and 500 generals and civil military officials, formed the core of the regime's bases of support in the urban areas(A. Jalal, 1990, p. 306).

2.5.2 Elections in Pakistan

National and two provincial assembly's elections were scheduled on 28th of April and 13th May 1962 respectively. Although political parties were banned, yet politicians took part in these elections excitedly(Afzal, 2000, pp. 234–237). One thing was pertinent to mention that these were not traditional direct elections but basic democrats played a role of Electoral College. After the promulgation of Matrial law,

Ayub allowed some political parties to take part in politics but there were some restrictions on them as well(A. Jalal, 1995, p. 56). To counter Ayub Khan, Hussain Shaeed Soharwardy made National Democratic Front (NDF) with the support of 54 members of both units. In July 1964, NDF and other parties formed an alliance combined Opposition parties (COP) and demanded complete democracy in the state. In the National Assembly, elections under the basic democrats, Ayub's own party Conventional Muslim League (Conv ML) won 80% and after this COP boycotted the provincial elections of 13th May 1965.

2.5.3 Presidential Elections 1965

Under the Constitution of 1962, Presidential elections were held in January 1965. Ayub warned the public that if opposition's candidate won, then country would have to face political instability in the country as it was during 1950s. On the other hand COP nominated Miss Fatima Jinnah (sister of Quaid-e-Azam) as a candidate of President to compete Ayub Khan. Ayube Khan had the blessings of civil-military bureaucracy while the opposition parties had lack of trust on each other(Rizvi, 2013, p. 133). Ayub was the candidate of Convention League which was ruling party(Khalid, 1968, p. 165). Ayub Khan stated on the nomination of Fatima Jinnah that "she was the sister of Quaid-i-Azam and she was bound to attract considerable attention for sentimental reasons, if for nothing else. The opposition also knew that after she had served their purpose they could easily get rid of her(Khan, 1967, p. 233)."

First time in his entire rule, Ayub was being challenged by a strong voice in the form of Fatima Jinnah. Although, Ayub was still enjoying the support of civil-military bureaucracy but instead of this, Ayub was frightened to see the popularity of Fatima Jinnah. Election was held and with all his arrangement Ayub won by clear

majority. Ayub received 63.21% and Fatima Jinnah 36.36% votes respectively(M. A.Khan, 1967, p. 240). Although Fatima Jinnah lost the elections, but she gave a voice to the people to speak against Ayub. Peoples started to rose their voices against Ayub and his policies. A number of Ulema, students and laborer stood against Ayub Khan's policies. People were not protesting only in West Pakistan but in East Pakistan, the politicians were more severe against the economic disparities which further aggravated the situation in East Wing. The population of East Wing was 56% of total population of Pakistan while their share in the legislature was only 25% which was unfair by all means of democratic principles.

Opposition parties like Jamat-e-Islami (JI), Awami League (AL), Nifaz-e-Islam Party NIP), Council Muslim League (Con,ML)formed an alliance against Ayub regime titled Pakistan Democratic Front (PDF). PDF and laborers were protesting against Ayub's policies on the other hand, instead of negotiation government used force against the protests which were increasing day by day. Press was brought under control of the Ayub's government and journalists were not free to report the events freely. When agitation against Ayub was on its full swing and there was nobody to negotiate with the opposition because Ayub's party was a group of greedy politicians and his army officers were also annoyed with Ayub due to his weak Tashkent declaration. This declaration was made between Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadar Shastri after the war of 1965 which was fought between Pakistan and India. They blamed him and his government of defeat(Khan, 2007, p. 62). When Ayub saw that situation is going out of his control he transferred the powers to another General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan and he himself stepped down. In this way the era of Muhammad Ayub Khan started and ended with martial Law.

2.6 Era of Yahya Khan and Second Martial

When Ayub Khan realized that situation was not under his control, then he decided to leave the office and handed over the powers to another military General, Agha Muhammed Yahya Khan on 25th of March 1969(H. Malik, 2001, p. 131). This showed lack of trust of Ayub Khan on politicians. While doing so, Ayub Khan violated his own made Constitution because it was mentioned in the Constitution that president would hand over the powers to the Speaker of the Assembly but he violated this law. Ayub's decision badly affected the process of democracy. Yahya Khan after getting in power, abrogated the Constitution of 1962. The purpose of the abrogating of Constitution was to secure his position and gain legitimacy. Yahya Khan dissolved One Unit on March 30, 1969(Qayyum p. 64) and gave East Pakistan representation on the basis of population. Direct elections were ensured and he abrogated the laws which were used to crush and victimize the politicians and the nationalization of industries(Maluka, 1995, p. 208).

Yahya Khan announced new election on party bases on the basis of 'one man one vote'. With this announcement of new elections, the political parties started to express their views(Rashiduzzaman, 1970 p,585). Yahya Khan imposed one restriction on the political parties by saying that if the Assembly failed to make new Constitution within 120 days of its birth, then it would be dissolved and new elections would be held(Baxter, 1971, pp. 201–202). Yahya Khan announced Legal Framework Order (LFO) on 30th March 1970(Jalal, 1995, p. 61). It was very clearly stated in LFO that National Assembly would be under the control of President. opposition parties criticized LFO about the powers granted to president such as right of President to dissolve the assembly, unlimited powers of President which could not be challenged in any court of law and under the presence of LFO, the Assembly will

remain vulnerable(Rizvi, 2013, p. 189). The restriction of Constitution making within 120 days was opposed by opposition. The LFO took away the sovereign status of National Assembly, in fact Yahya had promulgated a Constitution in the form of LFO itself(Maluka, 1995, pp. 213–214). Pakistan saw a historic day of its history when on 7th December 1970 first general election were held which were free and fair(Rose, 1989, pp. 117–118).

Table 2.5: National Assembly Election Results 1970

Party	Seats
PPP	81
Awami League	160
CML	7
QML	9
JUP	7
JUI(Hazarvi)	7
JI	4
NAP(wali khan)	6
Conv.ML	2
PDP	1
IND	16

Source: Rizvi, Military in Politics in Pakistan 1947-97 p,91

These were the first direct elections which were held. Awami League of Shaikh Mujeeb won majority of seats by securing 160 and Pakistan Peoples Party of Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto secured 81 seats out of 300(Nohlen et al., 2001). The total seats of National Assembly were 162 and 138 in East and West Pakistan respectively. JI won 4 Convention Muslim League 02, ML (Qayum) 09, JUI 07, JUI (P) Council ML

09 and independents won 16 seats respectively. Elections of provincial assemblies were held on 17th December 1970.

According to the true spirit and norms of the democracy, power should be given to Awami League and it was the right of Shaikh Mujeeb to form the government. Due to the lack of democratic vision it could not happen. Tajuddin Ahmed, the General-Secretary of East Pakistan AL in a response to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, claimed that the AL had proficiency and ability to frame the Constitution and to establish government at the Centre since it had complete majority. Both Shaik Mujeeb and Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto were not ready to accept the other's mandate and consequently, Assembly could not meet. The first session was scheduled on 3rd March 1971 but soon it was postponed due to the disagreement. Experts says that Yahya wanted to get time for preparation of military operation in East Pakistan which was launched on 25th March 1971(Ahmed, 1980, p. 12). It shows that military and political leadership of West Pakistan were not happy with the victory of AL in the elections(Alvi, 1983, p. 88). Due to these disagreement, political leadership and public of East Pakistan started the demand of separation. This was the time of negotiation with East wing but due to autocratic mindset, the military establishment decided to find solution with the use of power and in the result a civil war broke out in East Pakistan. India supported Bengalese and opened a war with Pakistan in which Pakistan had to face a great humiliated defeat. On 16th of December 1971 East Pakistan left west wing and formed a new state Bangladesh and this all happened due to the undemocratic practices which were being in practice since the independence of Pakistan.

2.7 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in Government (1971-1977)

After separation of East Pakistan when army was under extreme pressure, public was criticizing the army, powers were transferred to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Head of Pakistan Peoples Party who won the elections of 1970 in Western Wing and Yahya Khan stepped down. Bhutto stepped into power on 20th December 1971 as a civilian martial law administrator. As Maluka in the Mayth of Constitutionalism said that at that time army had lost its prestige among people. After assuming the office Bhutto had to work hard. He met with politicians of National Awami Party (Wali Khan) Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (H) to discuss interim Constitution (Hasan, 2000, p. 86). Eventually, political parties reached to an agreement on 6th of March 1972 (Hilali, 2000, pp. 153–154). After promulgation of interim Constitution, Bhutto withdrew martial law on 21st April 1972 and the same, enforced by Yahya Khan, came to an end.

After the separation of East Pakistan the nation was disappointed and military was under severe criticism and demoralized. At that time Bhutto took the responsibility to lead the nation. While doing so Bhutto proved himself energetic, visionary, bold and pragmatic. Due to his these qualities Bhutto got reputation from several illogicalities of the ‘decade of development’ like war 1965 and Tashkent Declaration. Bhutto emerged as a force against those who were ruling the state directly or indirectly since the creation of Pakistan. He gave a unique slogan of “Roti, Kapra or Makaan” (bread, cloth and house) and got the intention of the masses. Bhutto had seen closely the autocratic rule of Ayub and Yahya so their impact was on the mind of Bhutto as well. As CMLA he exercised unlimited powers and he further enhanced his powers after becoming president (S. Kaushik, 1963, p. 71). Although he

made some consultations with other parties while forming the interim Constitution but in fact this Constitution was a hand work of Bhutto.

After the promulgation of interim Constitution, martial law was lifted and PPP made its government in center, the Punjab and Sindh while NAP (W) and JUI (H) formed their alliance government in NWFP and Balochistan. After the formation of governments an accord was signed by all parties for a permanent Constitution. Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto was eager to enhance maximum powers and to have a hold on entire state. So keeping these intentions, the governments of NAP(W) and JUI(H) were not acceptable for Bhutto and he decided to overthrow them. Bhutto utilized all means to topple the governments of these provinces. To get the excuse, the center even gave air to ethnic conflicts in these two provinces(Amin, 1988, p. 127). In the state of confrontation, in May 1972 forty men were entered Balochistan, these men had a truck fitted with loud speaker. These loud speakers were used to spread anti NAP (W) sentiments in people which resulted in clashes(Bashir, 2015, P. 63). The central government received information in February 1973 that in Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, there were arms and it was assumed that these arms were being supplied to Balochistan to create disturbance in the province. The provincial government requested the federal government to send forces to meet the situation but federal government denied the request. Another incident took place when Shabuddine of Jandool, Wali Khan and information Minister were going on road they were forcefully stopped and fire was opened on them in which two men were killed and four were injured. These leaders accused Qayum Khan for this heinous offence(Kumar, 1978, pp. 163–164). On this pretext the central government postponed the by elections in two constitutiences Sawat and Pishawer and this action was taken without the consultation of governor and chief Minister of the

province.(Williams, 1975, p. 97). In this state of confrontation, Bhutto dismissed the NAP(W) and JUI(H) government in Balochistan on 12th February 1973 and installed Sardar Akbar Bughti as new Chief Minister(Wolpert, 1993, p. 211). The NAP and JUI protested against the dismissal of Provincial Government of Balochistan and the NWFP Government also resigned against this action of Federal Government(Jafri, 2002, p. 33).

When Bhutto dismissed Chief Minister Akhter Mengal's government in Balochistan, agitations were started in the province and to control agitations, central government decided to use force and deployed army there to normalize the situation instead of dialogues which is the beauty of democratic culture. The call for army exposed civil leadership that they have no vision to settle issues through dialogues and negotiations. It also showed that Mr. Bhutto started to rely on military to control the opposition's voice. When Bhutto got the favor of military in Balochistan, he started to portray that his government was not anti-military(Yusuf, 1999, p. 71). When the opposition parties like JUI, JUI(P), JI, NAP, Khaksar Tehrik, PML-Council, PML-Convention, Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) and Group of independent members of the National Assembly saw the increasing autocratic style of Bhutto they decided to face him unitedly and in this regard they formed an alliance called United Democratic Front(UDF) on 13th of March 1973 in Rawalpindi(Verinder Grover & Arora, 1995, pp. 231–232). These were the objectives of UDF;

- To lift state of emergency.
- To safeguard parliamentary and provincial Constitution.
- Protection of fundamental rights.
- To eradicate all the conspiracies against the ideology of Pakistan.
- To dig out the facts regarding Iraqi embassy's arms conspiracy.

- All the political prisons should be released.
- Army should return back from Balochistan.(Mazari, 1999, p. 293)

Although the interim Constitution was in function but there was a dire need for a permanent Constitution for the state. In this regard Bhutto met the opposition (UDF) to get their views about the new Constitution on different occasions. The opposition presented some changes in the bill of Constitution but Bhutto initially refused to accept those changes. One thing is pertinent to mention that Bhutto purposefully evaded meetings with Wali Khan and Pir of Pagaro. Finally in the third meeting held on 9th April 1973, Bhutto accepted proposals of opposition and a consensus was made on the Constitution making. As William said that the most important thing was this that instead of this that there was confrontation between opposition and Bhutto, yet there was no vote against this Constitution. In the opinion of Dr.Iram ‘this Constitution was the result of many compromises. Some salient features of the Constitution of 1973 was;

- A bicameral system of government was introduced which was a new thing for Pakistan.
- Under this Constitution the PM was strong.
- Contrary to the Constitution of 1962 in this Constitution the president was just a titular head.
- There were two list and a concurrent list.
- Human rights were protected including all those which were in the Constitution of 1956.

As Maluka said that religious rights were granted to all minorities. This Constitution reflected the consensus of all provinces and political parties. After the promulgation of the new Constitution Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed the office of

Prime Minister on 14th of August 1973 and Fazal Elahi Chaudhry was elected as President. In a parliamentary democratic system government has to realize the worth and importance of the opposition but PPP's government was not ready to give any importance to the opposition. PPP was not ready to ponder on the activities of opposition as legitimate while these activities were labelled as anti-state. Bhutto in his speeches assured the public that in his government everyone would be equal before law and there would be no discrimination and the government of the PPP would be government of the people. But after assuming the office he turned himself into an autocratic Prime Minister. Bhutto used all the means to press the opposition. He banned NAP (W) which was third largest party in 1971 elections. Bhutto banned this party only to force Wali Khan out of political arena. As Muhammad Waseem said that Bhutto established Federal Security Force (FSF) to wipe out the opponents. Jahan Dad Khan narrated that a Dalali camp was set in Azad Kashmir to fix the opposition through torture in case the reprimands of the government did not work (J. D. Khan, 2001, pp. 148–149). Press was brought under control and there was no freedom/liberty to criticize on the policies of the government. For example, an independent newspaper the 'the sun' in Karachi reported about language controversy, its license was cancelled. After assuming the powers Bhutto turned himself into an uncaring tyrant who do not believe in democratic norms. He always wished to become a center of power.

2.7.1 Appointment of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq as COAS

On 1st March 1976 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto with the intention of becoming more powerful, he appointed most junior General Zia-Ul-Haq as new COAS in place of General Tikka Khan. As Zerring syas that at that time when Bhutto made Zia-Ul-Haq COAS there were 7 senior Generals as Lieutenant General Muhammad Akbar Khan,

General Muhammad Sharrif, Lieutenant General Azmat Baksh Awan, Lieutenant General Agha Ibrahim Akram, Lieutenant General Abdul Majeed Malik, Lieutenant General Aftab Ahmad Khan, and Lieutenant General Ghulam Jilani Khan. When Zia was made COAS he himself was surprised over his appointment.

2.7.2 General Election 1977

In 1976 Bhutto announced that next elections would be held in the first quarter of the next years. The vibrant opposition was not ready to give him free space. To counter PPP in the upcoming elections, the opposition parties formed an alliance titled as Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Bhutto was of the belief that his party would win the elections with ease. These assurances were given to him by intelligence agencies. As Jahan Dad Khan has stated that intelligence agencies conducted surveys and draw the conclusion that Bhutto's PPP will win the elections (J. D. Khan, 2001, p. 152).

Table 2.6: National Assembly Elections 1977

Party	Seats
PNA	36
PPP	155
MLQ	1
Independent	8
Total	200

Source: Dawn, March 9, 1977.

Elections of National and Provincial Assemblies were held on 7th and 10th of March 1977 respectively. The PPP won the majority of seats and stood single largest party by securing 155 out of total 200 seats of national assembly while its opponent alliance PNA won only 36 seats and did not accept the results and declared that these

elections were rigged. The PNA demanded for fresh elections under the supervision of army. After the National Assembly's elections in March 1977, the PNA boycotted the Provincial Assembly elections. But instead of this that PNA boycotted, the elections were held as scheduled. PPP got overwhelming majority in all four provinces with PPP winning 69, 32, 100 and 232 out of 80,40, 100 and 240 from NWFP, Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab respectively(The Times, Rawalpindi, March 12, 1977).

As Bhutto refused to accept the demands, the PNA started agitation and many other groups such as laborers, NAP(W) etc who were affected by the severe/ill treatment of Bhutto's government joined the protest. As Rizvi said that those groups who were unhappy due to ill treatment of PPP's workers also started protest against Bhutto. Once again this was the time to settle the situation through negotiation but it did not happen. In the Baiginning, army supported Bhutto but at finally when the negotiations were going on, the COAS General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew the government of Bhutto and imposed another martial in the country on 5th July 977. The Constitution was put in abeyance. Thus, another democratic rule came to an end due to the undemocratic attitude of government and opposition. Bhutto era is considered as a buffer between one army ruler and the other. As army could not play central role in politics after the debacle of East Pakistan so during Bhutto era army remained most of the time behind the scene. As professor Jeved says that the presence of Bhutto was pleasant both for public and army. Army regained its position that was lost, and a civil leader was no more required, to challenge the authority.

2.8 Government under Zia

After getting the powers as Chief martial Law Administrator, Zia placed Constitution in abeyance but not abrogated as Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan did in

1958 and 1969 respectively. He also dismissed the national and provincial assemblies and even senate. He did not throw out of the office to the then President Fazal Elahi Chaudhry (A. H. Khan, 1991 p. 82). As ex. CJP Sajjad Ali Shah had narrated that for the provincial administration, all chief justices were appointed as the ad hoc governor of the respective provinces. The decision was made in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice Yaqub Ali Khan. This martial law was the violation of the Constitution of 1973 in which it is very clearly mentioned that military would remain away from politics and it would not engage in politics or political activities. It was mentioned in the Constitution that anyone who tried to abrogate or undermine the Constitution by force or by any other means this action would be considered as high treason under article 6 of the Constitution. According to article 12(2), the armed forces are under the control of the federal government. It is further mentioned in article 243 of the Constitution that the armed forces had to take oath to remain loyal to the Constitution. In article 244 it is declared that the armed forces would perform/act on the order/command of the federation (R. Raza, 2002, pp. 33–34). But it is being done against the nature of the Constitution. Contrary to the law prescribed in the constitution, time and again military has violated the Constitution even with the assistance of civil bureaucracy.

After getting the powers, Zia made promise with the nation to hold elections within 90 days as it was prescribed in the Constitution and after the elections, powers would be transferred to elected representatives. Zia was expecting that PNA would win the elections but both PNA and Zia were frightened of the popularity of Bhutto. Especially Zia was frightened that if Bhutto came in power then he (Bhutto) will trial him under article 6. Moreover Nusrat Bhutto (wife of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) was protesting against martial law and she was attracting large crowd. This fear and

pressure forced Zia to postponed elections. On 16th October 1977, he announced the postponement of the elections on the pretext of Islamization and accountability(Dawn. 20 October, 1977). Moreover Zia stated that politicians had asked him to postpone the elections. Zia postponed the elections without announcing any next schedule of the elections.

To get the support of judiciary, Zia met Chief Justice Yaqoob Ali Khan in his (Yaqoob) chamber and asked him to support him (Zia) for the restoration of democracy in the country. Zia gave assurance to Justice Yaqoob Ali Khan that martial law was not permanent but temporary and elections would be held within the time frame as described in Constitution. Chief Justice gave some suggestion to Zia such as not to abrogate the Constitution, martial law administration must not indulge in government system and power should be transferred to elected representatives. Zia assured justice Yaqoob that he will act upon his advises. On the other hand, Nusrat Bhutto filled a Constitutional petition in Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) on 20th September 1977 and challenged the martial law and also challenged the detention of Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto under fundamental rights. The SCP after brief hearing, immediately ordered to transfer Bhutto and other accused to Rawalpindi(Dawn. 21, September, 1977). On the admission of the petition, the military rulers got worried and by taking precautionary measures, Zia issued CMLA Order no.6 , 1977. This order was about the retirement of CJP. After this order, the sitting CJP had to resign and a new CJP Anwar Ul Haq assumed the office of CJP who under the law of necessity validated the martial law. Once again history was repeated as it had happened in Maulvi Tameezuddin case in 1954.

Bhutto was still a threat for military establishment and military regime decided to get rid of Bhutto permanently and opened a case of murder of Nawab Muhammad

Ahmed Khan which was register in November 1974 and Bhutto's name was there in the First Information Report (FIR). The mourning aspect of Pakistan's politics is this that majority of PNA leadership urged Zia that Bhutto should be tried for murder prior to the October elections. Asghar Khan (retird Air Marshal) moving a step forward asked Zia that Bhutto should be tried even if the elections had to be delayed. The proceeding started and at the initial stage, case was transferred to Lahore High Court (LHC). The forces arrested Bhutto but he was released on bail which was granted by Justice M.A.Samdani of LHC (PLJ, 1978, Criminal cases, Lahore, p, 9). After this a full bench of LHC cancelled the bail. After a brief hearing, LHC sentenced all the accused involved in the murder of Nawab Muhammad Ahmed Khan to death. It was softness of judiciary during Zia era and in previous regimes (dictatorships or elected democracy) that helped the governments in their ultra-Constitutional aims.

2.8.1 Provincial Constitutional Order

As Ayesha Jalal says that Zia attempted to take away the society from democratic norms/ tradition to autocratic/dictatorship under the shade/banner of Islam. Zia formed his government as he himself was CMLA and Fazal Elahi president. Along with this he formed a military council which would decide all important matters. All the services chiefs and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee were the member of the council. Zia kept political parties and press under his well control. To strengthen his position he introduced a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). Under article 14 of this PCO no political party could be formed without the permission of election commission. Under this PCO the president was authorized to ban any political party if he (president) consider that the party is working against the interest of the state or Islam. In this article it was stated that only those political

parties can take part in politics which had registered themselves by 11th of October 1979. It is pertinent to mention that later this article was challenged by Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) in SCP and on 20th Jun 1988 and the SCP declared it null and void. The only purpose of this PCO was to make Zia's hands more powerful. He was so authoritative that he made law that any martial law's order was not allowed to be challenged in any court of law.

2.8.2 Second Provisional Constitutional Order

Zia introduced 2nd PCO in 1981. Under this PCO the Constitution was amended badly. In this PCO 17 article were included. Article 6 of the original Constitution which was related to abrogation of the Constitution was suspended. Judiciary was brought under control and all laws and regulation of martial law period were validated by the SCP. The intensity of this PCO can be seen through this rule that no court of law can hear any case against martial law. In fact Zia badly damaged the true spirit of democracy in the name of Islam. Zia proved a power voracious and through this order he got the authority that the president (which he was) can ban any political party to which he considered to be working against the interest of the state and Islam or national interest.

To legitimize his position, Zia decided to hold a referendum. Zia was aiming at Islamic Democracy while the politicians were looking for parliamentary form of government. Referendum was held on 12th December 1984. Zia cleverly used religious in this referendum as well. In fact in this referendum a question was asked to voters that whether they like the process of Islamization. There were only two options yes and no. In fact Zia played with the emotions of the public because in an Islamic state who will differ. In this way Zia was elected as president for the next five years.

2.8.3 Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

One of the important feature of parliamentary democratic form of government is alliances politics. Pakistan is an example of these democratic systems where alliances had played an important role in politics. The history of Pakistan is evident of such alliances as; Major Alliances in Pakistan (1954-88), United Front (UF) (Jugto Front) 1953, National Democratic Front 1962 (NDF), Combined Opposition Parties 1964 (COP), Pakistan Democratic Movement 1967 (PDM), Democratic Action Committee 1969 (DAC), United Democratic Front 1973 and Pakistan National Alliance 1977 (PNA). When JI, ML (pagara group) and JUP left PNA, the remaining leadership of PNA decided to develop working relationship with PPP to give tough time to Zia regimes. It was called Movement for the restoration of Democracy (MRD). Later this alliance was led by Benazir Bhutto. The Prime objectives of this alliance were;

- Restoration of democracy
- Abolition of censorship
- To end the military courts
- Restoration of 1973 Constitution completely
- Fresh elections(Anjum, 2000, p. 222)

MRD again and again put pressure on Zia for the restoration of democracy. On 14th April 1984, MRD announced to launch a movement against Zia for the revival of democracy. When Zia realized the intensity he promised to hold the elections but MRD not cancelled its plan. This was a success of MRD.

After the referendum, Zia decided to handed over the powers to elected representatives but with some conditions like to continue the process of Islamization(President's statement in Dawn, 26 October 1984). Elections were held

on 25th and 28th February 1985 of National and Provincial Assemblies respectively on nonparty base.

2.8.4 Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985

President's Order No. 14 of 1985

On 2nd March 1985 Zia Ul Haq issued a presidential Order called Revival of the Constitution Order of 1973 (RCO). The purpose of this RCO was to make some changes in the Constitution(Waseem, 1989, p. 399). This shows his approach and attitude toward democracy that he issued a presidential order/martial law order to amend the Constitution instead of this that he should left this task for the elected government. After this RCO, president got the powers to appoint all services chiefs, Prime Minister, governors, judges of SC, HC and Federal Shariat Courts. He further enhanced his powers by getting the powers under article 58(2) (b) of the Constitution of dissolving the assemblies and PM. Under RCO, the president was empowered to dissolve the assembly in two different situations;

- On the advice of the Prime Minister
- On his own discretion in two situations. Firstly when president come to know that no party has majority in the house and the sitting government had been defeated after a vote of no confidence, secondly when he think that the government is not working according to the law or not performing its duties well.

This is the article which caused a big hurdle in the way of democracy in the period under study. It is worth mentioning that this article later became a part of Constitution when the new elected assembly passed it. In original Constitution, President was a titular head and all the powers were vested in Prime Minister according to the norms of parliamentary democracy. To secure his future Zia got

indemnity under article 270A to all ordinances, regulations of martial law and decisions of military courts. Zia was also given the right to stay in the office of president for the next five years in uniform (COAS). This right was given to him under article 41(7) of the Constitution as amended in 1985.

2.8.5 National Security Council

Zia made National Security Council (NSC) under RCO to ensure military's permanent presence in political matters. Along with president the PM, all services chiefs, CJCS and all four CMs were made its members. It was declared that this NSC was an advisory body and will give its recommendation on the security issues which might be referred to it related to national importance. All the matters would be referred to it by president after consultation with PM. But the NSC could not be approved/passed from the assembly/parliament(Assembly debate on Eighth Amendment, 1985).

2.9 Muhammad Khan Juneju elected as Prime Minister

Muhammad Khan Juneju (who was a prominent agriculturist of Sindh and had served in Ayub's cabinet) his name was proposed by Pir Mardan Shah Pagaro as Prime Minister. To fulfil his future desires, Juneju a less known politician was a better choice for Zia. Shuja Nawaz wrote that in his first meeting with Juneju when Zia asked him that he (Zia) has decided to nominate him as Prime Minister then Juneju did not thank him but asked a question to Zia that 'when do you plan to remove the martial law? This was a shocking question for Zia but Zia said that this martial law would support him. Finally, on 23rd March 1985 the party less assembly approved the name of Juneju as Prime Minister.

In the elections MRD did not take part and boycotted it. In the absence of traditional politicians new faces got the opportunity and entered in assembly and

showed their willingness to work under Zia. After eight years of Zia's rule the Majlis-e-Shora (consultative assembly) was replaced by elected assembly. A new democratic era was started but due to the amendments in the Constitution the President was still the hub of powers. After the amendments which were made in the Constitution under PCO and RCO, the shape of the government was turned to almost semi-Presidential. Although Mr. Junejo was elected on nonparty basis, but soon he made a political group by the name of Muslim League Parliamentary Party (MLPP). Many other politicians also joined this party. Later, through Electoral College the senate was elected. Then on 30th December 1985, the martial law was lifted and the Constitution of 1973 was reinstalled.

2.9.1 Emerging conflicts between Zia and Junejo

Junejo after assuming the office of Prime Minister tried to use his authority as real head of the government. In the first attempt he refused to include all the persons in his cabinet whose names were given to him by Zia. He only endorsed the name of Sahibzada Yaqoob Ali Khan (was a retired Major General, who worked as CMLA in East Pakistan but courageously declined army action against Bengalis. He was downgraded from Lt. General to Major General) as foreign Minister and for planning and development Junejo accepted the name of Mahbobul Haq later become finance Minister (A. Mahmood, 2017, p. 15). First time in his 8 years rule Zia was being challenged by any one.

Smooth relationship of Zia and Junejo became problematic on different issues such as on the appointment of secretaries and ambassadors. Rift between Zia and Junejo further increased as stated by A. Mahmood that when the later blocked the summery of Zia's foreign visit to Africa because Junejo was of the opinion that in a parliamentary democratic system it is the right of Prime Minister to make foreign

tours. This attitude of Junejo was totally unacceptable for Zia. Moving a step forward as stated by M.Waseem and also by A.Mahmood that military general turned against him when he ordered of moving back the Mercedes staff cars from the senior civil and military officers by changing them with small Suzuki cars. Junejo's statement that he would put 'Generals into Suzukis' annoyed the senior commanders.

Being a parliamentary Prime minister it is the right of the PM to make foreign policy of his own. But Pakistan's foreign policy had been under Khaki shadow since long. Junejo decided to make foreign policy especially on the issue of Afghanistan. He adopted the policy of reconciliation. In this regard he consulted with different political leaders even with Benazir Bhutto (Benazir had returned to Pakistan on 10th August 1985 from exile as the successor of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and was warmly welcomed by the public. She stated that when she came to Pakistan she asked Zia to resign and demanded for fresh elections). It is pertinent to mention that after her return Benazir joined MRD and make it more active. To seek the support of parties on the issue of Afghanistan Junejo called a roundtable conference of all parties.

On the other hand the autocratic mind of Zia took this move of PM as a conspiracy against his point of view on Afghanistan. In fact Zia had a plan to install a pro-Pakistan interim government in Afghanistan before signing any agreement but Junejo wished for peace dialogue with United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR now Russia) over Afghanistan's issue. Zia very clearly declared that Pakistan would not sign any agreement with Najibullah(the sitting ruler of Afghanistan) (A. Mahmood, 2017, p. 19). The gulf between Junejo and Zia widened when Zia, ISI head Hameed Gul and Junejo's foreign Minister Yaqoob Ali Khan met with US envoy in October 1987 to discuss on Afghanistan's issue and to replace USSR puppet Najeebullah with Zahir Shah. In a parliamentary democratic form of government Prime Minister must

be included in important meetings but autocratic minded general bypassed him. Juneju took it serious as he knew that this idea was generated by his own foreign minister Yaqoob Ali Khan. This matter should be dealt with dialogue but Juneju aggressively removed Yaqoob Ali Khan from the portfolio of foreign Minister. In this conflict as it is narrated by A. Mahmood that unofficially Juneju asked the foreign office to not send any file to president. This shows how due to personal egos the leaders played with democratic system. The tussle further deteriorated when Juneju on 14th April 1988 signed Geneva Accord and Najeebullah came to power. In this Accord it was signed that USSR will withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and Pakistan will stop the supply of arms to Mujahiddin.

2.9.2 Ojhri Camp incident and Confrontation between Zia and Juneju

Another incident which widened the gulf between Zia and Juneju. Just before signing Geneva Accord an incident took place in Rawalpindi near Faizabad which is known as Ojhri Camp tragedy on 10th of April 1988. It causes of loss of life and property. This was an ammunition depot. The people of all the walk of life demanded of an independent inquiry to fix the responsibility(Rizvi, 2000, p. 201). This question was also arose that why an ammunition depot was made in civil area. Juneju took immediate steps to look into the fact and formed a committee to dig out the reality. It was assumed that the committee had recommended the removal of General Akhtar Abdurehman the right hand of Zia(R. Khan, 1998, p. General K.M. Arif, interview telecasted in program ‘Band File (close file)’ on Geo News, 30 August 2009). Once again after 1971, the military was being criticized on a large scale. Zia wanted to save his general who was held responsible of the tragedy. On the other hand as Rizvi said that Zia was also thinking that after this enquiry, Juneju might force him to resign from the office of COAS. The relations between Zia and Juneju reached to no return


and on May 29, 1988 when Junejo just returned from a successful visit of South Korea, Philippines and China, Zia dismissed his government by using the axe of article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution and announced new general elections on 17th November 1988. Provincial assemblies were also dissolved. Junejo's government struggled hard for three years to regain its statutory powers which was resisted by Zia and finally ended in removal of his government. But these elections could not be held on due date because on 17th of August 1988 when Zia was coming back from Bahawalpur along with his top military brass and two US officials they were killed in an air crash of C.130 air craft. "First phase of transition under General Zia as a President is thus the classic example of military rule in a civilianized form which is called a hybrid regime(A. Mahmood, 2017, p. 24)."

CONCLUSION

The period 1947-1988 was suspenseful politically because a state which was established on the basis of democracy remained under tyranny rule for over two decades. After a long interval when parliamentary democracy was restored but even then the style of governance was autocratic and parliamentarians could not perform freely and remained under extreme influence of civil-military bureaucracy. After the death of Quaid-e-Azam there was a vacuum of heavy weight and visionary leader. Constitutional making remained not the priority of the politicians. The head of the state (governor general/president) remained indulge in repeated interference in the matters of government even in making and breaking of the governments. For most of the time, all actions of the head were supported by civil-military bureaucracy. This tendency did not allow democracy to take its roots. After the promulgation of the Constitution 1956 hopes were made that a democratic culture would flourish but soon these hopes sank by the imposition of martial law which was imposed on 1958.

Pakistan was ruled till 1971 by military with the pleasant support of civil bureaucracy and during this period the role of politicians was marginalized. Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto took the control of the state and army was pushed back to barracks. He made some changes in the structure of civil-military bureaucracy. But he could not control completely these power hubs because due to lack of democratic norms he confronted with opposition and then he had to rely heavily on civil military bureaucracy in the end once again military dictator become the master of the state.

Figure 2.1: pattern of society from 1947-1988



Sources: Researcher's own constructed

In the presence of weak political leadership, civil-military bureaucracy was organized, well trained and powerful. It started to control politicians and the system but at the end the military become more powerful and influential. Some decisions of judiciary which it gave under the doctrine of necessity also strengthen the hands of

military rulers and later the judiciary had to face the music of regimes and they put their pressure on it to get the legal cover of their unlawful actions. After the imposition of first martial law the print and electronic media was brought under control through different laws like NPT and there was no freedom for press to report the events factually. With few exceptions the journalists remained under the influence.

The role of opposition was also not productive. It is considered that opposition's role in democratic system is very important. It contributed through its criticism. But its criticism was not tolerated and was taken as conspiracy against the state. The norms of constructive criticism was not flourished from opposition sides even during the period of civil governments. Moreover the sitting governments took the opposition as a hurdle in their way. There are also some examples when opposition played very immature role and their immaturity created hurdles on the way of pure form of democracy.

Due to the imbalance of power tilted in favor of the non-democratic force a smooth working relationship which is the core need to strengthen any kind of political system could not be established. The civil governments remained vulnerable. They could not enforce their manifestoes. Even in the presence of civil governments when military was not running the state directly, it remained busy in maneuvering the politics. Due to these reasons a strong democratic culture and democratic norms and traditions could not be developed.

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CHAPTER 3

BENAZIR BHUTTO AND NAWAZ SHARIF FIRST TERM AS PRIME MINISTER

In this chapter it is discussed in detail that how Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif formed their governments and how their governments were dissolved prematurely. How system could not run smoothly due the politics of confrontation. This is also discussed that how tussle between the institutions effected the system. Why Benazir and Nawaz Sharif's governments could not complete their Constitutional term of government.

After a long dictatorship rule of Zia Ul Haq, when Benazir's democratic period was started then media especially western media declared it as the start of a new age of Pakistani political system. After the death of Zia Ul Haq in a plane crash, the vacant post of president was filled by Ghulam Ishaq Khan (the then chairman senate) and the vacuum of chief of army staff was filled by General Aslam Baig. At that time the office of the president was very powerful because he had the powers to appoint the Prime Minister under article 91 (2) but this power was going to be end on 20th of March 1990 and president can also dissolve the government by using the article 58 (2)(b) of the Constitution. when Ghulam Ishaq Khan (GIK) assumed the office of president then after having a discussion with the powerful institution (military) he announced general elections of national and provincial assemblies in the state on 16th and 19th of November 1988 respectively.(Raza, 2001 p, 45)

Political activities were started in the country after the announcement of elections and it got momentum. To counter Benazir's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) a political alliance of different political parties was made which was given the name of

Islami Jamhuri Itthad (IJI).(Shaikh, 2000 p.109) This alliance was made by 9 different political parties like Jamat-e-Islami, National Peoples Party, Markazi Jamiat Ehl-e-hadith (Lakhvi group) Jamiat ulma-e-Islam (Darkhwasti group), the PML (Fida Faction), Jamiat-ul-Mashaikh (Sahabzada Fazle Haq Group), the Fakhr Imam Group, the Hizb-e-Jihad and the Independent Parliamentary Group (IPG)(Khan. 2001 p,706). Here one thing is very interesting and that is this revealed secret that IJI was made by General Hameed Gul (the then Director General of ISI) and two other helpers named as Brigadier Imtiaz and Major Aamir to counter PPP(Shaikh, 2000 p. 109). Contrary to the election of 1985, which were party less/nonparty based, these elections were going to be held on party basis because Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) declared that it is against the human rights to stop a party from contesting elections. The SCP gave its verdict on 2nd of October 1989(PLD 1989 Supreme Court p 66) and clearly mentioned that without political parties, elections are not genuine. The SCP further declared that it is the right of every citizen to make a political party. In fact all the democracy lovers were happy with the announcement of the elections. Big names of army decided that it is better to run the state while living behind the curtain instead to run the state on the front line (Jalal, 1995 p.110). Here is another aspect to be discussed that after Zia's death the new COAS was not sure about the support of the army if he (General Baig) take the control of the system in his own hands like Zia. He needed some time to secure his position. So he decided to support the elections (Rizvi, 1989).

Election commission awarded the election symbols to the parties in October 1988. GIK issued/circulated an ordinance in which he prohibited a person to cast the vote in the absence of identity card. This ordinance was challenged by PPP in Lahore High Court (LHC) and argued that it is against article 52 of the Constitution of

Pakistan which is about citizen's right to cast a vote. The PPP also highlighted the issue that the caretaker government had obtained the identity cards of their (PPP) supporters. The Court gave its verdict by declaring this ordinance illicit. The government challenged the LHC judgement which was adjourned by the Supreme Court; to which many voters had not partook in elections(Patel, 2000).

Caretaker government's activities were suspicious/wary. The PPP had no trust on caretaker regime that even when PPP challenged the Ordinance in the LHC, the PPP also made a complaint in the court that caretaker government is favoring the anti PPP groups/parties. On 24th of October 1988, the COAS called a meeting to know about the elections proceedings and arrangements which were made for the elections. In that meeting the participants were ISI head, federal interior Minister Ghafoor Ahmed of JI and all four chief Ministers of the provinces which were all loyal to IJI(Shaikh, 2000 p,111). Looking at all the arrangement for the elections, it seemed clear that all the arrangements were being made against Benazir's PPP. Instead of the biased and unfair attitude of the administration the victory of PPP astonished everyone(Bashir, 2015 p,75).

These elections were being welcomed by the whole country. The newflash of the election was welcomed by the nation. In elections the candidates were allowed to spend money for election campaign up to five lac. But the candidate spend more money than the limit which was fixed by the election authorities(Mahmood, 2000 p.388). In the elections of 1988, the PPP and IJI were two mainstream parties which were contesting the elections. In their election campaign they violated the code of ethics. During election campaign, some religious parties (which were a part of IJI) called Benazir and her Mother Nusrat Bhutto "gangster in bangles"(Lamb, 1991, p. 33).

These parties campaigned that Benazir was being launched by the west to promote western culture in the state. Benazir was called a western lady. Even the leaders of religious parties appealed to the nation to not give vote to Benazir because she will destroy the true culture and ethics of the people of Pakistan if she wins. They also distributed the pictures of outfits of Benazir and her mother among the people (Lamb, 1991 pp,33-35). In 1988, during and after the elections, Benazir had to face criticism of religious people. Some Ulama (religious scholars) gave Fatwas (religious order) that in an Islamic state a woman could not rule. (Akhund, 2000, p.58). The opponents of PPP also alleged that Nusrat Bhutto had written letters to New York in which she stated that after assuming power, the PPP would open Kahuta (a federally financed, national research institution and laboratory site primarily dedicated to uranium enrichment, supercomputing and fluid mechanics) for American inspection. But this allegation was denied by Nusrat Bhutto and American as well (Dharamdasani, 1989).

3.1 Elections' Results

In these elections no party could grasp clear majority to form the government single handedly.

Table 3.1: Party position in Election 1988

PPP	93 (45% of total seats)
IJI	54 (26.47% of total seats)
JUI(F)	07
MQM	13
Pakistan Awami Ittehad (PAI)	03
National Party	02
Balochistan National Alliance	02
Independents	27
Source: Waseem, 1989.	

In these elections PPP won 93 seats, which was 45.59% of total seats. IJI won 54 seats which was 26.47% of total seats. Other seats were won by other parties and independents as JUI (F) 7, MQM 13 Pakistan Awami Ittehad 3, National Party 2, Balochistan Alliance 2(Waseem, 1989). Here one thing is pertinent to mention that in these elections MQM's candidates contested the elections on an independent basis but they followed the party policy in government making process. More than 80% of the IJI's strength came from Punjab. However the representation of PPP was from all the provinces. PPP's big opponents could not win their own seats including previous Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi from Sindh. Large number of other protuberant leaders like Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sher Baz Mazari, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, Miraj Mohammad Khan, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Malik Mohammad Qasim, Fatehyab Ali Khan, also abortive to get the people's mandate. Division of votes between IJI and PAI helped PPP to win in several constituencies in Punjab.

3.2 Elections' Results of Provincial Assemblies

In these elections the PPP won 94 seats in Punjab Assembly whereas IJI won 108 seats, independent won 33, JUI(F) 1, Pakistan Awami Ittehad 2, Pakistan democratic party 2, National PP (khar Group)1 out of total 240 seats of assembly. In Sindh Assembly's elections PPP won majority of seats securing 67 out of hundred seats, IJI 1, independent (including MQM) 31, Punjabi Pakhtoon Ittehad Sindh 1. Elections of the provincial assembly NWFP (now KPK) were held on the announced date and PPP won 20 seats, IJI 28, independent 16, ANP 13, JUI (F) 2 out 80 seats of the assembly. In the elections of Balochistan Assembly there were total 40 seats and out of these seats PPP won 3, IJI 9, independent 7, JUI (F) 10, Baluchistan National alliance 6, Pakistan national alliance 2, Pakistan Milli Awami Ittehad 1 and wattan party won 1 seat. Benazir accused the IJI for selective rigging in the Punjab(Waseem, 1989 p, 455).

3.3 Formation of the Government

After elections' results, both major parties IJI and PPP were busy to get the support of the MNAs and MPAs to form the government in center and provinces. Especially, both PPP and IJI were busy in seeking the support of independents to form their government(Lamb, 1991). In the prevailing situation the president had the discretionary powers under the changed Constitution, (Revival of Constitutional order) 1985. The president would appoint Prime Minister who, in his view could command majority of the National Assembly. Due to these vested powers, the office of the president became the hub of power politics and political activities. Although this power was being used with the consultation of powerful institution of army. The power of the President put him in the haggling position in 1988 as no party had clear majority to form government.

The period between the elections and nomination of the PM was the period of ambiguity because no party had a clear majority and according to the 8th Amendment in the Constitution, the President had the powers to appoint any Muslim member of the assembly to whom he believed that the nominated person by him could get the support of the majority. In the camp of Benazir, it was believed that the establishment was against the PPP. Some experts claimed that Benazir Bhutto was appointed as Prime Minister on the international pressure. Mohammad Waseem argue that she was appointed under the increasing domestic and international pressure and after some certain reassurances which she gave to the military establishment(Waseem, 1989 p,453).

When the PPP and IJI were trying to form the government after the elections, at that time army being a powerful institution was looking keenly at the situation. Army also had some reservations on the transfer of power to PPP and Benazir could make government only when army was satisfied with her. Thus, Benazir formed the government only after a deal was struck between army and PPP. According to Javed Ashraf (a senator of Pakistan Muslim League N) the deal was made and it covered the following points:

- Benazir would not take revenge from Zia's family;
- whatever had been done on Kashmir and Afghan policy would not be undone;
- Army should be kept on board regarding decisions on foreign policy.

However, the leaders of PPP explained that deal was done only on two points vis a vis; do not indulge in army affairs and to not take any revenge from the armed forces. The army officials had denied having any deal with the PPP and stated that it had suggested nothing more than some proposals(Bashir, 2015p,78). According to Senator Safdar Abbasi (he remained a political secretary of Benazir) this deal was

took on the wish of establishment. Kalim Bahadur claims that Ghulam Ishaq Khan sworn in Benazir Bhutto only after she had taken to accept the following conditions:

1. Continuation of the Afghan Policy.
2. Retention of Sahibzada Yaqub Khan as Foreign Minister
3. PPP would support Ghulam Ishaq Khan's election as President.
4. No cut in certain budget items, reportedly this referred to defense budget and nuclear program(Bahadur, 1998 p, 26).

The army was eager that PPP should form a coalition government with IJI which was rejected and not accepted by the PPP. During the course of formation of the government, COAS General Baig had proposed a national government but this idea was rejected by both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif. Benazir Bhutto was of the view that according to democratic principle of majority rule, she had right to form the government as PPP not only had maximum seats in the National Assembly but it was the only party which had representation from all of the provinces. So only PPP could represent the federation of Pakistan in true sense. Nawaz Sharif was also reluctant to accept the proposal because he expected that on the basis of his dominance over Punjab, he might be able to muster enough support in the National Assembly to form his government.

General Baig did not further pursue the idea but this statement shows that despite adopting a policy of not imposing direct military rule and noninterference, military was eager to continue to monitor and influence the direction of political process(Kaniyalil & Pande, 1989). On the other side the president was reluctant to ask Benazir to form the government in place of IJI. After some arrangements which were made by army, the president keeping in view the mounting international pressure with heavy heart, asked Benazir to form the government and nominated Benazir for the

office of PM on 1st December 1988(Kamran, 2008 p,140). The USA acted as a mediator for the transfer of power. In this regard the US Convey Robert.B meet with Benazir and military official to bring PPP and military closer(Mitra, 1990 p,64-65).

This was first time in the history of Pakistan that a female member of Assembly was nominated for the office of the PM. On 2nd December 1988, with the support of MQM (which emerged as the 3rd largest party in the NA and won 13 seats in urban areas of Haiderabad and Karachi which was a pleasant addition in politics of Pakistan), other small parties and votes of tribal areas was nominated as Prime Minister. Benazir addressed the NA on 2nd December 1988 in which she criticized 8th amendment which was made in the Constitution in 1985. She said that the purpose of this amendment was to keep away PPP from politics. She promised to restore the Constitution of 1973 completely. As Bashir stated that she also declared freedom for media, equal opportunities for men and women, the release of political prisoners and lifting of ban on student unions and trade unions. She got the vote of confidence on 12th of December 1988. When Benazir took the office of the PM, somewhat she gave freedom to media, music program were aired on Pakistan Television (PTV), the actress were allowed to appear on screens bareheaded while she herself wore scarp in public meetings. Her opponents' protested that she is supporting vulgarity in the state(Haqqani, 2016 p,134).

3.4 Formation of Provincial Governments

In general elections of 1988, in Punjab the PPP won majority of seats of NA but in provincial assembly's elections PPP won less number of seats than IJI. The IJI from Punjab won 108 seats out of 240 and PPP won 94 seats. With the help of independent candidates whose number was 32, IJI made its government in Punjab and Nawas Sharif became the Chief Minister (CM) of Punjab. The PPP could not make its

government in the Punjab. Benazir tried hard to make PPP's government in Punjab and for this purpose she tried to get the vote of the IJI's members but failed to grasp the desire numbers. On the other hand, Mian Nawaz Sharif to get the support of Punjabi members used the Punjabi nationalism card. There is no qualm that in Punjab, IJI had the support of president and the institutions who were involved in keeping Benazir in check by having government of the opposition set up in Punjab(Khan, 2005 p,715). Benazir was hopeful that she will make government in Punjab but it did not happened. She stated that elections in Punjab were rigged(Waseem, 1989).

Situation in Balochistan was more complex because in the elections of Balochistan Assembly there were total 39 elected seats (election on 1 seat was postponed) and out of these seats PPP won 3, IJI 9, independent 7, JUI (F) 10, Baluchistan National alliance 6, Pakistan national alliance 2, Pakistan Milli Awami Ittehad 01 and wattan party won 1 seat. On 2nd December 1988, Mir Zaffarullah Khan Jamali was nominated as CM of Balochistan by the vote of speaker because both the contesters got 50% vote of the house each and the vote of the speaker was final. The speaker of the assembly casted its vote in favor of Jamali. The Speaker issued a certificate declaring him as elected. In this way, he (Jamali) formed a very fragile government in the first week of December 1988. In NWFP no party could win clear majority to form the government. The PPP won 22, IJI 28, ANP 13 and there were 15 independent MPAs as well. Benazir made a coalition government in NWFP with ANP and Aftab Ahmed Shairpao became CM of NWFP. In Sindh PPP was single largest party by winning 67 out of hundred seats and there were 31 independents and out of 31 members 26 independents belonged to MQM. As the MQM had boycotted the elections and its candidates had contested as independent but they followed the party policy as in Centre. As MQM was partner in the center and so they (PPP and MQM)

formed their coalition government in Sindh as well and Syed Qaim Ali Shah became the CM(H. Khan, 2005 p,715-716).

3.5 Presidential Elections

After the formation of central and provincial governments, presidential elections were held on 12th December, 1988. As a political deal between the acting president and PPP, the latter ignored old allies and supported GIK. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was the leading figure of MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy). Four candidates, including GIK, Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan, Ahmed E.H. Jaffar, and Muhammad Nauroz Malik took part in the polls. Ghulam Ishaq Khan won the election with an overwhelming majority by getting 233 votes while the other candidates Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Mr.Ahmed E.H.Jaffer and Muhammad Nauroz Malik got 39, 6 and 1 vote respectively(Election Commission report 1988). On the same day, Benazir took the vote of confidence by obtaining 148 against her contesteer who obtained 55 votes.

The PPP did not get power in an ideal circumstances. The considerable section of the civil-military bureaucracy of Zia era was still in position. The provinces of Balochistan and the Punjab had anti-PPP governments which were causing problems for the PPP-led Centre. The PPP had to develop working relationship with the Senate where IJI and its allies had majority. Till Senate elections of 1991 the PPP remained a small faction in this House making it difficult for PPP to pursue legislative work in the Senate(Kamran, 2008).

Benazir formed the government in not an ideal situations. She was a weak Prime Minister, compelled to make compromises and to adopt flexible attitude on many issues. William Richter has summarized the situation in following words:

“Benazir Bhutto found herself confronted on all sides—by the President, whose enhanced powers under amended Constitution seriously limited her scope of authority; by the military, which insisted on retaining authority over Afghan policy and other sensitive subjects; by the IJI opposition in the National Assembly, which sought to remove her through no-confidence motions; by the IJI majority in the Senate; and by Nawaz Sharif, who attempted to strengthen Punjab and other provinces at the expense of central government(Richter, 2019 p,22).”

The first task before the PPP government was to present the budget because before this during the period of caretaker government president approved a budget of 4 months only. On 4th of December 1988, the finance Minister Mr. Ehsan Ul haq Piracha presented the budget in the NA.

Regardless of lot of contraction, Benazir’s era is considered an era of restoration of democracy in Pakistan after over a decade of military authoritarianism. It was the establishment of Benazir’s government due to which Pakistan entered in the phase of full-fledged democracy after the period of partial democracy from 1985 to 1988. As Lawrence Ziring describes this truth in following words:

“ Democracy was in the air, as well as in the sentiments of the people, when Benazir entered the National Assembly accompanied by the President of Pakistan and assumed her new responsibilities(Ziring, 1997 p,511).”

The whole credit goes to Benazir Bhutto that she tried to restore substantial democratic standards in Pakistan. The Press gained freedom at somewhat. Her government avoided tyranny. Political observers think that her government was

"liberal and tolerant of diverse political views, Pakistan appeared to be on the edge of a new era of institutionalized politics(Monshipouri & Samuel, 1995 pp, 981-82). Benazir Bhutto took different steps to strengthen democracy by promoting human rights in some areas. She liberalized the media policy. Benazir writes in her autobiography that the seeds of democracy were planted in her era. She further wrote that "I was taught that Islam believes justice is essential to the functioning of a civilized society. I therefore ordered the separation of legal system and the executive, laying the foundation for an independent judiciary (Bhutto, 2007)."

3.6 Dissolution of Balochistan Assembly

Popular government accepts a settlement on principles of game reasonable to all residents, regardless of whether they have a place with majority or minority parties. In a popularity based set-up political rivalry doesn't mean the specific inverse of collaboration in the light of the fact that the contenders should help out one another by playing the game as per rules. If the minority party or parties irreconcilably oppose each law and policy laid down by the ruling majority, democracy would fail to work and there can be no stable democracy (Seymour Martin Lipset, 1959 p,153).

The Baluchistan Chief Minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali was not in a comfortable position and he was in fear all the time of losing his office by a vote of no confidence motion which can be moved any time by the opposition. To counter his fear, on 15th of December 1988, he advised the governor of Balochistan General Muhammad Mussa to dissolve the assembly and the governor dissolved the assembly. This dissolution was challenged by the opposition in the Balochistan High Court that Jamali had not obtained the vote of confidence/or majority of votes of the house so he cannot advise the governor to dissolve the assembly. This is a clear example of the weakness of political system that assembly which was formed few days ago was

being dissolved in this fear that CM might be removed by vote of No confidence. The other aspect is this that this incident shows the level of political rivalry and politics of conflicts.

The opposition accused Benazir that she was behind that move. Benazir denied these allegations and invited opposition for dialogue on the issue (Bahadur & Singh, 1989 p, 12-13). In fact Jamali had very thin majority of one vote of speaker. A full Bench of the Baluchistan High Court on 23rd of January 1989 gave its verdict in favor of writ petition, thus holding that, as the CM had not attained a vote of confidence, so his advice to Governor to dissolve the Assembly is ultra-Constitutional (Nasir & Aslam, 1990 p, 37). The Baluchistan High Court declared that as CM Jamali had not taken the vote of confidence according to the clause 130 (3) so Jamali was not in a position to ask governor to dissolve the assembly. On January 26, 1989 IJI, BNA and JUI (F) made an accord to form government of Balochistan with Akbar Bugti as its Chief Minister.

3.7 Relation of PPP's Government with IJI

Benazir's main opposition was IJI which formed government in Punjab. It was compulsory for both PPP and IJI to create a working relationship for the betterment of the country. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Convenience can be viewed as best approach in such conditions. Accommodation can be measured finest strategy in such conditions. Accommodation can be well-defined as a course relating mindful energies of competing parties to cultivate a working arrangement, suspend clash, and make their relations more acceptable and less prodigal of energies. Relations between center and Punjab remained confronter and least helpful all through the period of Benazir Bhutto.

There is a distinction of sentiment among political experts that who—PM or CM of Punjab was liable for this showdown which spoiled the political culture, badly affected the democratic development and above all burned-through valuable time and energies of public delegates which may have been used for well-being of the people of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto has called Nawaz Sharif “political son of the dictator Zia-ul-Haq in her biography(Bhutto, 2007 p, 404).” Benazir Bhutto was incapable to make pleasant relations with any person related to Zia and this thinking forced her to stop of having a good working relations between the Centre and the Punjab. Zerings writes about her condition that her intemperate behavior revealed how wounded she was by her father's execution and how closely she resembled the character of her father, who had shown a total inability to work with people who disagreed with him.

When Benazir started Peoples works Program(PWP), Nawaz Sharif objected on it and asked president to convince Benazir to stop this program. The peoples work program was not only the one issue there were other issues as well as there was an issue over wheat. Both Center and Punjab blamed each other for the wheat crises(Khan.1989,50-51). Relations between Benazir Nawaz Sharif became worse when the later was made the head of IJI on 11th February 1989. Benazir decided to move a no confidence motion against Nawaz Sharif. Although she had less numbers than IJI, she decided to do so in order to overthrow Nawaz Sharif's government. On 6th of March 1989, speaker of Punjab assembly Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo was requested to summon the meeting of the assembly so that PPP can table the motion of no confidence. The application was signed by 80 MPAs. The federal government was trying to get the loyalties of MPAs by its influence. She had no legislative and administrative experience, which is expected from a head of government.

It was therefore, not surprising that Benazir chose to challenge Nawaz Sharif rather than work with him. Nawaz Sharif said that Benazir and her Ministers while staying in Punjab were doing horse trading (purchasing the loyalties of the MPAs). Keeping in view the intensified situation, the president GIK called PM for meeting for the solution of the problem. When Benazir met with President the COAS Aslam Baig was also there. She was surprised to see COAS in meeting. In the presence of COAS, the President asked Benazir that her Ministers are sitting in Punjab to oust the government of Nawaz Sharif. He further asked that by doing so the relations between center and Punjab would become worse. Mr. GIK asked Benazir not to evolve in the conspiracy against Nawaz and he (president) would ask Nawaz as well to cooperate with federal government. Benazir affirmed that no member of her party was a candidate for the office of CM in Punjab and that it was the indecorous and bad behavior of Nawaz which is responsible for this situation. Later, after meeting with President as Bashir stated that Benazir and Nawaz met and both decided to support each other in national interest. The PPP accepted the mandate of the IJI in the Punjab and the IJI acknowledged the privilege of the PPP to rule in the Centre. But this harmony did not last longer.

Benazir appointed his party's Secretary-General Gen. (Retd) Tikka Khan as Governor of the Punjab to check the actions of government of Punjab. Though federal government has right to appoint the governor of any province but ethics of co-operation and accommodation assured by the PM in her first address to the nation demanded a process of consultation with the CM on the matter of appointment of governor. In this intensified situation, federal government transferred chief secretary of the Punjab but Nawaz Sharif reacted on these orders of transfer by saying that the chief secretary would not leave charge and will continue his duties. GIK intervened

and asked Benazir to cancel the order of transfer of Chief Secretary(Nasir, 1990 p,30). In reaction to these orders, Nawaz asked the officials working in Punjab not to accept the orders of the federal government otherwise they would not be allowed to work in Punjab. On the other hand moving a step forward Benazir stated that this act of Nawaz is mutiny against federal government(Shad. p,123). Punjab government reacted when it did not accord Benazir Bhutto the protocol that a Prime Minister deserves according to rules. It also threatened to send back 227 Federal Government officers posted in Punjab(Hussain.1989 p,55-56). Situation become worse when the Punjab government announced to establish its own bank 'The Bank Of Punjab' (BOP)(Siddique, 2002, p.378).

Because of the Centre ad Punjab conflict a strong political culture could not be established in Pakistan because both the parties were leading parties in the political arena PPP and IJI. It was their duty to create a friendly atmosphere in the state but they polarized the politics. To get the loyalties of the other's members they used money(Maluka, 1995). This process of political corruption started when PPP in its effort to topple the Punjab government of IJI, sought to entice independent as well as IJI MPAs with "lucrative financial offers"(Nasr, 1992 p,531).

3.8 PPP's Government and Press

It was claimed by the PPP that there will be no restrictions on press but with the passage of time this could not happened. For newspaper, publishers and editors, a long list of rules was issued. The press ordinance was never brought before the NA by the PPP government but it was reissued many times. In 1989 the Council of Newspaper Editors suggested the government to implement the code of ethics and form a press court of honour to tackle the disciplinary clauses of the Ordinance. The PPP Government did not heed to these proposals(Chand, 1992 p,398-399).

3.9 PPP Government and Crises in Sindh

Although PPP had majority in Sindh, instead of this PPP made an alliance with MQM in Sindh because MQM was a coalition partner in center. When ethnic violence started in Sindh, MQM withdrew its support. As the differences between PPP and MQM increased there were more ethnic violence. However, the alliance split when another feud of ethnic ferocity over Sindhi and non-Sindi flared up in Karachi and Hyderabad. Moreover, the PPP failed to perform what it had pledged in its elections campaign. In 1989, the MQM withdrew its partnership from the PPP. In retaliation, the PPP's government conducted an operation against its (MQM) activists across Sindh.

On 26th of May 1989, the provincial government of Sindh launched an operation in Haiderabad at Pukka Qila. The reason for launching this operation was this that the government came to know/found out that there was illegal weapons and ammunition in a large quantity. When the police raided there, the guards who were patrolling there hide themselves and a procession of women and children appeared there with holy Quran on their heads(Shaikh, 2000 p,182). The situation become worse when the army entered the city without the call of civil government and confronted with police.

The PPP leaders criticized on the role of the army and stated that army is supporting those people who have a huge amount of illicit weapons. They stated that under the article 147 of the Constitution of Pakistan, provincial government can call army with the prior approval of the federal government. The other situation when army could be called is mentioned in article 247(Shaikh, 2000 p,183). In the result of this operation, the activists of MQM were either gunned down or they received fatal

wounds. The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan also visited the operation and later this operation was also one of the reasons of the removal of government of PPP in 1990.

Opposition openly criticized federal government and Sindh government on the floor of National Assembly that both the governments' federal and Sindh could not normalize the situation in Karachi and Haiderabad. According to PPP sources as Bashir stated that If Benazir was given authority to tackle with the MQM on her own without interference of Aslam Baig, she would have been able to certify normal law and order in Sindh. According to Maliha Lodhi (a famous writer and Pakistani ambassador to USA) the Army while conducting operation in Sindh demanded powers from the federal government under article 245 but Benazir was ready to give powers under article 145(Lodhi, 1990 p,32).

The MQM had observed strike against PPP on February 9, 1990 that ended up burning buildings, shopping centres, banks, restaurants, and five PPP workers alive in a Suzuki pickup. The army was installed to control the situation but it patrolled only in the streets. On February 24, 1990 the CM of Sindh Qaim Ali Shah gave his resignation which was accepted by Benazir. The main criticisms on Qaim Ali Shah were that he did not control the law and order situation. Aftab Shaban Mirani was made the next CM of Sindh unanimously.

3.10 Relation between NWFP and PPP

Relations between NWFP and PPP were not ideal. Although, PPP had coalition government in NWFP but with the passage of time this coalition became fragile. In fact at the time of formation of the government, Benazir made a promise with the ANP that Chief Minister will be from PPP and the governor will be from ANP but it did not happen. The ANP nominated Adbul Khaliq as the candidate for governorship but Benazir did not keep her words. On this breach of promise the

alliance between ANP and PPP was broken on 4th of Jun 1989. It was also narrate by ANP sources that the Ministers of ANP were not allowed to work their own and Aftab Shair Pao had kept a close eye on them. Even the ministers had to consult with CM on nominal/minor matters. So, ANP made another alliance with IJI on 14th June 1989 and in the presence of this situation the NWFP government became vulnerable. While responding to the statements of ANP, Chief Minister Aftab Shair Pao in an interview said that the role of CM was vital in the provincial set up and the alliance with the ANP was of political nature and not on policies. He also stated in his interview that Ministers were exercising their Constitutional powers freely and the PPP's agreement on having Governor of ANP's choice was not fulfilled as Aslam Baig and Ishaq Khan had reservation about the ANP on the basis of its past anti-Pakistan repute.

3.11 No Confidence Motion against Benazir

MQM which was a major partner of PPP in the center broke its alliance with the PPP. Prof. Siddique Qureshi analyses Benazir Bhutto's failure to maintain the coalition in following words:

“She failed in the art of political management. Instead of broadening the base of the civilian polity by winning over other political parties, she Began to lose her allies. She was dependent upon MQM, ANP and FATA MNAs, etc. They all extended complete support to her but fell apart very soon. While Wali Khan complained of Benazir's arrogance, MQM was disillusioned by her attitude. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, also, broke away. Lastly she lost Nwabzada Nasrullah Khan”(Siddique, 2002 p, 376).

To counter PPP, an alliance 'Combined Opposition Parties' (COP) was formed with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as its chief on Jun 4, 1989. With the formation of the COP, strength of the opposition members increased to 100. This alliance joined hands with leading opposition party/alliance IJI. The ANP, though ideologically close to the PPP, also fell out with the PPP due to its differences with PPP. IJI being a big opposition of PPP was looking for this opportunity. The COP was assured about its success in the motion. When Benazir was in Kuala Lumpur to attend the commonwealth meeting, the COP officially tabled the no confidence motion in NA on October 23, 1989. After returning to the country, Benazir and Ishaq Khan met On October 31, 1989 to discuss the arrangements about no-confidence motion. All resources were used for this motion by IJI and PPP. The IJI also influenced the PPP's legislators to support its move. The IJI led governments in Punjab and Balochistan used all resources for the success of this motion. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) had tapped the record of meetings by its sources that transpired between the leaders of the IJI and PPP (September 28- October 6, 1989) to get their support in favour of no-confidence motion. The IB had preserved the records of meetings in twelve cassettes. The record proved that the top management of the Intelligence was also involved in the plot to dissolve the Benazir government (Shaikh, 2000 p,172). Later it was revealed by Cahudhry Nisar Ali Khan (one of the top ranked leader of IJI and closed one to Nawaz Sharif at that time) as Shaikh has narrated that COAS Aslam Baig was also involved in no confidence motion and he made calls to MQM head to get his support in the favour of the motion.

Voting on no confidence took place on 1st November 1989. Before voting, opposition leader Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi made a speech and blamed the PPP government that it had failed to control law and order and has increased in

corruption(H. Khan, 2005). Benazir in her speech defended the performance of her government. After couple of speeches, voting took place and Benazir secured her position by margin of 12 votes. Out of 237, 107 votes were poled against Benazir. After saving her position Benazir addressed the house and said that no confidence is not a joke.

3.12 Legislation of PPP Government

Legislative performance of PPP's government was not up to the mark. There was no substantial legislation. The only bill passed through National Assembly was the Constitutional Bill 1989 or Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, article 51(4) of the original Constitution, regarding reserved women seats in NA was changed. Benazir's cabinet at that time was the biggest cabinet of Pakistan's history. There was a problem for legislation as well for the PPP because the IJI had majority in senate and on the other hand PPP had only thin majority in the NA. But the major problem with PPP was this that it had no mutual harmony with the opposition. This is the duty of the federal government to create such atmosphere. During the first Benazir Bhuttos' government, frequency of sessions was so low that only 11 meetings were held(Shafqat, 1998 p, 292). Ayesha Jalal observes that "during the twenty odd months that she hung on to power, not a single piece of legislation was placed before the parliament by the treasury benches"(A. Jalal, 1995). Working of the cabinet damagingly affected the democratic image of the Benazir's government. Benazir Bhutto herself had six important ministries. This attitude spoiled the performance of government. The debates were pigeonholed by allegations and counter allegations. Adequate time was not given to members to express their views.

3.13 Shariat bill and Benazir

During election campaign anti PPP parties portrayed Benazir as western woman and again and again it was asked to the people of Pakistan to not vote Benazir because in their opinion she would destroy the true Islamic culture of Pakistan. The opposition parties made another move and presented a Shariat Bill in the senate and after passing it send to the National Assembly for approval in the upcoming session which was scheduled on 9th August 1990. In this bill it was promised that every part of life should be lined with the light of sharia. This bill had a lot of insinuations and if this had been enforced, the courts, government and the media might've been affected. In addition, the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan would've been empowered to declare unconstitutional the rulings of the courts if they had not been Islamic. In reality, it was a test for the government of Benazir to decide how to deal with the bill. If Benazir had extended her support to the bill, her office would have been in danger, and if she had denied her support, she would have been accused of being an opponent of Islam. On 19th July 1990, Benazir Bhutto said in response to a questions from the media at Lahore Airport, that she would keep the sovereignty of the parliament intact and did not think that she would sever human hands and ears properly. She was blamed for the argument in the religious circles and her statement riled the religious elites who had always been inimical to her because of their rightist preferences. This bill could not be discussed in assembly because president dissolved the assemblies before the mentioned date.

3.14 Organizational Weakness of PPP

The parties which are well-knit organizations bound by principles and programs are true form of democratic parties. But in Pakistan situation of political parties is quite different. Benazir became the head of PPP because her father was the

head and founder of this party. With frail formal backgrounds in society, political parties in Pakistan are amorphous groups knotted together by their leaders; some enthralling, others not, some becoming party leaders because of their wealth and the others due to inheritance. Major problem in Pakistani politics is this that there is lack of democratic spirits within the parties. On the whole, there is a domination of few families in every political party. Political approach of PPP's leadership ratifies this style and PPP has always selected rather than elected office-bearers.

Although, Benazir became a source of strength for PPP's workers. She set aside her own sufferings and tensions for party but due to lot of reasons she paid less attention toward party's organization. She nominated office bearers at every level rather to held elections within the party. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who was former provincial head of PPP said that while nominating office barrier of PPP, Benazir neglected some very hard workers of PPP and those were given the responsibilities who remained a part of martial law regime. As Ayesha Jalal writes that applying her energies in encounter with opposition "she had even less time than her father" to pay attention towards the PPP's tumble-down party machinery(A. Jalal, 1995). As Ziring says that "Benazir's PPP had an despotic arrangement that had never adopted democratic practices"(Ziring, 1997). So due to these organizational weakness Benazir could not counter IJI and other opposition parties effectively.

3.15 Benazir's Relations with Army

In Pakistani politics army being a powerful institution has a very important position. Overall in the history of Pakistan, army has played a vital role in the formation and dissolution of governments. From 1958 to 1971 and from 1977 to 1988 army was directly running the system of the state. Although, after the death of President and COAS Zia ul Haq, the next COAS decided to restore democracy in the

state while living behind the curtain but instead of this intention after the elections of 1988, Benazir had to give some assurances to the army before forming her government. Initially relationships between the government of Benazir Bhutto and military leadership remained friendly. Keeping in mind the importance of army Benazir announced a medal of democracy for the army on 23rd March 1989(Rizvi.2000 p, 206). The purpose of this medal was to appease the army(Z. Khan, 2004 p,12).

When army entered in Sindh to support the government and army demanded powers under article 245 to set up military courts and would only agree to be deployed under the said Article but PPP's government was reluctant to give such powers. Vital differences between the Prime Minister and army emerged on the handling of the deteriorating law and order condition in Sindh, which was primarily result of ethnic clashes between the Mohajir community of the urban Sindh represented by MQM and Sindhi supporters of PPP. The incident of Pucca Qila also worsened the relations between Benazir and army. This situation intensified the relations of government and the army. To seek out any solution related to operation in Sindh, the COAS in the presence of defense Minister Col. Ghulam Sarwer Cheema met with Benazir on July 28th, 1990 in Prime Minister House and discussed in detail all the aspects. In this meeting the COAS also informed Benazir about the corps commander meeting held a day before this meeting. A report which published in the UK newspaper "the Independent" also claimed that the Benazir-Army dispute over the situation of Sindh province had become a conflict. (M. I. Khan, 2019). On the other hand Benazir was trying to normalize relations with India which were mounting due to Kashmir Issue (Anjam, M. 2009).

Benazir also tried to get control on the foreign policy from the hands of army. She was assisted by the USA in her dealings with Afghanistan and India. When ISI head Hamid Gul was replaced by General Shamsurehman Kalu (retired) and Hamid Gul was promoted as Lieutenant General and posted to Multan. Initially, Aslam Baig was pleased with the action of Benazir however he was not happy on the appointment of shamsurehman Kalu because General Baig had given Benazir a list of personals for the said post but Benazir rejected his list and appointed her own nominee. It was the same Aslam Baig who was awarded with Tamgha-i-Jamhooriyat(medal of democracy) by Benazir (S. Aziz, 2009). As narrated by Hassan Askari that due to these differences of Benazir with military, alliance between PPP and MQM was broken on the will of agencies(Rizvi, 1998 p, 101). The military also did not like Benazir's policy of normalizing relation with India and when Rajive Gandhi (the Prime Minister of India) visited Pakistan, the army took it serious and thought that Benazir was undependable(Rizvi, 2000 p,207).

Benazir Bhutto's meddling in the army's promotions also created umbrage in the institution. On several occasions, she rejected to agree with the recommendations of the Army Promotions Board(Lamb, 1991 p, 290). When PM attempted to retire Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Admiral Iftikhar Ahmad Sirohi, army and president took it very serious and this deteriorated the relations of army and Benazir. In short, due to the interferences of Benazir in the matter of military about the appointments and retirements the relationship between military and Benazir deteriorated day by day.

3.16 Relation with President

When Benazir assumed the office of Prime Minister, she had to work with a very experienced and sharp minded person Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the president of

Pakistan. GIK was the person whose loyalties and sympathies were with IJI. GIK has worked in Zia administration as Chairman Senate, secretary general, finance Minister etc. He (GIK) himself stated that he was first civilian whose services were hired by Martial Law authorities in July 1977. Benazir could not develop trust based relation with GIK from the day one. She could not trust on a character who has been so closely connected with Zia-ul-Haq.


Benazir wanted to repeal the 8th amendment of the Constitution. An issue that had ruined the relations between Benazir and Ishaq Khan. When Benazir realized that her position was weak on this aspect and she had no support of opposition then she given up the idea to repeal the 8th amendment which has deteriorated her relations with GIK. She made a partial successful try to again normalize her relations with president and on March 23, 1990 (the eve of Pakistan Day) both looked stress-free and confident but this reconciliation did not last long.

Another issue which spoiled the relations of Benazir with GIK was the decision of the retirement of Admiral Sirohey in July 1989, the motive of Benazir behind this move was to prove herself more powerful than GIK(Siddique, 2002 p, 377). Prime Minister said that Sirohey had ended his three years term as Admiral, so he should be retired but the President was of the view the admiral would only retire after completing his three years tenure as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and that the President alone had the discretionary power to appoint and fire the armed services chiefs. Benazir Bhutto argued that as Chief Executive of the country she had authority to dismiss them(Lamb, 1991 p,116). Benazir once again had to retreat as Mohammad Waseem argues that Sirohey's continuation in office give evidence that 8th amendment has moved supreme power outside the parliament(Wasseem, 1992 p, 624).

Another issue which proved destructive in the relation of PM and President was the appointments in higher judiciary. In the caretaker government GIK made 50 appointments in the superior judiciary. Benazir discussed this issue with CJP Muhammed Haleem to take his opinion as SC has ruled that judges of SC and HCs could not be appointed without the consultation of PM. Benazir cancelled the appointments but Ishaq Khan's opinion was that he can appoint the judges. The matter came up before the two member bench of LHC which, without hearing the point of view of the federation, ruled in favour of the President(Nasir.1990 p,32). The federal government challenged LHC verdict in SCP but latter this matter was settled out of court and it was accepted that PM's advice is mandatory for the appointments of higher judiciary. After the agreement the federal government withdrew its appeal but as Nasir has described that this tussle further eclipsed the relations of PM and President.

At the time of the formation of NWFP government Benazir made an agreement with ANP about the appointment of Governor. Under an agreement with the ANP, Benazir was bound to appoint its nominee as the governor of NWFP. ANP proposed the name of Mr. Abdul Khaliq Khan. But president ignored the summery of PM and appointed his own loyal Amir Gulistan Janjua as governor of NWFP(Abbas, 1997 p,89). As Yasmeen had stated that Ghulam Ishaq Khan often took his own stand on national and international issues(Yasmeen, 1994).

Diagram 3.1: First Term of Benazir Bhutto 1988-1990



Source: Researcher own constructed

3.17 Dissolution of Government

In a morning of 6th August 1990, people were surprised to read a news which was published in 'Nawa-e-waqt (an urdu newspaper) that assemblies would be dissolved today by the president. All the Ministers including Benazir were not aware about this news. Benazir took it as the conspiracy of IJI. To know about the exact situation, Benazir asked one of the faithful of president Happy Minwalla to find out the intentions of the President. Robert B.Oakly also met the president to know his position and both (Happy Minwala and Robert B) reported back that president had denied these stories.

In this situation of uncertainty, it was announced that a press conference is going to be held in the presidency at 5pm. everyone was looking forward to the press conference. In press conference, GIK announced that he had dissolved the assemblies by using the power of 58(2) (b) of the Constitution(R. Khan, 1998). The assemblies of NWFP and Sindh were also dissolved and the same day order of dissolution was also issued. Following charges were made, corruption, administrative malfunctioning, disrespect towards the Senate and courts of law, , political confrontation, horse trading infringement of Constitutional provisions.(Bashir, 2015) president further leveled charges by saying that the Civil services of Pakistan had been undermined by disregarding the provisions of Article 240 and 242. The government was guilty of a number of acts of omission and commission including corruption and nepotism in corporations and banks; failure to arrest internal disturbances in the Sindh, resulting heavy loss of life and property; open disrespect shown to the superior courts; misuse of authority, resources and agencies of the federal government for personal gains. In fact dissolution order were a charge sheet against Benazir. Emergency was imposed in the country under article 232 (1) of the Constitution.

Benazir promptly rejected all the allegations and said that dissolution of the assemblies was unlawful and unconstitutional (Ziring, 1991 p 113). Benazir declared this dissolution as reported in Dawn newspaper on 7th of August 1990 ‘constitutional coup’. How army was backing the president it can be seen by the statement of General Baig when he was talking to newsmen at State Guest House, General Mirza Aslam Baig termed the presidential action to dissolve the assemblies as a Constitutional and timely decision (Ahmed p, 618). He said it should have been taken few weeks earlier. Dissolution of assemblies once again proven the fact that the inherent nature of the Eighth Amendment was unfair against suave working of representative system.

On the other hand Benazir in a press conference at Bilawal house Karachi said that president has took this step under the pressure of army. In the next two days all provincial assemblies were dissolved as well but there is difference of the dissolution of Punjab and Baluchistan assemblies. These two assemblies were dissolved by the recommendation of the respective CMs.

3.18 Aftermaths of the dissolution

The PPP challenged the dissolution orders in Sindh High Court, Balochistan High Court, Lahore High Court, and Peshawar High Court under the Article 199. The federal government requested the Supreme Court to consolidate all the writ petitions, on the command of SCP the writ petitions pending in Peshawar High Court was shifted to the Lahore High Court. The petition filed in Quetta High Court was move to the Sindh High Court (Dawood, 1994a). The LHC endorsed the presidential order and gave its decision on 14 October 1990 while validating first reason stated in the Presidential order. The decision of LHC was challenged before the SCP. Supreme Court upheld the judgment of Lahore High Court Decision. In Sindh High Court the

full bench comprised of four judges and the Chief Justice heard the petitions on September 24, 1990(Bashir, 2015). The reserved ruling was announced on October 18, 1990 and the petition was dismissed by the unanimous order of the Court(Dawood, 1994a).

According to the article 243(1) of the Constitution armed forces are under the command of the federal government but instead of this that army performs its duties under federal government but in fact it is running the state according to its wishes. GIK and General Baig did not allow Benazir to run her government according to her wishes. It was the army and bureaucracy that bypassed the Constitution and controlled the Constitutional powers which should have been exercised by the elected people. Later, Lt. General Aslam Jan Mahsood said that at the start of 1990, army decided to overthrow the government of Benazir when she indulged in confrontation with army on the issue of retirement of Admiral Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey on the wrong advice of Nasirullah Babar(Dawood, 1994a). However it is an established fact that army was behind the move of president. Moreover, Benazir was thought as security risk. Consequently, distraction and enmity existed between the army elites and Benazir Bhutto. Only Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani Group) was the party which disparaged the dissolution.

3.19 Caretaker Government

After the dissolution of Benazir's government it was compulsory to appoint a caretaker government to run the functions of the country. In this regard the president had maximum powers to appoint the caretaker government and these powers were used as he (Ghulam Ishaq Khan) wished. In forming the caretaker cabinet it must be kept in mind that caretaker setup should be unbiased and non-partisan. But in this cabinet this rule/norms was not applied. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi who was leader of the

opposition in Benazir's government was appointed as caretaker PM. The CMs, particularly from the Punjab and Sindh, were booked from the opposition, mainly from those people who were openly intolerant toward PPP. Ghulam Haider Wyne, The caretaker CM of Punjab, was selected by Nawaz Sharif(H. Khan, 2005).

By pondering at the caretaker cabinet No one could anticipate free and fair election. Throughout the Punjab, Mr. Ghulam Haider Wyne openly campaigned for IJI and in this regard, he offered all the resources. New elections of NA and Provincial Assemblies were scheduled on October 24 and 27, 1990 respectively(Shāh, 2001). Not only PPP was criticizing on the biased formation of the caretaker government but the JUI (F) and Maulana Shah Ahmed Norani also criticized the caretaker setup. The President, in the broadcast to the nation on October 23, 1990 through media, a day before the polls, appealed to the voters to reject PPP(Dawn.24October 1990). This was not only the president who was favoring the IJI but PM as well. Mr. Jatoi asked the interior ministry for the formation of special courts for the trial of ex-government on the allegations of nepotism and corruption(Shaikh, 2000). The purpose of this move was to engage the PPP in courts. Under the parliament act of 1977, disqualification courts were setup for the trial of parliamentarians for their misconduct.

On the other hand, to counter IJI, Benazir formed an alliance with small parties like Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Jafariyyah (TNFJ), Muslim League (Qasim Group) and Tehrek-e-Istaqlal (TI) which was named Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA). The PPP issued a white paper in which it criticized that caretaker government is biased and an election cell is in operation in presidency under General Rafiqat on the direction of the president(PDA White Paper on Elections 1990, 48-49). There were lot of question marks on the 1990's elections. Military was also supporting the IJI as

latter in a statement the DG ISI of that time Asad Durani said that the then COAS General Aslam Baig advised him to divide money among those politicians who are contesting against PPP/PDA(Rizvi, 2000 p,280). Benazir also tried to make an alliance with MQM but MQM joined hand with IJI.

Ex.PM Muhammed Khan Juneju wished that Muslim League should contest the elections separately not from the platform of IJI but as Bashir narrated that the powerful institutions advise was given to them that they should contest the election from IJI's platform. All the government machinery was being used against PPP/PDA. During election campaign, Benazir was addressing the election meetings and on the other hand she was appearing in the courts regularly. A Fatwa (a religious order) was also issued or taken by Imam of Badshahi Mosque Maulvi Abdul Qadir Azad. He gave fatwa that any person who supported Benazir would be thrown in hell on the Day of Judgement. It was prohibited In the Constitution and election laws, to not influence the voters and punishment was set in case of breaking the law. But the *moulvi* was never blamed for providing the *fatwas* against any party(S. S. Ali, 2003). The 22nd of the October was the last day of election campaign. Generally, elections campaign was more negative than positive.

3.20 Elections Results

General elections 1990 of national and provincial assemblies were held on 24 and 27 of October respectively. Total seats of national assembly were 207 (Muslim) and 460 general seats of provincial assemblies. There were 1340 candidates of NA elections and 3593 of provincial assemblies candidates till the day of election.

Table 3.2: Position of Political Parties/alliances in General Elections 1990

Party/alliance	Elected candidates
Islami Jamhoori Ittehad/IJI	106
Pakistan Democratic Alliance/PDA	44
Awami National Party	06
MQM	15
JUI(F)	6
Other small parties/ independents	30

Source: ECP report on general elections 1990, vol.1 Islamabad

In elections PPP/PDA won 44 seats, IJI 106, ANP 6, MMQM 15, JUI (f) 6 and other small parties and independent were 30. PDA rejected the election results and stated rigging(Jaffrelot, 2004b). In fact no party could produce any evidence.

Table 3.3: Party position in provincial elections 1990

Sr.No	Party	Punjab	Sindh	Balochistan	NWFP	Total
1	PDA	10	46	02	06	64
2	IJI	214	06	07	33	260
3	ANP				23	23
4	HPG		28			28
5	JWP			10		10
6	JUI(F)			06	02	08
7	PNP			05		05
8	PKMAP			03		03
9	BNM			02	02	
10	PDP	02				02
11	SNA (HJ)		01			01
12	independent	14	19	05	16	54
	total	240	100	40	80	460

Source: ECP report on general election 1990

3.21 Formation of Federal Government

On 4th of November 1990 speaker and deputy speaker were elected Gauhar Ayub and Nawaz Khokar respectively. On 6th November Nawaz got the vote of confidence by obtaining 153 votes while his contesteer Afzal Khan got 39 votes

(Munir, 1975). On the same day emergency was lifted. Nawaz sharif in his maiden speech said;

1. Pakistan would retain friendly relations with all its neighboring countries, especially with the People's Republic of China, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and America.
2. Government would endeavor to secure the right of self-determination for subjugated Kashmiri Muslims according to the United Nations resolutions.
3. Good neighborly relations with India would be worked on.
4. Pakistan would endorse and give full support to the right of Muslims all over the world.
5. The power crisis which had been generated on account of the rise in oil prices had made it incumbent on Pakistan, further its peaceful nuclear programme. Government would discharge its obligations in this regard in accordance with national feelings and aspirations. Massive industrialization could not be accomplished without a peaceful nuclear energy programme.
6. A wide-ranging national reconstruction plan would be undertaken and ad-hocism would be shunned.
7. Denationalization undertaken for of sick industries would be economic uplift.

Nawaz Sharif got the two third majority first time in the political history of Pakistan. He made his government not only in center but in all the provinces as well. Nawas Sharif also had the advantage that he had good relations with army and president(Kukreja, V. 1991 p,665). He sworn in without any pre conditions. After taking his oath, Nawas sharif promised that he would make Pakistan prosperous and a strong Islamic country. President GIK always extended his support to Nawaz Sharif but this friendliness did not remain longer and due to many reasons they indulged in

conflicts which proved harmful for both Nawaz sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan and for the politics of Pakistan.

3.22 Economic Reforms

Nawaz Sharif proved a business friendly and action oriented PM. The government of Nawaz Sharif started aspiring projects to improve and increase the national infrastructure in the vital areas of telecommunication, highways, and power generation in a short period of time. The Nawaz Sharif's government also tried to resolve long standing problems. On two vital issue consensus was developed among the provinces.

- The distribution of Indus river water between the Provinces, awaiting an agreement since the creation of Pakistan
- National Finance Commission award on the distribution of sources of revenue between the Federation and the provinces pending since 1975

These two issues were being ignored since long(Yusuf, 1999 p,239). Nawaz Sharif quickly restored the confidence of business community of the country. He took decisive and concrete steps toward denationalization of huge and inefficient public sector industrial units and allowed new banks to be formed in private sector. The Government was able to pinpoint 115 industrial units for denationalization. Thirty five units were denationalized in 1991-92 And 28 more in 1992-93, in addition to two commercial banks, the Muslim Commercial Bank(MCB) and the Allied Bank(Yusuf, 1999).

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was determined to reduce the dependence on foreign aids and loans. He was eager to make country prosperous with local resources. He was sure that Pakistan can make progress while using the local resources. Keeping in mind his targets, an ordinance was issued on August 1991 by the name Protection

of Economic Reforms Ordinance. Two more ordinances were issued to meet the challenges of the time in December 1991 and April 1992. The purpose of these ordinances was the same. A permanent law was passed by the assembly in July 1992 which is called Protection of Economic Reforms Act. The following reforms were made in this act;

1. Any Pakistani who is living in Pakistan or abroad his all foreign exchanges and transactions were protected.
2. All Pakistani will enjoy the immunity from income tax whether they are living in Pakistan or abroad.
3. All the Banks will insure to keep secrecy on the foreign currency's transactions.
4. There would be no restriction on deposit or withdrawal of foreign money.
5. All foreign currency accounts will be exempted from income and wealth tax.
6. Mystery of bonafide banking exchanges was needed to be carefully seen by all banks and monetary foundations by whomsoever possessed, Controlled or oversaw them{protection of Economic Reform Act}

Import and export of foreign trade, holding of foreign exchange and opening of money records, deal and acquisition of foreign trade in the open market and settlement of profits and disinvestments continues was permitted. The necessity of government authorize for private investments besides if there should be an occurrence of areas on negative rundown was nullified. Various other administrative limitations on industry were additionally removed(Yusuf, 1999 p, 237). Although Pakistan was facing American Sanctions, due to these measures economic condition of the country

improved. In the result of these reforms a reasonable foreign investment was attracted by Pakistan.

3.23 Yellow Cab Scheme

Nawaz Sharif was launching scheme after scheme to boost economic condition of Pakistan. In this regard for the reduction of unemployment a scheme was launched which was called “yellow cab” scheme. Under this scheme, yellow taxis were given to unemployed people. This scheme contributed a lot in public transport.

Different projects of motorways were launched in different parts of the state such as Lahore to Islamabad Motorway. Economic policies of the government were appreciated by the experts.

3.24 Water consensus

An issue which had created a sense of deprivation in the smaller provinces, with the efforts of Nawaz’s government a water accord was announced on March 25, 1991. As Nawaz has his own government in the Punjab, so it was easy for him to convince Punjab to sacrifice/surrender from its due right of water. The Punjab sacrificed and accepted a 6% cut from its share of water for the smaller provinces. This sacrifice not only resolve the issue but also reduced the negative feelings of smaller provinces against Punjab and a water regulatory authority was formed/made(Chaudhary, p 135).

3.25 Shariat Bill and Nawaz Government

In election campaign, Nawaz Sharif and his alliance IJI had campaigned to make Pakistan a strong Islamic state. The IJI also criticized on Benazir that she is a symbol of West. It also got fatwas from religious scholars against Benazir. As it is mentioned earlier that Imam of Badshahi Mosque Maulvi Abdul Qadir Azad gave

fatwa that any person who supported Benazir would be thrown in hell on the Day of Judgement. It was prohibited in the Constitution and election laws, to influence the voters and punishment was set in case of breaking the law but the moulvi was never blamed for providing the *fatwas* against any party (S. S. Ali, 2003). Some rightest parties were part of IJI. Moreover, Nawaz himself was in favor of Shariat Bill. He showed great interest in this Bill. A committee consisting of Ulama's, (Religious scholars), MNA's, lawyers, judges and senators was made in March, 1991. This committee was consisted of 11 members and it was headed by law Minister. On 8th of May, 1991, eight members attended the session and out of them four rejected the bill.

On the other hand PDA had lot of reservations on the bill. It was the burning desire of the government to pass the bill as soon as possible. The PDA presented its amendments for the bill with some probes.

This bill became a challenge for Nawaz government as a rightest party JUI (S)'s head stated that this bill is against the true spirit of Islam as in this bill it was proposed that president and PM would be exempted to appear before any court of law. While giving an interview to the *The Herald*, Karachi, April 1991 Benazir said that this bill is a scorn of parliament, by taking its powers away and giving it to nominated characters. When rightest parties started to speak against this bill, this created a new challenge for Nawaz's government.

3.26 Senate Elections

The election of upper house/ senate were held on 14th of March 1991. In these elections government was trying its best to get the majority in senate and was trying to wipe out the opposition. Interesting fact of election was this that the majority of people who got the tickets from government were those who had the blessings of establishment and president. Only from Punjab IJI was provided total eleven tickets

out which five were nominated by President GIK. Nawaz Sharif and his party was not happy on this development. Jam Sadiq Ali (CM of Sindh) was using all the powers to control the MNAs of PPP/PDA from costing the vote. Sherry Rehman, one of the vocal spokesperson of PPP stated that Nawaz had granted Jam Sadiq enough powers to do so (S. Rehman, "Stormy Weather", The Herald, 1991).

PDA asked government to delay the hearing of cases against the MNAs of PDA and also threatened the government to release the MNAs of PDA otherwise they will boycott the elections. At that time the attitude of Nawaz Sharif was positive toward the demands of PDA and he accepted the demands to avoid the deadlock. In elections the ruling party IJI won 23 seats out of 42 and PDA won 5 seats (Dawn, 15 March 1991).

3.27 Twelfth Amendment

Nawaz got the chance to come into power when President GIK used the power of 8th amendment of the Constitution. The allegations which were leveled against Benazir law bad law and order situation was one of them. Nawaz Sharif was determined to improve the law and order situation but in this regard it wished maximum powers to tackle the prevailing situation. To get these powers there was a need to amend the constitution but at that time coalition parties were not interested in this law making process as Dawn reported on July 8, 1991 that JUI(F), JUP(N) and ANP were ready to abstain away from this amendment.

Eventually, the government succeeded in making a consensus for a constitutional amendment to improve law and order. This amendment had offered immense power to the state government. The suggested period of the amendment was three years and was to break after three years. To finish and crush the terrorism it was up to federal government to decide any area affected by terrorism but how to crush

the terrorism, it was not decided and was left for government to decide it. The IJI had also tabled four bills in the House, namely, the criminal law (third amendment) bill, 1991; Illicit arms ordinance, 1991; the terrorist affected area (special courts) bill, 1991; and the special courts for speedy trials bill, 1991. The opposition called these four bills as “black laws”(Bashir, 2015 p,150). Article 212B was added to the Constitution. The purpose of this amendment was to establish special courts for speedy trial of heinous offences (Twelfth Amendment Act, 1991). The Twelfth amendment reduced the authority of customary criminal courts to attempt those criminal cases that were indicated by law to them. Through this amendment authority of SC and HC was truncated.

On 18 July 1991 voting on the Twelfth Amendment took place and 152 votes were in favour whereas 33 were against it. Nawaz obtained a justifiable and legitimate instrument under the Twelfth Amendment to effectively wipe out the opposition. With the consensus of the federal government and the Chief Justice of the High Court, the judges of the special court had to be appointed. The federal government was in a position to approve the names of the judges that could produce the results of their choices. The provision that allowed the federal government to declare a state of emergency in any part of the country was removed(Nisar Osmani, “Undue Haste”, Dawn, Karachi, July 20,1991). This amendment was passed in such a hurry that opposition was deprived of their Constitutional right to speak on the bill.

3.28 Operation Clean up and Law and Order Situation in Sindh

The political situation in Sindh had a major impact on Islamabad. The pattern of political development was similar to the situation that occurred in 1990 just before the government of the PPP was dissolved. The bureaucracy believed that it could not "last beyond June" the way in which the government was handling the affairs (Lodhi

& Hussain, 1992). The law and order situation in Sindh was not improving for the last six years.

MQM was a coalition partner with IJI in Sindh. To control situation in Sindh, operation cleanup was started under the supervision of CM Sindh, corps commander and Inspector General Police of Sindh. The military authorities said that local/ Sindh administration is noncooperative. The military authorities also complained against one of the ethnic group of pressurizing about the release of its workers. MQM asked federal government to give explanation on operation cleanup. The MQM (A) left the session of the National Assembly in protest against the operation(Askari, 1992). To appease Altaf Hussain, Nawaz meet with him in London but in vain. MQM asked government and military authorities that law and order situation was poor in rural not urban area.

The coalition government in Sindh was working smoothly before the operation cleanup. The MQM left the coalition due to this operation. In the meanwhile, opposition called All Parties Conference (APC) to discuss the situation. The APC said that due to the operation, reputation of army is eclipsed and army is becoming controversial. The APC noted that there was no action against known terrorists in cities because whenever law enforcement agencies arrested the perpetrators, they are released because of their political links with the Sindh government's alliance party. APC demanded for the dissolution of federal and provincial governments.

MQM was assured that the purpose of operation was to eliminate MQM (Askari, 1992). MQM was confident that without its support it would be difficult for IJI to maintain its government in Sindh and it asked its MPAs to resign. The resignations were accepted in November 1992. Benazir criticized on the prevailing

law and ordered and political situation. She said that during her tenure, instead of bad law and order situation, she never imposed article 147 in Sindh (Askari, 1992).

3.29 Absence of Omnipotence of Parliament

The attitude of the government and opposition did not promote democratic customs. The image of Parliament and parliamentarians was badly affected by a non-democratic attitude. With the passage of time, due to the repeated boycott of National Assembly sessions by the opposition and the slow pace of legislation, the state of affairs was further intensified. The issues also mirrored the government's laxity towards parliamentary institutions and their fiasco to realize their role in a democratic set-up. As Maleeha Lodhi says that Prime Minister decides the working of the parliamentary behavior of majority party, Nawaz Sharif's political nurturing during the period of Martial Law in which assemblies held secondary position was major cause of the problem. During Nawaz Sharif's government Parliament remained powerless as Speaker of the national assembly Gohar Ayub writes;

“Getting a quorum in the National Assembly session was a major problem. Hardly any of the members would be present in the scheduled time. To at least maintain a semblance of decorum, I would start the session in time and adjourn the House if a lack of quorum persisted even after summoning the members(G. A. Khan, 2007).” With a few exemption, the Ministers were never able during the question hour to reply the questions. They would always postpone their answer to the next day. In fact parliament is a forum to discuss different issues of national interest but due to the lack of democratic spirit it did not happen.

3.30 Building Democracy without Democrats

The politics of Pakistan was in the hands of two young bloods Nawaz Sharif and Benazir. Both were immature and were playing in the hands of power pillars. They adopted aggressive attitude toward each other rather to create a sense of harmony and cooperation. Both Nawaz and Benazir were not ready to support each other in the larger interest of the state. When Benazir was in confrontation with president at that time Nawaz remain on the side of president and when Nawaz was in a confrontation/rivalry position with president and Nawaz was in a mood to amend the 8th amendment, now Benazir sided with president. She forgot that this was the person who dissolved her government with the axe of 58(2) (b). in the start of Nawaz's government, she thought to support Nawaz and make an alliance with him but then she turned her thinking and got the help of Roedad Khan (Khan was an ex bureaucrat and confident one of president) to normalize her relations with president. She assured president that she will not stand with Nawaz in the process to repeal the 8th amendment. She further assured GIK that she would nominate him as president for the next term (Talbot, 1998). She also asked him to fulfil his quest of power if he dissolve the government of her rival (Jaffrelot, 2002). This shows how political elite compromise for personal interest and work against democracy (R. A. Khan, 1993).

During each attempt to play the zero-sum game, political parties and the Nawaz Sharif government were locked in bitter antipathies. There were no parallels to their bitterness. During the two years of the government of the IJI under Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister and the President did not meet with opposition leader even for a single time (R. A. Khan, 1993).

On Nawaz Sharif's failure to curb the ethnic trouble in Sindh, PDA took its full advantage of the situation. The PDA alleged the IJI for peddling the Muslim

Commercial Bank (MCB) and condemned the insolvency of certain cooperatives owned by the IJI Ministers and members(Wasseem, 1992a). So political of confrontation and politics of conspiracy and counter conspiracy was on its full swing.

Meanwhile a long march call was announced by Benazir scheduled on 18th November 1992. She explained the long march in these words:

“We are not looking towards A, B or C for our demands. We represent the poor, oppressed people who want to demonstrate against a corrupt and illegitimate government which is a product of ballot fraud.” She also explained the terminology adopted for the march: “the demonstrations led by Boris Yeltsin in front of the Kremlin, by religious leaders in Iran and in Manila were not aimed at personalities”(Dawn, November 11,1992).

The army interfered in this matter and send a strong direct message to Nawaz sharif and Benazir to settle the issues with dialogue. A realistic analysis of political trick of Benazir Bhutto divulges that she played the game of political realism, showing little respect for democratic morality(Rasul Bakhsh Rais, 2019).

3.31 Nawaz Sharif, Army and confrontation

Nawaz Sharif had to work hard to secure his position in the system in contrast with powerful pillars of the polity President and military administration. He had three different options; to stay submissive before the President and military; to embrace hostile stance and collide with them or to deal with a fair working arrangements. COAS and president was not ready to make Nawaz PM nor was Nawaz their first choice. Nawaz Sharif Began to declare his position as elected PM of the nation. Since the Baiginning of his political career, his power and impact stayed restricted in the

region of Punjab. The appointive triumph in the 1990 election and the presumption of the workplace as head administrator gave him another certainty, since he held authority at the public level. The economic changes constantly made the picture of a man determined to lead Pakistan into the 21st century as modern industrialized state. He was a representative of working class and enjoyed the help of the trading community and by and large the urbanized segment of the society. Under 8th amendment president was the central figure of powers but Nawaz Sharif started to use the real authority of PM.

Aslam baig was the main architecture of IJI and he was ready to control the political system or he was wishing a big hand in political affairs but it did not happen(Lodhi & Hussain, 1992). The army was hoping that Nawaz Sharif will restore the military assistance of USA which was suspended, by using some diplomatic channels but he failed to do so. In addition the USA put Pakistan in the watch list of terrorism sponsoring state. The army was unhappy on this development(Rizvi, 1998).

Differences between General Baig and Nawaz Sharif emerged over several issues such as appointments in intelligence services, Gulf war, law and order situation in Sindh(Mahmood, 2000 p,71). The issue of Gulf war proved very fatal for Nawaz and army relations. Nawaz and General Baig openly disagreed on Gulf war. On 2nd of August 1990 Kuwait was attacked by Iraq and Saudi Arabia and UAE were also receiving threats of attack. At this time, Saudi Arabia and UAE requested Pakistan to provide them security with forces but at that time caretaker government under Jatoi was in position to take such decision and when Nawaz Sharif came to power this issue become a bone of contention between him and army. General Baig wished to support Iraq and he publically stated that in this war Iraq will win but Nawaz Sharif was against this point of view. Government made a decision to send an armored brigade to

the Gulf in backing of USA and its allies but General Baig, publically opposed the decision which blushed the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif complained to president on the attitude of COAS but he took no action(Warraich, 2006 p,94). Shahid Khaqan Abbasi later observed in an interview: “Aslam Baig did Pakistan a tremendous financial lose in the Gulf War. He took stance which was militarily and politically incorrect. Nawaz should have fired him at that time. We recommended Nawaz Sharif to fire him as the Army Chief did not have any right to make irresponsible statements. The Egyptian had given 10 billion dollar worth of aid and 10 billion was waived off. So, in this context Aslam Baig did tremendous damage to Pakistan.”

Public sentiments on gulf war were in favor of Iraq and Saddam Hussain (president of Iraq). Big rallies and procession were being arranged in favor of Iraqi forces. The head of Jamiat Ulma Pakistan (JUP) Shah Ahmed Norani asked people to pray for the victory of Iraq and Saddam Hussain. Huge posters of Saddam Hussain were hanging here and there. Maulana Abdusttar Khan Niazi, who was general secretary of JUP and a cabinet member of Nawaz, resigned from the cabinet in protest against Nawaz’s decision to not send troops in favor of Iraq(Talbot, 1998 p,316). JI which was a biggest part of IJI after Muslim League, also organized rallies against the decision of government and in favor of Iraqi forces and Saddam Hussain(Abbas, 2005a). Nawaz Sharif knew that he has taken a step which was very unpopular in Pakistan so, he decided to normalize the situation at home and at international level. He sent a message to Saddam Hussain to settle the issue in peaceful way. He also asked Saddam to withdraw his forces from Kuwait.

The difference between Nawaz and COAS continued to escalation. For instance when Baig issued a statement about dangers to security of country and chance of an attack by India, Foreign office straightaway repudiated any strain with

India. The propaganda campaign of COAS continued against Nawaz Sharif which badly affected Nawaz's relations with allies rightest parties(Nasr, 1992). Even after the retirement of Gen. Baig, PM could not improve working liaisons with military leadership. At the time of Gen. Baig's retirement, Lt. General Shamim Alam was on the top on the basis of seniority and Lieutenant General Asif Nawaz was second in the line. Nawaz Sharif says that he had recommended another Lieutenant General's name for COAS (Warraich, 2006 p,95). Gohar Ayub Khan says that NS was predisposed towards Lieutenant General Hameed Gul who had good relations with the Sharif brothers(G. A. Khan, 2007 p, 22-223). President appointed General Asif Nawaz as COAS So, from the very first day Asif Nawaz's relations with Prime Minister were unpleasant.

On the issue of operation cleanup, the difference between Prime Minister and COAS widened. To improve the law and order situation in Sindh, PM under article 147 of the Constitution issued an order to dispatch the army in Sindh. It was asked the army to insure an operation against those who were involved in atrocious criminalities of massacring, preying and abduction. The army launched "operation Blue Fox" for six months. Law and order situation became batter due to this operation(R. A. Khan, 1993 p,103). Situation become tense when army on its own made a plan to extended this operation towards urban area of Sindh(Abbas, 2005 p,147). Many activists of MQM were captured in this operation which eclipsed the reputation of MQM. In this situation MQM blamed federal government for targeting MQM and as a protest left the alliance with government and later resigned from the assemblies.

An incident further intensified the situation when Lt.General meet with shehbaz Sharif (brother of Nawaz Sharif). General Asif Nawaz disliked this meeting and summoned the Lt. General and asked him to keep on waiting outside COAS

office. It is said that the Lt. General waited for two hours. The COAS gave him a very harsh lecture and asked him to do his job rather than to indulge with politicians(G. A. Khan, 2007 p,224).

Once in a meeting of MNA's in PM house one of the close MNA of MNS said that they would make General Gul Hassan as COAS in place of Asif Nawaz. One of the MNA reported this to COAS. In a meeting when PM's military secretary asked COAS to stay there for a private conversation with PM, the COAS replied that he will with PM on some other day. On this Nawaz asked President to remove Asif but he refused to do so(Bahadur, 1998 p,103).

3.32 President, Nawaz Sharif and Confrontation

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif both were blue eye of the establishment. Both had worked under Zia. Moreover, GIK supported Nawaz against Benazir but when Nawaz entered in the PM office their relations became bad to worse. Although in the Beginning of Nawaz period as PM, Nawaz enjoyed blessings of GIK but when Nawaz started to think to be a real PM as in parliamentary democracies there started a rift between Nawaz and Ishaq Khan. Nawaz used to say that according to parliamentary norms the PM should have vast powers. He said that he want to empower the parliament(Ziring, 1997). His relations with president remained not normal and with each passing day their relations became bad to worse.

When Nawaz announced on 21st February 1993 that his party is going to present a bill to repeal the 8th amendment. Nawaz himself said that he want to get the powers like British PM John Major(Siddique, 2002). When Nawaz took this decision it was not good time for him because he had lost two third majority in NA(Rasul Bakhsh Rais, 2019). Relation between Nawaz and GIK further deteriorated when in February 1993, Nawaz's party asked him that he (Nawaz) has the authority to

nominate the candidate for president. Nawaz remained silent and it was reported that Nawaz was thinking to nominate Syed Ghaus Ali Shah as his candidate for president(Syed, 1997). In this situation, GIK who had his close links with PML's MNAs and MPAs started meetings with them. Within two months, the politician of PML were either with GIK or NS(Abbas, 2005b).

When Nawaz saw the increasing relations of Benazir and president, he decided to normalize the relations with President. He meet with president on 23rd of March 1993 and declared GIK as his candidate for the president for next term but now it was too late. Nawaz's effort remained fruitless and the relations did not restore as both were not trusting each other and moreover, GIK was aiming at president office for the next term and Benazir had given him assurance that she will support him as she supported in 1988.

Another incident further increased the rift between Nawaz and Ghulam Ishaq and that was the sudden death of COAS Asif Nawaz Janjua. The death of COAS Asif Nawaz Janjua become a threat for Nawaz Sharif when the widow of late Asif Nawaz blamed that Nawaz Sharif and Ch.Nisar Ali Khan (one of the prominent leader of PML) are responsible for her spouse death. She further said that Janjua's death is a conspiracy. This political bombshell was 'apparently plotted by presidential camp(Amin, 1994a). To investigate the matter, Nawaz formed a commission under the supervision of senior judge of SCP justice Shafiquehman. After the postmortem of the body the commission gave its finding that the death of Janjua was due to heart failure.

When after the death of COAS Nawaz wished to appoint General Rahim Dil Bhatti or General Javed Ashraf Qazi as COAS but GIK decided to appoint General Farukh as COAS. In this situation, Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan (prominent leader of


PML and a very close to Nawaz Sharif) meet with Roedad Khan (Roedad Khan was a former bureaucrat and confident one of President) and requested him to normalize the situation and convince GIK to change his mind about the appointment of COAS. So, after meeting with Roedad Khan, GIK appointed General Waheed Kakkar as COAS.

Another incident which further deteriorated the relations of Nawaz and GIK was a rape case. A gang rape case's FIR was registered at Gizri Police Station Sindh in which the victim Veena Hayat (veena is a daughter of veteran Muslim League leader Shaukat Hayat and a close friend of Benazir was raped on November 27, 1991) blamed that Irfanullah Marwat (son in law of President GIK) is involved in this rape. Benazir raised this issue on the floor of the house. To know about the reality of the incident. Nawaz formed a commission under Lt. General Shafiq (retired). The commission prepared a report against son in law of president. This further deteriorated the relations between president and Nawaz Sharif.

3.33 Nawaz Address to the Nation

Nawaz Sharif addressed the nation on radio and television on 17 April 1993. The crux of his address was the sturdily worded that Ghulam Ishaq Khan was colluding to expel his valid government, and that the President had made it very tough for his government to function (Kennedy, 2019). He further said that presidency is being involved in conspiracy against his government. He defended his position as leader of the house audaciously and said that he is enjoying nation's mandate. He professed that "I shall resign. I shall not dissolve the Assembly. I shall not take dictation." He further said that his Shehbaz Sharif, my younger brother is offered Prime Minister Ship. Nawaz said that his party is united but on the same day his party split into two groups.

Diagram 3.2: Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's First Term 1990 to 1993



Problems for Nawaz Sharif

Nawaz sharif had to face the following problems which later incourged president to use 58(2)(b) against Nawaz Sharif;

- A rift was emerged within PML and a group within the party led by Juneju criticized Nawaz Sharif for not consulting with the party on important issues. This group supported 8th amendment which gave courage to GIK.
- When head of PML Juneju was died in USA on March 19, 1993 then Nawaz Sharif called a meeting of the party and became president of PML which was objected by many senior party members and many of them resigned as a protest.
- Opposition joined hands with president against Nawaz Sharif.
- The senators and MNAs of FATA joined the camp of president(Khan, 1997. P, 132)

3.34 Dissolution of Nawaz's Government

After the address it was expected that being a seasoned politician, GIK will response politely. But everyone was astonished to see the reaction of president GIK because Prime Minister's belligerent speech made this task easy for him. On 18th of April 1993, after getting the support of army and opposition, Ghulam Ishaq dissolved the government of Nawaz Sharif(H.-A. Rizvi, 1998b). Ghulam Ishaq Khan leveled the charges of economic crises, unsatisfactory situation, NS tried to hide misdeeds of his government, due to the predominance of federal government federating units are protesting, NFC was being complained by provinces, former PM had paralyzed the administrative machinery, national resources and wealth is being monopolized by few, sensitive departments were being nationalized like PIA, WAPDA etc. there was

a great criticism about the decision of GIK as there was no evidence that NS government lacking public or parliamentary support(Rasul Bux Rais, 1994). This action of president was declared illegal and unConstitutional by Nawaz Sharif(Ziring, 1997).

3.35 Petition against order of Dissolution

Gohar Ayube Khan, the speaker of national Assembly challenged the order of dissolution in LHC Rawalpindi bench under article 199 and requested the court to restore the assembly(G. A. Khan, 2007). While the petition of speaker was pending in the HC the ouster PM Nawaz filed a Constitutional petition under article 184(3) directly in SCP (any matter relating to human rights can be filed in SCP directly) and challenged the order of dissolution as this act of president was against the human rights. After the dissolution of NS government severe fall in country's foreign exchange reserves reflected the fear and uncertainty President's action had caused among public(Yasmeen, 1994).

Petition was heard by full bench of 11 judges headed by CJ Naseem Hassan Shah. SCP heard this petition on day-to-day basis. On 26 of May 1993, the SCP gave its verdict and restored the assembly and government of Nawaz Sharif. This decision was not being expected by the court(Ziring, 1997). It is debated that the judiciary's exceptional judgement in favor of representative instead of the establishment was in fact psychological reaction to an avowal of General (Retd.) Aslam Baig revealing that he did try to influence the SCP in 1988, not to give a judgment for the refurbishment of Muhammad Khan Junejo's sacked government(Amin, 1994a).

3.36 Political Crises in the Punjab

When GIK dissolved the government of Nawaz he made Sher Baz Mazari of IJI as caretaker PM on 18 April 1993. The caretaker government was mostly composed of PPP and PML (Junejo). After the restoration of the government by the SCP, NS took the vote of confidence from the house on 27 May 1993 and Nawaz got 123 votes. In Jun, PM and President meet and declared to work together but later developments proved that the statement of GIK was not true. When Nawaz Sharif's government was dissolved many MPAs of PML joined hand with president and revolted against CM Ghulam Haider Wyne. With the force of no confidence they removed him from the office on 15 April 1993. Manzoor Watto who was speaker of provincial assembly became CM with the support of 151 votes. To ensure his grip on Punjab, president appointed Chaudhry Altaf Hussain of PPP as the governor of the province on 24th of April 1993 but when the assembly was restored, the MPAs were ready to change their loyalties and to join the Nawaz's camp. Nawaz Sharif nominated Chaudhry Pervez Elahi as his candidate for CM Punjab. To avoid this situation the governor of the Punjab dissolved the Punjab assembly on 29 May 1993 on the advice of CM and the governor further asked Manzoor Watto to remain in office as caretaker CM (Ata Khan, 2019). Pervez Elahi challenged this governor's order in LHC and on 9 Jun 1993, court gave its verdict for the restoration of the assembly. The order of the governor was declared unlawful. But CM Manzoor again advised the governor to dissolve the assembly who dissolved the assembly immediately. Under article 234 of the Constitution of Pakistan on 29 June 1993 the Federal government issued a proclamation to place Punjab under federal rule and appointed Mian Mohammad Azhar as Administrator representing the federal government. Although this decision was taken in joint house meeting (opposition

boycotted the session) but President Ghulam Ishaq Khan instantly repudiated signing the proclamation placing Punjab under federal rule (Ata Khan, 2019). Hence, two parallel governments were operating in Punjab and there was possibility of civil disorder breaking out. PM ordered federal paramilitary troops to remove the Governor and CM to install his appointees while Governor and CM summoned police to guard them. Army mediated and ordered the withdrawal of paramilitary troops. Thus on 11 July, Nawaz Sharif government postponed the operation of its orders to enforce federal rule in the Punjab (Inayatullah, 1997). On the other hand CM of NWFP Mir Afzal Khan advised Governor Amir Gulistan Janjua to dissolve the NWFP assembly on 30 May 1993. The motive behind move was to avoid no confidence motion.

3.37 Corps Commander Meeting and End of Democratic Rule

After a series of meetings between troika situation remained tense. A corps commander's emergency meeting was held on 2 July 1993 in which some decisions were made regarding prevailing political situation. COAS General Kakkar asked Nawaz Sharif to hold fresh elections. Nawaz Sharif agreed on the formula which is also called Kakkar Formula and advised the president to dissolve the assembly with this condition that he (president) will also stepped down. Assembly was dissolved and then GIK stepped down from the presidency.

3.38 An analysis of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif's First Tenure

The experience of Pakistan in democracy does not represent the moral values relevant to the interaction between government and opposition, as it has to function in the sense of neo-viceregalism. Neo-viceregalism in Pakistan can be described as a political structure governed by civil-military administrations and a political presence of feudal rulers, imperialist, industrial, religious and professional elites. The ideal

democracy's principles and traditions cannot be completely operationalized and assured under such an operating environment.

The period of 1988-1993 shows that the presence of opposition in Pakistan's politics was unsuccessful, insufficient and unreliable, which could be highlighted as the main explanation for the country's lack of democracy. Due to this attitude of opposition Ideal democracy's traditions could not be completely enforced, implemented and ensured.

After a long struggle against martial law by the democratic powers, the establishment of vice regal democracy under the 8th Constitutional amendment system had been assured but could not endure in the power game between the competing power centers. Indeed the opposition could not adjust itself between majority parity and vice-regal power centers. In reality, in the vice regal democracy power game, representative and anti-representative, democratic and non-democratic powers have been competing for positions, where the opposition can play a counter balancing role, ensuring that democratic values over practices of despotisms, self-rule and authoritarianism. Instead of reinforcing elected governments, the opposition regularly lined up against the government of the ruling party with non-democratic vice regal centres, which contributed to the pause in democratic development of Pakistan.

The unseen yet most important role played by the military establishment through its intelligence services in political matters was a further trend regarding the role and presence of the opposition in the vice regal order. Via its overt and covert efforts mainly against the party in governing the Civil-Military Establishment has remained engage in coordinating the opposition alliances. It seemed that the opposition was seeking support of hidden organs of military establishment. This

pattern of relationship inevitably weakened and compromised the level of opposition's commitment to the principles of democracy and did not enable it to achieve a consensus on basic minimum requirements of democracy with the party in government.

In this era of democracy 1988-1993, Pakistan was building democracy without democrats. After the death of Zia-ul-Haq democracy lovers were thinking and hoping for the new democratic era will start and their hopes comes true when new party based elections were announced in 1988 but these hopes bungled to bear any fruit. Behavior of establishment shows their belief on democracy that instead of this that Benazir got majority in elections, she was not allowed to form her government with ease. Before forming her government she had to satisfy the military and president. After assuming the office of Prime Minister, she was not allowed to run the function of the state according to her own policy as she herself stated that even phone calls were misdirected(Lamb, 1991). The political scene in the polity was characterized by confrontation. After assuming the office both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif stuck in confrontation with each other and failed to realize their job and responsibility. Benazir and Nawaz Sharif remain dependent on the army. Their conflict were not about policy matters but for power. They proved themselves power voracious. They remained busy in back door politics.

Nawaz Sharif started his political career under the umbrella of Zia-ul-Haq. He remained in open relations with military establishment. He enjoyed the blessings of military establishment. His open call to president and military to interfere in political matters shows his belief in democracy. During 1990-1993 when he was governing the state his approach toward political and national matters was not democratic at all. He

relied on ordinances. In his first term 78 ordinances were issued. He always wished to have maximum powers.

Both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif adopted the policy of favoritism. They never asked questions to their MNAs and MPAs about their wrong deeds. They introduced the system of horse trading. Loyalties of the political leaders was purchased. It seen frequently in both the periods from 1988-1993. They both failed to perform their role as leader of the house and leader of the opposition positively. Moreover, the hung parliament was also a reason of political instability. The alliances made governments remained all the time under threats of alliance partners during the period of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif. The coalition partners could not develop a sense of compromise on common interests. The coalition partners always threatened the party in government to leave the alliance.

On the matter of appointments in military, both Benazir and Nawaz were struck in conflict all the time. Being an elected PM and according to the norms of the parliamentary democratic system, they wished to appoint COAS and on other key position their own choice but all the time president and military establishment created hurdles in their way. These conflicts created a sense of disappointment in the hearts of the democracy lovers. Even in some cases president who possess lot of powers under the 8th amendment of the Constitution, locked in confrontation that he had to resign along with the resign of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif(Haroon, 2004).

Democracy was restored in Pakistan after a long interval but the attitude of the political elite and military elite was making its face ugly. It does not mean that democracy is not a good form of government but these are undemocratic behavior of the political leaders. When these leaders are in opposition they talk about democracy and when they assume power they practice autocratically. Pakistan is among those

countries where people wish for democracy but there pro democratic leaders are few (Shafqat, 1998).

So it is easy to conclude that mutual conflict of political and non-political elites had eclipsed the democracy in Pakistan for personal gain. They do not even hesitate to join hands with the army in this battle for power in order to bring down their rival. It was this rivalry for power that none of the government was able to complete its time span. Each government had to leave the bureau unhappily. Political elites are held accountable for this state of affairs, taking into account their role, which has given an opportunity to non-democratic forces to take advantage of the situation.

Benazir's and Nawaz Sharif's initial term in office were portrayed by the governmental issues of encounter, tyranny, and of what not. Both the reigning party and the opposition had been engaged in so called politics which was only to advance their own advantages at the cost of democracy. Moreover, the function of the opposition was not as per democracy standards. It made alliance against the reigning party to cut it down and invited often the undemocratic decisions of the President. The function of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif during their first periods in opposition talks about the conduct of the opposition. In addition, the hung parliaments were additionally a factor in deepening the crises during Benazir's and Nawaz Sharif's initial term in office. In alliance form government the major party always remain in vulnerable position. The allies always pressurize the government for their personal issues. If their needs are not fulfilled then they always ready to join hands with opposition. As it happened in in Benazir's first period in NWFP and Nawaz's first period in Punjab. While living under the threat the ruling party had to suffer from crises. Moreover establishment always try to remain above the law. They make their

influence on the parties. The functioning relation among elected and non-elected institutions lingered non-functional. The bad centre-province relations, press was under control, abuse of human rights, worsened law and order, unconstitutional role of opposition, stalemate between president and PM, government-opposition tug of war etc were reason of nonfunctional relationship between the institutions. Inadequate democracy was in Pakistan with resilient establishment.

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CHAPTER 4

CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP OF BENAZIR AND NAWAZ SHARIF (SECOND TENURE)

This chapter critically examined that why Benazir and Nawaz Sharif could not take advantage of their second term and what challenges they had to face due to which they failed to establish a democratic culture in the country. Those challenges are discussed critically which completely sacked democratic process in the second term of Nawaz Sharif. This chapter also deals with the performance of another elected government of Benazir 1993-1996 and Nawaz Sharif's government from 1997-1999. This chapter has also discussed caretaker governments, elections, civil-military relations, president and government relations and law and order situation in the state. The crises which become a reason of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif's dismissal are highlighted. Having confident one in the office of the president then why again, discrepancies emerged and history repeated itself and their governments were dissolved before the completion of their terms. Due to political development in July 1993, both the president and Prime Minister had to resign and a neutral caretaker government was installed (Inayatullah, 1997 p,281).

After the dissolution of Nawaz government, caretaker government was installed (Inayatullah, 1997 p,281) to run the functions of the state and to conduct the elections which were scheduled on October 6 and 9, 1993 respectively. The office of the president was filled by Waseem Sajjad, the then chairman senate and the office of the Prime Minister was filled by Moeen Ahmed Qureshi as caretaker Prime Minister. **Moeenuddin Ahmad Qureshi** (معین الدین احمد قریشی; 26 June 1930 – 22 November 2016) was a Pakistani American economist and civil servant who served as Caretaker

Prime Minister of Pakistan in an acting capacity from July to October 1993. He had served the Planning Board (1954-1956), he then joined International Monetary Fund (IMF), Moeenuddin Ahmed Qureshi also served in the capacity of senior vice president of World Bank.

He was enthusiast of democracy and market economy. He was internationally established and a well-known economist). The office of the governors and Chief Ministers were filled by retired army and civil officers. This type of formation shows how army is powerful and strong in Pakistan(Waseem, 1994). The opus of Centre and Provincial caretaker governments was decided in consultation with the army(Khan, 2005 p,766). On the advice/request of caretaker Prime Minister, the army monitored the elections.

Before these elections, the PPP made some demands from the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) such as;

- The elections of National Assembly and provincial Assemblies should be held on the same day contrary to 1988 and 1993 elections. But the Election Commission rejected this demand and Nawaz Sharif also opposed this demand.
- The local bodies' authorities should be dissolved so that they could not influence the elections. This demand was accepted. On 15 August 1993 local bodies (720 in number) in the Punjab were dismissed under the clause 26-A of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979.
- The PPP demanded that the condition of showing the identity card to cast the vote should be waved but this demand was not accepted by CEC(Waseem, 1994).

4.1 Election Campaign

Like elections of 1988 and 1990, the elections of 1993 were be deemed issueless. The political parties used rhetoric of abolition of poverty etc but none of them offered substantive, realistic or coherent solutions for overcoming national problems. The major parties like PPP and PML (N) tried to give assurance that their government would be clean (Lodhi, 1994). In elections the leaders focused on criticism on the opponents. As according to Lodhi, PML(N) campaign was more negative than of the PPP(Lodhi, 1994 p,17). These elections were more or less like the elections of 1988 and 1990, a repeat of PPP versus anti PPP forces. The PML(N) had promoted Punjabi identity to oppose Benazir when she was in government(Waseem, 1994).

Contrary to the previous elections, more candidates participated in these elections.in these elections almost $\frac{3}{4}$ candidate were backed by PML(N) and PPP (Lodhi, 1994). Jamait-e-Islami (JI) separated itself from the alliance with PML (N) and contested the elections from the platform of Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) and emerged as third force in the politics of Pakistan. In these elections PML (N) fielded 176 and PPP 166 candidates respectively while National Democratic Alliance (NDA) fielded 08 for NA, 12 for Punjab Assembly and one each for NWFP and Sindh. JI launched 103 candidates in elections. In election campaign while setting aside the real issues, the leaders focused on mainlining each other. The balloting was generally open orderly and well administered.

4.2 Elections Results

Elections were held on 6th of October 1993 of NA and on 9th October 1993 of Provincial Assemblies. Common Wealth Observer Group (CWOG) considered elections as freest, fairest, open and most peaceful than any other earlier elections

(Yaseen, Election 1993). The elections of National Assembly were boycotted by MQM (A) but on October 7, 1993 MQM (A) ended the boycott and agreed to contest provincial assembly elections.

Table 4.1: Party Position

Party	Seats
PML(N)	72
PML(J)	6
Islami Jamhoori Mahaz (IJM)	4
ANP	3
PIF	3
PKMAP	3
MDM	2
NDA	1
NPP	1
BNM (H)	1
BNM(M)	1
PPP	86
Independent	15

Sources: ECP Elections Report of 1993.

In these elections no party could win two third majority. PPP came out as the single largest Party winning 86 seats in the national assembly with 37.85% votes. But it could not get a majority to form the government without the cooperation of other parties. The PPP got benefit of MQM's boycott (Abbas, 1997 p,98). The PML (N) won 73 seats with 39.86% votes. Though it was behind the PPP in number of seats, due to substantial number of seats, it was in the race to form the government. The PPP made an alliance with PML (J) which won only six seats.

4.3 Formation of Government

Elections of Speaker and Deputy Speaker of National Assembly were held on 17th of October 1993 between Yousaf Raza Gilani and Zafar Ali Shah of PPP and Gohar ayub Khan and Nawaz Khokhar of PML (N) respectively. Yousaf Raza Gilani got 106 votes and elected as speaker while Zafar Ali Shah obtained 115 votes and elected as deputy speaker. Their contesters Gohar Ayub and Nawaz Khokhar received 90 and 81 vote respectively (Zafar & Hussain, 1994 p,3). On 19th of October Benazir was elected as PM by securing 121 and Nawaz Sharif could get 72 votes. Benazir formed a coalition government in the center (Amin, 1994b).

4.4 Formation of Provincial Governments

In the Punjab assembly's elections the PML (N) won majority of seats 106 while PPP won 94, PML (J) 18, NDA 2. Although PML (N) won majority of seats but could not form its government in the Punjab because PPP made an alliance with PML (J) and accepted its member as the CM of the Punjab. Manzoor Ahmed Watto became the CM of the Punjab. The situation in Sindh Assembly was different as in Sindh, the PPP won 57 seats and was in position to form its government without any alliance. Syed Abdullah Shah of PPP became CM by defeating Farooq Sattar of MQM. In province of North West Frontier Province (NWFP), PML (N) won 15, PPP 22 and ANP 21. PML (N) joined hands with ANP and formed its government in NWFP and Pir Sabir Shah was elected as CM of NWFP. Party position in Balochistan was very interesting where largest seat winner were independent by winning 9 seats. No party could get absolute majority in the assembly. PML (N) won only six seats but managed to form its government and nominated Zulifiqar Ali Magsi as CM. Thus, PPP formed its government in centre, Sindh and Punjab and PML (N) formed its coalition government in Balochistan and NWFP.

4.5 Presidential Election

The elections of president were scheduled on 13th of November 1993. Initially, more than 22 candidates filed their nomination papers (R. Khan, 1998 p,154) such as Nawabzada Nasrullah Baber, Akber Bugti, Aftab Sherpao, Aftab Shahban Mirani, Sartaj Aziz, Gauhar Ayub Khan, Sayed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Abdul Majid Malik, Asghar Khan, Balakh Sher Mazari, Haji N. A. Zairian, Yahya Bakhtiar, Ghulam Ishaq Khan Mir Muhammad Umar, Sagir Hussain Safi, Pirzada Mukhtar Saeed, Bashir Ahmad Meo, Syed Nazar Hussain Shah Gillani, Ghazi Shafiqur Rehman Siddiqui, M. P. Khan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan but later only two were left in the field Sardar Farooq Ahmed Leghari of PPP and Wasim Sajjad of PML (N). It was believed that army wished that Moeen Qureshi should continue as the president but Nawaz Sharif and Benazir were reluctant to support him. Moreover, it was general perception that Qureshi was an agent of international lending agencies. In these circumstances Qureshi decided to withdraw his name from the race(Waseem, 1994 p,193-194). On the other hand, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was thinking that Benazir would support him as she did in 1988 because when he was toppling the government of Nawaz, at that time Benazir had developed good relations with GIK and she assured GIK that she would support him as the candidate of president. When Benazir was elected as PM, Ishaq Khan was the first person who congratulated her on her success but Benazir did not support him in the presidential elections. After this Ishaq Khan had to withdraw himself from the race of president and this was the end of his political career. Two prominent political figures, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Akbar Bugti withdrew in favor of Leghari only two days before elections. Benazir was assured that Leghari would remain submissive to her. Moreover, Leghari himself publically announced that the days of interference in politics are over. I will prove myself as a symbol of

federation (Abbas, 1997 p,98).The total Electoral College was 464 and Farooq Ahmed Leghari got 274 and Waseem Sajjad secured 160 votes. After assuming his office, Leghari spoke about 8th amendment (which empowered him to dissolve the assemblies and many more powers) that it would be better to lift this amendment. He further said I would not be a President who encourages in conspiracies or undermines the democratic process.

After the formation of federal, provincial governments and moreover her loyalist was in the office of president, Benazir started her tenure in a comfortable position. In her previous tenure she had to face the opposition of the president and of Punjab where IJI's government led by Nawaz was in operation. But this time her coalition government was installed in the Punjab under Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo of PML (J) as Chief Minister.

She got more secure position after senate elections which were held on 2nd of March 1994. In the elections, Benazir's PPP won 18 seats out of 44 while her rival PML (N) won only 10. Now an experienced Benazir was in the office of PM and was feeling secure on her arrangements. It was assumed that she would deal in a gentle way with Bureaucracy, army and opposition. In her second term, she started her job as a hardworking PM as Former interior secretary I.M Mohsin says that Benazir Bhutto, if not itinerant, was surefire to scan through every document and file succumbed to her the same day and her Secretariat would return it the next day to the related ministry.

Benazir took some important steps for the promotion of economy of the state. International agencies also liked Benazir and appreciated her nomination. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and international Bank for regional development promised to give Pakistan an aid of 1.55 Billion\$ for three years. This shows that

how Benazir was internationally welcomed. When Benazir took the charge of the office of PM, BBC reported that now an era of economic stability will start.

In elections, Benazir repeatedly said that she would work for the uplift of women of the country. She would work for the welfare of the women and to appease the women she opened a police station with all female staff in 1994. Their salaries were equal to the men police officers. This happened first time in the history of Pakistan that a police station was opened with all female staff. To promote women's rights, health, sanitation, education, and housing, she launched a social action program (SAP) with a joint effort of her government and private donors/patrons. Her these steps win for her the support and sympathy of the women. Moreover, her efforts in health sector were appreciated by world Health Organisation (WHO) and WHO awarded her with a gold medal (Bhutto, 2007 p 415).

To meet the challenge of shortage of energy she made some positive policies to attract the investors. Her policies attracted the foreign investors and a record investment of 20 billion\$ shown by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Out 20 Billion\$ 80% was invested in power sector (Bhutto, 2007 p,413). Due to these policies and stable government budget shortfall was also diminished (Baxter & Kennedy, 1998 p,164).

4.6 Government and Opposition Relations

During the period of 1993-1996, role of opposition was incompetent, inadequate and inefficient which may be singled out as the most important reason which did not allow the democracy to flourish in the country. In this era of democracy, Pakistan was building democracy without democrats. Ethnicities of perfect democracy cannot be painstakingly operationalized, realized and ensured. In

fact the opposition failed to adjust themselves positively in political system. They remained busy in conspiracy and counter conspiracy.

After taking her oath as PM, Benazir in her first speech said that she would strengthen the democracy. She openly stated that her second term will be an era of change and she will not indulge in confrontation. she would work to fortify democracy and to promote forbearances (Ziring, 1993). On this occasion, Nawaz Sharif also said that he will avoid the politics of agitation and confrontation and he will not follow the path of long march and train march (Ziring, 1993). In fact in Nawaz's period Benazir used this strategy to destabilize the government. But these statements of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif's did not come true and proved only lip service. Benazir had to face stiff opposition led by Nawaz sharif. Throughout the period of 1993-1996, both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif being head of the leading political parties remained busy in confrontation. They did not developed political of harmony.

When Benazir took the oath of PM at that time Nawaz assured the Benazir he was ready to co-operate with the government for the betterment of democracy because Pakistan could not afford crunch after crunch. So he would work to end the politics of clash but these statements was mere a lip service and he announced train march in autumn1994 from Karachi to Peshawar against the government of Benazir Bhutto and this protest/train march was given the name of Tehrik-e-Nijat. According to Amin it was a partial success of opposition (Amin, 1995). In October 1994, Nawaz gave another call of agitation/protest. Due to these calls his statement which he made when Benazir won the election of PM that he will avoid the politics of confrontation, sank into the river of politics of confrontation.

On the other hand, Benazir also did not keep her words and after the call of Nawaz Sharif of train march, she ordered the law enforcement agencies to arrest the workers of Nawaz Sharif. Even Nawaz's 75 years old father was also arrested. Her this action was doomed by almost all political and non-political actors(Wynbrandt, 2009 p,242). Benazir promoted the politics of victimization and more than 180 cases of corruption and misconduct were registered against Nawaz Sharif and his family (Bhardwaj,k 1998, p 23). In this situation of confrontation, Shahbaz Sharif (brother of Nawaz sharif) tried to get maximum advantage in this political crises. He meet with COAS General Waheed Kakar and publicized the meeting as every politician in Pakistan always wish to meet with COAS to show his/her closeness with military establishment. The politicians considere these meetings with COAS as an honor for them. This is the misery of the time that the politicians who talked about democracy but always looked toward military establishment to get in power. When Shehbaz Sharif publicized the meeting with COAS, the army had to declare its position that it had no intention to intervene or to involve itself in politics (Ghazi, 1994).

Some religious parties also joined hands and formed an alliance by the name of Milli Yakjeht Council (National Unity Council) to campaign for Islamization. This council did not join hands with main political parties like PML (N). This council was formed on three objectives;

- To improve law and order
- To end sectarianism
- Revival of positive identity of religious parties

On 27th of May 1995, it organized a strike against the government related to blasphemy law.

4.7 Politics of confrontation and political crises in NWFP

Working relationship between PML (N) and PPP came to an end when PPP's led federal government overthrew the PML (N) and ANP coalition government in NWFP through dubious means. As Zering says that

“PPP operators with huge sums of money, enticed and ultimately won over enough borderline members of the ruling coalition to weaken and thus bring down, the provincial government(Ziring, 1997 p 556).”

Federal government tried to topple the NWFP government by winning down the loyalties of independents and two PML(N) members. As a result the opposition launched a movement called “save NWFP”. On the behest of federal government, governor of NWFP Major General (retired) Khursheed Ali Khan asked the CM of NWFP Pir Sabir Shah to get the vote of confidence but Sabir Shah did not called the session. In this situation of confrontation, the president imposed governor rule in the province on 25th of February 1994(Amin, 1995 p,142). This action of president was challenged in SCP. The SCP restored Pir Sabir Shah's government on 21 April 1994 (*Pir Sabir Shah vs Federation of Pakistan PLD 1994, SC 738*). Pir Sabir Shah took this decision as a moral victory but his happiness came to an end after three days when he failed to get the vote of no confidence from the assembly(Ata Khan, 2019). Nawaz Sharif vowed that the federal government's action in the NWFP was unlawful and a charade of democracy(Ziring, 1997 p,557).

4.8 Problems within PPP

Benazir Bhutto was leading PPP as chairperson in place of her mother, Nusrat Bhutto. Her mother wished that party should be run by Mir Murtaza Bhutto (brother of Benazir). She (Nusrat Bhutto) shown her liking toward Murtaza after his (Murtaza)

return to Pakistan from exile on September 3, 1993. Mir Murtaza Bhutto was in exile for the last 16 years and was busy in Al-Zulfiqar's activities. Al-Zulfiqar was an organization which he founded during the days when Zia was busy in crushing Bhutto family (Bahadur, 1998). But at that time Benazir, with her continuous struggle had earned a repute of a true leader. She kept the party united and by providing them leadership to sundry political forces in a difficult situation under the movement for restoration of democracy (MRD). More over her triumph to form government in 1988 and constant struggle as leader of opposition from 1992 to 1993 had made herself a loyal leader of the PPP. In this situation Benazir said that her mother's views caused me pain and anguish.

Soon clashes started between Benazir and Murtaza's supporters in which two persons were killed and more than 200 were injured. Nusrat Bhutto, moving a step forward, tried to wedge PPP fans and officials from visiting Bhutto's gravesite. On this Benazir ordered to break the barriers (Ziring, 1997). A conflict between the brother and sister torn the image of the party by internal disagreement (Baxter & Kennedy, 1998). All these clashes between Benazir and Murtaza created a sense of disturbance among the voters. Murtaza was openly criticizing on Asif Ali Zardai (husband of Benazir Bhutto) for his involvement in corruption. This weakened Benazir's position among the people. Murtaza Bhutto made his own party by the name of Peoples party of Pakistan (Shaheed Bhutto).

4.9 Conflict between PPP and MQM over Operation in Sindh

Law and order situation in Sindh was one of the cause of the dissolution of Benazir's first government and during her second term law and order situation was still not improved. Due to bad law and order situation, Benazir extended the stay of army in the province till June 1994. The only purpose of this move was to eradicate

criminal activities in Sindh. But in the politics of confrontation and point securing Nawaz opposed this operation and stated that this operation is a conspiracy against MQM. The purpose of this statement was to get the sympathies of MQM and to create problems for PPP's government in Sindh. Sectarian vehemence and the clash between MQM and PPP gave birth to the proverbial condition of the war(Amin, 1995).

On the other hand Benazir declared that MQM's activities are suspicious and it is working against the stability of Pakistan. Moving a step forward she further said that MQM had joined hands with Indian elements. MQM started protests against PPP's led government. This is the reason that MQM is shifted and re-shifted its alliance with PPP and PML (N) (Haqqani, 2016). MQM joined hands with other political parties against Benazir's government. After the worst law and order situation in Sindh, opposition demanded for the dismissal of the government (LaPorte Jr, 1997). Benazir terminated operation in Sindh on 2nd of December 1994 instead of this law and order situation did not restore. There were frequent incidents of vehicles seizing and homicide (Askari, 1996). Both federal and provincial governments did nothing except to blame MQM. Karachi remained agonized from violence during three years of Benazir's rule(Kamran, 2009). Law and order situation became bad to worse when on 20th September 1996 Mir Murtaza Bhutto along with his six companion was assassinated by police in day light in Karachi. After this assassination, opposition demanded for the dismissal of Benazir's government.

4.10 The Suspension of the Punjab Government

In the province of the Punjab, Mian Manzoor Ahmed Watto of PML (J) was CM with an alliance of PPP. Initially this alliance of PPP and PML (J) was working smoothly but soon power tussle emerged between CM and the members of PPP. The PPP blamed that Chief Minister Watto is not giving them funds. Situation became

worset when the Ministers of PPP and PML (J) finalized the plan to resign from Chief Minister Watto's cabinet. This step was taken to pave the way for president to declare emergency in the province. On 6th of September 1995, president by using the power under article 234 of the Constitution of Pakistan dismissed the Watto's government. Under the same article the governor runs the province for 60 days after the dismissal of CM. PPP also blamed that CM Watto was kind towards opposition. This shows unbearable attitude with respect to the opposition parties(Musarrat & Ibrahim, 2013). On 13th of September 1995, Arif Naki of PML (J) a seasoned politician from Kasur (Pakistan) was made CM with the support of PPP. Although, through this move Benazir controlled the situation which was being created in the presence of Watto but this move created a rift between president and PM because President Leghari wished that Makhdoom Altaf should be made CM of the Punjab(Kamran, 2008).

4.11 Benazir's Confrontation with Judiciary

The PPP's leadership had developed the attitude of disliking toward judiciary due to two reasons

- Death sentence of Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto, the founding father of PPP
- Supreme Court did not restore PPP's government but restored PML(N).

Due to the above mentioned reasons, PPP accused/indicted that judiciary is biased. After coming in power the PPP decided to appoint its own loyal/nominee of the bench. To fulfil its dream, PPP appointed Justice Sajjad Ali Shah as Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) by snubbing the sonority of two judges(Mian, 2004). Here one thing is pertinent to mention that when Nawaz Sharif government was restored Justice Sajjad Ali was the only dissenting/disagreeing voice in the bench.

Mian Nawaz Sahrif in his tenure appointed 6 judges in Sindh High Court (SHC) but after two years of their appointment, Benazir denied to confirm them. Benazir used Federal Shariat Court (FSC) as a tool to side line those judges who were not acting according to her wishes. A very renowned and respected justice Nasir Aslam of LHC was transferred to FSC because of his non-cooperative attitude(Arif, 2001 p,311). Justice Muhammad Ilyas of LHC was also transferred to FSC and he even made a complained to CJP but in vain. Justice Mehmood, the CJ of LHC was also transferred to FSC but he did not join FSC and got premature retirement(Shāh, 2001). Benazir's government appointed one of its favorite judge Mr. Agha Rafiq in SHC by bypassing 30 judges. These all appointments were made without consultation of CJP.

On the issue of separation of judiciary from executive at lower level widened the gulf between PM and CJP. SCP had ruled about the separation of judiciary on March 23,1994 but after this deadline all the four province filed petitions and pleaded more time. The SCP extended time till 23rd of March 1996. Government was not ready to separate the judiciary from the executive and by different tactics government tried to pressurize the CJP. Even police raided on the residence of son in law of CJP. Sajjad Ali Shah writes about these days that "I had a meeting with the president and complaint against the harassment"(Shāh, 2001 p,247). A lawyer, who had close links with PPP filed a petition in Pishawar High Court and challenged the appointment of CJP.

On August 5, 1995, the PPP's government appointed 20 judges in LHC and Out of those 20 judges, 13 were PPP's and 3 of PML(J)'s activists. In these tense circumstances, a lawyer Habib Wahab AL Khairi the chairman of Al-Jehand Trust from Rawalpindi filed a petition in LHC and challenged these appointments but the

LHC dismissed the petition. Mr. Khairi took this matter to SCP and SCP gave its historic verdict and ordered the government to appoint permanent Chief Justices of Lahore, Pishawar and Sindh High Courts. The SCP also declared in its decision that the appointments which were made by acting CJs should be dropped. It also declared the appointments of the judges of superior courts were made without the consultation of CJP are invalid(*Al Jihad Trust vs Federation of Pakistan and Others Pld 1996 SC 324*).

The conflict became bad to worse when government refused to comply with the court's decision. This verdict finally implemented on 20th September 1996 after a delay of 6 months and 10 days but the damage had already been done(*Waseem, 1998*). The judgement weakened the control of government over the judiciary.

4.12 Mehran Bank scandal

Mehran bank scandal was a financial scandal which confirmed the corruption's culture in Pakistan. It was revealed by Naseerullah Baber, the interior Minister of Benazir's government that some money was distributed in the elections of 1990 to the politicians who were contesting against PPP. Latter General Aslam Baig the then COAS stated that an amount of 140 million rupees was collected by Younas Habib (president of the said Bank) and was given to ISI chief Asad Durrani and this all was done on the instructions of president planning cell. While Younas Habib stated that he collected this money from his community on the instruction of president and this money was distributed among politicians, civil and military officers. Nawaz Sharif was also a part who received the money. Nawaz Sharif stated that before election 1993, President Leghari sold his useless land on very high rates to Habib and that Leghari is also a part of this scandal but Leghari denied all these blames(*Dawn, Karachi, June 18, 1994*). Nawaz further said in an interview in Jun

1994 that a parliamentary commission should be formed to probe the issue under Mehmood Khan Achakzai. On this the opposition demanded the resignation of Leghari(*Dawn*, Karachi, June 23, 1994). This scandal shows that how president, COAS, Nawaz, Benazir etc were directly or indirectly remained involved in undemocratic activities.

4.13 Coup Attempt


In October 1995, a plot was exposed in which some army officers planned to eliminate the leadership for the ambition of introducing an Islamic system in the country. Major general Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi was leading the scheduled coup d'état to become “amirul momineen” the head of true Muslims (HRCF, 1996). To finalize their plan they were going to arrest generals and main politicians. The outline of the *coup* plan, the written Constitution, and the speech that would be broadcast after the *coup d'état* was recovered by the authorities. The plotters were halted by the military intelligence and their trial took place before the Field General Court Martial (FGCM) (*Dawn*, Karachi, January 1, 1996). The FGCM investigated/founded four army officers guilty and imprisoned them (*Dawn*, Karachi, October 31, 1996).

4.14 Relations with Army

The COAS General Kakkar after intervening in politics to negotiate for fresh elections, kept a low profile. He adopted the policy of non-interference. In her second term, Benazir keeping in mind the previous worst experience she was very careful about her relations with army. She adopted the policy of harmony and non-conflicting with military establishment. She was seeking advice of the military leadership on different aspects/matters. On the other hand by acknowledging the positive attitude of Benazir, military decided to remain away from politics when she locked her in confrontation with Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif. PM and

COAS used to meet each other to discuss the issues of national interest(H. Rizvi, 2000). Benazir kept up good relations with the generals and permitted them full liberty in their field. Instead of this that Pakistan's economy was under pressure, the defense budget was not cut down. Moreover, when the military decided in November 1994 to wind up its operation clean up in Sindh, Benazir accepted the proposal promptly. Air chief marshal Farooq Feroz Khan became chairman joint Chief of staff committee and general Kakar keeping the COAS slot provided a signal that there was complete harmony between military and government.

Diagram 4.1: How Benazir's Government was dissolved



Source: Researcher's own constructed

When general kakar completed his term as COAS Benazir asked him to continue as COAS but he refused and preferred to resign as he had completed his term. After his retirement, General Jahangir Karamat who was most senior general became the COAS and took the command of Pakistan army on 12 January 1996. After General Kakar Benazir never felt easy. Her doubts and mistrust emerged again. General Karamat supported president when Leghari was in confrontation with Benazir. Karamat said to president that army will support any decision of supreme

commander (president) of the army(The News, 18 October 1996). This oblique the balance of power in favor of president.

4.15 Relation with president

President Farooq Leghari was a stalwart of PPP and a close associate of Benazir Bhutto for many years. Benazir and Leghari remained in good relations in first two years(Shaikh, 2000). She nominated Leghari as president to secure herself because her first government was dissolved by the ex.president and she did not want to repeat the history. After the appointment of Leghari, it was being assumed that Benazir will be the first PM to complete her five years term in office but soon differences between Benazir and Leghari emerged. In this power tussle system, Benazir and Leghari were contending for authority.

Benazir was thinking that Leghari will remain her loyal and submissive. On the other hand, Leghari was thinking that being a president he will be consulted in all important matters. So, when Benazir did not consider it important to take advice of the president then Leghari started to hear the problems of the opposition members(Waseem, 1998 p,6). It is said that Benazir had made her mind to dismiss him via impeachment before that plan materialized, Leghari dissolved her government on the charges of corruption(Hussain, 2010 p,369).

When in 1994, opposition leveled allegation of corruption against Leghari about his involvement in Mehran bank Scandal and it alleged that Leghari personally took advantage from the bank sale of property but Leghari stated that it had all been done within the strict tenants of the law(Ziring, 1997 p,557). Misunderstanding touched to its peak when Leghari said that Asif Zardari (husband of Benazir) was behind this scandal and he was disclosing his involvement(The News,13Nov.1996). Although Benazir denied these allegations but Leghari remained hard-nosed. In SCP

it was told by Masood Sharif former chief of intelligence that official and civil citizen's phone calls are being monitored by 12 different agencies. Even telephone calls of president, his wife, sons and Cousin Jaffar Leghari are being taped. Almost 5727 cassettes were recovered by SCP which were recorded during 1995-1996(Dawn,6 November 1997).

The terms of president and PM turned bad to worse when president requested the PM to improve law and order in Sindh but PM did not accept the request of the president. Even Benazir accused/blamed that the president is involved in the murder of her brother Mir Murtaza Bhutto in day light in 1996. She further said that president ordered the police to kill Murtaza(H.-A. Rizvi, 1998 p, 104).

Another incident which deteriorated the relation between PM and president was the inclusion of Nawaz Khokhar in the cabinet by Benazir. Nawaz Khokhar was the person who proclaimed that Leghari is involved in Mehran Bank Scandal. This move offended the Leghari(Kamran, 2008). Another incident which widened the gulf between PM and president was an accountability bill which was introduced by the government. This bill created the doubts in the mind of president. Discrepancies increased when the president Leghari wrote to the Prime Minister that by introducing the bill without telling the president government had despoiled article 46-A of the Constitution which states that it shall be duty of the Prime Minister to interconnect to the president all proposal for lawmaking. After a smooth working relation for almost two years, the president and PM indulged in conflict which resulted in disruption of democratic process.

4.16 Dissolution of Benazir's Government

Farooq Ahmed Leghari was a handpicked president of Benazir. Benazir was not expecting that Leghari would dissolve her government. The President Farooq

Ahmed Khan Leghari had told her about the intention of the military that it desired her to be removed. While the COAS informed her that the President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari wanted to sack her government. (Khan, 1996). On November 5, 1996 the army units were deployed on key positions in Islamabad early in the morning. Benazir's husband Zardari was also arrested by army. This shows how army was backing president and his decision. Benazir once again had to face bitter reality on November 5, 1996 when President Farooq Ahmed Legari by using his authority under article 58(2) (b) of the Constitution dissolve the government of Benazir. Benazir challenged the dissolution of her government in the Supreme Court but the Court had decided in favour of the dissolution of National Assembly.

4.17 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 2nd Term in Office and Crises

Nawaz Sharif assumed the power after getting a sweeping majority in the election held on 7th February 1997. He formed his government in center and in all provinces. His this overwhelming majority became an obstacle for the democratic development(Chadda, 2000 p,88). It was evident that he did not want primacy rather he wished for supremacy(Syed. A, 2005). Nawaz Sharif through his overwhelming majority created such circumstances that the president and COAS General Jahangir Karamat has to step down. To fulfill his dreams, he picked Ex-judge Rafiq Tarar as president and General Pervaiz Musharraf as COAS. Nawaz Sharif appointed Musharraf only because of this that Musharraf was Mohajir and he would have no significant control over Pushtun and Punjabi dominated army(Rizvi, 1999 p,183) but soon differences emerged between him and his handpicked COAS and resulted in military coup on 12th October 1999.

Caretaker government was formed and Malik Miraj Khalid an ex-speaker of National Assembly was appointed as caretaker Prime Minister. Elections were scheduled on February 3, 1997. This was the first time in the history of Pakistan that the elections of National Assembly and all provincial assemblies were going to be held on the same day. In the elections, the people of FATA were given the right to vote. To maintain law and order, army was deployed with extra judicial powers. These elections were declared as free and fair by European Union observers. They declared that the elections were held according to international standards (Dawn, 18 February 1997). Because of successive premature dissolution of assemblies people showed little excitement/exhilaration in these elections and voter turnout as it was reported in Dawn on 14th February 1997 was only 35.92%.

Jamat-e-Islami, which was a third force in political system and it campaigned impressively in the 1993 elections boycotted and convinced the voters that without pure accountability of politicians electoral process would be mere farce/mockery. On the other hand PPP started its election campaign late because it had filed a petition in SCP against the dissolution order of President Farooq Lagari. The delay in the judgement created confusion in the voters of PPP because they were hoping that the SCP will restore the government of Benazir Bhutto as it had restored Nawaz Sharif government in 1993.

4.18 Ehtisaab Ordinance

On November 18, 1996, Ehtisaab Ordinance was issued by President Lagari. The purpose of this ordinance was to insure the accountability. All the officers of grade twenty or above were accountable under this law (Shaikh, 2000 p,299). The PPP was in doubt that the law will be used to pressurize the politicians. A ban was put on loan defaulters to contest the elections under the representation act of 1976. JI and

Tehreek-e-Istaklal(TI) supported this step that after fair accountability elections should be held.

On January 6, 1997, President Lagari made Council of Defense and National Security (CDNS) by amending the business rules and this step was taken by Lagari without the consultation of Prime Minister. There was a wide spread concern over the creation of CDNS by Lagari. The creation of this CDNS was like “Super cabinet” which could/ may dictate the decision making process regarding the National Importance(Waseem, 1998 p,08). In fact through this CDNS, the role of army involvement in political matters was institutionalized.

In election campaign, the MQM which was divided in two groups MQM (A) and MQM (Haqiqi) blamed/accused the government for creating hurdles in its campaign. JI and JUP (Noorani) boycotted the election. In these elections a new party took part which is known as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf(PTI) under the leadership of Imran Khan a former cricket player(PTI is currently ruling party under the leadership of Imran Khan). The way PTI campaigned, it was assumed that the PTI would emerge as a big force but it did not happen.

4.19 Election Results

In the elections PML (N) got an overwhelming majority and it almost wiped out the opponents. It can be argued with some reasoning that was not that Nawaz Sharif won but rather that Benazir had lost the election(Bahadur, 1998 p,160).

Table 4.2: Party Position 1997

Parties	Positions
MQM	12
ANP	09
BNP	03
PPP	18
JWP	02
JUI(F)	02
PPP (Shaheed Bhutto)	01
NPP	01
PML(N)	135
Independent	21
Total	204

Source: ECP 1997, General election report vol.1

It is pertinent to mention that due to the death of one of the candidate in NA 143. NA 121 and NA 1 elections were postponed.

The results of provincial assemblies showed the dominance of PML (N) in Punjab and NWFP by securing 210 out of 240 and 32 out of 80 and emerged as single largest party in these provinces. It wiped out all the political parties in the Punjab while its opponent and previous ruling party PPP could win only 03 and 04 from Punjab and NWFP respectively. In the Punjab and NWFP independent won 21 and 11 seats respectively. In provincial assembly of Balochistan PML (N) could win 04 and PPP 01 seats only. In Balochistan BNP emerged as single largest party by winning 09 and 08 independents also won their seats. In the elections of Sindh Assembly, PPP

performed well and secured 34 seats. Its closest party was MQM won 30 while PML (N) could win only 15 seats.

Mian Nawaz Sharif was the candidate of PML (N) and Aftab Shaban Mirani of PPP for Prime Minister ship. On 17th of February voting took place and Nawaz Sharif elected as Prime Minister by securing 177 votes and Aftab Shaban Mirani of PPP received 16 votes. PML (N) included MQM and ANP in its coalition. Shahbaz Sharif became the Chief Minister (CM) of Punjab, Sardar Mehtab Abbasi with coalition of ANP and PML (N) became the CM of NWFP. A coalition government was formed under Sardar Akhtar Mengal in Baluchistan. Liaqat Ali Jatoai became the CM of Sindh with alliance of PML (N) and MQM(H. Khan, 2005). Mian Nawaz Sharif's become stronger after the elections of Senate held on March 1997 and out of 46 seats PML (N) won 23 and PPP and ANP 4 and 3 each.

After assuming the office Nawaz Sharif took deep interest in legislation. This government's legislation performance was better than the previous. It legislated forty six acts during the first year. On development front Nawaz Sharif government constructed first motorway of South west Asia from Lahore to Islamabad with a length 367KM. Foreign remittance increased by 46.5% from 614 Million USD to 988 Million USD. Peoples responded the Nawaz Sharif call of debt retirement and it loan off PKR 15 Billion from the money which was collected under the scheme. Inflation decreased from 12.15% to 8.9%. Action against dishonest elements was the need of time to get bribery free management. Many officers were moved in 48 hours of the establishment of the government from income tax and customs departments and Agricultural Development Bank(Ghani Eirable, March 8, 1997).

4.20 Thirteenth Amendment

In a parliamentary form of government Prime Minister is considered the head of government with maximum powers. Nawaz Sharif was eager to restore Parliamentary form of government in which the PM is the center of power. Nawaz Sharif was also in a hurry to repeal the Eighth amendment as soon as possible because a speech of president which was prepared by government, President refused to deliver that speech instead of this he wished to deliver his own speech in joint session of parliament(S. Aziz, 2009 p,172).

On April 1, 1997, both the houses passed the thirteenth amendment by the vote of 79 against zero from Senate, the upper house of parliament and 190 against zero from National Assembly. It is pertinent to mention that all other political parties supported PML (N) and voted in favour of amendment. After thirteenth amendment president was deprived of many powers. In 13th amendment article 58 (2) (b) and 112(2) were removed which empowered the president and the governor to dissolve the National assembly and provincial assemblies respectively. The article 101 (1) was related to the appointment of governor. The word with the consultation of PM was removed by the words “on the advice of PM”. After this amendment it was compulsory for president to act upon the advice of PM. Under article 243 (2) (c) the discretionary power of president was taken away about the appointment of the Chiefs of Armed forces. At this point, Nawaz Sharif said that he had resuscitated the democratic model. Military leadership also accepted the decision(H.-A. Rizvi, 1998 p,107). This amendment gave much powers to PM if used haphazardly and without any check(Mahmood, 2000 p,401). Some experts argued that the purpose of this amendment was to strengthen the PM rather than to democracy.

4.21 Accountability Act/Ehtesab Act

Parliament passed accountability act on May 31, 1997 and this act empowered the Prime Minister to appoint Ehtesab chief before this act this power was vested in hands of president. The period from 1985-1990 was left out/excluded to make any investigation about wrong doings. The political experts stated that this move was made to give shelter to the loopholes of Mian Nawaz Sharif's deeds during this period he remained in government. The main focus of Ehtesab was opposition even later under the law of this Act, Benazir and her husband Asif Ali Zardari were convicted by Lahore High Court's Ehtesab bench on April 15, 1999 with an imprisonment of five years and a fine of 8.5 USD. When the decision was given Benazir was in USA. This Act was considered as to victimize the opposition and those who were associate of Benazir's government(Zaffar Abbas, "Improper Channels "July, 1997, 44-45).

4.22 Fourteenth Amendment

Since the creation of Pakistan, it had been a practice of politicians to change their loyalties. This practice frequently remained on swing in 1951-1958 and even during the period under study. In fact through this practice, the members who were involved in this immoral practice always pressurized the head of the party and Prime Minister and got benefits. This practice was promoting a culture of horse trading and corruption. Having a required majority, Nawaz decided to block this practice. This amendment was passed on 1st of July 1997 and Article 63(a) was included in the Constitution. After this amendment, if any member does not follow the party discipline he will lost his seat. The fear of lose the seat was actually a punishment(Aziz, 2009 p,173).

4.23 Fifteenth Amendment

“Pakistan would be an Islamic state” this was the slogan which was used by Muslim League at the time during the movement of Pakistan. After the creation, it became a viable demand of the community to make all laws according to Quran and Sunnah. People thought that sacrifices which they have made would be in vain if Islamic rules are not implemented in the form of Constitution(Callard, 1957 p, 126). The creation of Pakistan thus saw a resilient yearning about the place of Islam in political and Constitutional structure of the state. Keeping in view all these aspects Charles Kennedy termed it as “Pakistan’s Islamic mandate”(Kennedy, 1996 p,44). This bill was proposed to amend the article 239 of the Constitution for providing different ways for the passing of amendment in the parliament. Although two third majority is required to amend the Constitution but in this bill it was proposed that any law related to Quran and Sunnah does not need two third majority but simple majority and it can be presented in any house there is no restriction. If this bill is passed from both houses without any change then it would be sent to president. Under this bill the federal government was responsible for the enforcement of Zakkat and Salat (charity and prayer). under this amendment government was bound to provide economic and social justice in the light of Quran and Sunnah(Shāh, 2001 p,572).

Proposed bill also violated the basic principle of federation. Federal structure of Pakistan's political system is in fact an agreement between the central government and provinces and Islam urges its followers to respect the agreements. According to this bill, it was the federal government which would take steps to enforce Shariah. This bill was opposed by NGOs and opposition as Hamed Jatoi of PML (N), Asfandiyar Wali of ANP openly criticized the bill and declared it against the autonomy of the provinces. After some amendments in the bill in article 239, this bill was passed by

lower house and then it was presented in Senate on 14th of October 1998 where it was never passed in its proposed form. This bill/amendment created a rift in between the center and the province(Kukreja, 2003).

4.24 Broke Down of Alliances and Governor Rule in Sindh

Although PML(N) had majority in national assembly but to make its roots strong and to isolate the PPP it made an alliance in Sindh with MQM and in NWFP with ANP but due to several reasons it could not maintain its alliance with these parties. In Sindh, MQM was facing the challenge of MQM (Haqiqi) and blamed the central government that it was not supporting them to counter MQM (haqiqi). MQM stated that civil-military establishment was behind MQM Haqiqi. Altaf Hussain the head of MQM threatened the central government that they would resign from provincial and federal ministries if their demands not fulfilled. On one occasion they left the provincial assembly but PML (N) succeeded to bring them back.

On the other hand, security agencies were continuously reporting to federal government that MQM was behind bad law and order situation in Sindh. Ministry of interior suggested the federal government in July 1998 to impose governor rule in Sindh which was the only solution to control law and order in Sindh. At that time Moeen ud Deen Haider was the governor of Sindh. But the federal government was reluctant to take this step due to fear of MQM's parting from the government. A horrible incident took place on October 17, 1998 in which Ex. governor Sindh and a renowned personality Hakim Muhammed Saeed was killed in a terrorist attack. At was alleged that the murderer were activists/terrorist of MQM. After this tragic incident, the central government decided to impose governor rule in Sindh and it was imposed on 30th of October 1998 and elected government was suspended(Mahmood,

2000 p,399-400). MQM broke down its alliance with PML (N) but instead of this step of federal government situation of law and order in Sindh did not improve.

On the other hand in NWFP, the ANP was a coalition partner of PML (N) demanded to rename North West Frontier Province (NWFP) by Pakhtoonkhwa. Its demand was not accepted. ANP reacted and decided to break its alliance with PML (N). On February 24, 1998 all Ministers of ANP resigned and decided to sit on opposition benches. PML (N) had to join hands with independent to maintain its government in the province.

4.25 Government Opposition Relation

Nawaz Sharif was ruling the country with an overwhelming majority. Due to this majority his style of government became autocratic. He tried to get maximum powers on parliament, judiciary and provinces through Shariah Law(Rizvi, 1999 p, 180). The role which the opposition party plays in a political system cannot be overlooked because it is very vital for the successful functioning of democratic institutions. The productive and optimistic criticism on the part of opposition can promote democratic morals in any political set up. It is the calamity of Pakistan that the reigning regime on the one hand and the opposition on the other hand hamper the smooth process of legislation.it is the demand of democratic norms to give opposition proper time to discuss legislation but due to the majority the ruling party always bypassed the rule of business and process of the house while doing legislation.

To destabilize and pressurize the government Benazir made a demand of national government. The opposition parties formed an alliance called Pakistan Awami Ittehad (PAI) on 18th of March 1998(Dawn, March 19, 1998). The PAI demanded new elections and Islamic social order on 4 of December 1998. The ANP also joined PAI. Pakistan Oppressed National Movement (PONAM) also joined PAI and launched an

anti-government campaign. It can be seen that both ruling and opposition parties did not join hands for the promotion of democracy rather they remain busy to destabilize the each other through hock and crock and while doing so they even invited nonpolitical actors to interfere in politics. Even ruling party and opposition tried their level best to make false propaganda against each other. The government used media for the character assassination of the opposition and started a program titled “Ehtesab”. This program was used to highlight the misdeeds of opposition. Benazir also appeared in this program and defended her policies and highlighted the wrong doings of Nawaz Sharif during previous years(Zaffar Abbas,1997).

4.26 Confrontation with Judiciary

Having an overwhelming majority in both the houses of parliament, Nawaz Sharif committed political blunders and locked himself in confrontation with judiciary. A letter was received to law ministry on April 21, 1997 in which the CJP asked the government to promote 5 judges of High Court and send them to SCP. The CJP recommended the names of the judges as well. But government did nothing because some names were not suited to it and responded negatively. On the same day, the government issued a notification through a presidential order and reduced the number of judges of SC from 17 to 12(Bahadur, 1998a p,170). This step of reducing the number of judges of SCP was made without the consultation of CJP(Shāh, 2001). This presidential order was challenged in SCP on 1st of September 1997. But to avoid the tussle government appointed all the judges which were recommended by CJP and to minimize the tension it withdrew its notification on 10th of September 1997.

Another incident which escalated the tension between government and judiciary was about the suspension of 14th amendment. One of the prominent leader of PPP Naseerullah Babar and A.Basit challenged the 14th amendment in SCP on

October 29, 1997 by saying that this amendment had violated the basic structure of the Constitution and the provisions of the Article 19 (Freedom of Speech) and Article 66 (Privileges of Members). After initial hearing, the SCP ordered for the suspension of operation of the amendment. later when Mian Ajmal took the charge as SCP this matter was brought to him. Chief Justice delivering the leading opinion, observed that the said article does not militate against any of the basic features of the Constitution. He stated in his judgement that the amendment will carry constancy in the state and it will be helpful in removing evil of the floor crossing. It is also in Consonance with the tenants of Islam and Sunnah.

Before this verdict, when the SCP suspended the operation of 14th amendment, Nawaz Sharif criticized that decision by saying that this order is unconstitutional. He further said that this act will promote horse trading(Dawn. 30, October 1997). Nawaz in a press conference challenged the authority of the Supreme Court and questioned the authority of the court to suspend any amendment which had been passed by parliament (Jang, 30 October 1997). Asfandiyar Khan Wali and Abida Hussain of PML (N) and others criticized on SCP's decision. The SCP took notice of these remarks and initiated a contempt of court case against Nawaz Sharif and eight other his colleagues in November 1997. On this issue the president and parliament were divided in two blocks. The president was on the side of judiciary while overwhelming majority of parliamentarian were behind Nawaz Sharif. Situation became bad to worse when the supporter/worker of PML (N) attacked physically on the premises of SCP on 28th of November 1997. In contempt case Nawaz appeared twice in SCP personally. In this case a renowned advocate S.M. Zafar was the council of Nawaz Sharif. In his written statement Nawaz stated that he always respect the SCP. Meanwhile, the government made a bill to amend the contempt of court laws 1976

and presented it in both the houses and it was passed due to the majority. after getting the support of both the houses this bill was send to president for his signature but he (president) refused to sign and said that he will give his consent only if CJP recommend it (Aziz, 2009 p,176). On this attitude of president, PML (N) decided to remove president through impeachment. In this tense scenario, COAS tried to resolve the issue and meet with president, PM and CJP and advised them to resolve the issue.

Meanwhile, petitions were filed in Quetta Circuit Bench of SCP on November 18, 1997(S. Aziz, 2009) and in Peshawar circuit bench against the appointment of Justice Sajjad Ali Shah as CJP. The Quetta Circuit bench heard the petition under Justice Arshad Hassan Khan and Justice Khalil Rehman Ramday and asked the CJP to stop working till further order. The CJP declared this decision unlawful but again Peshawer bench supported the Quetta bench decision(Aziz, 2009 p,177).

On the other side, CJP while presiding over a three member bench suspended the 13th amendment on December 2, 1997(Mian, 2004 p,248). Uncertainty was on its full swing, a ten member bench headed by senior most Judge Justice Saeeduzzaman Siddiqi held the said order in abeyance. This full bench also issued a separate order to appoint Mian Ajamal as new CJP. In this tense situation, president Leghari decided to dissolve the assembly and he asked the COAS to support him but COAS refused to provide such support(Bashir, 2015 p,267). Government made its mind to remove Laghari through impeachment. When Leghari came to know about this plan he immediately resigned on December 2, 1997(Aziz, 2009 p,179).

After the resignation of Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari the chairman senate Waseem Sajjad assumed the office as acting president on December 2, 1997 and remained in office till 1st January 1998. On the recommendation of government acting president appointed Ajmal Mian as new Chief Justice of Pakistan. In this way

102 days crises came to an end which paralyzed/undermined the democratic process in the country.

4.27 Rafiq Tarar as New President

After the resignation of Leghari, election of the new president was held on December 31, 1997. PML (N) nominated ex. Judge Rafiq Tarar candidate for president. He was one of the close family friend of Nawaz Sharif(Syed, 1998 p, 119-120). This decision was surprising for the members of PML (N). When Nawaz Sharif nominated Rafiq Tara he did not consult even with senior members of his party. The PPP nominee was Aftab Shaban Mirani. Initially, nomination paper of Rafiq Tara were rejected by the Chief Election Commissioner because Rafiq used improper language and wrong statements about Sajjad Ali Shah(Aziz, 2009 p,183). This order was turned down by LHC and Tarar was allowed to contest the election(Aziz, 2009 p,183). Election was held on 31st of December 1997(Wynbrandt, 2009 p, 119-120). Rafiq Tarar won the election by securing 374 votes and his competitor Aftab Shaban Mirani 58.

4.28 Nuclear Tests

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's popularity touched to its peak when he declared to detonate nuclear bomb/device. On 11 and 13 of May 1998 India tested nuclear bomb/device at Pokhran and started to threat Pakistan to remain away from Kashmir otherwise be ready for consequences. Political parties and civil society demanded immediate reply from Pakistan to India. The PPP while playing political card tabled a resolution in favor of nuclear tests and this demand was adopted unanimously from National assembly(Aziz, 2009 p,193). The then president of America Bill Clinton made many calls to Nawaz Sharif to avoid nuclear tests. But Nawaz Sharif knew that this event would give him popularity because he knows the mindset of the nation.

With the approval of the government six nuclear devices were tested five on 28 and one on 30 of May 1998 respectively at Chaghi in Balochistan. After these tests, international community imposed sanctions on Pakistan. Through a presidential order under article 232 emergency was declared in the state. India tested Agni ii missile on April 11, 1999 and Pakistan responded with Ghauri ii ballistic missile. These events increased the popularity of Sharif among the public.

4.29 Resignation of COAS General Jahangir Karamat

COAS General Jahangir Karamat was working well with Nawaz Sharif even when president Leghari asked him to support him because he (Leghari) want to dissolve the government he refused to do so. One statement become a bone of contention between Karamat and Sharif. General Karamat in his address to navy officers at Naval War College Lahore proposed the formation of National Security Council (NSC). He added that through this council, decision making would be institutionalized and that issues such as economy, internal security, sense of deprivation in smaller provinces and relations with bordering countries namely Afghanistan, China, India and Iran, and United States of America (USA) would be tackled immediately(Dawn, Karachi, October 6, 1998). The major political parties liked this proposal(Aziz, 2009 p,200) but Nawaz Sharif disliked this proposal and express his reservations.

A new controversy was generated and COAS's request of NSC was not accepted. He was coupled to resign which he did on October 7, 1998(Siddique, 2002 p,399). Karamat was asked by his officers to stand up but he refused and defended his resignation(Cohen, 2004 p,150). Later Karamat told to Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan (one of the closest of Nawaz) and Shehbaz Sharif on a phone call that his officers' especially General Ali Quli Khan suggested him to takeover instead to resign. There

is a chance that Nawaz Sharif not made Kuli Khan COAS, who was senior to Pervez Musharraf due to this information which provided by Karamat(Aziz, 2009 p,201).

After the resignation of General Jahangir Karamat, Nawaz Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharraf as new COAS on October 7, 1998 by superseding two generals General Khalid Nawaz and General Ali Quli Khan. At that time General Ali Quli Khan was Chief of General Staff. Mr.Asghar Kidwai who was a common friend of Nawaz and Musharraf paved the way for Musharraf's appointment as COAS. Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan Also played his part in the appointment of Musharraf(Mahmood, N. 2017). But the role of Asghar Kidwai was significant. Mr.Kidwai was made ambassador to Kenya where he remained ambassador even in Musharraf regime as well(Haqqani, 2010). Moreover, Nawaz made Musharraf COAS by assuming that he (Musharraf) was a Mohajir (Migrator) and in the presence of Pashtoon and Punjabi dominant army it would be difficult for Musharraf be a trouble maker. Being a Mohajir Musharraf would be weak(H. Rizvi, 2000).

4.30 Vajpyee's Visit

Nawaz Sharif wished to normalize relations with India and to materialize his wish he invited Vajpyee the Prime Minister of India to come to Pakistan. This invitation was accepted by Vajpyee. On 11 February 1999 foreign office announced the state visit of Vajpyee. Prime Minister Vajpyee visited Lahore through Wahga Border (a border between India and Pakistan) and a treaty was signed by both Nawaz and Vajpyee. On the other hand, the right wing parties protested against this visit. JI threatened the government that it would block the roads and would demonstrate. Military establishment was also not happy on this activity. When government tried to arrest Qazi Hussain Ahmed the head of JI then he took shelter in army house. It was reported in an urdu newspaper that military establishment was behind Qazi. It further

reported that Major General Ehsan-ul-Haq the then chief of Military Intelligence asked JI to protest against the visit of Vajpyee (Haqqani, 2010 p,159). Military establishment was not happy on this step of Nawaz Sharif and assumed that Nawaz could damage the security of the state.

4.31 Issue of Kargil and Difference between Army and Nawaz Sharif

Failure of Kargil operation widened the gulf between army and Nawaz sharif. Army which was already annoyed with Nawaz Sharif on the resignation of General Karamat toppled the government of Nawaz Sahrif on 12th October1999.

In fact in May 1999, control of few mountain peaks was took by Mujahideen and others in the absence of Indian army. On this activity India used diplomacy aggressively to isolate the Pakistan in international arena and blamed that Pakistan Army has violated the international law. Nawaz Sharif asked/suggested India to resolve the issue with negotiation but in vain. At last with mediation of Bill Clinton this issue was resolved on July 04, 1999 when Nawaz signed a treaty in the absence of India in which Nawaz stated that Pakistan would withdraw its forces from Kargil(H. Khan, 2005 p,932). But due to this treaty, Generals got annoyed and staged a coup in October 1999(Naidu, 2002). This issue damaged the relationship between Nawaz Sharif and his hand -picked COAS(Musharraf, 2006 p,136).


For any operation conducted by the army it is very important that civil-military leadership must be on the same page. Although army fight in the battlefield/operation area but it required moral authority and financial support as well which is provided by civil government. But in Kargil this basic strength was missing. Mian Nawaz Sharif blamed that army kept him ignorant about this matter(Sattar, 2007 p,259). Nawaz blamed that only Musharraf's mind was behind the Kargil's

plan(Ziring, 2003 p,255). In this tense situation of accusation and counter accusation Musharraf transferred the army officers from their respective positions who were close to Nawaz. On the other hand Nawaz was waiting for an opportunity to remove Musharraf(G. A. Khan, 2007 p, 330). To counter Nawaz, Musharraf was aiming to remove Nawaz because he (Musharraf) was assuming that Nawaz would initiate an enquiry about Kargal(Siddiqa, 2017 p,97).

After the Kargal episode, the Army officers were annoyed on the withdrawal of troops this statement was given by army spokesperson Bergediar Rashid Qureshi(Constable, 1999). On this occasion Shahbaz Sharif visited USA along with DG ISI Lt.General Ziauddin and gave assurance to US authorities about cooperation against Taliban (a terrorist/ Jihadi wing in Afghanistan). Shahbaz Sharif also expressed his concerns to the US authorities that Army could toppled the government. On these concerns the US authorities said that “we hope there will be no return of days of interrupted democracy in Pakistan”(Shafqat, 2009).

Mistrust touched to its peak when Corps Commander Quetta, General Tariq Pervez met with Nawaz and told him (Nawaz) about the intention of military commanders that if Nawaz attempted to remove COAS then army would react aggressively. Due to mistrust when Musharraf came to know about the meeting he promptly called Tariq and asked Tariq to resign(Shafqat, 2009).

Diagram 4.2: Pattern of Dissolution of Nawaz Sharif Government



Source: Researcher own constructed

4.32 End of Democratic Era

On October 12, 1999 when Musharraf was in Sri Lanka to attend the 50th anniversary parade, Nawaz Sharif tried to remove him and appointed Lt.General Ziauddin as new COAS who was working as Head of ISI but the commanders refused to accept the orders of Ziauddin. However, his (Musharraf) subordinates reacted, and sacked his (Nawaz) government brusquely on 12th Oct, 1999 (Kukreja, 2003 p,255-257). The army took the control of the state and on 14th of October 1999, Musharraf, under PCO, assumed the powers of Chief executive of the state and declared emergency. Parliament and provincial Assemblies were also dissolved and

constitution was held in abeyance. Thus a democratic era which was started in 1988 came to an end and martial was imposed

Table 4.3: A brief comparison of Benazir and Nawaz Shaif's Tenure

Benazir Bhutto failed to promote accommodation building and dialogue across the political domain.	Nawaz Sharif failed to promote accommodation building and dialogue across the political domain.
Failed to maintain coalition.	Failed to maintain coalition.
Remained busy in undemocratic practices.	Remained busy in undemocratic practices.
Benazir was vulnerable due to her thin majority.	He was comfortable about his numbers in parliament.
Benazir had not government in all the provinces.	Nawaz Sharif had government in all the provinces.
Benazir remained in controversies with judiciary.	Nawaz Sharif also remained in controversies with judiciary.
Freedom of Media was highly restricted.	Freedom of Media was highly restricted.
In her period, intervention of civil bureaucracy was greater than military.	Due to overwhelmingly majority civil bureaucracy was almost under control.
Promoted practice of political victimization.	Promoted practice of political victimization.
Working relationship with president remained not pleasant due to imbalance of power.	Partially balanced till 1998 and then excellent.
Tried to interfere in the matters of military related to transfer and posting	Interfered in the matters of transfer and posting.
A deep wish of centralization of power.	A deep wish of centralization of power.
Establishment did not support Benazir.	Establishment Supported Nawaz Sharif till kargil issue.

In her tenure parliament was rubber stamp.	In his tenure parliament was rubber stamp.
There was no significant legislation in this period.	Legislation continued due to majority.
Failed to repeal the 8 th amendment.	8 th amendment was repealed.
Promoted culture of allegation and counter allegation.	Promoted culture of allegation and counter allegation.
Dissolved by president both the times in 1990 and 1996.	Government was dissolved by president in 1993 and in 1999 dissolved in the result of Coup.

4.33 Conclusion

By looking at the style of government it is observed that both Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996) and Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999) remained busy in the struggle of power. They learned nothing from their past experience. The mistakes of past should have been corrected but it did not happen. Moreover, there was a general opinion among the masses that Benazir and Nawaz Sharif during their term in office had played a key role in placing parliamentary democracy's legitimacy at stake (Tonchev, 2002).

The politicians in Pakistan always talk about democracy and prescribed democracy the best cure of all the issues in the state. They always claimed that the issues can be tackled easily if the people of Pakistan allowed to cast their vote without any pressure and with free will. But it was scene that when these politicians came to power they acted like an autocrat.

Benazir in her tenure indulged in conflict with President Farooq Leghari and both tried to control each other. Benazir remained embroiled in so-called issues with military, judiciary and opposition. Similarly, Nawaz Sharif rivaled for power with Leghari, Musharraf and the judiciary. Everyone was wondered that while

strengthening his/her position they did not care about democracy. Even in the struggle for power Nawaz Sharif forced to resign to COAS General Jahangir Karamat and President Farooq Ahmed Leghari and appointed his loyal Musharraf as COAS and Rafiq Tarar as president. After the coup the political leaders like PPP who talked about democracy welcomed the coup. Only few were there who criticized the military coup. This prove that in this era of Pakistani politics we were trying to build democracy without democrats.

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CHAPTER 5

INSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Democracy is a coherent way of government. In democracy executive, judiciary, civil and military establishments represent a state. For the progress and prosperity of the state, stability of all kinds is very important. Since its creation, Pakistan is facing internal political instability like Constitutional deadlock, government's instability and institutional confrontation. Confrontation between main organs of the state as judiciary, president, military establishment and mutual confrontation and mistrust of the politicians had badly affected the democratic system of Pakistan. Better working relationship is very important for the progress of the state. With the revival of democracy in Pakistan, the people of Pakistan were expecting political stability in state but their dreams could not become true and sank in the sea of institutional confrontation. This chapter would explain that how these institutions remained in the state of confrontation and how they affected the political system of Pakistan.

Table 5.1: Pattern of working of Institution during 1988-1999

Institutions	Working Pattern
President	• In the presence of 8th amendment was more powerful then Prime Minister • Remained in confrontation with PM in person of Ghulam Ishaq Khan 1988-1993 and Farooq Leghar during 1993-1998. • Dissolved the Government of Benazir in 1990 and of Nawaz Sharif in 1993and in person of Farooq Leghari 1993-1998 dissolved the government of Benazir in 1996 and remained in confrontation with Nawaz Sharif.
Prime Minister	• Confrontation with president, Army, Judiciary and Opposition.
Military	• Hegemony of military establishment remained in politics and • Never allowed PM to work freely • Backed the presidents' decisions of dissolution.
Judiciary	• Validated the orders of dissolution in 1990 and 1996 even military Coupe of 1999 • Confrontation with Executive
Opposition	• Confrontation with Government • Politics of agitation • Supported dissolution orders even military Coupe of 1999 • Played politics of conspiracy • Back door contacts with undemocratic forces to destabilize the sitting Government

Note: in a parliamentary form of government, opposition plays a very vital role through its positive contribution therefore researcher has defined the role of opposition as 'institution'.

Source: Researcher own constructed

A smooth working relationship between the various state institutions is a basic condition for the effective functioning of the state. When institutions act improperly, unrest and instability are the ultimate outcome. Pakistan has been facing the same

problem. The primacy of institutions and law over individuals and organizations is an important value of democracy. These institutions must respect each other because every institution enjoys autonomy but does not operate in a vacuum; each institution has to interact with others. If an institution attempts to expand its domain at the expense of others or tries to dominate others or develops a self-ascribed mission of rectifying all other institutions, there will be sharp institutional imbalance and conflict/confrontation which is not helpful to democracy.

No society can run without justice. Judiciary is the guardian and final interpreter of the Constitution. In the period under study, the judiciary remained under lot of stress. It had to decide several petitions which were filed regarding Constitutional amendments and against the orders of dissolution of assemblies of presidents and COAS. From Governor General Ghulam Muhammad to Musharraf, it had to decide the matters of suspension, abrogation, violation of the Constitution and held in abeyance of the Constitution.

For an independent judiciary, provisions had been provided in all Constitutions of Pakistan. But at different times, practice to control judiciary had been made which later became a reason of confrontation between judiciary and executive and between executive and president which badly affected smooth running of functioning of state. It was tried to put judiciary under control by political appointments and through amendments. Political appointments were started during Ayube Khan Era(Nawa-i-waqat, Lahore, 25th January 1985). Even these appointments were made during caretaker period as Ghulam Ishaq Khan made fifty appointments before elections of 1988(Nasir, 1990) which latter became a bone of contention between him and Prime Minister. As according to article 48 of the Constitution, president was bound to take the advice of Prime Minister. When this matter was

brought to Lahore High Court which gave its decision in favour of president without hearing the point of view of federation(Nasir, 1990). Government filled a petition in SCP against this decision. Although this matter was later settled out of the court but it created a sense of confrontation between two powerful institutions president and executive (PM). Along with this, it also created doubts in the mind of government about the judiciary as well.

When on 6th of August 1990, government of Benazir Bhutto was dissolved by president by using article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution, Benazir decided to challenge the order in all the four High Courts under article 199(Dawood, 1994a). The federation of Pakistan under article 186-A of Constitution requested the Supreme Court to consolidate all petitions pending in four high Courts(PLD 1992,SC pp 654). On this request, Supreme Court on 15th of October 1990 transferred the pending petition of Pishawer High Court to Lahore High Court and Balochistan High Court to Sindh High Court(Dawood, 1994b). Lahore High Court upheld the order of president on 14th of October 1990 and the petitioner challenged this decision in SCP. A full court bench consisting of 12 judges of SCP judged the petition and dismissed the petition and upheld the order of president by 10-02. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and Justice Abdul Shakoor Salam wrote the disagreeing/dissenting verdict(Dawood, 1994b p,103). In fact the issue of dissolution was of Constitutional nature, it needed a debate in parliament before the execution of the order. Endorsement of the termination of assembly by the court set a sorry practice in the parliamentary history of Pakistan. This decision caused political uncertainty which proved dreadful for the future of democratization(Khalid, 2012, p. 06). On this decision Paula R. Newberg writes in his book that “like rulings in earlier courts, the court took its direction from

political winds and refused to examine the soundness of president's arguments or the sufficiency of his claim(Newberg, 2002 p,216).”

Under article 243(1) of the Constitution armed forces are under the command of the federal government but instead of this that army perform its duties under federal government it is running the state according to its wishes which resulted in confrontation. During the era under study, it tried to maintain its hegemony over the entire political setup. As it was revealed by Lt. General Aslam Jan Mahsood that when Benazir indulged in confrontation with army on the issue of retirement of Admiral Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey on the advice of her Minister Nasirullah Babar then army decided to dismiss her government(Dawood, 1994). According to Aslam Jan Mahsood a corps commander meeting was held on 21st July 1990 in Rawalpindi in which it was decided to sack the Benazir's government. He further said that it was decided some six month before the dissolution(Akhund, 2000 p, 309). It was the army and bureaucracy that bypassed the Constitution and controlled the Constitutional powers which should have been exercised by elected people. However it is an established fact that army was behind the move of president. Moreover, Benazir was being thought as security risk. Thus, interference and animosity was existed between Benazir and army. The army always desired to have an authority that could preserve its benefits and did not interfere in its functions(Raza, 2001).

In parliamentary democratic system of governments, president assumed the office as head of the state. He leaves all the party affiliations while representing federation. It is believed that he would work for the unity of federation and for the betterment of the state. But it did not happen during the period under study. Personal interests bulldozed the national interests. When Nawaz Sharif came in power, Ghulam Ishaq Khan the president, supported him and gave him preference over Benazir. But

when Nawaz Sharif urged on 21st February 1993 to repeal the 8th amendment due to which two governments were already dissolved one of Muhammad Khan Junejo in 1988 and the other of Benazir in 1990 than a tussle started between Prime Minister and president. Later, the same president dissolved the assembly of another elected Prime Minister Muhammed Nawaz Sharif on different allegation almost the same as he leveled against Benazir. Nawaz Sharif, knowing this fact that there were no such circumstances due to which his government was dissolved, filed a petition in SCP under article 184(3). He prayed the court to restore his government as the order of the president was based on malafied intention. This petition was heard on day to day basis by full bench(H. Khan, 2005, p. 755). On 26th of May 1993, the SCP gave its verdict and restored the assembly and government of Nawaz Sharif. This decision was not being expected by the court as Zering says that “This time, however, the jurists decided to challenge the very vice regal tradition that their predecessors were, in major part, responsible for nurturing and institutionalizing.(Ziring, 1997, p. 515)”

Benazir, who earlier had become the victim of article 58(2) (b) should welcome the decision and must join hands with Nawaz to repeal the said 8th amendment. But showing immaturity and promoting the politics of confrontation joined hands with president. Benazir criticized the decision and declared it as the result of “Chamak” (money) but the CJP Naseem Hassan Shah responded and said that his decision was clean and crystal(N. H. Shah, 2002, p. 114). Justice Sajjad Ali Shah wrote dissenting judgement.

In this power politics the army being a powerful institution should come forward and must use its influence for the implementation of the order of the court. But there were already difference between army and Nawaz since Gulf War crises and it did not do what was the requirement of the time. It was the necessary of the

time that military play its role for the continuation of the government but it not happened. After a series of meetings between troika (president, Prime Minister and COAS) situation remained tense. A corps commander's emergency meeting was held on 2 July 1993 in which advised was given to Nawaz Sharif to hold fresh elections. Nawaz Sharif agreed on the formula which is also called Kakkar (the then COAS) Formula and advised the president to dissolve the assembly with this condition that he (president) will also stepped down. Assembly was dissolved and then GIK stepped down from the presidency. History is evident that military has influenced the decisions of the judiciary as well. As Aslam Baig disclosing that he did try to influence the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1988, not to give a verdict for the restoration of Muhammad Khan Junejo's dismissed government(Amin, 1994, p. 193).

In fact anti India stance in foreign policy is a “lifesaving boat” for military centered establishment. Military being a well-established and well-disciplined institution is widely respected by the nation. Due to its influence it had ruled the state directly from 1958-1971, 1977-1985 and 1999-2007 by Ayube Khan, Yaha Khan, Zia Ul Haq and Musharraf respectively. But after the sudden death of COAS and president Zia, the army took a grim view to restore democracy. As Hassan Askri Rizvi stated that army started to think that directly running the political institution is a strain on its institution's professionalism(Rizvi, 1989, pp. 256–257). As Kooning and Krujit has used the term “political Army” and stated that “military institutions that consider involvement in – or control over – domestic politics and the business of government to be a central part of their legitimate function(Koonings & Kruijt, 2002)”.

Military had been involved in making and breaking of political parties and governments to manipulate the political system as it happened in the elections 1988.

Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) was made by military establishment to counter PPP. Although, the military establishment decided to restore democracy yet it did not allow PPP to sweep a victory and to counter PPP it made IJI which was an alliance of different political parties majority of them was right wing parties. The 8th amendment which was passed during COAS and President Zia era was used by president with the support of military. The army always wanted to have an individual in authority that could preserve its benefits and did not intrude in its business(Raza, 2001, p. 103). Although it is used by president but as Ayesha Jalal says that these decisions are never taken without the consultation and approval of the army(Bose & Jalal, 2017, p. 234). Hamid Gul an Ex. Chief of ISI later admitted that he made IJI to counter PPP(Shaikh, 2000, p. 199).

Ultra-Constitutional activities of the institutions did not allow the democracy to take its roots. It is the practice of parliamentary system of government that the party which won the elections formed its government. But when Benazir won the election of 1988 she was not allowed to form her government. Before going to form her government she had to give many assurances to the military(Waseem, 1989, p. 453). It shows that powers were shared not transferred. The institution of army and president remained united against Prime Minister. It was once again seen that when president dissolved the government of Benazir in 1996, the army completely backed the president(Malik, 2008, p. 188).

Institutional confrontation once again emerged during the second term of Benazir about two issue; separation of judiciary from the executive and appointments of judges. In this institutional confrontation government transferred Judges from high courts to Federal Shariat Court such as Nasar Aslam Zahid, Mehboob Ahmed and Justice Muhammad Ilyas. This policy was applied to sideline those judges who not

suites to government. Because government wanted to see its favorite judges in the courts. On the issue of separation of judiciary from executive the SCP ruled to act till 23rd of March 1994 but when the time approached the government and all four provinces filled petitions to extend the time which was given till 23rd March 1996. The government allegedly put pressure to get the decision by different tactics even it suspended the son in law of Chief Justice from government service(Waseem, 1998 p,5). On the issue of appointments of judges there emerged a deadlock between executive and judiciary. The SCP gave its verdict in Al.Jihad Trust vs Federation of Pakistan case to appoint permanent Chief Justice of High Courts and also declared that the appointments made by acting Chief justices should be dropped. The government locked itself in confrontation with SCP and not comply the orders. After a delay of six months and 10 days it implemented the decision. This created a rift between judiciary (CJP) and government.

In this confrontational situation Benazir on the floor of the house ridiculed the judgement of SCP(PLD, 2000. P, 1217). President also asked her to implement the orders but in vain. President filed references to take the opinion of SCP. In this confrontation executive, judiciary and president were indulged. Moving a step forward the president dissolved the assembly of Benazir On 4th of November 1996 on the charges of corruption, mal practice, misuse of public funds etc(Bhutto, 2007, pp. 140–150). When Benazir and Sajjad Ali Shah was in the state of confrontation at that time assembly was dissolved and Benazir challenged the order in SCP and denied all the allegations which were leveled against her by president. The CJP formed a seven member bench to decide the matter. It is pertinent to mention that all the matters of dissolution are heard by full court bench but in this case only seven members bench was formed out of total 14 members. The SCP gave its decision on 29th of January

1996 and upheld the order of the president. Out of seven judges one Judge Justice Zia Mahmood Mirza gave dissenting judgement. The impact of this decision was again resulted into uncertainty/instability of democratic institutions. Benazir criticized the decision and said it was not unexpected decision while on the other hand opposition showed political immaturity and admired the decision which validated the order of the president..

It is a sorry situation that when our politicians are in opposition they always talked about democracy and demand from the government to practice democratic norms but when they get power they practice autocratically. They always offer themselves to topple the other's government. History is evident that in 1990 Nawaz Sharif, in 1993 Benazir joined hands with president respectively. When Leghari was in conflict with Benazir at that time Nawaz was happy with turmoil situation and when Nawaz locked himself in conflict with army than Benazir was pleased with the unstable position of government.

In a parliamentary form of government, political parties also had a very vital position in strengthening the political system. Along with other institutions, opposition has also its vital position in democratic setup. In democracy majority is given the right to govern and minority plays its role as opposition. The purpose of this role is to keep a check on the performance and functioning of the government. Opposition always keeps an eye on the interests of the society. As Thomas in 'the politics of the developing nations' says that resolute and active government and a liable opposition are vital components for a democracy(Thomas, 1964) it is considered that opposition is a group of people who will challenge the policies of the government(Wilding & Laundry, 1961, p. 498). But this challenge is assumed for the benefits of the state and nation not for personal goals. The importance of opposition

could be seen by the statement of Sir Ivor Jennings statement “if there is no opposition there is no democracy”(Gulag, 2007, p. 30). No society can be free of conflicts and disagreements, their names and conditions can be varied(Diamond & Plattner, 1996, p. 40). In every system of government power struggle is a continued process. The party or parties which are not in power try to get power by ousting/overthrowing those who are in power. But to get in power there are different methods like elections and vote of no confidence. Democratic system insure the right of opposition by using the forum of parliament.

In the politic of confrontation the role of opposition in Pakistan during the era under study had not been up to the mark of democratic norms. It had not worked for the strengthening the institution of parliament rather to weaken it through its undemocratic acts through its policies of long marches, dharnas (sit in) and conspiracies against the government. Thus they threatened the system. History of Pakistan is evident that whenever government-opposition are locked in conflict the nonpolitical forces got benefits as it happened in 1977 when opposition and government could not reach on an agreement then military took over. Even due to the confrontations Pakistan had to face the debacle of East Pakistan. At that time political parties did not accept the other’s right to form the government and at the end had to face the parting of one part of the country.

Parliament is an institution and opposition is an important part of this institution. In developing countries, the opposition provides procedures for political stability(Hofstadter, 1969). No doubt that there are certain types of conflicts between ruling party and opposition but these conflicts should remain within the boundaries of system(Hofstadter, 1969). As democracy cannot function properly without the opposing forces(Madan, 1986, p. 163). Opposition is a compulsory part of

parliamentary democracy(Jennings, 1947, p. 484). But it should work according to the norms of democracy. Opposition in Pakistan always tried to criticize on all the policies of the government. The 8th amendment of the Constitution due to which three governments were dissolved When Benazir tried to repeal it in her first tenure then Nawaz Sharif did not give her support and when Nawaz wished to repeal the amendment in first tenure then Benazir did not support him and joined hands with president. The non-cooperative attitude of the opposition has put in danger the future of democracy in the state. Opposition plays a vital role in the survival of parliamentary control. it is considered that opposition is vital for the viability of a democratic system(Coxall, 2014, p. 165). In Pakistan, for its personal interests, the opposition has always undermined the democratic system.

Democratic experience of Pakistan does not characterize the normative ideals connected with government-opposition links as it has to function in the background structure of neo-viceregalism. In Pakistani situation of neo-viceregalism could be explained as a political system controlled by civil-military bureaucracy, reinforced by feudal lords, industrialists and religious classes with some resemblance of democracy. In such operational framework, the norms and traditions of ideal democracy cannot be thoroughly ensured. Linz while describing the factors which influence the democracy states that a loyal opposition that it is dedicated to attain power only by democratic means, and it discards vehemence or undemocratic pleas to the military as a way to gain power(Stepan & Linz, 1978, pp. 16–17).

During the decade under study 1988-1999 the opposition's role in politics had been insufficient and unproductive which is the most important reason for the failure of democratic experience and institutional confrontation in the country. The revival of democracy under the 8th Constitutional amendment was the result of a great struggle

of the democratic forces, but it could not continue in the power game between the opposing centers of power. In fact the opposition could not adjust itself between ruling party and vice regal centre of power. In fact this struggle of power was between the representative and non-representative, democratic and non-democratic forces in which, the opposition was supposed to play a counter complementary role to endorse the pre-dominance of democratic ideals over the traditions of absolutism and dictatorship. But the opposition did not strengthen the democratic government and to quest its lust for power oppositions again brought itself in line with the non-democratic vice regal centres of power.

On the other hand government or ruling party involved itself in so called conflicts with the opposition. Throughout this decade the attitude of Intolerance, repression and high handedness on the part of the governments towards the opposition had remained a common practice. Bigoted dealing with the opposition parties and the use of autocratic steps with intolerant approaches on the part of government remained continuous as a method of dealing with those who expressed protest against the policies of the government. During this era all the governments tried their level best to harass the opposition by registering false case against them.

In parliamentary form of government, the difference of arguments/opinion is considered very fruitful and constructive. These differences could be on different matters like foreign policy, internal policy etc. There are division of thoughts in all the nations. The government and opposition are projected to preserve positive measures of understanding and harmony on the basic necessities of democratic order to certify the continuation of the course by all means. But in Pakistani politics the opposition is always viewed as an ignored political stake holder by virtue of certain

flaws and has often been used by the traditional vice regal establishment as a tool to manipulate against the party in power.

Throughout the democratic history of Pakistan every deadlock in government-opposition relationship has resulted in the fatal forfeits/penalties/results for democratic process in the country. It is understood reality that the ruling/majority party and the opposition are the real participants in democratic setup. Their peaceful existence with sense of compromise, tolerance, mutual respect and cooperation is vital for suave working of democracy. They need to learn lesson from the repeated and recurrent mistakes on their part, which have most of the time pushed the situation to the ultimate deadlock and standoff that always resulted in the deadly termination of democratic experience. They are expected to promote a culture of harmony and understanding by avoiding needless opposition.

In the presence of politicians having lust of power the military establishment and its intelligence agencies had also played its part in undermining the democratic traditions. Being a powerful institution it is the duty of this institution to safeguard the boundaries but since the creation of Pakistan it is very active in politics especially after 1958. The civil-military establishment has also been active in the process of organising opposition alliances through its overt and covert activities, often against the ruling party. The opposition always remained ready to get the support from the hidden hands of military. Such form of affiliation certainly weakened ideals of democracy.

Institutional confrontation touched to its peak when Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif won the election with overwhelming majority in 1997 and finished the powers of president to dissolve the assembly by 13th amendment than he indulged in conflicts with president, judiciary, military and opposition. Prime Minister Sharif was gaining

displeasure on many fronts, for he was alleged to be power hungry. He had forced out the chief justice of the Supreme Court and the army chief soon after the 8th amendment was revised, he was cracking down on the press as well. Even president had to resign when he came to know about the motion of impeachment which was assumed to be tabled against him by ruling party. But when he indulged in conflict with New Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf he had to face the wrath of the army. On 12th October 1999 General Musharraf overthrew his government and declared emergency in the country. The Constitution was put in abeyance and Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) was issued to provide a provisional governing framework. With this arrangement General Musharraf assumed the office of the Chief Executive(Ahmed, 2010, pp. 1–6). Judges were forced to take new oath of the office under PCO. Only six judges refused to take oath under PCO.

Once again matter was brought to SCP when A petition was filled by Zafar Ali Shah which is known as Zafar Ali Shah vs General Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive(PLD 2000,SC 869) . A full court bench headed by CJP Irshad Hassan Khan announced its decision on 12th May 2000 and validated the military takeover. This shows how the judiciary supported the dictators and putting down their guns on the shoulder of tyrants under the doctrine of “law of necessity” like CJP Muneer Ahmed. As Dr.Irum says that “Army has always been in quest of legitimacy and judiciary has fulfilled this requirement very often(Khalid, 2012, p. 02).” In the presence of institutional confrontation the military being a powerful institution had used its embargo power through the 8th Amendment of the Constitution and informal power-sharing agreements, which restricted the *de facto* authority of the representative institutions. The military did not dither to use its authority on the means of compulsion to defend its position was obvious from the 1999 military coup, which

was carried out in spite of extensive international criticism. Thus it is clear that the military would agree a limited political impact only through its own inventiveness.

It is obvious that the political process which returned in Pakistan after a long military rule in 1988 did not meet the criteria of true democratic norms and traditions. During this era the governments were weak and remained in vulnerable position in the presence of strong establishment and president. The governments also shared power with the President *de jure* and the military *de facto*. The Prime Ministers remained in the state of confrontation and could not make any agreement or compromise.

No democracy can serve the people if it is not ready to ensure justice. On the one side the Constitution provides enough powers to the judiciary but on the other hand, the *de facto* power of the military threatened the institution to get the decisions by force. (Statement of COAS Aslam Baig has been discussed in chapter 3) Thus came about a fundamental conflict among these state institutes. But this contradiction existed with the intrinsic weakness of a judiciary that how it surrendered before the dictators both military and civil. “As a matter of fact, no judiciary can play its effective role towards democratization in the absence of judicial independences. A strong institution of judiciary is inevitable for democratization(Khalid, 2012, p. 11).”

5.1 Conclusion

Since its creation Pakistan has faced the problem of institutional confrontation and imbalance of power tilted in favor of the president and COAS. Strengthening the military and the bureaucracy also strengthened Pakistan's structural disparity. Democratic institutions such as the Legislature, political parties, social organisations and the media were weak, and the civil-military bureaucracy was powerful. This disparity has been reinforced over time because Pakistan has been under extreme security pressure from India and Afghanistan. It also had issues with domestic law

and order, prompting the government to assign the top priority to protection against external threats and internal chaos. Moreover politicians used all means to get power and invited the non-democratic forces to interfere in political matters. As Aqil Shah says “once out of power, political leaders have never hesitated to cut a power-sharing deal with the military, even if that has meant legitimating its institutionalized political role(A. Shah, 2003, p. 34).” This strengthened the military and political institutions were ignored. This era may also be believed to be the same as our past, with the characteristics of poor political parties, with egotistical leadership, confrontation between the state institutions and finally non democratic actions(Javaid & Latif, 2017, p. 07).

The moral authority of institutions and of law over entities and institutions is an important principle of democracy. These institutions must regard one another because each institution prefers authority but does not perform in a vacuum; each institution must cooperate with the other. If an institution seeks to increase its sphere at the cost of others, or tends to control others, or develops a self-ascribed mission to correct all other institutes, there will be a sharp institutional disparity and turmoil that does not help democracy.

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
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CHAPTER 6

REVIEW AND REFLECTIONS

Pakistan came into being after a long struggle. Leaders and public made untiring efforts to create Pakistan. After the creation of Pakistan there was a wide geographical difference between the two wings East and West Pakistan. Ethnically these two wings were also different. The only one thing which connected them was religion. The religion was the force which kept these two wings united during the movement of Pakistan. After the creation, Pakistan had to face many problems internally and externally. In the first decade, these ethnic issues made administration of newly born state very difficult. In these circumstances every state needs a leader who is admired and respected by everyone living in the country. The Quaid-E-Azam was the only personality who lead the independence movement single handedly. It was his charismatic personality which kept united the Muslims of subcontinent having different norms, language and culture. This was the key feature of his personality/leadership. Unfortunately, in the initial years of the creation of Pakistan, it had to face the bitter reality of the death of founding leader which completely shattered the entire nation. This death created a leadership vacuum. Although Liaquat Ali Khan was there to run the functions of the state and he tried his best to make true the vision of his leader Quaid_E_Azam but he was less admired and respected in the country then his leader. His period was cut short by mysterious act of assassination on 16th October 1951. The demise of Jinnah in September 1948 and the assassin of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951 eliminated the two figures of a truly national status from of the political arena.

Diagram 6.1: The Outline of the Research



Source: Research's Own Constructed


After the death of Quaid E Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan did not have the leadership qualities that Quai-e-Azam had to keep the nation united. Moreover, the heinous act of assassination detracted parliamentary democracy in the state. Although there were too many leaders behind them but hey only proved strong against one each other. There started a ruthless race of power among them. Due to this race a strong and stable political culture could not be established. Liaqat Ali Khan's death proved a turning point in the history of Pakistan. Because after his death there emerged a nexus of civil military bureaucracy. The existed political leader ship remained vulnerable and was not able to run the state democratically. A true democratic culture

could not be established because of unholy alliance of civil-military bureaucracy and cunning politicians. Non-elected institutions repeatedly interfered in political matters. They played vibrant role in making and breaking the governments.

After the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin became the Prime Minister and Malik Ghulam Muhammad Governor general. The existence of Malik Ghulam Muhammad proved destructive for the coming years. Nazimuddin's period was cut short by Ghulam Muhammad and he removed Nazimuddin and appointed Muhammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister. When Bogra was made Prime Minister at that time he was serving as ambassador in USA. He presented his famous 'Bogra Formula' by which seats of constituent assembly were divided amongst the units. This formula was accepted by all except Punjabi members. His government was dissolved by Ghulam Muhammad on 24th October 1954. His decision was given validity by the judiciary under the 'doctrine of necessity'. On 12 August 1955 he was replaced by Chaudhry Muhammad Ali. Muhammad Ali Succeeded in Constitution making. During this period Ghulam Muhammad was sent on two months leave and Iskandar Mirza replaced him permanently. After the promulgation of the Constitution Iskander Mirza became the first president of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. One thing is pertinent to mention that after getting assurance that he would be made president then he signed the bill. Iskander Mirza also misused his office and within next three years four Prime Ministers Muhammad Ali, Hussain Shaheed Soharwardi, I.I.Chundrigar and Feroz Khan Noon were changed. First decade of Pakistan's political history is full of power tussle and the system was derailed again and again by Governor Generals with the support of military. This tendency did not allow the political culture to flourish which proved harmful in the coming years.

The following diagram will show the nature of governments including the period of Musharraf who toppled the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999 which ended a decade of democracy.

Figure 6.1: Types of Government from 1947-2008



Source: Syed Ali Shah, Article Factors responsible for weak democratic culture among the political parties of Pakistan, P.16

Being a commander In Chief and close ties with the office of Governor General, Ayub already was in politics. He started his political role actively and openly when he was made Prime Minister by Iskandar Mirza on 24th October 1958 . This move of Mirza put deep effects on the entire history of Pakistan. Then the time came when Ayub Khan forced Mirza to leave the office and took the control of state as martial law administrator. Ayub Khan used bureaucracy for strengthening his rule. As Nadeem Akhtar in his thesis has stated that Ayub mostly relied on bureaucracy. On the other as hand Zering and Calard argued that it is the political leadership which is responsible of the martial law. After getting in power Ayub abrogated the Constitution which was made after the efforts of nine years, which remained in operation for only three years. Ayub run the system according to his own wishes and introduced a new model of democracy called ‘basic democracy’. He elected himself by these democrats. He introduced his own presidential Constitution and took all the powers in his hand. This shows how bureaucracy bulldozed the democratic process

since Ghulam Muhammad. Bureaucracy especially military bureaucracy got prestige after the imposition of martial and it enjoyed its prestigious position in the coming years. Even when Miss Fattima Jinnah contested the presidential election on the platform of COP, the bureaucracy completely supported Ayub and he won the election by clear margin. He introduced many policies but in emerging setup these policies proved harmful because these marginalized the majority of the population from the process of growth and governance. As it is described by Stern and Soligo in their work "Tariff Protection, Import Substitution, and Investment Efficiency, Pakistan Development Review 1965" that during the period of 1960s the main industries of Pakistan were generating negative value added. Having not trust on politicians, when there arose wide agitations against him, then he transferred powers to another military dictator General Muhammad Yahya Khan instead of this to hand over the powers to speaker of national assembly as it was prescribed in the Constitution. Yahya's era proved most troubled one. His ambition of more and more centralized autonomy destroyed the system. He tried to run the system through 'LFO' but could not control the situation finally he had to leave the scene after the separation of East Pakistan and handed over powers to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

Bhutto came in power when whole the nation was in grim of sorrow but through his energetic, bold and visionary qualities he handled the situation quit well. This was first time that military was pushed to barracks and Bhutto even dismissed top brass of military who were involved in war like General Gull Hassan. He made reforms according to the demands of the time. He build new Pakistan brick by Brick with his determination. In this era there was a break of civil-military relation. Bhutto gave Pakistan the Constitution of 1973 which was unanimously accepted by all. But gradually military regain its position and once again Pakistan had to face another martial law under Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. Zia also tried to run the system according to his wishes. He introduced 'Islamization'. He strengthened his position through PCO and

RCO. He got himself elected through referendum. When he saw the emerging pressure of ‘MRD’ he held party less elections and nominated Muhammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister. But when Junejo used his Constitutional/ parliamentary powers then Zia dissolved his government by using the axe of ‘58(2 b)’.


Table 6.1: National Assembly Seats of PPP and IJI / PML.N at elections 1988-1997 (total 207 seats)

Party	1988	1990	1993	1997
IJI (1988-1990) PML(N) (1993-1997)	56	106	73	137
PPP	94	44	89	18
Voter turn out	44%	46%	40%	36%

Source: Illhan Niaz, Article Pakistan History, P.08

In the era under study four elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 were held and four elected governments performed but not a single government could complete its Constitutional term of five years. The governments remained under the influence of establishment and were taking guidance of the establishment and were not free in their decision making. The legacies of Zia wanted the involvement of military in all the fields which made democracy a joke in Pakistan. The military played a role of king maker which used politicians to get their interests. In the presence of law under the article 58(2) (b) the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan who was also an Ex. bureaucrat remained more power full and he enjoyed the pleasure of military establishment as well. Which badly damaged the fabric of democracy. On the other hand people of Pakistan were not well aware of their power of vote and they did not actively participated in the elections.


Diagram 6.2: Voter turn Out during 1988-1997



Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

When Benazir came in power in 1988 people were hoping for a change. In a parliamentary democratic system the Prime Minister is considered the head of the government and is responsible for all the matters of the state. But she was not allowed to work freely. Her all decisions were watched and monitored closely by the military with a hint of distrust. Although military establishment got some assurances before giving the powers to her but this distrust remained there. Due to the lack of experience she had to rely on the bureaucrats. She demanded for the restoration of democracy when she was leading the MRD but when she came in power, made no effort to promote democratic traditions. She did not develop working relationship with the opposition. She did not develop a sense of harmony and compromise with the opposition. Due to her style of governance she indulged in confrontation even with president and judiciary which caused the fall of her government.


Diagram 6.3: Sectoral expenditures from funds allocated to Members of national assembly (1988-1993)



Source: Ministry of Local Government, Government of Pakistan

Muhammad Nawaz sharif who was a blue eye of establishment came in power with full support of military and president even his party IJI was provided ‘logistic’ support by president and military. He too could not develop mutual harmony and locked himself in confrontation with opposition and president. His approach toward opposition and institution was no different than his predecessor. He himself created problems for his rule with his non-cooperative attitude. During the existing political deadlock in 1993 he had to resign along with president according to the General Kakar’s formula. The service delivery of both Benazir and Nawaz was not up to the mark. For instance health and education are the core sectors for the progress of any state. During their respective terms in government from 1988-1993 the funds which were allotted to the MNAs were mostly spend on roads not on health and education. A very low portion of GDP was invested on health and education. Education has not been priority of the ruling class.

Diagram 6.4: Consolidated government expenditures on education and health, as percentage of GDP



Source: Government of Pakistan, Finance Accounts

In the 2nd term of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif both tried centralism of power. They did not learn any lesson from their past bitter experience. It was assumed in their respective terms that now both are mature and experience and they will perform well but it not happened and once again history repeated itself even worse at the end of the period of the later. They confronted with judiciary. Initially, Benazir maintained smooth working relations with military and did not make any try to involve in their matters in other words she surrendered her democratic powers for the sake of her government. She accepted all the proposals of military about appointments, policy and budget allocation. But after the departure of COAS Kakar she never felt easy. This shows how the ‘blessings’ of COAS is required for the sake of government. On the other hand Benazir’s own loyal nominated president did not tolerated her attitude and sacked her government. The tug of war between her and

president started when Benazir did not bother to consult with the later on policies. President Leghari took it as she is undermining his position and then rift reached to the point of no return.

Table 6.2: Percentage of seats won by independent candidates in provincial assembly elections

Province	1988	1990	1993	1997
Punjab	12.1%	6.7%	8.3%	7.9%
Sindh	6.0%	19.0%	6.0%	13.0%
NWFP	20.0%	21.3%	15.0%	13.8%
Balochistan	17.5%	12.5%	22.5%	20.0%

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

In his 2nd term Nawaz Sharif was also not a changed person and he tried to rule as he did in his first tenure. First time in the history of Pakistan any party got such overwhelmingly majority but he did not use this majority for the betterment of the state. He practiced like Ayub, Yahya, Bhutto and Zia by adopting a policy of centralization. He tried to secure his position more strong. Through 13th amendment he stopped/taken away the powers of president of dissolving the assembly. He also succeeded in forcing the COAS, president and chief justice to resign. But in the race of power, he appointed COAS Musharraf by superseding two generals so that he (Musharraf) remain loyal to him. But Musharraf never trusted on Nawaz Sharif and he started to keep Nawaz Sharif ignorant from military decisions like Kargil adventure and when Nawaz tried to replace him (Musharraf) with a new COAS, Musharraf removed him and in the politics of power, he himself took the control of the state by imposing martial law.

Table 6.3: Vote Percentage of Independents' Winning Seats in National Elections:

Party	1988	1990	1993	1996
INDPENDENT	4.75%	3.82%	0.28%	0.57%

Source: General Elections Report: Comparative Statistics for General Elections 1988,1990,1993 & 1997, Vol.ii, *Election Commission of Pakistan*, Islamabad,1997. (Percentage has been counted by the Researcher)

Another stumbling block in the establishment of democracy was the attitude of the politicians. During the period under study the politicians who contested elections independently always remain in bargaining. They never hesitated in switching their loyalties. So the Prime Minister for the sake of his/her provincial government had to deal with them by compromising her/his manifestoes. It is pertinent to mention that during the decade under study all the governments which were formed was a coalition of different parties but they could not succeed and all the time failed to maintain the alliance. It clearly shows that political culture of Pakistan does not suits for such arrangements. The following table show the status of coalition cabinets during 1988-1999. There was no potential in political parties to maintain the coalitions/alliances and due to the internal disputes they failed to manage mutual conflicts.

Table 6.4. Summary of Coalition cabinets (1988-1999)

S. No	Description	Coalition partners	Cabinet Strength*	Time Period
1	PPP-led coalition (Benazir Bhutto)	PPP, MQM, ANP	148-55	1988-90
2	IJI-led coalition (Nawaz Sharif)	IJI, MQM, ANP	153-39	1990-93
3	PPP-led coalition (Benazir Bhutto)	PPP, PML-J	121-72	1993-96
4	PMLN-led coalition (Nawaz Sharif)	PMLN, ANP	177-16	1997-99

*Cabinet strength refers to the number of votes taken by a Prime Minister in National Assembly during his/her election. **PMLN, MQM, and JUI have left the coalition.

During the period under study feudal elite also proved a stumbling block in the way of democracy. During 1988-1999 feudal elites remained unbroken. As Saeed Shafqat has highlighted that there was a big numbers of feudal elite in the cabinet.

Table 6.5: Presentation of Feudal Elites in the cabinet

Benazir Bhutto 1st Term 1988-1990	Nawaz Sharif 1st term 1990-1993	Benazir 2nd term 1993-1996	Nawaz Sharif 2nd term 1997-1999
15	12	17	8

Source: Saeed Shafqat 'Democracy in Pakistan: Value changes and challenges to institution building' p,291]

In all the societies for the establishment of a strong political system, judiciary had played a very important role. In Pakistan, the role of judiciary did not strengthen the system. Since the Maulvi Tameezuddine case it has strengthened the hands of the

establishment. It always declared their all acts legitimize under the 'doctrine of necessity'. There is no difference whether it is the martial law of Ayub, Yahya, Zia or Musharraf it always gave a shelter to these rules through its decisions which proved harmful for the system. In this era under study judiciary remained in conflict with the governments. It legalized the presidential orders of 58(2) (b) except in 1993. On the other hand politician also tried to politicize the judiciary to stop it from interference in legislation matters. As Nawaz Sharif reduced its powers by creating special courts. Government tried to control the judiciary by the appointments of its loyal in the judiciary.

Confrontation between the institutions harmed the democratic system. Especially during 1988-1999 politicians remained busy in mutual infightings. In the politic of confrontation the role of opposition had not been up to the mark of democratic norms. It had not worked for the strengthening the institution of parliament rather to weakened it through its undemocratic acts through its policies of long marches, dharnas and conspiracies against the government. Thus they threatened the system. History of Pakistan is evident that whenever government-opposition are locked the nonpolitical forces got benefits. Both ruling party and opposition did not adopted the attitude of compromises during the era under study. All the power pillars president, Prime Minister, military establishment and judiciary remained in a state of confrontation. Even the governments tried to control the voice of both electronic and print media. They tried to use the voice of media in their favor. There is no doubt that in Pakistan, political process did not meet the standards of true transition of democracy. The governments during this era were not free to perform their duties according to their party manifestoes because they had to share power with president as de jure and military as de facto. Therefore, they could not reach on an agreement

that which form of government should be either centralized or federal state. In this period the system was playing in the hands of 'Troika' president, Prime Minister and army chief. In the presence of union of president and army chief the Prime Minister remained vulnerable.

In a democratic political system in a country a single person or institution cannot claim all wisdom. All the institution are interconnected in a chain of law so mutual understanding, harmony and cooperation is very important for the betterment of the state. This spirit remained missing during this era. As Prime Minister, president and COAS considered themselves source of all wisdom which caused the confrontation between them and finally the system once again taken by martial law regime. There was an imbalance of power tilted in favor of president and COAS. For a better working relationship, all the institutions have to support each other while living in their domains and this norm was missing during 1988-1999.

For the prosperity of any state a strong political culture is very important. Since Baiginning Pakistan is facing the problem of weak political system. The creator party Muslim League failed to grasp the reality of the time. After the death of Quaid-e-Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan there was a leadership vacuum. Muslim League failed to produce visionary leaders. The existing weak leadership provided a space to organized bureaucracy and Ghulam Muhammad, Iskandar Mirza and Muhammad Ayub Khan easily derailed political supremacy and established military hegemony. A military dictatorship trend in political system was set by Ayub. in 1958, Yahya in 1969 abrogated the Constitutions and in 1977 Zia put in abeyance the Constitution. All these dictators introduced their own law. In West Pakistan the politics was under feudalists politicians. Both the Units adopted opposing attitude. When Bhutto came to power people were hoping for the betterment of the system but due to the infigtings

of the politicians, political system once again slipped into the hands of military. Zia's policies of islamization and Afghan badly affected and harmed not only state but society as well. After the death of Zia his autocratic rules remained there in the shape of 58(2)(b) which played vital role in destabilizing the politics during the era under study.

6.1 Conclusion

The greatest stumbling block in the way of democracy had been the uncompromising attitude of the politicians. Throughout the era 1988-1999 they could not develop a mechanism that could mediate their issues because democracy cannot take its roots without the consensus of the institutions and political leadership. The politicians talked about democracy but whenever they came in power they behaved like an autocrat. Throughout this decade the culture of sharing of responsibility did not develop. The greed of centralism did not allow the institutions to share their responsibility within their Constitutional frame work.

6.2 Contribution

It is an established fact that civil-military bureaucracy has played a vibrant role in undermining the democracy in the state but this study not only contains a comprehensive history of the era but importantly moving a step forward discusses and analyses the relationship between elected and non-elected institutions and the contribution and influence of civil-military bureaucracy on evolution of parliamentary democracy in the country. It also highlights the long term impact of repeated disruption of democratic process. Cohen's theory is partially endorsed but moving a step forward this study makes some additional revelations. All the time politicians' deadlock was ended with military interference. This role of military empowered it.

Undemocratic policies were supported by unnecessary political meddling by the elite, which reinforced the argument that political chaos was deliberately generated by the establishment. Apparently, every time the President was the central character in launching the idea of dismissing the government from the military bureaucracy. But it was also a fact that the presidents would not have been able to overthrow the governments without the help of the COAS. Cohesion between civil-military bureaucracy and power struggle between the government and the establishment have been the key factors for undermining the foundations of democracy. In reality, it was the concurrence between civil and military links that distorted the democratization process.

6.3 Findings

- During this era the political leadership used blame game approach toward each other and toward president such as, when Benazir's first government was dissolved she said, as it was reported in two renowned Urdu newspapers 'Jang' and Nawa-i-Waqt that 'sadar ko assambliyaan tornay par majboor kiya giya hai' (why president is forced to dissolve the assemblies). She further said about her dismissal in these words reported by leading English newspapers The Nation and Dawn printed that the act of the president is 'Constitutional Coup' and when Nawaz Sharif's government was dissolved on 18 April, 1993. He said, it was reported in two leading newspapers Nawa-i-Waqt Urdu and an English newspaper Dawn, in these words one day before the dissolution 'Prime Minister blamed presidency for conspiracies' and when his government was dissolved on 18 April, 1993 he declared this dissolution as reported in two leading English Newspapers Dawn and The Nation 'illegal', 'immoral', and

‘unConstitutional’. As Nawaz said that presidency is the center of conspiracies the same words were repeated by Benazir when her government was dissolved in 1996 as was reported by an Urdu newspaper Jang on 6 November, 1996 that ‘sadar sazshi tolay k trap main a gaey’ (president caught in the trap of conspirators).

- During this era the political parties and leadership supported the decisions of president such as when Nawaz Sharif’s government was dissolved by president Ishaq then Benazir supported the same president to whom she blamed three years ago for her dismissal and stated in these words about Nawaz’s government as it was reported in an English Newspaper The Nation that ‘government brought country to a collapse’ and when her government was dissolved by president Leghari then Nawaz said as it was reported in ‘Jang’ on 6th November 1996 that ‘main hakoomat ke rukhsati ka khair maqdam karta hn’ (I welcome the departure of the government) and in an English Newspaper Dawn it was reported that ‘PML(N) welcomes presidential action’. Due to this tendency a strong democratic system could not be established.
- In the parliamentary form of government, the Prime Minister is considered to be the most powerful person, but contrary to democratic norms during this period, the Prime Minister proved to be a junior partner in the power game.
- Dynastic structure of PPP, which was dominated by Bhutto family and the PML (N) was dominated by Sharif family prevented both the parties from functioning along modern lines.

- Despite the working of parliamentary democracy and governance the hegemony of military establishment remained in the politics of Pakistan.
- Governments were not free to generate new policies and they also shared powers with the president de-jure and military de-facto. Neither had any agreement been regarding old and fundamental questions, such as the choice of either centralized or a federal state.
- During this period Pakistan had badly experienced the lack of democracy in country just because of weak political institutions, military interventions, dissolution of governments, fake and flawed elections, not enforcing the supremacy of Constitution and due to the lack of rule of law.
- Intolerance and misuse of institutions for personal reasons remained a tendency during this period.
- Institutional confrontation like executive vs judiciary, president vs executive, executive vs civil-military establishment remained on full swing during the prescribed period.
- This period 1988-1999 was not purely parliamentary because the office of the president remained desirous to acquire political power equal to Prime Minister.

6.4 Recommendations

- The political and non-political actors should respect the mandate of the ruling party.
- All the stakeholders should play their role as prescribed in the Constitution.
- The democratic process should be allowed to prevail in the country.
- The military involvement in politics must be discouraged.

- Civil-military relations must be based on the concept of Constitutional supremacy.
- The principle of separation of power must be followed.
- The media should play its role positively.
- The Election Commission should play its role as instrumental institutionalization.
- Transparent and accountable mechanism of accountability must be developed.
- The culture of rubber stamp parliament should be removed and an affective parliament should operate with an guarantee of institutional supremacy.
- The orders of the judiciary must be implemented in true spirit.
- Policy of mutual understanding, harmony, tolerance and cooperation must be adopted.

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Nawa-i- Waqt (Lahore, Rawalpindi)

The Muslim (Islamabad)

The Nation (Lahore)

The News (Islamabad, Karachi)

The Pakistan Times (Islamabad, Rawalpindi)

The Times (Rawalpindi)

Indian Independence Act, 1947.

10 & 11 GEO. 6. CH. 30.

ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS.

Section.

1. The new Dominions.
2. Territories of the new Dominions.
3. Bengal and Assam.
4. The Punjab.
5. The Governor-General of the new Dominions.
6. Legislation for the new Dominions.
7. Consequences of the setting up of the new Dominions.
8. Temporary provision as to government of each of the new Dominions.
9. Orders for bringing this Act into force.
10. Secretary of State's services, etc.
11. Indian armed forces.
12. British forces in India.
13. Naval forces.
14. Provisions as to the Secretary of State and the Auditor of Indian Home Accounts.
15. Legal proceedings by and against the Secretary of State.
16. Aden.
17. Divorce jurisdiction.
18. Provisions as to existing laws, etc.
19. Interpretation, etc.
20. Short title.

SCHEDULES :

First Schedule—Bengal Districts provisionally included in the new Province of East Bengal.

Second Schedule—Districts provisionally included in the new Province of West Punjab.

Third Schedule—Modifications of Army Act and Air Force Act in relation to British forces.



CHAPTER 30.

An Act to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent Dominions, to substitute other provisions for certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, which apply outside those Dominions, and to provide for other matters consequential on or connected with the setting up of those Dominions.

[18th July 1947.]

BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :—

1.—(1) As from the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as India and Pakistan. The new Dominions.

(2) The said Dominions are hereafter in this Act referred to as “the new Dominions”, and the said fifteenth day of August is hereafter in this Act referred to as “the appointed day”.

2.—(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of this section, the territories of India shall be the territories under the sovereignty of His Majesty which, immediately before the appointed day, were included in British India except the territories which, under subsection (2) of this section, are to be the territories of Pakistan. Territories of the new Dominions.

(2) Subject to the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of this section, the territories of Pakistan shall be—

- (a) the territories which, on the appointed day, are included in the Provinces of East Bengal and West Punjab, as constituted under the two following sections ;

- (b) the territories which, at the date of the passing of this Act, are included in the Province of Sind and the Chief Commissioner's Province of British Baluchistan ; and
 - (c) if, whether before or after the passing of this Act but before the appointed day, the Governor-General declares that the majority of the valid votes cast in the referendum which, at the date of the passing of this Act, is being or has recently been held in that behalf under his authority in the North West Frontier Province are in favour of representatives of that Province taking part in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the territories which, at the date of the passing of this Act, are included in that Province.
- (3) Nothing in this section shall prevent any area being at any time included in or excluded from either of the new Dominions, so, however, that—
- (a) no area not forming part of the territories specified in subsection (1) or, as the case may be, subsection (2), of this section shall be included in either Dominion without the consent of that Dominion ; and
 - (b) no area which forms part of the territories specified in the said subsection (1) or, as the case may be, the said subsection (2), or which has after the appointed day been included in either Dominion, shall be excluded from that Dominion without the consent of that Dominion.
- (4) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing the accession of Indian States to either of the new Dominions.

Bengal and
Assam.

26 Geo. 5 &
1 Edw. 8. c. 2.

3.—(1) As from the appointed day—

- (a) the Province of Bengal, as constituted under the Government of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist ; and
- (b) there shall be constituted in lieu thereof two new Provinces, to be known respectively as East Bengal and West Bengal.

(2) If, whether before or after the passing of this Act, but before the appointed day, the Governor-General declares that the majority of the valid votes cast in the referendum which, at the date of the passing of this Act, is being or has recently been held in that behalf under his authority in the District of Sylhet are in favour of that District forming part of the new Province of East Bengal, then, as from that day, a part of the Province of Assam shall, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, form part of the new Province of East Bengal.

(3) The boundaries of the new Provinces aforesaid and, in the event mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, the boundaries after the appointed day of the Province of Assam, shall be such as may be determined, whether before or after the appointed day, by the award of a boundary commission appointed or to be appointed by the Governor-General in that behalf, but until the boundaries are so determined—

- (a) the Bengal Districts specified in the First Schedule to this Act, together with, in the event mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, the Assam District of Sylhet, shall be treated as the territories which are to be comprised in the new Province of East Bengal ;
- (b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of the passing of this Act in the Province of Bengal shall be treated as the territories which are to be comprised in the new Province of West Bengal ; and
- (c) in the event mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, the District of Sylhet shall be excluded from the Province of Assam.

(4) In this section, the expression “ award ” means, in relation to a boundary commission, the decisions of the chairman of that commission contained in his report to the Governor-General at the conclusion of the commission’s proceedings.

4.—(1) As from the appointed day—

The Punjab.

- (a) the Province of the Punjab, as constituted under the Government of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist ; and
- (b) there shall be constituted two new Provinces, to be known respectively as West Punjab and East Punjab.

(2) The boundaries of the said new Provinces shall be such as may be determined, whether before or after the appointed day, by the award of a boundary commission appointed or to be appointed by the Governor-General in that behalf, but until the boundaries are so determined—

- (a) the Districts specified in the Second Schedule to this Act shall be treated as the territories to be comprised in the new Province of West Punjab ; and
- (b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of the passing of this Act in the Province of the Punjab shall be treated as the territories which are to be comprised in the new Province of East Punjab.

(3) In this section, the expression “ award,” means, in relation to a boundary commission, the decisions of the chairman of that commission contained in his report to the Governor-General at the conclusion of the commission’s proceedings.

5. For each of the new Dominions, there shall be a Governor-General who shall be appointed by His Majesty and shall represent His Majesty for the purposes of the government of the Dominion :

The Governor-General of the new Dominions.

Provided that, unless and until provision to the contrary is made by a law of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions, the same person may be Governor-General of both the new Dominions.

Legislation
for the new
Dominions.

6.—(1) The Legislature of each of the new Dominions shall have full power to make laws for that Dominion, including laws having extra-territorial operation.

(2) No law and no provision of any law made by the Legislature of either of the new Dominions shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of this or any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Legislature of each Dominion include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as it is part of the law of the Dominion.

(3) The Governor-General of each of the new Dominions shall have full power to assent in His Majesty's name to any law of the Legislature of that Dominion and so much of any Act as relates to the disallowance of laws by His Majesty or the reservation of laws for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon or the suspension of the operation of laws until the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon shall not apply to laws of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions.

(4) No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or after the appointed day shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to either of the new Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion unless it is extended thereto by a law of the Legislature of the Dominion.

(5) No Order in Council made on or after the appointed day under any Act passed before the appointed day, and no order, rule or other instrument made on or after the appointed day under any such Act by any United Kingdom Minister or other authority, shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to either of the new Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion.

(6) The power referred to in subsection (1) of this section extends to the making of laws limiting for the future the powers of the Legislature of the Dominion.

Consequences
of the setting
up of the new
Dominions.

7.—(1) As from the appointed day—

- (a) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as respects the government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India ;
- (b) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions

exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise; and

- (c) there lapse also any treaties or agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and any persons having authority in the tribal areas, any obligations of His Majesty existing at that date to any such persons or with respect to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable at that date by His Majesty in or in relation to the tribal areas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise:

Provided that, notwithstanding anything in paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of this subsection, effect shall, as nearly as may be, continue to be given to the provisions of any such agreement as is therein referred to which relate to customs, transit and communications, posts and telegraphs, or other like matters, until the provisions in question are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State or person having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or by the Dominion or Province or other part thereof concerned on the other hand, or are superseded by subsequent agreements.

(2) The assent of the Parliament of the United Kingdom is hereby given to the omission from the Royal Style and Titles of the words "Indiæ Imperator" and the words "Emperor of India" and to the issue by His Majesty for that purpose of His Royal Proclamation under the Great Seal of the Realm.

8.—(1) In the case of each of the new Dominions, the powers of the Legislature of the Dominion shall, for the purpose of making provision as to the constitution of the Dominion, be exercisable in the first instance by the Constituent Assembly of that Dominion, and references in this Act to the Legislature of the Dominion shall be construed accordingly. Temporary provision as to government of each of the new Dominions.

(2) Except in so far as other provision is made by or in accordance with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion under subsection (1) of this section, each of the new Dominions and all Provinces and other parts thereof shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935; and the provisions of that Act, and of the Orders in Council, rules and other instruments made thereunder, shall, so far as applicable, and subject to any express provisions of this Act, and with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as may be specified in orders of the Governor-General under the next succeeding section, have effect accordingly:

Provided that—

- (a) the said provisions shall apply separately in relation to each of the new Dominions and nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing on or after the appointed day any Central Government or Legislature common to both the new Dominions ;
- (b) nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing in force on or after the appointed day any form of control by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom over the affairs of the new Dominions or of any Province or other part thereof ;
- (c) so much of the said provisions as requires the Governor-General or any Governor to act in his discretion or exercise his individual judgment as respects any matter shall cease to have effect as from the appointed day ;
- (d) as from the appointed day, no Provincial Bill shall be reserved under the Government of India Act, 1935, for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure, and no Provincial Act shall be disallowed by His Majesty thereunder ; and
- (e) the powers of the Federal Legislature or Indian Legislature under that Act, as in force in relation to each Dominion, shall, in the first instance, be exercisable by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion in addition to the powers exercisable by that Assembly under subsection (1) of this section.

(3) Any provision of the Government of India Act, 1935, which, as applied to either of the new Dominions by subsection (2) of this section and the orders therein referred to, operates to limit the power of the legislature of that Dominion shall, unless and until other provision is made by or in accordance with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, have the like effect as a law of the Legislature of the Dominion limiting for the future the powers of that Legislature.

Orders for
bringing this
Act into force.

9.—(1) The Governor-General shall by order make such provision as appears to him to be necessary or expedient—

- (a) for bringing the provisions of this Act into effective operation ;
- (b) for dividing between the new Dominions, and between the new Provinces to be constituted under this Act, the powers, rights, property, duties and liabilities of the Governor-General in Council or, as the case may be, of the relevant Provinces which, under this Act, are to cease to exist ;

- (c) for making omissions from, additions to, and adaptations and modifications of, the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Orders in Council, rules and other instruments made thereunder, in their application to the separate new Dominions ;
- (d) for removing difficulties arising in connection with the transition to the provisions of this Act ;
- (e) for authorising the carrying on of the business of the Governor-General in Council between the passing of this Act and the appointed day otherwise than in accordance with the provisions in that behalf of the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 ;
- (f) for enabling agreements to be entered into, and other acts done, on behalf of either of the new Dominions before the appointed day ;
- (g) for authorising the continued carrying on for the time being on behalf of the new Dominions, or on behalf of any two or more of the said new Provinces, of services and activities previously carried on on behalf of British India as a whole or on behalf of the former Provinces which those new Provinces represent ;
- (h) for regulating the monetary system and any matters pertaining to the Reserve Bank of India ; and
- (i) so far as it appears necessary or expedient in connection with any of the matters aforesaid, for varying the constitution, powers or jurisdiction of any legislature, court or other authority in the new Dominions and creating new legislatures, courts or other authorities therein.

(2) The powers conferred by this section on the Governor-General shall, in relation to their respective Provinces, be exercisable also by the Governors of the Provinces which, under this Act, are to cease to exist ; and those powers shall, for the purposes of the Government of India Act, 1935, be deemed to be matters as respects which the Governors are, under that Act, to exercise their individual judgment.

(3) This section shall be deemed to have had effect as from the third day of June, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and any order of the Governor-General or any Governor made on or after that date as to any matter shall have effect accordingly, and any order made under this section may be made so as to be retrospective to any date not earlier than the said third day of June :

Provided that no person shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence by reason of so much of any such order as makes any provision thereof retrospective to any date before the making thereof.

(4) Any orders made under this section, whether before or after the appointed day, shall have effect—

- (a) up to the appointed day, in British India ;
- (b) on and after the appointed day, in the new Dominion or Dominions concerned ; and
- (c) outside British India, or, as the case may be, outside the new Dominion or Dominions concerned, to such extent, whether before, on or after the appointed day, as a law or the Legislature of the Dominion or Dominions concerned would have on or after the appointed day,

but shall, in the case of each of the Dominions, be subject to the same powers of repeal and amendment as laws of the Legislature of that Dominion.

(5) No order shall be made under this section, by the Governor of any Province, after the appointed day, or, by the Governor-General, after the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and forty-eight, or such earlier date as may be determined, in the case of either Dominion, by any law of the Legislature of that Dominion.

(6) If it appears that a part of the Province of Assam is, on the appointed day, to become part of the new Province of East Bengal, the preceding provisions of this section shall have effect as if, under this Act, the Province of Assam was to cease to exist on the appointed day and be reconstituted on that day as a new Province.

Secretary
of State's
services, etc.

10.—(1) The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, shall not continue in force the provisions of that Act relating to appointments to the civil services of, and civil posts under, the Crown in India by the Secretary of State, or the provisions of that Act relating to the reservation of posts.

(2) Every person who—

- (a) having been appointed by the Secretary of State, or Secretary of State in Council, to a civil service of the Crown in India continues on and after the appointed day to serve under the Government of either of the new Dominions or of any Province or part thereof ; or
- (b) having been appointed by His Majesty before the appointed day to be a judge of the Federal Court or of any court which is a High Court within the meaning of the Government of India Act, 1935, continues on and after the appointed day to serve as a judge in either of the new Dominions,

shall be entitled to receive from the Governments of the Dominions and Provinces or parts which he is from time to time serving or,

as the case may be, which are served by the courts in which he is from time to time a judge, the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be, as respects the tenure of his office, or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit, as that person was entitled to immediately before the appointed day.

(3) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as enabling the rights and liabilities of any person with respect to the family pension funds vested in Commissioners under section two hundred and seventy-three of the Government of India Act, 1935, to be governed otherwise than by Orders in Council made (whether before or after the passing of this Act or the appointed day) by His Majesty in Council and rules made (whether before or after the passing of this Act or the appointed day) by a Secretary of State or such other Minister of the Crown as may be designated in that behalf by Order in Council under the Ministers of the Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946.

9 & 10 Geo. 6.
c. 31.

11.—(1) The orders to be made by the Governor-General under the preceding provisions of this Act shall make provision for the division of the Indian armed forces of His Majesty between the new Dominions, and for the command and governance of those forces until the division is completed.

(2) As from the appointed day, while any member of His Majesty's forces, other than His Majesty's Indian forces, is attached to or serving with any of His Majesty's Indian forces—

(a) he shall, subject to any provision to the contrary made by a law of the Legislature of the Dominion or Dominions concerned or by any order of the Governor-General under the preceding provisions of this Act, have, in relation to the Indian forces in question, the powers of command and punishment appropriate to his rank and functions; but

(b) nothing in any enactment in force at the date of the passing of this Act shall render him subject in any way to the law governing the Indian forces in question.

12.—(1) Nothing in this Act affects the jurisdiction or authority of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, or of the Admiralty, the Army Council, or the Air Council or of any other United Kingdom authority, in relation to any of His Majesty's forces which may, on or after the appointed day, be in either of the new Dominions or elsewhere in the territories which, before the appointed day, were included in India, not being Indian forces. British forces
in India.

(2) In its application in relation to His Majesty's military forces, other than Indian forces, the Army Act shall have effect on or after the appointed day—

- (a) as if His Majesty's Indian forces were not included in the expressions "the forces", "His Majesty's forces" and "the regular forces"; and
- (b) subject to the further modifications specified in Parts I and II of the Third Schedule to this Act.

(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, and to any provisions of any law of the Legislature of the Dominion concerned, all civil authorities in the new Dominions, and, subject as aforesaid and subject also to the provisions of the last preceding section, all service authorities in the new Dominions, shall, in those Dominions and in the other territories which were included in India before the appointed day, perform in relation to His Majesty's military forces, not being Indian forces, the same functions as were, before the appointed day, performed by them, or by the authorities corresponding to them, whether by virtue of the Army Act or otherwise, and the matters for which provision is to be made by orders of the Governor-General under the preceding provisions of this Act shall include the facilitating of the withdrawal from the new Dominions and other territories aforesaid of His Majesty's military forces, not being Indian forces.

(4) The provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall apply in relation to the air forces of His Majesty, not being Indian air forces, as they apply in relation to His Majesty's military forces, subject, however, to the necessary adaptations, and, in particular, as if—

- (a) for the references to the Army Act there were substituted references to the Air Force Act; and
- (b) for the reference to Part II of the Third Schedule to this Act there were substituted a reference to Part III of that Schedule.

Naval forces. 13.—(1) In the application of the Naval Discipline Act to His Majesty's naval forces, other than Indian naval forces, references to His Majesty's navy and His Majesty's ships shall not, as from the appointed day, include references to His Majesty's Indian navy or the ships thereof.

(2) In the application of the Naval Discipline Act by virtue of any law made in India before the appointed day to Indian naval forces, references to His Majesty's navy and His Majesty's ships shall, as from the appointed day, be deemed to be, and to be only, references to His Majesty's Indian navy and the ships thereof.

(3) In section ninety B of the Naval Discipline Act (which, in certain cases, subjects officers and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines to the law and customs of the ships and naval forces of other parts of His Majesty's dominions) the words " or of India " shall be repealed as from the appointed day, wherever those words occur.

14.—(1) A Secretary of State, or such other Minister of the Crown as may be designated in that behalf by Order in Council under the Ministers of the Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946, is hereby authorised to continue for the time being the performance, on behalf of whatever government or governments may be concerned, of functions as to the making of payments and other matters similar to the functions which, up to the appointed day, the Secretary of State was performing on behalf of governments constituted or continued under the Government of India Act, 1935.

Provisions
as to the
Secretary of
State and the
Auditor of
Indian Home
Accounts.

(2) The functions referred to in subsection (1) of this section include functions as respects the management of, and the making of payments in respect of, government debt, and any enactments relating to such debt shall have effect accordingly :

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing in force so much of any enactment as empowers the Secretary of State to contract sterling loans on behalf of any such Government as aforesaid or as applying to the Government of either of the new Dominions the prohibition imposed on the Governor-General in Council by section three hundred and fifteen of the Government of India Act, 1935, as respects the contracting of sterling loans.

(3) As from the appointed day, there shall not be any such advisers of the Secretary of State as are provided for by section two hundred and seventy-eight of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that section, and any provisions of that Act which require the Secretary of State to obtain the concurrence of his advisers, are hereby repealed as from that day.

(4) The Auditor of Indian Home Accounts is hereby authorised to continue for the time being to exercise his functions as respects the accounts of the Secretary of State or any such other Minister of the Crown as is mentioned in subsection (1) of this section, both in respect of activities before, and in respect of activities after, the appointed day, in the same manner, as nearly as may be as he would have done if this Act had not passed.

15.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, and, in particular, notwithstanding any of the provisions of the last preceding section, any provision of any enactment which, but for the passing of this Act, would authorise legal proceedings to be taken, in India or elsewhere, by or against the Secretary of State in respect of State.

Legal
proceedings
by and
against the
Secretary of
State.

of any right or liability of India or any part of India shall cease to have effect on the appointed day, and any legal proceedings pending by virtue of any such provision on the appointed day shall, by virtue of this Act, abate on the appointed day, so far as the Secretary of State is concerned.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this subsection, any legal proceedings which, but for the passing of this Act, could have been brought by or against the Secretary of State in respect of any right or liability of India, or any part of India, shall instead be brought—

(a) in the case of proceedings in the United Kingdom, by or against the High Commissioner ;

(b) in the case of other proceedings, by or against such person as may be designated by order of the Governor-General under the preceding provisions of this Act or otherwise by the law of the new Dominion concerned,

and any legal proceedings by or against the Secretary of State in respect of any such right or liability as aforesaid which are pending immediately before the appointed day shall be continued by or against the High Commissioner or, as the case may be, the person designated as aforesaid :

Provided that, at any time after the appointed day, the right conferred by this subsection to bring or continue proceedings may, whether the proceedings are by, or are against, the High Commissioner or person designated as aforesaid, be withdrawn by a law of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions so far as that Dominion is concerned, and any such law may operate as respects proceedings pending at the date of the passing of the law.

(3) In this section, the expression “ the High Commissioner ” means, in relation to each of the new Dominions, any such officer as may for the time being be authorised to perform in the United Kingdom, in relation to that Dominion, functions similar to those performed before the appointed day, in relation to the Governor-General in Council, by the High Commissioner referred to in section three hundred and two of the Government of India Act, 1935 ; and any legal proceedings which, immediately before the appointed day, are the subject of an appeal to His Majesty in Council, or of a petition for special leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, shall be treated for the purposes of this section as legal proceedings pending in the United Kingdom.

Aden.

16.—(1) Subsections (2) to (4) of section two hundred and eighty-eight of the Government of India Act, 1935 (which confer on His Majesty power to make by Order in Council provision for the government of Aden) shall cease to have effect and the British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945, (which authorise His

Majesty to make laws and establish institutions for British Settlements as defined in those Acts) shall apply in relation to Aden as if it were a British Settlement as so defined.

(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said subsections (2) to (4), the Orders in Council in force thereunder at the date of the passing of this Act shall continue in force, but the said Orders in Council, any other Orders in Council made under the Government of India Act, 1935, in so far as they apply to Aden, and any enactments applied to Aden or amended in relation to Aden by any such Orders in Council as aforesaid, may be repealed, revoked or amended under the powers of the British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945.

(3) Unless and until provision to the contrary is made as respects Aden under the powers of the British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945, or, as respects the new Dominion in question, by a law of the Legislature of that Dominion, the provisions of the said Orders in Council and enactments relating to appeals from any courts in Aden to any courts which will, after the appointed day, be in either of the new Dominions, shall continue in force in their application both to Aden and to the Dominion in question, and the last mentioned courts shall exercise their jurisdiction accordingly.

17.—(1) No court in either of the new Dominions shall, by Divorce virtue of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts, jurisdiction. 1926 and 1940, have jurisdiction in or in relation to any proceedings for a decree for the dissolution of a marriage, unless those proceedings were instituted before the appointed day, but, save as aforesaid and subject to any provision to the contrary which may hereafter be made by any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by any law of the Legislature of the new Dominion concerned, all courts in the new Dominions shall have the same jurisdiction under the said Acts as they would have had if this Act had not been passed.

(2) Any rules made on or after the appointed day under subsection (4) of section one of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, for a court in either of the new Dominions shall, instead of being made by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, be made by such authority as may be determined by the law of the Dominion concerned, and so much of the said subsection and of any rules in force thereunder immediately before the appointed day as require the approval of the Lord Chancellor to the nomination for any purpose of any judges of any such court shall cease to have effect. 16 & 17
Geo. 5. c. 40.

(3) The reference in subsection (1) of this section to proceedings for a decree for the dissolution of a marriage include references to proceedings for such a decree of presumption of death and dissolution of a marriage as is authorised by section eight of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937. 1 Edw. 8 & 1
Geo. 6. c. 57.

(4) Nothing in this section affects any court outside the new Dominions, and the power conferred by section two of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, to apply certain provisions of that Act to other parts of His Majesty's dominions as they apply to India shall be deemed to be power to apply those provisions as they would have applied to India if this Act had not passed.

Provisions as
to existing
laws, etc.

18.—(1) In so far as any Act of Parliament, Order in Council, order, rule, regulation or other instrument passed or made before the appointed day operates otherwise than as part of the law of British India or the new Dominions, references therein to India or British India, however worded and whether by name or not, shall, in so far as the context permits and except so far as Parliament may hereafter otherwise provide, be construed as, or as including, references to the new Dominions, taken together, or taken separately, according as the circumstances and subject matter may require :

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing in operation any provision in so far as the continuance thereof as adapted by this subsection is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act other than this section.

(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and to any other express provision of this Act, the Orders in Council made under subsection (5) of section three hundred and eleven of the Government of India Act, 1935, for adapting and modifying Acts of Parliament shall, except so far as Parliament may hereafter otherwise provide, continue in force in relation to all Acts in so far as they operate otherwise than as part of the law of British India or the new Dominions.

(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the law of British India and of the several parts thereof existing immediately before the appointed day shall, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, continue as the law of each of the new Dominions and the several parts thereof until other provision is made by laws of the Legislature of the Dominion in question or by any other Legislature or other authority having power in that behalf.

(4) It is hereby declared that the Instruments of Instructions issued before the passing of this Act by His Majesty to the Governor-General and the Governors of Provinces lapse as from the appointed day, and nothing in this Act shall be construed as continuing in force any provision of the Government of India Act, 1935, relating to such Instruments of Instructions.

(5) As from the appointed day, so much of any enactment as requires the approval of His Majesty in Council to any rules of court shall not apply to any court in either of the new Dominions.

19.—(1) References in this Act to the Governor-General shall, in relation to any order to be made or other act done on or after the appointed day, be construed—

- (a) where the order or other act concerns one only of the new Dominions, as references to the Governor-General of that Dominion ;
- (b) where the order or other act concerns both of the new Dominions and the same person is the Governor-General of both those Dominions, as references to that person ; and
- (c) in any other case, as references to the Governors-General of the new Dominions, acting jointly.

(2) References in this Act to the Governor-General shall, in relation to any order to be made or other act done before the appointed day, be construed as references to the Governor-General of India within the meaning of the Government of India Act, 1935, and so much of that or any other Act as requires references to the Governor-General to be construed as references to the Governor-General in Council shall not apply to references to the Governor-General in this Act.

(3) References in this Act to the Constituent Assembly of a Dominion shall be construed as references—

- (a) in relation to India, to the Constituent Assembly, the first sitting whereof was held on the ninth day of December, nineteen hundred and forty-six, modified—
 - (i) by the exclusion of the members representing Bengal, the Punjab, Sind and British Baluchistan ; and
 - (ii) should it appear that the North West Frontier Province will form part of Pakistan, by the exclusion of the members representing that Province ; and
 - (iii) by the inclusion of members representing West Bengal and East Punjab ; and
 - (iv) should it appear that, on the appointed day, a part of the Province of Assam is to form part of the new Province of East Bengal, by the exclusion of the members theretofore representing the Province of Assam and the inclusion of members chosen to represent the remainder of that Province ;
- (b) in relation to Pakistan, to the Assembly set up or about to be set up at the date of the passing of this Act under the authority of the Governor-General as the Constituent Assembly for Pakistan :

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as affecting the extent to which representatives of the Indian States take part in either of the said Assemblies, or as preventing the

filling of casual vacancies in the said Assemblies, or as preventing the participation in either of the said Assemblies, in accordance with such arrangements as may be made in that behalf, of representatives of the tribal areas on the borders of the Dominion for which that Assembly sits, and the powers of the said Assemblies shall extend and be deemed always to have extended to the making of provision for the matters specified in this proviso.

(4) In this Act, except so far as the context otherwise requires—

references to the Government of India Act, 1935, include references to any enactments amending or supplementing that Act, and, in particular, references to the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 ;

9 & 10 Geo. 6.
c. 39.

“ India ”, where the reference is to a state of affairs existing before the appointed day or which would have existed but for the passing of this Act, has the meaning assigned to it by section three hundred and eleven of the Government of India Act, 1935 ;

“ Indian forces ” includes all His Majesty’s Indian forces existing before the appointed day and also any forces of either of the new Dominions ;

“ pension ” means, in relation to any person, a pension whether contributory or not, of any kind whatsoever payable to or in respect of that person, and includes retired pay so payable, a gratuity so payable and any sum or sums so payable by way of the return, with or without interest thereon or other additions thereto, of subscriptions to a provident fund ;

“ Province ” means a Governor’s Province ;

“ remuneration ” includes leave pay, allowances and the cost of any privileges or facilities provided in kind.

(5) Any power conferred by this Act to make any order includes power to revoke or vary any order previously made in the exercise of that power.

Short title.

20. This Act may be cited as the Indian Independence Act, 1947.

SCHEDULES.**FIRST SCHEDULE.**

Section 3.

**BENGAL DISTRICTS PROVISIONALLY INCLUDED IN THE
NEW PROVINCE OF EAST BENGAL.**

In the Chittagong Division, the districts of Chittagong, Noakhali and Tippera.

In the Dacca Division, the districts of Bakarganj, Dacca, Faridpur and Mymensingh.

In the Presidency Division, the districts of Jessore, Murshidabad and Nadia.

In the Rajshahi Division, the districts of Bogra, Dinajpur, Malda, Pabna, Rajshahi and Rangpur.

SECOND SCHEDULE.

Section 4.

**DISTRICTS PROVISIONALLY INCLUDED IN THE NEW
PROVINCE OF WEST PUNJAB.**

In the Lahore Division, the districts of Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura and Sialkot.

In the Rawalpindi Division, the districts of Attock, Gujrat, Jhelum, Mianwali, Rawalpindi and Shahpur.

In the Multan Division, the districts of Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan and Muzaffargarh.

THIRD SCHEDULE.

Section 12.

**MODIFICATIONS OF ARMY ACT AND AIR FORCE ACT IN
RELATION TO BRITISH FORCES.****PART I.****MODIFICATIONS OF ARMY ACT APPLICABLE ALSO TO AIR FORCE ACT.**

1. The proviso to section forty-one (which limits the jurisdiction of courts martial) shall not apply to offences committed in either of the new Dominions or in any of the other territories which were included in India before the appointed day.

2. In section forty-three (which relates to complaints), the words "with the approval of the Governor-General of India in Council" shall be omitted.

3. In subsections (8) and (9) of section fifty-four (which, amongst other things, require certain sentences to be confirmed by the Governor-General in Council), the words "India or", the words "by the

3RD SCH.
—cont.

Governor-General, or, as the case may be " and the words " in India, by the Governor-General, or, if he has been tried " shall be omitted.

4. In subsection (3) of section seventy-three (which provides for the nomination of officers with power to dispense with courts martial for desertion and fraudulent enlistment) the words " with the approval of the Governor-General " shall be omitted.

5. The powers conferred by subsection (5) of section one hundred and thirty (which provides for the removal of insane persons) shall not be exercised except with the consent of the officer commanding the forces in the new Dominions.

6. In subsection (2) of section one hundred and thirty-two (which relates to rules regulating service prisons and detention barracks) the words " and in India for the Governor-General " and the words " the Governor-General " shall be omitted except as respects rules made before the appointed day.

7. In the cases specified in subsection (1) of section one hundred and thirty-four, inquests shall be held in all cases in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of that section.

8. In section one hundred and thirty-six (which relates to deductions from pay), in subsection (1) the words " India or " and the words " being in the case of India a law of the Indian legislature ", and the whole of subsection (2), shall be omitted.

9. In paragraph (4) of section one hundred and thirty-seven (which relates to penal stoppages from the ordinary pay of officers), the words " or in the case of officers serving in India the Governor-General " the words " India or " and the words " for India or, as the case may be " shall be omitted.

10. In paragraph (12) of section one hundred and seventy-five and paragraph (11) of section one hundred and seventy-six (which apply the Act to certain members of His Majesty's Indian Forces and to certain other persons) the word " India " shall be omitted wherever it occurs.

11. In subsection (1) of section one hundred and eighty (which provides for the punishment of misconduct by civilians in relation to courts martial) the words " India or " shall be omitted wherever they occur.

12. In the provisions of section one hundred and eighty-three relating to the reduction in rank of non-commissioned officers, the words " with the approval of the Governor-General " shall be omitted in both places where they occur.

PART II.

MODIFICATIONS OF ARMY ACT.

Section 184B (which regulates relations with the Indian Air Force) shall be omitted.

PART III.

3RD SCH.
—cont.

MODIFICATIONS OF AIR FORCE ACT.

1. In section 179D (which relates to the attachment of officers and airmen to Indian and Burma Air Forces), the words " by the Air Council and the Governor-General of India or, as the case may be," and the words " India or ", wherever those words occur, shall be omitted.

2. In section 184B (which regulates relations with Indian and Burma Air Forces) the words " India or " and the words " by the Air Council and the Governor-General of India or, as the case may be," shall be omitted.

3. Sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph (4) of section one hundred and ninety (which provides that officers of His Majesty's Indian Air Force are to be officers within the meaning of the Act) shall be omitted.

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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (1)
PRIME MINISTER
QUAID-I-MILLAT LIAQUAT ALI KHAN
(August 15, 1947 to October 16, 1951)

S No	Portfolio	Period	Remarks
1. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan (August 15, 1947 to Oct 16, 1951)	1. Defence 2. Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations 3. Kashmir Affairs 4. States & Frontier Regions	(15-8-47 to 16-10-51) (15-8-47 to 27-12-47) 31-10-49 to 13-4-50 12-9-48 to 16-10-51	
2. Mr. Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar (Aug 15, 1947 to May 7,1948)	1. Commerce 2. Industries 3. Works	(15-8-47 to 7-5-48)	
3. Mr. Ghulam Mohammad (Aug 15, 1947 to Oct 19,1951)	1. Finance 2. Economic Affairs 3. Commerce 4. Works	(15-8-47 to 19-10-51) (1-3-48 to 19-10-51) (8-5-48 to 29 5 48)	
4. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (Aug 15, 1947 to August 2, 1949)	Communications	(15-8-47 to 2-8-49)	
5. Raja Ghanzafar Ali Khan (Aug 15, 1947 to July 30,1948)	1. Food 2. Agriculture 3. Health Refugees & Rehabilitation	(15-8-47 to 30-12-47) (27-12-47 to 30-7-48)	
6. Mr. Jogendra Nath Mandal (Aug 15,1947 to Sept 16,1950)	1. Law 2. Labour 3. Works	(15-8-47 to 16-9-50) (31-5-49 to 10-9-49)	

7. Mr. Fazlur Rehman (Aug 15, 1947 to Oct 24, 1951)	1. Interior 2. Information & Broadcasting 3. Education 4. Rehabilitation 5. Industries 6. Commerce 7. Works	(15-8-47 to 8-5-48) do (15-8-47 to 24-10-51) (10-9-47 to 27-12-47) (8-5-48 to 10-9-49) (30-5-48 to 24-10-51) (30-5-48 to 30-5-49)	
8. Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan (Dec 27, 1947 to Oct 24, 1951)	Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations	(27-12-47 to 24-10-51)	
9. Mr. Abdus Sattar Pirzada (Dec 30, 1947 to Oct 24, 1951)	1. Food 2. Agriculture 3. Health 4. Law 5. Labour	(30-12-47 to 24-10-51) (30-12-47 to 10-9-49) (16-9-50 to 24-10-51) (16-9-50 to 31-3-51)	
10. Khwaja Shahabuddin (May 8, 1948 to Oct 24, 1951)	1. Interior Information & Broadcasting 2. Refugees and Rehabilitation	(8-5-48 to 24-10-51) (30-7-48 to 24-10-51)	
11. Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani (Jan 3, 1949 to Oct 31, 1949) (April 13, 1950 to Oct 24, 1951)	(Without portfolio) Kashmir Affairs	(3-1-49 to 31-10-49) (13-4-1950 to 24-10-51)	
12. Sardar Bahadur Khan (Sept 10, 1949 to Oct 24, 1951)	1. Communications 2. Health 3. Works	(10-9-1950 to 24-10-51) (10-9-49 to 20-9-49) (15-5-50 to 31-3-51) (10-9-49 to 20-9-49) (15-5-50 to 31-3-51)	
13. Chaudhry Nazir Ahmad (Sep 10, 1949 to Oct 24, 1951)	Industries	(10-9-49 to 24-10-51)	

14. Dr. A. M. Malik (Sep 20, 1949 to Oct 24, 1951)	1. Health 2. Works 3. Minority Affairs 4. Labour	(20-9-49 to 15-5-50) and (31-3-51 to 24-10-51) (20-9-49 to 15-5-50) and (31-3-51 to 24-10-51) (15- 5-50 to 23-4-51) (31-3-51 to 24-10-51)	

MINISTERS OF STATE

Sr. No	Name	Portfolio	Period
1.	Dr. Mahmud Husain (Oct 24, 1950 to Oct 24, 1951)	States & Frontier Regions	(24-10-50 to 24-10-51)
2.	Dr. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi (Oct 24 1950 to Oct 24,1951)	Refugees & Rehabilitation	(24-10-50 to 24-10-51)
3.	Mr. Azizuddin Ahmad (Apr. 23,1951 to Oct 24, 1951)	Minority Affairs	(23-4-51 to 24-10-51)

DEPUTY MINISTERS

Sr. No	Name	Portfolio	Period
1.	Dr. Mahmud Husain (Feb 3, 1949 to Oct 24, 1950)	1. Defence 2. States & Frontier Regions 3. Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations 4. Finance 5. Economic Affairs	(3-2-49 to 10-9-49) (10-9-49 to 2-4-50) (3-11-49 to 24-10-50)

2. Sardar Bahadur Khan (Feb 17,1949 to Sep 10, 1949)	1. Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations 2. Communications	(17-2-49 to 10-9-49) (2-8-49 to 10-9-49)
3. Dr. I. H. Qureshi (Feb 17, 1949 to Oct 24, 1950)	1. Interior 2. Information & Broadcasting 3. Refugees & Rehabilitation	(17-2-49 to 24-10-50)
4. Sardar Mohammad Nawaz Khan (Sept 10, 1949 to June 30,1950)	1. Defence 2. States & Frontier Regions	(10-9-49 to 30-6-50)
5. Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan (April 13, 1951 to Oct 24,1951)	1. Finance 2. Economic	(10-5-51 to 24-10-51)

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ISLAMABAD, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1985

PART I

**Acts, Ordinances, President's Orders and Regulations including Martial Law
Orders and Regulations**

SENATE SECRETARIAT

Islamabad, the 11th November, 1985

The following Acts of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) received the assent of the President on the 9th November, 1985, and are hereby published for general information :—

ACT No. XVIII of 1985

An Act further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

WHEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the purposes hereinafter appearing;

It is hereby enacted as follows :—

✓ 1. **Short title and commencement.**—(1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985.

(2) It shall come into force at once, except section 19 which shall come into force on the day on which the Proclamation of the fifth day of July, 1977, is revoked.

2. **Amendment of Article 48 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 48,—

(a) in clause (1),—

(i) for the commas and words “, the Prime Minister, or appropriate Minister” the words “or the Prime Minister” shall be substituted; and

(ii) for the proviso the following shall be substituted, namely :

“ Provided that the President may require the Cabinet or, as the case may be, the Prime Minister to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration. ”;

(b) in clause (2), after the words “do so”, at the end, the words “and the validity of anything done by the President in his discretion shall not be called in question on any ground whatsoever” shall be added;

(c) clause (3) shall be omitted; and

(d) in clause (5), in paragraph (a), for the words “one hundred” the word “ninety” shall be substituted.

3. **Amendment of Article 51 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, in Article 51, in clause (4), for the word “second” the word “third” shall be substituted.

4. **Amendment of Article 56 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, in Article 56, for clause (3) the following shall be substituted, namely :—

“(3) At the commencement of the first session after each general election to the National Assembly and at the commencement of the first session of each year the President shall address both Houses assembled together and inform the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) of the causes of its summons.”.

5. **Amendment of Article 58 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, in Article 58,—

(a) in clause (1), in the Explanation, for the words “resolution for a vote of no-confidence has been moved” the words “notice of a resolution for a vote of no-confidence has been given” shall be substituted; and

(b) for clause (2) the following shall be substituted, namely :—

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) of Article 48, the President may also dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where, in his opinion,—

(a) a vote of no-confidence having been passed against the Prime Minister, no other member of the National Assembly is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, as ascertained in a session of the National Assembly summoned for the purpose; or

(b) a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary."

6. Amendment of Article 59 of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, in Article 59—

(a) in clause (1), in paragraph (c), for the word "chosen" the word "elected" shall be substituted;

(b) in clause (3),

(i) for paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) the following shall be substituted, namely :—

"(a) of the members referred to in paragraph (a) of clause (1), seven shall retire after the expiration of the first three years and seven shall retire after the expiration of the next three years;

(b) of the members referred to in paragraph (b) of the aforesaid clause, four shall retire after the expiration of the first three years and four shall retire after the expiration of the next three years;

(c) of the members referred to in paragraph (c) of the aforesaid clause, one shall retire after the expiration of the first three years and two shall retire after the expiration of the next three years; and

(d) of the members referred to in paragraph (d) of the aforesaid clause, two shall retire after the expiration of the first three years and three shall retire after the expiration of the next three years;" ; and

(ii) in the proviso, the words "or chosen" shall be omitted; and

(c) clause (4) shall be omitted.

7. Amendment of Article 60 of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, in Article 60, in clause (2), for the word "two" the word "three" shall be substituted.

8. Amendment of Article 75 of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, in Article 75,—

(a) in clause (1), for the word "forty-five" the word "thirty" shall be substituted; and

(b) for clause (2) the following shall be substituted, namely :—

“(2) When the President has returned a Bill to the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), it shall be reconsidered by the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in joint sitting and, if it is again passed, with or without amendment, by the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), by the votes of the majority of the members of both Houses present and voting, it shall be deemed for the purposes of the Constitution to have been passed by both Houses and shall be presented to the President and the President shall not withhold assent therefrom.”.

9. **Amendment of Article 90 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, Article 90 shall be renumbered as clause (1) of that Article and, after clause (1), renumbered as aforesaid, the following new clause shall be added, namely :—

“(2) Nothing contained in clause (1) shall—

- (a) be deemed to transfer to the President any functions conferred by any existing law on the Government of any Province or other authority ; or
- (b) prevent the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) from conferring by law functions on authorities other than the President.”.

10. **Amendment of Article 91 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, in Article 91,—

(a) after clause (2), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely :—

“(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2), after the twentieth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and ninety, the President shall invite the member of the National Assembly to be the Prime Minister who commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly, as ascertained in a session of the Assembly summoned for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”.)

(b) in clause (3), after the brackets and figure “(2)”, the words, commas, brackets, figure and letter “or, as the case may be, invited under clause (2A)” shall be inserted ; and

(c) for clause (5) the following shall be substituted, namely :—

“(5) The Prime Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the President, but the President shall not exercise his powers under this clause unless he is satisfied that the Prime Minister does not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly, in which case he shall summon the National Assembly and require the Prime Minister to obtain a vote of confidence from the Assembly.”.)

11. **Amendment of Article 101 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, in Article 101,—

- (a) in clause (1), for the words “in his discretion” the words “after consultation with the Prime Minister” shall be substituted ;
- (aa) in clause (2), the proviso shall be omitted ;
- (b) clause (2A) shall be omitted ; and
- (c) in clause (5), after the word “Governor”, at the end, the words “in any contingency not provided for in this Part” shall be added.

12. Amendment of Article 105 of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, in Article 105,—

(a) in clause (1),—

(i) for the comma and words “, Chief Minister or appropriate Minister” the words “or the Chief Minister” shall be substituted;

(ii) for the first proviso, the following shall be substituted, namely:—

“Provided that the Governor may require the Cabinet or, as the case may be, the Chief Minister to reconsider such advice, whether generally or otherwise, and the Governor shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration.”;
and

(iii) the second proviso shall be omitted;

(b) in clause (2), for the comma and words “, the Cabinet or a Minister” the words “or the Cabinet” shall be substituted; and

(c) in clause (5), for the brackets and figure “(3)” the brackets and figure “(2)” shall be substituted.

13. Amendment of Article 106 of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, in Article 106, in clause (4), for the word “second” the word “third” shall be substituted.

14. Amendment of Article 112 of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, Article 112 shall be renumbered as clause (1) of that Article and,—

(a) in clause (1), renumbered as aforesaid, in the Explanation, for the words “resolution for a vote of no-confidence has been moved” the word “notice of a resolution for a vote of no-confidence has been given” shall be substituted; and

(b) after clause (1), renumbered and amended as aforesaid, the following new clause shall be added, namely:—

“(2) The Governor may also dissolve the Provincial Assembly in his discretion, but subject to the previous approval of the President, where, in his opinion,—

(a) a vote of no-confidence having been passed against the Chief Minister, no other member of the provincial Assembly is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Provincial Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, as ascertained in a session of the Provincial Assembly summoned for the purpose; or

(b) a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.”.

15. Amendment of Article 116 of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, in Article 116,—

(a) in clause (2), for the word “forty-five” the word “thirty” shall be substituted; and

- (b) for clause (3) the following shall be substituted, namely:—

“(3) When the Governor has returned a Bill to the Provincial Assembly, it shall be reconsidered by the Provincial Assembly and, if it is again passed, with or without amendment, by the Provincial Assembly, by the votes of the majority of the members of the Provincial Assembly present and voting, it shall be again presented to the Governor and the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom.”.

16. Amendment of Article 130 of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, in Article 130,—

- (a) after clause (2), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:—

“(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2), after the twentieth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight, the Governor shall invite the member of the Provincial Assembly to be the Chief Minister who commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the Provincial Assembly, as ascertained in a session of the Assembly summoned for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution ;

Provided that nothing contained in this clause shall apply to a Chief Minister holding office on the twentieth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.” ;

- (b) in clause (3), after the brackets and figure “ (2) ”, the words, commas, brackets, figure and letter “ or, as the case may be, invited under clause (2A) ” shall be inserted ; and
- (c) for clause (5) the following shall be substituted, namely:—

“(5) The Chief Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor, but the Governor shall not exercise his powers under this clause unless he is satisfied that the Chief Minister does not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Provincial Assembly, in which case he shall summon the Provincial Assembly and require the Chief Minister to obtain a vote of confidence from the Assembly.”.

17. Amendment of Article 144 of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, in Article 144, clause (2) shall be omitted.

18. Omission of Article 152A of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, Article 152A shall be omitted.

19. Substitution of Article 270A of the Constitution.—In the Constitution, for Article 270A the following shall be substituted, namely:—

“270A. *Affirmation of President's Orders, etc.*—(1) The Proclamation of the fifth day of July, 1977, all President's Orders, Ordinances, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders, including the Referendum Order, 1984 (P.O. No. 11 of 1984), under which, in consequence of the result of the referendum held on the nineteenth day of December, 1984, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq became the President of Pakistan on the day of the first meeting of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in joint sitting for the term specified in clause (7) of Article 41, the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985 (P.O. No. 14 of 1985), the Constitution (Second Amendment) Order, 1985 (P.O. No. 20 of 1985), the Constitution (Third Amendment) Order, 1985 (P.O. No. 24 of 1985), and all other laws made between the fifth day of July, 1977, and the date on which

this Article comes into force are hereby affirmed, adopted and declared, notwithstanding any judgement of any court, to have been validly made by competent authority and, notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, shall not be called in question in any court on any ground whatsoever.)

Provided that a President's Order, Martial Law Regulation or Martial Law Order made after the thirtieth day of September, 1985, shall be confined only to making such provisions as facilitate, or are incidental to, the revocation of the Proclamation of the fifth day of July, 1977.

(2) All orders made, proceedings taken and acts done by any authority or by any person, which were made, taken or done, or purported to have been made, taken or done, between the fifth day of July, 1977, and the date on which this Article comes into force, in exercise of the powers derived from any Proclamation, President's Orders, Ordinances, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders, enactments, notifications, rules, orders or bye-laws, or in execution of or in compliance with any order made or sentence passed by any authority in the exercise or purported exercise of powers as aforesaid, shall, notwithstanding any judgement of any court, be deemed to be and always to have been validly made, taken or done and shall not be called in question in any court on any ground whatsoever.

(3) All President's Orders, Ordinances, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders, enactments, notifications, rules, orders or bye-laws in force immediately before the date on which this Article comes into force shall continue in force until altered, repealed or amended by competent authority.

Explanation.—In this clause, "competent authority" means,—

- (a) in respect of President's Orders, Ordinances, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders and enactments, the appropriate Legislature; and
- (b) in respect of notifications, rules, orders and bye-laws, the authority in which the power to make, alter, repeal or amend the same vests under the law.

(4) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie in any court against any authority or any person, for or on account of or in respect of any order made, proceedings taken or act done whether in the exercise or purported exercise of the powers referred to in clause (2) or in execution of or in compliance with orders made or sentences passed in exercise or purported exercise of such powers.

(5) For the purposes of clauses (1), (2) and (4), all orders made, proceedings taken, acts done or purporting to be made, taken or done by any authority or person shall be deemed to have been made, taken or done in good faith and for the purpose intended to be served thereby.

(6) Such of the President's Orders and Ordinances referred to in clause (1) as are specified in the Seventh Schedule may be amended in the manner provided for amendment of the Constitution, and all other laws referred to in the said clause may be amended by the appropriate Legislature in the manner provided for amendment of such laws.

Explanation.—In this Article, "President's Orders" includes "President and Chief Martial Law Administrator's Orders" and "Chief Martial Law Administrator's Orders".

20. **Addition of new Schedule to the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, after the Sixth Schedule, the following new Schedule shall be added, namely:—

“SEVENTH SCHEDULE

[Article 270A (6).]

Laws to be amended in the manner provided for amendment of the Constitution.

PRESIDENT'S ORDERS

- (1) The Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Trust and Peoples Foundation Trust (Renaming and Administration) Order, 1978 (P. O. No. 4 of 1978).
- (2) The Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainments Duty) Order, 1979 (P. O. No. 13 of 1979).
- (3) The Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority Order, 1980 (P. O. No. 7 of 1980).
- (4) The Foreign Currency Loans (Rate of Exchange) Order, 1982 (P. O. No. 3 of 1982).
- (5) The Establishment of the office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 (P. O. No. 1 of 1983).
- (6) The Aga Khan University Order, 1983 (P. O. No. 3 of 1983).
- (7) The National College of Textile Engineering (Governing Body and Cess) Order, 1983 (P. O. No. 11 of 1983).
- (8) The Lahore University of Management Sciences Order, 1985 (P. O. No. 25 of 1985).

ORDINANCES

- (1) The International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985 (XXX of 1985).

M. A. HAQ,
Secretary.

CORRIGENDA

[to the Gazette of Pakistan, 1985, Extraordinary, Part I, dated 5th May, 1985, containing Ordinance No. XXXII of 1985.]

- Page 346 : In line 13 from the bottom, for “purchase of hares” read “purchase of shares”.
- “ 348 : In line 20, for “to included” read “to be included”.
- “ 349 : In line 7 from the bottom, for “to be be” read “to be the”.
- “ 352 : In line 21, for “wholly, or” read “wholly or”.
- “ 353 : In line 8 from the bottom, for “(Act XIV of 1960)” read “(Act XLV of 1960)”.

FEDERAL CARE-TAKER CABINET
FROM 09. 06. 1988 TO 01. 12. 1988

S.No.	Portfolio	Period	Remarks
The President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq 1. Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan Acting President. 17. 8. 1988 to 2. 12. 1988	Cabinet Secretariat.		
2. Mr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak, Senior Minister, 9. 6. 1988 to 1.12.1988	Communications	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
3. Dr. Mahbubul Haq 9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Commerce, and Finance & Economic Affairs and Planning & Development.	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
4. Malik Farid Ullah Khan 9. 6. 1988 to 1.12. 1988	Culture & Tourism	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
5. Mr. Mahmood A. Haroon 9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Defence and States & Frontier Regions Divisions Railways	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988 28. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
6. Mr. Wazir Ahmad Jomezai 9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Education	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
7. Mr. Sartaj Aziz 9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Food, Agriculture & Cooperative and Local Govt. & Rural Development. Industries	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988 20. 10. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
8. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Foreign Affairs.	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
9. Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani 9.6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Health, Special Education & Social Welfare and Housing and Works.	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
10. Ch. Shujat Hussain 9. 6. 1988 to 14. 11. 1988	Industries	9.6. 1988 to 14. 11. 1988	

11.	Mr. Illahi Bakhsh Soomro 9. 6. 1988 to 20. 11. 1988	Information & Broadcasting and Water & Power	9. 6. 1988 to 20.11. 1988.	

12.	Malik Nasim Ahmad Aheer 9. 6. 1988 to 17. 11. 1988	Interior and Kashmir Affairs & Northern Affairs Division.	9. 6. 1988 to 17. 11. 1988	
13.	Mr. Wasim Sajjad 9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Justice & Parliamentary Affairs	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
14.	Mir. Ahmad Nawaz Bughti 9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistani Petroleum & Natural Resources and Science & Technology	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
15.	Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan , 9. 5. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988		9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
16.	Mir. Afzal Khan 9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Production	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	
17.	Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali 9. 6. 1988 to 24. 6. 1988	Railways	9. 6. 1988 to 24. 6. 1988	
18.	Maulana Wasi Mazhar Nadvi 9. 6. 1988 to 19. 11. 1988	Religious Affairs & Minorities Affairs	9. 6. 1988 to 19. 11. 1988	
19.	Mr. Mustafa Sadiq, 8. 8. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	Public Affairs	8. 8. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	

MINISTER OF STATE

1.	Mr. Fateh Mohammad Mohammad Hasni 9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988.	Communications	9. 6. 1988 to 1. 12. 1988	

8TH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FROM 1988 TO 1990
LIST OF MEMBERS & ADDRESSES

N.W.F.P-26

S. No	Constituency	Name	Permanent Address	Remarks
1.	NA-1 Peshawar-I	Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Bilour	Bilour House, Peshawar Cantt	
2.	NA-2 Peshawar-II	Khan Bahadur Khan	Danish Abad, University Town, Peshawar	
3.	NA-3 Peshawar-III	Mr. Sardar Ali Khan	Zar Bagh, Pabbi Tehsil Nowshera	
4.	NA-4 Peshawar-IV	Mian Muzaffar Shah	H.No.1224, Khushal Colony, Nowshera Cantt	
5.	NA-5 Charsadda	Khan Abdul Wali Khan	Wali Bagh, Charsadda	
6.	NA-6 Mardan-I	Haji Muhammad Yaqoob	Shaheen Colony, Mardan	
7.	NA-7 Mardan-II	Maulana Muhammad Ahmed	Darul Uloom, Sher Garh, Tehsil Takhat Bai, District. Mardan	
8.	NA-8 Swabi	Mr. Abdul Khaliq Khan	Hoti, Distt. Mardan	
9.	NA-9 Kohat	Maulvi Niamatullah	H.No.T-96, Purani Mal Mandi, Kohat	
10.	NA-10 Karak	Maulana Shaheed Ahmed	Vill. Mohbati Killa, P.O. Tatter Khel, Distt. Karak	
11.	NA-11 Abottabad-I	Mr. Farid M. Jadoon	4/A-1, II South Street, Defence Housing Society, Karachi	
12.	NA-12 Abbottabad- II	Sardar Haji Gul Khitab Khan	Ward No.7, Mohalla Gul Khitab Abad, P.O. Havelian, Distt. Abbottabad	
13.	NA-13 Abbottabad- III	Raja Sikander Zaman Khan	H.No.117, Khanpur House Market Road, Rawalpindi Cantt	
14.	NA-14 Mansehra-I	Alhaj Syed Qasim Shah	101, Westridge-I, Rawalpindi Cantt	
15.	NA-15 Mansehra-II	Nawabzada Salahuddin Saeed	Vill. Shergarh, Distt. Mansehra	

16.	NA-16 Mansehra-III	Mr. Muhammad Ayub Khan	Vill. Biari Allai, Tehsil Batgram Distt. Mansehra	
17.	NA-17 Kohistan	Mr. Fazle Haq	65, Defence Colony Peshawar Cantt	
18.	NA-18 D.I.Khan	Maulana Fazlur Rehman	Abdul Khel, Distt. D.I.Khan	
19.	NA-19 Bannu-I	Maulvi Ali Akbar Khan	Jamia Anwar-ul-Uloom, chak Dandan, P.O.Mira Khel, Distt. Bannu	
20.	NA-20 Bannu-II	Mr. Anwar Saifullah Khan	H.No.11, Street No.25 Sector F-6/2, Islamabad	
21.	NA-21 Swat-I	Shahzada Aman-I-Room	Naway-Kilay, Mingora, Swat	
22.	NA-22 Swat- II	Haji Fazl-e-Raziq	Vill. China, Tehsil Daggar, Bunair, Distt. Swat	
23.	NA-23 Swat- III	Dr. Mehboob-ur- Rehman	Farhat Abad, Khawaza Khela, Distt. Swat	
24.	NA-24 Chitral	Syed Abdul Ghafoor Shah	Vill. Charun, Tehsil Mastuj, Distt. Chitral	
25.	NA-25 Dir	Sahibzada Fatehullah	Sahibabad Tehsil. Wari, District, Dir	
26.	NA-26 Malakand Protected Area-cum-Dir	Mr. Muhammad Hanif Khan	Vill. Jolagram, Malakand Agency	

THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA

(FATA-8)

27.	NA-27 Tribal Area-I	Haji Qadar Gul Khan	Attock Floor Mill, Mardan Road, Nowshera	
28.	NA-28 Tribal Area-II	Akhunzada Muhammad Saeed	Kuram Agency, Para Chanar	
29.	NA-29 Tribal Area-III	Ghazi Said Jamal	Jamal Sarai, P.O. Hangu, Distt. Kohat	
30.	NA-30 Tribal Area-IV	Malik Nadar Khan	Vill. Kazza Meda Khel, Tehsil Datta Khel, Miran Shah North Waziristan Agency	

31.	NA-31 Tribal Area-V	Malik Sakhi Jan	S.K.7, Sakhi Jan Line, P.I.B. Colony Karachi-5	
32.	NA-32 Tribal Area-VI	Mr. Bismillah Khan	Nawagai, Bajaur Agency	
33.	NA-33 Tribal Area-VII	Malik Waris Khan	Bara, Khyuber Agency	
34.	NA-34 Tribal Area-VIII	Mr. Momin Khan Afridi	Vill. Rahim Gul Meri Khel, Zarghum Khel, Darra Adam Khel. F.R. Kohat	

FEDERAL CAPITAL-01

35.	NA-35 Federal Capital	Raja Pervez Khan	Vill. Phulgran, Islamabad	

THE PUNJAB

36.	NA-36 Rawalpindi-I	Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi	H.No.4, Street No.17, F-7/2, Islamabad	
37.	NA-37 Rawalpindi-II	Raja Muhammad Zaheer Khan	Dhoke Raja Karm, Khan Chohan, Gujar Khan, Distt. Rawalpindi	
38.	NA-38 Rawalpindi-III	Shaikh Rashid Ahmed	Lal Haveli, Bohar Bazar, Rawalpindi	
39.	NA-39 Rawalpindi-IV	Raja Shahid Zafar	«Kayam » Tipu Road, Rawalpindi	
40.	NA-40 Rawalpindi-V	Ch. Nisar Ali Khan	72, Dhamial Road, Rawalpindi	
41.	NA-41 Attock-I	Malik Mohammad Aslam	3, Saint Johns Park, Lahore Cantt	
42.	NA-42 Attock-II	Malik Amir Muhammad Khan	Ward No.11, Pindi Gheb, Distt. Attock	
43.	NA-43 Chakwal-I	Lt. Gen (R) Malik Abdul Majeed	30-B, St. No. 10, F-8/3, Islamabad	
44.	NA-44 Chakwal-II	Sardar Mansoor Hayat Tamman	Vill. & P.O. Tamman, Tehsil. Talagang, Distt. Chakwal	
45.	NA-45 Jhelum-I	Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan	Islamia School Road, Jhelum City	

46.	NA-46 Jhelum-II	Nawabzada Iqbal Mehdi	7, Civil Lines, Jhelum	
47.	NA-47 Sargodha-I	Mr. Ihsan-ul-Haq Piracha	H.No.276, E/7, Islamabad	
48.	NA-48 Sargodha-II	Lt. Co. (R) Ch. Qadir Bakhsh Mela	Vill. & P.O. Mela Tehsil. Bhalwal, Sargodha	
49.	NA-49 Sargodha-III	Haji Muhammad Javed Iqbal Cheema	Chak No.47-N.B, Sargodha	
50.	NA-50 Sargodha-IV	Ch. Anwar Ali Cheema	51, Civil Lines, Sargodha	
51.	NA-51 Sargodha-cum- Khushab	Malik Muhammad Naeem Khan	H.No. 79-A, Satellite Town, Sargodha	

52.	NA-52 Khushab	Malik Khuda Bakhsh Khan Tiwana	5, Shah Jamal, Lahore	
53.	NA-53 Mianwali-I	Maulana Muhammad Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi	22, Onkar Road, Islampura, Lahore	
54.	NA-54 Mianwali-II	Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi	Watta Khel, Mianwali	
55.	NA-55 Bhakkar-I	Mr. Muhammad zafar Ullah Khan	Vill & P.O. Jandawala, Tehsil Kallurkot, Distt. Bhakkar	
56.	NA-56 Bhakkar-II	Mr. Rashid Akbar Khan	Vill. Nawani, P.O. Shahani, Tehsil & District. Bhakkar	
57.	NA-57 Faisalabad-I	Mian Zahid Sarfraz	6/1, Guru Nanak Pura, Faisalabad	
58.	NA-58 Faisalabad-II	Rai Muhammad Aslam Khan	Kharal House, Lahore road, jaranwala	
59.	NA-59 Faisalabad-III	Khan Shahadat Ali Khan Baloch	Chak No.409 G.B. P.O. Tandlianwala, Tehsil Samundri	
60.	NA-60 Faisalabad-IV	Ch. Abdul Saboora Khan	28, New Civil Lines, Faisalabad	
61.	NA-61 Faisalabad-V	Ch. Muhammad Nazir Ahmed	259/B, Peoples Colony, faisalabad	
62.	NA-62 Faisalabad-VI	Ch. Ghulam Mustafa Bajwa	G-423, Gulistan Colony, Faisalabad	

63.	NA-63 FaisalabadVII	Mr. Nisar Akbar Khan	11, Liaqat Road, Faisalabad	
64.	NA-64 FaisalabadVIII	Mr. Ahmed Saeed Awan	600/B, Peoples Colony Faisalabad	
65.	NA-65 Faisalabad-IX	Maher Abdul Rasheed	1/6, Haseeb Shaheed Colony, Faisalabad	
66.	NA-66 Jhang- I	Mr. Amir Hussain Syed	Thatti Sharqi, Chiniot	
67.	NA-67Jhang- II	Maulana Muhammad Rehmatullah	Jamia Muhammadia Sharif Jhang	
68.	NA-68 Jhang- III	Syeda Abida Hussain	31, St. No.8, F-7/3, Ibd	
69.	NA-69 Jhang- IV	Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat	1, Civil Lines Jhang Saddar	

70.	NA-70 Jhang- V	Sahibzada Muhammad Nazeer Sultan	Hazrat Sultan bahoo, Jhang	
71.	NA-71 T.T.Singh-I	Ch. Asad-ur- Rehman	Outside Kamalia, Distt. Toba Tek Singh	
72.	NA-72 T.T.Singh-II	Ch. Abdul Sattar	I-C, Syed Maratab Ali Road, Gulberg II, Lahore	
73.	NA-73 T.T.Singh-III	Haji Muhammad Ishaq	Latif Menson, Gojra	
74.	NA-74 Gujranwala-I	Col. (R) Ghulam Sarwar Cheema	M-218, Defence Society Lahore Cantt	
75.	NA-75 Gujranwala-II	Malik Fazal Hussain Awan	Vill. Ghari Awan, Hafizabad, Distt. Gujranwala	
76.	NA-76 Gujranwala- III	Haji Amanullah	Fazil Fruit Market, Gujranwala	
77.	NA-77 GujranwalaIV	Khawaja Muhammad Aslam Lone	Marshal Ceramics, G.T.Road, Gujranwala	
78.	NA-78 Gujranwala-V	Rana Nazir Ahmed Khan	G.T. Road Kamoke, District Gujranwala	

79.	NA-79 GujranwalaVI	Ch. Ejaz Ahmad	Qila Dedar Singh District Gujranwala	
80.	NA-80 Gujrat-I	Ch. Tajjammal Hussain	Zahoor Elahi House, Gujrat	
81.	NA-81 Gujrat-II	Ch. Shujat Hussain	Zahoor Elahi House, Gujrat	
82.	NA-82 Gujrat-III	Ch. Muhammad Asghar Kaira	Kaira House, Lalamusa	
83.	NA-83 Gujrat-IV	Mr. Mumtaz Ahmed Tarar	Tarar House, Mandi Bahauddin, Distt. Gujrat	
84.	NA-84 Gujrat-V	Mr. Umar Hayat Lalika	Village Barmusa, Tehsil Phalia, Distt. Gujrat	
85.	NA-85 Sialkot-I	Mian Muhammad Shafi	Hamza House, Pesrur Road, Sialkot	
86.	NA-86 Sialkot-II	Ch. Amir Hussain	Mohall Preim Nagar, Katchery Road, Sialkot	
87.	NA-87 Sialkot-III	Mr. Khurshid Alam Cheema	Pairas Road, Sialkot	
88.	NA-88 Sialkot-IV	Ch. Abdul Sattar	Chairman Zila Council, Sialkot	
89.	NA-89 Sialkot-V	Mr. Hamid Nawaz Khan	169/C, Alauddin Road, Lahore Cantt	

90.	NA-90 Sialkot-VI	Mr. Anwar-ul- Haq Ch	Zafarwal By-pass, Narowal, Sialkot	
91.	NA-91 Sialkot-VII	Mr. Anwar Aziz Chaudhry	Shakargarh, District Sialkot	
92.	NA-92 Lahore-I	Maj-General (Retd) Muhammad Hussain Ansari	80-B/1, Tariq Road, Lahore Cantt	
93.	NA-93 Lahore-II	Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan	5, Canal Bank, Zaman Park, Lahore	
94.	NA-94 Lahore-III	Mian Umar Hayat	60-Haq Nawaz Road, Baghbanpura, Lahore	
95.	NA-95 Lahore-IV	Mian Muhammad Azhar	183, Abu Bakr Block, New Garden Town, Lahroe	
96.	NA-96 Lahore-V	Mr. Jehangir Badar	129-B, New Muslim Town, Lahore	

97.	NA-97 Lahore-VI	Kh. Ahmad Tariq Rahim	11 Gulberg-V, Lahore	
98.	NA-98 Lahore-VII	Mian Muhammad Usman	95-Ferozpur Road, Lahore	
99.	NA-99 Lahore-VIII	Mr. Muhammad Arshad Ghurki	16 F.C.C. Gulberg-II, Lahore	
100.	NA-100 Lahore-IX	Malik Meraj Khalid	29-Lakhmani Mension Hall Road, Lahore	Speaker National Assembly
101.	NA-101 Sheikhupura-I	Mr. Nisar Ahmed Pannoun	Back Sangeet Cinema, Shahdara Town, Lahore	
102.	NA-102 Sheikhupura-II	Malik Mushtaq Ahmed	Mohalla Hunjranwala, Old City, Sheikhupura	
103.	NA-103 Sheikhupura-III	Mr. Muhammad Arif Awan	Gali Hakimian, Sheikhupura City	
104.	NA-104 SheikhupuraIV	Ch. Tawakkal- ullah Virk	Rafique Road, Civil Lines, Sheikhupura	
105.	NA-105 SheikhupuraV	Rai Rashid Ahmed Khan	Kot Hussain, Tehsil nankana, District Sheikhupura	
106.	NA-106 Kasur-I	Sahibzada Khizar Hayat Khan	Out-side Kot Fateh Din Khan, Tehsil & Distt. Kasur	
107.	NA-107 Kasur-II	Rao Muhammad Khizar Hayat	Rao Khan Wala, Distt. Kasur	
108.	NA-108 Kasur-III	Sardar Talib Hassan	58-E/1, Gulberg-III, Lahore	

109.	NA-109 Kasur-IV	Sardar Muhammad Ashiq Dogar	Al-Faisal Town, A-Block H.No. 65, St.No.6, Research Institute, Lahore Cantt	
110.	NA-110 Okara-I	Rao Sikandar Iqbal	Sahiwal Road, Okara	
111.	NA-111 Okara-II	Syed Sajjad Haider	P.O. Renala Khurd, Distt. Okara	
112.	NA-112 Okara-III	Rao Muhammad Afzal Khan	Iqbal Manzal, Godown Street Okara	

113.	NA-113 Okara-IV	Mian Muhammad Khan Maneka Ata	31, Tariq Block, New Gorden Town, Lahore	
114.	NA-114 Multan-I	Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani	Gillani House, Gous-ul-Azam Road, Multan	
115.	NA-115 Multan-II	Mr. Riaz Hussain Qureshi	3-A, Gulgasht Colony, Multan	
116.	NA-116 Multan-III	Malik Mukhta Ahmed Awan	1-Gulshan-e-Mehr Colony, Bosan Road, Multan City	
117.	NA-117 Multan-IV	Mr. Muhammad Siddique Khan Kanju	Village Alipur Kanju, Tehsil Lodhran, Multan	
118.	NA-118 Multan-V	Mirza Muhammad Nasir Baig	4-A, Gulgasht Colony, Multan	
119.	NA-119 Multan-VI	Rana Taj Ahmad Noon	Basti Mitho Tehsil Shujabad, District, Multan	
120.	NA-120 Multan-cumKhanewal	Mr. Fazal Dad Wahla	Hahania, Tehsil Khanewal, Distt. Multan	
121.	NA-121 Khanewal-I	Mehr Muhammad Iqbal Hiraj	173 Shamsabad Colony, Multan	
122.	NA-122 Khanewal-II	Mr. Aftab Ahmad Khan Daha	H.No.3, Civil Lines, Khanewal	
123.	NA-123 Khanewal-III	Mr. Ghulam Haider Wyne	H.No.5/13 MianChannu, District Khanewal	
124.	NA-124 Sahiwal-I	Ch. Nouraiz Shakoor Khan	937-B, Farid Town, Sahiwal	
125.	NA-125 Sahiwal-II	Ch. Muhammad Ashraf	142/G, Model Town, Lahore	
126.	NA-126 Sahiwal-III	Rai Ahmed Nawaz	Rai Cotton Factory, Chichawatni, Distt. Sahiwal	

127.	NA-127 Sahiwal-IV	Mian Ghulam Muhammad Ahmed Khan Maneka	Pir-Ghani, Tehsil Pak-Pattan District Sahiwal	
128.	NA-128 Sahiwal-V	Raja Shahid Saeed Khan	51-N Model Town Extension, Lahore	

129.	NA-129 Vehari-I	Mr. Muhammad Mumtaz Khan Bhaba	Village Malko P.O. Sambohal Tehsil Mailsi, Distt. Vehari	
130.	NA-130 Vehari-II	Mr. Akbar Ali Bhatti	20-Masson Road, Lahore-3	
131.	NA-131 Vehari-III	Mr. Shahid Mehdi Nasim	H.No.16/17, I Block, Civil Lines, Burewala Distt. Vehari	
132.	NA-132 D.G.Khan	Khawaja Kamalud- Din Anwar	Opposite Nishtar Animal House, Jail Road, Multan	
133.	NA-133 D.G.Khancum- Rajanpur	Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari	H.No.12, St.No.89, G- 6/3, Islamabad	
134.	Rajanpur-I	Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari	9-A, Officers Colony, Multan	
135.	NA-135 Muzaffargarh -I	Dr. Zulfiqar Ali Barq	Bahawalpur	
136.	NA-136 Muzaffargarh -II	Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan	32-Nikalson Road, Lahore	
137.	NA-137 Muzaffargarh -III	Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khan	Khar House, Near New Campus Lahore	
138.	NA-138 Muzaffargarh -IV	Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi	18, Khayaban-eShamsheer, Defence Housing Society Karachi	
139.	NA-139 Layyah-I	Malik Niaz Ahmad Jakhar	Advocate, Layyah Distt. Bar, Layyah	
140.	NA-140 Layyah-II	Sahibzada Faizul- Hassan	Chak No. 102, Darbar Swag Sharif Tehsil, Karor, Distt. Layyah	
141.	NA-141 Bahawalpur-I	Nawab Salahuddin Abbasi	Sadiq Garh Palace, Dera Nawab Sahib, Bahawalpur	
142.	NA-142 Bahawalpur- II	Mr. Muhammad Farooq Azam Malik	Al-Awan Near Sattellite Town, Bahawalpur	

143.	NA-143 Bahawalpur-III	Syed Tasneem Nawaz Gardezi	Gardezi House, Bahawalpur	
144.	NA-144 Bahawalnagar-I	Syed Mumtaz Alam Gillani	Eidgah Road, Bahawalnagar	
145.	NA-145 Bahawalnagar-II	Mian Abdul Sattar Lalika	Lalika House, Haroonabad, Distt. Bahawalnagar	
146.	NA-146 Bahawalnagar-III	Ch. Abdul Ghafoor	2-D, Model Town Lahore	
147.	NA-147 Rahimyar Khan-I	Makhdum Syed Ahmed Alam Anwar	17-B, Model Town A, Bahawalpur	
148.	NA-148 Rahimyar Khan-II	Makhdum Ruknudin	8-Shami Road, Lahore Cantt	
149.	NA-149 Rahimyar Khan-III	Mian Abdul Khaliq	Hassan Colony, Rahimyar Khan	
150.	NA-150 Rahimyar Khan-IV	Sardar Rais Shabbir Ahmed	P.O. Box No.12336 Defence Cooperative Housing Society, Karachi	

SINDH PROVINCE-46

151.	NA-151 Sukkur-I	Mr. Ali Hassan Manghi	2, Bath Island Road, Karachi	
152.	NA-152 Sukkur-II	Faqir Abdul Haq alias Mian Mitho	P.O. Dahrki Taluka, Ubauro, Distt. Sukkur	
153.	NA-153 Sukkur-III	Haji Noor Muhammad Khan Lund	Mirpur Mathelo, Distt. Sukkur	
154.	NA-154 Shikarpur-I	Agha Tariq Khan	Badar Mohalla, Sultankot, Te Distt. Shikarpur	
155.	NA-155 Shikarpur-II	Agha Atta Muhammad Khan	Parsi Colony, Sukkur	
156.	NA-156 Jacobabad-I	Sardar Muhammad Muqeem Khan Khoso	Khoso House, Jacobabad	
157.	NA-157 Jacobabad-II	Mir Mehran Khan Bijarani	H.No.209, St.No.49, F- 10/4, Islamabad	

158.	NA-158 Nawabshah-I	Syed Zafar Ali Shah	Darbelo, District Nawabshah	
159.	NA-159 Nawabshah-II	Haji Rehmatullah Behan	Vill. Dheeran Taluka Moro, Distt. Nawabshah	
160.	NA-160 Nawabshah-III	Mr. Hakim Ali Zardari	Zardari House, 225-E.I. Lines, Karachi-No.4	
161.	NA-161 Nawabshah-IV	Syed shabir Ahmed Shah	B-27, K.D.A, Scheme No.1 Miran Muhammad Shah Road, Karachi	
162.	NA-162 Khairpur-I	Syed Pervez Ali Shah Jillani	Jillani Mohalla, Khairpur Mirs	
163.	NA-163 Khairpur-II	Pir Syed Abdul Qadir Shah Jillani	Vill. Ranipur, Distt. Khairpur	
164.	NA-164 Larkana-I	Begum Nusrat Bhutto	Al-Murtaza, Larkana	
165.	NA-165 Larkana-II	Dr. Mrs. Ashraf Abbasi	Abbasi Health Home, Larkana	Deputy Speaker National Assembly of Pakistan
166.	NA-166 Larkana-III	Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto	Prime Minister House, Islamabad	Prime Minister of Pakistan
167.	NA-167 Hyderabad-I	Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Faheem	11-A, 2 nd Sunset Street, Phase-II, Defence Housing Society, Karachi	
168.	NA-168 Hyderabad-II	Mr. Aftab Ahmad Shaikh	A/214, Block-C, Unit No.2, Latifabad, Hyderabad	
169.	NA-169 Hyderabad-III	Mr. Rashid Ahmed Khan	127, Hali Road, Hyderabad	
170.	NA-170 Hyderabad-IV	Kazi Abdul Majid Abid	C/O Daily Ibrat Gari Khata Hyderabad	
171.	NA-171 HyderabadV	Makhdoom Khaleeq-uz- Zaman	12-D, Muhammad Ali Housing Karachi-8	
172.	NA-172 Badin-I	Haji Abdullah Halepoto	31, unit No. III, Latif Abad, Hyderabad	

173.	NA-173 Badin-II	Mr. Bashir Ahmed Halepoto	Goth Haji Muhammad Saleh halepoto, P.O. Phalkara, Taluka Matli, Distt. Badin	
174.	NA-174 Tharparkar-I	Syed Qurban Ali Shah	Satellite Town, Mirpurkhas	
175.	NA-175 Tharparkar-II	Mr. Ali Nawaz Shah	P.O. Box12599 Karachi-29	
176.	NA-176 Tharparkar-III	Arbab Amir Hassan	Vill. Khet Iari, Via Noakot Taluka Deplo, Distt. Tharparkar	
177.	NA-177 Dadu-I	Malik Asad Sikandar	Malik House, Kotri	
178.	NA-178 Dadu-II	Haji Muhammad Bux Jamali	Jamali Street, Dadu	
179.	NA-179 Dadu-III	Haji Zaffar Ali Laghari	Station Sita Road, Distt. Dadu	
180.	NA-180 Sanghar-I	Syed Ali Gohar Shah	A-1, Scheme No.1, Amir Khusro Road, Karachi-8	
181.	NA-181 Sanghar-II	Shah Nawaz Junejo	Vill. Shah Nawaz Junejo, Distt. Sanghar	
182.	NA-182 Thatta-I	Baboo Ghulam Hussain	Soni Mundhi, Mohallah Shahi Bazar, Thatta	
183.	NA-183 Thatta-II	Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah	36-D, Karachi Admn. Coop. Housing Society off. Shaheed Millat Road, Karachi-8	
184.	NA-184 Karachi (West)-I	Syed Amir Hyder Kazmi	B-235, Block-D, North Nazim Abad, KarachiWest	
185.	NA-185 Karachi (West)-II	Syed Saleem-ul- Haque	A-498 block-5, Gulshan-e-Iqbal Karachi	
186.	NA-186 Karachi Central-I	Kunwar Khalid Younus	B-81/P Hussain Dsilva Town, North Nazimabad, Karachi-33	
187.	NA-187 Karachi Central-II	Dr. Imran Farooq	R-855/1, Sharifabad F.B. Area, Karachi	

188.	NA-188 Karachi Central-III	Syed Muhammad Aslam	1432/14, F.B. Area, Karachi-38	
189.	NA-189 Karachi South-I	Mr. Abdul Rahim Baluch	Photo Lane, Chakiwara, Karachi	
190.	NA-190 Karachi South-II	Dr. Muhammad Farooq Sattar	268, P.I.B. Colony, Karachi-5	

191.	NA-191 Karachi South-III	Syed Tariq Mehmood	Metharam Parmanan Building, 71-M No.1 Prince Road, Karachi-1	
192.	NA-192 Karachi East-I	Dr. Muhammad Rafique Essani	29/1/A, Behar Colony, Claten Road, Karachi-5	
193.	NA-193 Karachi East-II	Syed Muhammad Zakaria Kazmi	C-42, Block H, North Nazim Abad, Karachi- 33	
194.	NA-194 Karachi East-III	Syed Aminu Haque	A-26/19, Roshanbagh Society (Alnoor) F.B. Area, Karachi	
195.	NA-195 Karachi East-IV	Syed Mahmood Hussain Hashmi	A/276, Zamanaba Area, 36-B, Landhi-5, Karachi	
196.	NA-196 Karachi East-V	Mr. Wasim Ahmed	H.No. F.24/1, (North), Malir Extension Karachi-37	
197.	NA-197 Quettacum- Chagai	Hafiz Hussain Ahmed	10-4/187 near Madrissa Matla-ul-Aloom, Brewery Road Quetta	
198.	NA-198 Pishin	Maulvi Abdul Ghani	Khateeb Jamia masjid, New Abadi, Mohallah Badanzai Chaman City, Distt. Pishin	
199.	NA-199 Loralai	Mir Baqar Muhammad Khan Khetran	P.O. Rakhni Dist Loralai	
200.	NA-200 Zhob	Maulvi Muhammad Khan Sherani	Sherani Mohalla, Zhob	
201.	NA-201 Kachhi	Mir Tariq Hussain Magsi	Magsi House 20 Sairab Road, Quetta	

202.	NA-202 Sibbi-cumKohlu- cumDera Bugticum- Ziarat	Mr. Saleem Akbar Bugti	Bugti House, Quetta	
203.	NA-203 JaffarabadcumTamboo	Mir Nabi Bakhsh Khan Khoso	Khoso House Togh Road, Quetta	
204.	NA-204 Kalat-cum- Kharan	Maulvi Muhammad Siddique shah	Muslim Mohalla, Kalat	
205.	NA-205 Khuzdar	Mir Muhammad Arif	Village Jebri Tehsil Mashki, District Khuzdar	
206.	NA-206 LasbelacumGwadur	Mr. Ghulam Akbar Lasi	D-11, Block 6, Federal B. Area, Karachi	
207.	NA-207 Turbatcum- Panjgur	Mr. Manzoor Ahmed Gichki	Village Sami, Tehsil and District Turbat	

LIST OF NON-MUSLIM MEMBERS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

TOTAL-10

Sr. No	Name	Community	Address	Remarks
208	Father Rufin Julius	Christian	Catholic Church, Hafizabad Road, Gujranwala	
209	Mr. George Clement	Christian	Warispura 224, R.B., Faisalabad	
210	Lt. Col. (Retd). W.Herbert Baluch,	Christian	H.No. 155, St. No.4, Old Cavtry Ground, Lahore Cantt	
211	Mr. J. Salik	Christian	Azam Town, Karachi-44	
212	Rana Chandar Singh	Hindu/Sche duled Castes	21-C, Blocd-6, P.E.C.H.S. Karachi	
213	Mr. Kishin Chand Parwani	Hindu/Sche duled Castes	P.O. Box 49, Mirpurkhas, Sindh	

214	Mr. Assar Das	Hindu/Scheduled Castes	P.O. Ghotki, Distt. Sukkur	
215	Mr. Bhagwandas K. Chawala	Hindh/Scheduled Castes	1 st Floor, Byculla Mension Shehra-eLiaquat, New Challi, Karachi	
216	Mr. Byram D. Awari	Parsi/Sikh/Budhists and others	Beach Luxury Hotel, M.T.Khan Road, Lalazar, Karachi-2	
217	Malik Bashir-ud-Din Khalid	Ahmadi	Siyam Street, Maqbool Road, Ichhra, Lahore	
218	Mrs. Kulsum Saifullah Khan	1-Michni Lane, Peshawar Cantt		

WOMEN MEMBERS-2

N.W.F.P-2

219	Mrs. Malik Mehr-un-Nisa	1010, Mawatian Gunj, Peshawar	

PUNJAB-12

220	Begum Sarwar Rehana	225-A, Sarwar Road, Lahore Cantt	
221	Begum Sarwari Sadiq	15-A, People's Colony Faisalabad	
222	Begum Nadir Khan Khakwani	83-Abdali Road, Multan Cantt	
223	Mrs. Amna Piracha	House No.1-C, St.21, F-7/2, Islamabad	
224	Mrs. Razia Sultana	91-B-II, Gulberg-III, Lahore	
225	Mrs. Rehana Aleem Mashadi	517-Nishter Block, Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore-18	
226	Mrs. Shahnaz Begum	22-C, Model Town "A" Bahawalpur	
227	Mrs. Abida Malik	112 Abdali Road Krishan Nagar, Lahore	
228	Mrs. Amira Ehsan	F-722, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi	
229	Mrs. Attiya Inayatullah	1, Babar Block, New Gorden Town, Lahore	

230	Mrs. Shanaz Wazir Ali	85-Safraraz Rafiqi Road, Lahore Cantt	
231	Begum Nasreen Rao Rashid	115/7, Sarwar Road, Lahore Cantt	

SINDH-04

232	Mrs. Shamim N.D.Khan	C-188, Block No.6, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi	
233	Dr. Mrs. Mehmooda Shah	House No.6/1, Gharibabad, Station Road, Jacobabad	
234	Mrs. Zareen Majeed	1013 P.I.B. Colony, Karachi-5	
235	Mrs. Rukaya Khanam Soomro	Peoples Maidan, Rato Dero, Distt. Larkana	
236	Bibi Amna	House No. 710, Muhalla Zarkhelan, Mastung, Distt. Kalat	

BALUCHISTAN-02

237	Mrs. Samina Razak	171 Al-Gillani Road, Quetta	

BALUCHISTAN-01

235	Begum Bilqees Shahbaz	Khudadad Road, Quetta	
236	Dr. Miss Noor Jehan Panezai	Panezai House Shawak Shah Road, Quetta	Parliamentary Secretary of Health Special Education and Social Welfare

Ist term
FEDERAL CABINET
UNDER THE PREMIERSHIP OF MOHTRAMA BENAZIR BHUTTOO
FROM 2. 12. 1988 TO 6. 8. 1990

S.No.	Portfolio	Period	Remarks
Prime Minister Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto 2. 12. 88 to 6. 8. 1990	Cabinet Secretariat.	2. 12. 88 to 6. 8. 90.	
1. Begum Nusrat Bhutto 31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Senior Minister without portfolio	31. 3. 89 to 6. 8. 1990	
2. Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat 4. 12. 88 to 6. 8. 1990	Commerce., Local Govt & Rural Development Industries (Addl. Charge)	4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990 6. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989	
3. Mr. Makhdoom Amin Faheem 4. 12. 88 to 6. 8. 1990	Communications Railways (Addl. Charge)	4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990 6. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989	
4. Agha Tariq Khan 4. 12. 88 to 6. 8. 1990	Culture & Tourism Culture & Supports	4.12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989 30.3.1989 to 6.8.1990	
5. Rao Sikandar Iqbal 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 12. 1990	Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives	4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	
6. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	Foreign Affairs	4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	
7. Syed Amir Haider Kazmi 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	Health, Special Education and Social welfare Education	4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990 6. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989	
8. Mr. Jahangir Badr 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	Housing and Works Science & Technology Petroleum & Natural Resources	4. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989 4. 12. 1988 to 20. 9. 1989 6. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	
9. Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	Interior Law and Justice	4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990 4. 12. 1988 to 28. 12. 1988	
10. Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad Awan 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 12. 1990	Labour Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis Labour	4. 12. 1988 to 11. 11. 1989 11. 11. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	

11.	Mr. Muhammad Hanif Khan 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 12. 1990	States and Frontier Regions & Kashmir Affairs Housing & Works	4. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989 to 28. 1. 1990	
12.	Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani 28. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	Law and Justice	28. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	
13.	Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari' 28. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	Water and Power	28. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	
14.	Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Education	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
15.	Mr. Zafar Ali Leghari 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Railways	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
16.	Mr. Ali Nawaz Shah 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Industries	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
17.	Mr. Khan Bahadar Khan 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Religious Affairs & Minorities Affairs	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
18.	Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Raheem 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Parliamentary Affairs	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
19.	Mir. Baz Muhammad Khan Khetran 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	States & Frontier Regions and Kashmir Affairs Environment and Urban Affairs Kashmir Affairs & Northern Affairs	23. 3. 1989 to 28. 1. 1990 28. 1. 1990 to 6. 8. 1990 10. 9. 1989 to 28. 1. 1990	
20.	Begum Rehana Sarwar 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Women Development	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
21.	Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani 31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Tourism Division Housing & Works (Works Division)	21.3. 1989 to 28. 1. 1990 28. 1. 1990 to 6. 8. 1990	
22.	Mian Ghulam Mohammad Ahmad Khan Maneka 11. 11. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis	11.11.1989 to 6. 8. 1990	

MINISTERS OF STATE			
1.	Mir. Baz Muhammad Khan Khetran 4. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989	Culture and Tourism	4. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989
2.	Col (Retd) Ghulam Sarwar Cheema 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	Defence	4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990
3.	Mr. Ehsan-ul-Haq Piracha. 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 12. 1990	Finance. Economic Affairs and Planning & Development	4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990
4.	Mr. Javed Jabbar 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	Information & Broadcasting Science & Technology	4. 12. 1988 to 20. 9. 1989 20. 9. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990
5.	Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Raheem 4.12.88 to 23.3.1989	Parliamentary Affairs Water & Power (Addl Charge)	4. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989 6. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989
6.	Raja Shahid Zafar 4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	Production	4. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990
7.	Khan Bahadar Khan 4. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989	Religious Affairs & Minorities Affairs	4. 12. 1988 to 23. 3. 1989
8.	Malik Waris Khan Afridi 5. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990	States & Frontier Regions	5. 12. 1988 to 6. 8. 1990
9.	Mr. Muhammad Farooq Azam Malik 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Railways	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990
10.	Malik Mushtaq Ahmad 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Works Division	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990
11.	Haji Amanullah 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Religious Affairs	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990
12.	Dr. Mehboob-ur-Rehman Yousuf Zaj 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Food, Agriculture & Cooperatives	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990
13.	Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi 23. 3. 1989 to 12. 6. 1990	Parliamentary Affairs	23. 3. 1989 to 12. 6. 1990
14.	Dr. Mrs. Mehmooda Shah 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Special Education & Social Welfare	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990
15.	Begum Nadir Khan Khakwani 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Population Welfare Division	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990

16.	Mian Muzaffar Shah 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Narcotics Control Division	23. 3. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
17.	Lt. Col. (Retd.) Ch. Qadir Bakhsh Mela 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Sports	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
18.	Alhaj Syed Qasim Shah 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Environment and Urban Affairs Division Tourism Division	23. 3. 1989 to 28. 1. 1990 28. 1. 1990 to 6. 8. 1990	
19.	Syed Parvez Ali Shah Jillani 23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Youth Incharge youth Affairs	23. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990 30. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
20.	Mrs. Shahnaz Wazir Ali 31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Education	31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
21.	Mr. Ahmad Saeed Awan 31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Industries Information & Broadcasting	31. 3. 1989 to 20. 9. 1989 20. 9. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
22.	Mir Tariq Hussain Magsi 31. 3. 1989 to 25. 10. 1989	Labour Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis	31. 3. 1989 to 25. 10. 1989	
23.	Mr. Shah Nawaz Junejo 31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Local Govt & Rural Development	31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
24.	Father Rufin Julius 31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Minorities Affairs	31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
25.	Syed Zafar Ali Shah 31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Water and Power	31. 3. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
26.	Makhdum Syed Ahmed Alam Anwar 11. 11. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis	11.11. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	
27.	Mr. Ghulam Akbar Lasi 11. 11. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	Labour	11. 11. 1989 to 6. 8. 1990	

FEDERAL CARE-TAKER CABINET
FROM 6. 8. 90 TO 6. 11. 90

S.No.	Portfolio	Period	Remarks
Prime Minister Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi 6. 8. 1990 to 6. 11. 1990			
1. Mr. Illahi Bakhsh Soomro 6. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Commerce	7. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
2. Mr. Sartaj Aziz 6. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning & Development	7. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
3. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar 6. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Water and Power	7. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
4. Mr. Rafi Raza 6. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Production	7. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
5. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 7. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Foreign Affairs	7. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
6. Chaudhry Shujat Hussain 7. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Industries	7. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
7. Malik Muhammad Naeem Khan 11. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Communications	13. 8. 90. to 6. 11. 90	
8. Lt. Gen. (Retd) Abdul Majid Malik 11. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Petroleum and NR States and FR & Kashmir Affairs.	13. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90 7. 10. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
9. Mian Zahid Sarfraz 11. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Interior and Narcotics Control	7. 10. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
10. Mir. Hazar Khan Bijarani 11. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Science and Technology Religious Affairs & MA.	13. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90 7. 10. 90 to 6. 11. 90 (Add. Charge)	
11. Syeda Abida Hussain 11. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Information and Broadcasting	13. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
12. Mr. Roedad Khan 11. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Minister without portfolio	13. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	

13.	Pir Aftab Hussain Shah 27.8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives	28. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
14.	Dr. Noor Jahan Panezai 27. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Health, Special Education & SW Women Development	28. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90 7. 10. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
15.	Kazi Abdul Majid Abid 27. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Education	28. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
16.	Mir Mohammad Naseer Mengal 27. 8. 90. to 6. 11. 90	Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis	28. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
17.	Makhdoom Shafiquz Zaman 27. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Culture and Tourism	28. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
18.	Chaudhry Amir Hussain 27. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Law, Justice and PA	28. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	
19.	Mr. Islam Nabi 27. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	Housing and Works	28. 8. 90 to 6. 11. 90	

9TH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FROM 1990 TO 1993 LIST OF MEMBERS & ADDRESSES

N.W.F.P-26

S. No	Constituency	Name	Permanent Address	Remarks
1.	NA-1 Peshawar-I	Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Bilour	Bilour House, Jheel Road, Peshawar Cantt	
2.	NA-2 Peshawar-II	Vacant		
3.	NA-3 Peshawar cum Nowshera	Arbab Muhammad Zahir	65, Sir Syed Road, Peshawar	
4.	NA-4 Nowshera	Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Khan Khattak	P.O. Akora Khattak, Distt. Peshawar	
5.	NA-5 Charsadda	Maulana Muhammad Hassan Jan	Madni Manzil, Madni Mohallah Near Sugar Mill, Charsadda	
6.	NA-6 Mardan-I	Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan Hoti	Near Khyber Tobacco Company, Mardan	
7.	NA-7 Mardan-II	Haji Sarfaraz Khan Hatihan	Vill. Hatihan Distt. Mardan	
8.	NA-8 Swabi	Mr. Rehmanullah Khan	Vill. Naway-Kilay, Tehsil & Distt. Swabi	
9.	NA-9 Kohat	Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani	H.No.2, St. No.32, F-8/1, Islamabad	
10.	NA-10 Karak	Mr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak	3 Park-Lane University Town, Peshawar	
11.	NA-11 Abbottabad-I	Sardar Mahtab Ahmed Khan	485, Mansehra Road, Abbottabad	
12.	NA-12 Abbottabad-II	Mr. Javed Iqbal Abbasi	H.No.70, Mansehra Road Near Supply Bazar, Abbottabad	
13.	NA-13 Abbottabad-III	Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan	5-Liaqat Road, Abbottabad	Speaker National Assembly of Pakistan
14.	NA-14 Mansehra-I	Sardar Muhammad Yousuf	Lubar Kot Road, near Degree College, Mansehra	

15.	NA-15 Mansehra-II	Nawabzada Salahuddin Saeed	Vill. Shergarh, Distt. Mansehra	
16.	NA-16 Mansehra-III	Mr. Alamzeb Khan	Vill. & P.O. Thakot Tehsil Batgram, Distt. Mansehra	
17.	NA-17 Kohistan	Maulvi Muhammad Amin	Vill. & P.O. Komila, Tehsil Dasu, Distt Kohistan	
18.	NA-18 D.I.Khan	Mr. Fazal Karim Kundi	Kundi Model Farm, Chashma Road, D.I.Khan	
19.	NA-19 Bannu-I	Maulvi Ali Akbar	Jamia Anwar-ul-Uloom, Chak Dadan, P.O. Mira Khel, Distt. Bannu	
20.	NA-20 Bannu-II	Mr. Naseer Muhammad Maidad Khel	Vill. Nar Sahib Dad, P.O. Serai Naurang, Distt. Lakki Marwat	
21.	NA-21 Swat-I	Mr. Khaliq Dad Khan	Office Jamt Islami, Main Bazar, Mingora, Distt. Swat	
22.	NA-22 Swat- II	Mr. Abdul Matin Khan	Vill & P.O. Bajkatta, Tehsil Daggar. Distt. Bunair	
23.	NA-23 Swat- III	Mr. Muhammad Afzal Khan	Vill. & P.O Drush Khela, Distt. Swat	
24.	NA-24 Chitral	Shahzada Mohiuddin	Chairman, Distt. Council, Chitral	
25.	NA-25 Dir	Mr. Najmud Din	Lowri House, Dir	
26.	NA-26 Malakand Protected Area-cum-Dir	Mr. Ahmed Hassan	Vill & P.O. Ziarat Distt. Dir	

27.	NA-27 Tribal Area-I	Haji Baroz Khan	DA Mohand Maina, Zaryab Colony, Peshawar	
28.	NA-28 Tribal Area-II	Syed Yousuf Hussain	Yousaf House, Para Channar	
29.	NA-29 Tribal Area-III	Malik Speen Gul	Main Bazar, Tehsil Hangu, District Kohat	
30.	NA-30 Tribal Area-IV	Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Khan	Jahangir House, Miran Shah, North Waziristan	
31.	NA-31 Tribal Area-V	Haji Sakhi Jan	Vill. Dosti Amala Tehsil Tank, District D.I.Khan	

32.	NA-32 Tribal Area-VI	Haji Lal Karim	Vill & P.O. Nawagai, Bajaur Agency	
33.	NA-33 Tribal Area-VII	Haji Muhammad Ayyub Afridi	Vill. Paind Khel P.O. landi Kotel Khyber Agency	

THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA

(FATA-8)

34.	NA-34 Tribal Area-VIII	Malik Muhammad Aslam Khan Afridi	Shakeel Market, Darra Adam Khail, N.W.F.P	

FEDERAL CAPITAL-01

35.	NA-35 Federal Capital	Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Khokhar	10-Nazimuddin Road F-8/1, Islamabad	Deputy Speaker National Assembly of Pakistan

THE PUNJAB

36.	NA-36 Rawalpindi-I	Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi	H.No.4, Street No.17, F-7/2, Islamabad	
37.	NA-37 Rawalpindi-II	Raja Muhammad Zaheer Khan	Dhoke Raja Karm, Khan Chohan, Gujar Khan, Distt. Rawalpindi	
38.	NA-38 Rawalpindi-III	Shaikh Rashid Ahmed	Lal Haveli, Bohar Bazar, Rawalpindi	
39.	NA-39 Rawalpindi-IV	Mr. Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq	203/70, Westridge-I, Rawalpindi	
40.	NA-40 Rawalpindi-V	Ch. Nisar Ali Khan	100, Faizabad Murree Road. Behind P.S.O. Petrol Pump. Rawalpindi	
41.	NA-41 Attock-I	Shaikh Aftab Ahmad	Near Cantt Board Office Attock	
42.	NA-42 Attock-II	Malik Allaha yar Khan	Vill & P.O. Khunda. Distt. Attock	
43.	NA-43 Chakwal-I	Lt. Gen (R) Malik Abdul Majeed	30-A, St. No. 10, F-8/3, Islamabad	
44.	NA-44 Chakwal-II	Sardar Mansoor Hayat Tamman	Vill. & P.O. Tamman, Tehsil. Talagang, Distt. Chakwal	
45.	NA-45 Jhelum-I	Vacant		

46.	NA-46 Jhelum-II	Nawabzada Iqbal Mehdi	7, Civil Lines, Jhelum	
47.	NA-47 Sargodha-I	Mr. Ihsan-ul-Haq Piracha	H.No.276, E/7, Islamabad	
48.	NA-48 Sargodha-II	Ch. Qadir Bakhsh Mela	Vill & P.O. Mela, Via Kot Moman, Distt. Sargodha	

49.	NA-49 Sargodha-III	Haji Muhammad Javed Iqbal Cheema	Chak No.47-N.B, Sargodha	
50.	NA-50 Sargodha-IV	Ch. Anwar Ali Cheema	51, Civil Lines, Sargodha	
51.	NA-51 Sargodhacum- Khushab	Malik Muhammad Naeem Khan	H.No. 79-A, Satellite Town, Sargodha	
52.	NA-52 Khushab	Malik Ghulam Muhammad Khan Tiwana	Vill. Hamoka Distt. Khushab	
53.	NA-53 Mianwali-I	Maulana Muhammad Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi	22, Onkar Road, Islampura, Lahore	
54.	NA-54 Mianwali-II	Mr. Gul Hameed Khan Rokhri	24, Race Course Road. Lahore	
55.	NA-55 Bhakkar-I	Mr. Aziz Ahmad Khan	Vill & P.O. Hassanwala Tehsil Kallurkot Distt. Bhakkar	
56.	NA-56 Bhakkar-II	Mr. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan Dhandla	Dhandla House, Bhakkar	
57.	NA-57 Faisalabad-I	Sardar Dildar Ahmed Cheema	Jaungle Singh Wala. Peoples Colony, Faisalabad	
58.	NA-58 Faisalabad-II	Rai Muhammad Aslam Khan	Kharal House, Lahore road, jaranwala	
59.	NA-59 Faisalabad-III	Mian Nasir Ali Khan Baluch	Vill Kanjwani Tehsil Summandri, Distt. Faisalabad	
60.	NA-60 Faisalabad-IV	Mr. Muhammad Abdullah Ghazi	H.No.25/7, Green View Colony Raja Wala, Faisalabad	
61.	NA-61 Faisalabad-V	Ch. Muhammad Nazir Ahmed	20-Y-103, Madina Town, Faisalabad	

62.	NA-62 Faisalabad-VI	Raja Nadir Pervez	Chak No.279/R.B.Faisalabad	
63.	NA-63 FaisalabadVII	Haji Muhammad Akram Ansari	H.No.1077/D, Chowk, Bilal Muhammad Ghulam Faisalabad Abad,	
64.	NA-64 FaisalabadVIII	Mian Zahid Sarfraz	6/1, Guru Nanak Pura, Faisalabad	
65.	NA-65 Faisalabad-IX	Ch. Sher Ali	Khalid Abad St.No.5. Kashmir House, Faisalabad	

66.	NA-66 Jhang- I	Mr. Amir Hussain Syed	Thatti Sharqi, Chiniot	
67.	NA-67Jhang- II	Maulana Muhammad Rehmatullah	Jamia Muhammadia Sharif Jhang	
68.	NA-68 Jhang- III	Maulana Muhammad Azam Tariq	Masjid Haq Nawaz Shaheed, Jhang Saddar	
69.	NA-69 Jhang- IV	Makhdoom Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat	47, Main Gulberg, Lahore	
70.	NA-70 Jhang- V	Sahibzada Muhammad Nazeer Sultan	17, Zafar Road, Lahore Cantt	
71.	NA-71 T.T.Singh-I	Ch. Asad-ur- Rehman	Kamalia, Distt. T.T.Singh	
72.	NA-72 T.T.Singh-II	Mian Abdul Waheed	2, Kashmir Road, Lahore	
73.	NA-73 T.T.Singh-III	Mr. Hamza	Eid Gah Road, Gojra, Distt. T.T.Singh	
74.	NA-74 Gujranwala-I	Malik Hamid Nasir Chattha	Ahmed Nagar, Gujranwala	
75.	NA-75 Gujranwala-II	Mr. Afzal Hussain Tarar	Vill & P.O. Kolo Tarar, Tehsil Hafizabad, Distt. Gujranwala	
76.	NA-76 Gujranwala- III	Mr. Ghulam Dastgir Khan	H.No.7/A, Satellite Town, Gujranwala	
77.	NA-77 GujranwalaIV	Brig (Retd) Muhammad Asghar	H.No.165-D, Satellite Town, Gujranwala	

78.	NA-78 Gujranwala-V	Rana Nazir Ahmed Khan	G.T. Road Kamoke, District Gujranwala	
79.	NA-79 GujranwalaVI	Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Warriach	Qilla Dedar Singh, Near Ghalla Mandi, Distt. Gujranwala	
80.	NA-80 Gujrat-I	Ch. Tajjammal Hussain	Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi House, Gujrat	
81.	NA-81 Gujrat-II	Ch. Shujat Hussain	Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi House, Gujrat	
82.	NA-82 Gujrat-III	Syed Manzoor Hussain Shah	The Dar Goods G.T. Road, Lalamusa	
83.	NA-83 Gujrat-IV	Ch. Nasir Iqbal Chalianwala	H.No.34, Margalla Road, F-8/3, Islamabad	
84.	NA-84 Gujrat-V	Ch. Muhammad Nawaz Bosal	Tibba Mank Khan Bosal, Tehsil Phalia, Distt. Gujrat	
85.	NA-85 Sialkot-I	Mian Muhammad Shafi	Hamza House, Pesrur Road, Sialkot	

86.	NA-86 Sialkot-II	Ch. Amir Hussain	Mohall Preim Nagar, Katchery Road, Sialkot	
87.	NA-87 Sialkot-III	Ch. Nazeer Ahmed Khan	Vill & P.O Bhopalwala, Distt. Sialkot	
88.	NA-88 Sialkot-IV	Ch. Abdul Sattar	Chairman Zila Council, Sialkot	
89.	NA-89 Sialkot-V	Ch. Muhammad Sarwar Khan	Rupo Chak House. Zafarwal Distt. Sialkot	
90.	NA-90 Sialkot-VI	Syed Ghous Ali Shah	34/1, Khayaban-eMujahid 16 th Street, Defence Housing Authority, Karachi	
91.	NA-91 Sialkot-VII	Mr. Muhammad Ishfaq Taj	Taj House Tehsil Shakargarh	
92.	NA-92 Lahore-I	Mr. Humayun Akhtar Khan	H.No.73-N, Phase-I, Defence Society Lahore Cantt	
93.	NA-93 Lahore-II	Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan	5, Canal Bank, Zaman Park, Lahore	
94.	NA-94 Lahore-III	Mian Umar Hayat	Al-Akbar, Purani Ghass Mandi, Baghbanpura, Lahore	
95.	NA-95 Lahore-IV	Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	Prime Minister 's House, Islamabad	Prime Minister Of Pakistan

96.	NA-96 Lahore-V	Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif	90-Railway Road, Lahore	
97.	NA-97 Lahore-VI	Mr. Liaqat Baluch	Clifton Colony Shuja Road. Lahore	
98.	NA-98 Lahore-VII	Mian Muhammad Usman	95-Ferozpur Road, Lahore	
99.	NA-99 Lahore-VIII	Mr. Wazir Ali Bhatti	Sodiwal Colony, Opposite Block No. 17, Multan Road, Lahore	
100.	NA-100 Lahore-IX	Ch. Muhammad Ashiq Dayal	39, FCC, Gulberg, Lahore	
101.	NA-101 Sheikhupura-I	Rana Tanveer Hussain	313, Upper The Mall, Lahore	
102.	NA-102 Sheikhupura-II	Ch. Nazir Aahmed Virk	Ghung Road, Sheikhupura	
103.	NA-103 Sheikhupura-III	Ch. Muhammad Barjees Tahir	Jamia Masjid Road, Sangla Hill, Distt. Sheikhupura	
104.	NA-104 SheikhupuraIV	Mr. Naeem Hussain Chattha	101, Civil Lines, Sheikhupura	

105.	NA-105 SheikhupuraV	Rai Mansab Ali Khan	Ward No.1, Nankana Sahib, Distt. Sheikhupura	
106.	NA-106 Kasur-I	Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali	13-A/1, Township, Lahore	
107.	NA-107 Kasur-II	Rao Muhammad Khizar Hayat	Rao Khan Wala, Distt. Kasur	
108.	NA-108 Kasur-III	Rana Muhammad Hayat Khan	Lambay Jageer, Tehsil Chunian, Distt. Kasur	
109.	NA-109 Kasur-IV	Maulana Moeenuddin Lakhvi	Jamia Muhammadia, Okara	
110.	NA-110 Okara-I	Mian Muhammad Zaman	1, Tehseel Road, Okara	
111.	NA-111 Okara-II	Syed Sajjad Haider	P.O. Renala Khurd, Distt. Okara	
112.	NA-112 Okara-III	Rao Qaisar Ali Khan	Khurshid Manzil, Godown Street, Okara	

113.	NA-113 Okara-IV	Mian Muhammad Yasin Khan Wattoo	3, Farid Kot Road, Lahore	
114.	NA-114 Multan-I	Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani	Gillani House, Gous-ul- Azam Road, Multan	
115.	NA-115 Multan-II	Syed Hamid Saeed Kazmi	Shadab Colony, Police Lines Road, Multan	
116.	NA-116 Multan-III	Mr. Tanwir-ul- Hassan Gillani	Al-Imran, Near Chungi No.1, Multan City	
117.	NA-117 Multan-IV	Mr. Hayatullah Khan Tareen	Outside Khuni Burj, Multan	
118.	NA-118 Multan-V	Mr. Muhammad Siddiq Khan Kanju	Alipur Kanju, Tehsil Lodhran, Multan	
119.	NA-119 Multan-VI	Syed Javed Ali Shah	Outside Rashid Shah Gate, Tehsil, Shujabad, Multan	
120.	NA-120 Multan-cum- Khanewal	Makhdoom Muhammad Javed Hashmi	Makhdoom Rashid, Multan	
121.	NA-121 Khanewal-I	Syed Fakhar Imam	H.No.31, St.8, F-7/3, Islamabad	
122.	NA-122 Khanewal-II	Mr. Aftab Ahmad Khan Daha	H.No.3, Civil Lines, Khanewal	
123.	NA-123 Khanewal-III	Pir Shujaat Hasnain Qureshi	226, Sikandar Road, Upper Mall, Lahore	
124.	NA-124 Sahiwal-I	Mian Anwar-ul- Haq Ramy	H.No.280-U, Farid Town, Sahiwal	

125.	NA-125 Sahiwal-II	Mehr Ghulam Farid Kathia	29, Jamia Farridia Road, Sahiwal	
126.	NA-126 Sahiwal-III	Rai Ahmed Nawaz	1, Railway Road, Chichawatni Distt. Sahiwal	
127.	NA-127 Sahiwal-IV	Raja Shahid Saeed Khan	51-N, Model Town Extension, Lahore	
128.	NA-128 Pakpattan	Mr. Mahmud Ahmad Khan	Kothi Hazrat Mian Sahib, Pakpattan Sharif	
129.	NA-129 Vehari-I	Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Khan alias Dilawar Khan Khichi	Vill. Fadda, Tehsil Maisli, distt. Vehari	
130.	NA-130 Vehari-II	Mr. Akbar Ali Bhatti	20-Masson Road, Lahore-3	

131.	NA-131 Vehari-III	Syed Shahid Mehdi Naseem	H.No.16/17, I Block, Civil Lines Burewala, Distt. Vehari	
132.	NA-132 D.G.Khan	Sardar Muhammad Amjed Farooq Khosa	Bahadur Garh House, D.G.Khan	
133.	NA-133 D.G.Khancum- Rajanpur	Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari	Vill. Choti Distt. D.G.Khan	
134.	Rajanpur	Mir Balakh Sher Mazari	House No.100-C/2, Gulberg-3, Lahore	
135.	NA-135 Muzaffargarh -I	Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan Jatoi	Jatoi House Tehsil Jatoi Distt. Muzaffargarh	
136.	NA-136 Muzaffargarh -II	Mian Atta Muhammad Qureshi	Tanveer Petroleum Service, Vehari Road, Mumtazabad, Multan	
137.	NA-137 Muzaffargarh -III	Malik Ghulam Muhammad Noor Rabani Khar	18-B, Khar House Nisar Road, Lahore Cantt	
138.	NA-138 Muzaffargarh -IV	Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar	Khar House, New Campus, Lahore	
139.	NA-139 Layyah-I	Syed Muhammad Khurshid Ahmed Bukhari	Darbar Pir Jaggi, Tehsil & Distt. Layyah	
140.	NA-140 Layyah-II	Sahibzada Faizul- Hassan	Chak No.102, Darbar Swag Sharif, Tehsil Karor, Distt. Layyah	
141.	NA-141 Bahawalpur-I	Nawab Salahuddin Abbasi	Sadiq Garh Palace, Dera Nawab Sahib, Bahawalpur	
142.	NA-142 Bahawalpur- II	Sahibzada Farooq Anwar Abbasi	19-D, Abbasi Road, Model Town-A, Bahawalpur	
143.	NA-143 Bahawalpur- III	Syed Tasneem Nawaz Gardezi	Gardezi House, Model Town-A, Bahawalpur	
144.	NA-144 Bahawalnaga r-I	Syed Muhammad Asghar Shah	Al-Rafiq, Baldia Road, Bahawalnagar	

145.	NA-145 Bahawalnagar-II	Mian Abdul Sattar Lalika	Lalika House, Haroonabad, Distt. Bahawalnagar	
146.	NA-146 Bahawalnagar-III	Ch. Ghaffar	2-D, Model Town, Lahore	
147.	NA-147 Rahimyar Khan-I	Makhdum Syed Ahmed Anwar	17-B, Model Town A, Bahawalpur	
148.	NA-148 Rahimyar Khan-II	Makhdum Shahab-ud-Din	P.O. Mianwali Qureshian Distt. Rahimyar Khan	
149.	NA-149 Rahimyar Khan-III	Mian Abdul Khaliq	Hassan Colony, Rahimyar Khan	
150.	NA-150 Rahimyar Khan-IV	Makhdum Syed Ahmed Mahmud	Makhdum House, 81-E-1, Gulberg-III, Lahore	

151.	NA-151 Sukkur-I	Mr. Khurshed Ahmed Shah	Manzil Gah Road, Sukkur	
152.	NA-152 Sukkur-II	Jam Saifullah Khan Dharejo	P.O. Adil Pur, Ghotki, Distt. Sukkur	
153.	NA-153 Sukkur-III	Al-Han Noor Muhammad Khan Lund	Vill. Noorabad, Taluka Mirpur Mathelo, Distt. Sukkur	
154.	NA-154 Shikarpur-I	Mr. Aftab Shahban Mirani	23/11 Khayban-e-Ghazi Defence Housing Authority Phase-V, Karachi	
155.	NA-155 Shikarpur-II	Mir Altaf Khan Bhayo	Bhayo House, Shikarpur	
156.	NA-156 Jacobabad-I	Mr. Illahi Bukhsh Soomro	232, Somerset Street, Karachi	

SINDH PROVINCE-46

157.	NA-157 Jacobabad-II	Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani	12-B, 10 th South Street East, Defence Housing Society Karachi	
158.	NA-158 Naushehro Feroze-I	Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi	18, Khayaban-e-Shamsheer, Defence Housing Society Karachi	

159.	NA-159 Naushehro-II	Syed Zafar Ali Shah	P.O Darbelo, Distt. Naushehro Feroze, Sind	
160.	NA-160 Nawabshah-I	Mr. Ghulama Murtaza Khan Jatoi	8-A, Phase-I, 2 nd West Street Defence Housing Society, Karachi	
161.	NA-161 Nawabshah-II	Syed shabir Ahmed Shah	B-27, K.D.A, Scheme No.1 Miran Muhammad Shah Road, Karachi	
162.	NA-162 Khairpur-I	Syed Pervez Ali Shah Jillani	Jillani House, Khairpur Mirs	
163.	NA-163 Khairpur-II	Pir Syed Abdul Qadir Shah Jillani	Vill. Ranipur, Distt. Khairpur	
164.	NA-164 Larkana-I	Begum Nusrat Bhutto	70, Clifton Karachi	
165.	NA-165 Larkana-II	Mr. Shabir Ahmed Khan Chandio	B-14, Housing Society, Larkana	
166.	NA-166 Larkana-III	Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto	Bilawal House, Karachi	Leader of the Opposition
167.	NA-167 Hyderabad-I	Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Faheem	11-A, 2 nd Sunset Street, Phase-II, Defence Housing Society, Karachi	
168.	NA-168 Hyderabad-II	Vacant		
169.	NA-169 Hyderabad-III	Vacant		
170.	NA-170 Hyderabad-IV	Syed Naveed Qamar	233-C, Unit No.2, Latifabad, Hyderabad	
171.	NA-171 HyderabadV	Mr. Abdul Sattar Bachani	Sattar Petroleum Service, Tando Allahyar, Distt. Hyderabad	
172.	NA-172 Badin-I	Haji Abdullah Halepoto	31, unit No. III, Latif Abad, Hyderabad	
173.	NA-173 Badin-II	Mr. Bashir Ahmed Halepoto	P.O Matli, Tehsil Matli, District Badin	
174.	NA-174 Tharparkar-I	Vacant		

175.	NA-175 Tharparkar-II	Vacant		
176.	NA-176 Tharparkar-III	Arbab Ghulam Rahim	P.O Kalo, Via Naokote, Distt. Tharparkar	
177.	NA-177 Dadu-I	Malik Asad Sikandar	Malik House, Kotri	
178.	NA-178 Dadu-II	Haji Muhammad Bux Jamali	Jamali Street, Dadu	
179.	NA-179 Dadu-III	Mr. Rafiq Ahmed Mahesar	P.O Mehar, Distt. Dadu	
180.	NA-180 Sanghar-I	Syed Ali Gohar Shah	A-1, Scheme No.1, Amir Khusro Road, Karachi-8	
181.	NA-181 Sanghar-II	Jam Mashooq Ali	P.O. Jam Nawaz Ali, Tando Adam, Distt. Sanghar	
182.	NA-182 Thatta-I	Baboo Ghulam Hussain	Soni Mundhi, Mohallah Shahi Bazar, Thatta	
183.	NA-183 Thatta-II	Arbab Wazir Ahmed Memon	P.O. Darro, Distt. Thatta	
184.	NA-184 Karachi (West)-I	Vacant		
185.	NA-185 Karachi (West)-II	Vacant		
186.	NA-186 Karachi Central-I	Vacant		
187.	NA-187 Karachi Central-II	Vacant		
188.	NA-188 Karachi Central-III	Vacant		
189.	NA-189 Karachi South-I	Mr. Asif Ali Zardari	Bilawal House, Karachi	
190.	NA-190 Karachi South-II	Vacant		

191.	NA-191 Karachi South-III	Vacant		
192.	NA-192 Karachi East-I	Vacant		
193.	NA-193 Karachi East-II	Mr. Islam Nabi	2-B, 5 th Central Lane, Defence Phase-II, Karachi	
194.	NA-194 Karachi East-III	Vacant		
195.	NA-195 Karachi East- IV	Mr. Rehan Umer Farooqui	98-Quaidabad, Landhi	
196.	NA-196 Karachi East-V	Mr. Wasim Ahmed	H.No. F.24/1, (North), Malir Extension, Karachi-37	

BALUCHISTAN-11

197.	NA-197 Quettacum- Chagai	Sardar Fateh Muhammad M. Hassani	209, 3-B, Satelli Town, Quetta	
198.	NA-198 Pishin	Mr. Mehmood Khan Achakzai	Central Secretari PMAP, Jinnah Roa Quetta	
199.	NA-199 Loralai	Sardar Yaqu Khan Nasar	Bungalow No.2, Khojak road, Quetta	
200.	NA-200 Zhob-cum- Killa Saifullah	Maulvi Muhammad Khan Sherani	Sherani Mohalla, Zhob	
201.	NA-201 Kachhi	Mir Ya Muhammad Rind	P.O. Shoran Dis Kachhi, Baluchistan	
202.	NA-202 Sibbi-cumKohlu- cumDera Bugticum- Ziarat	Mr. Saleem Akbar Bughti	Bugti House, Quetta	
203.	NA-203 JaffarabadcumTamboo	Mir Nabi Bakhsh Khan Khoso	Khoso House Tog Road, Quetta	
204.	NA-204 Kalat-cum- Kharan	Maulvi Muhammad Siddique Shah	Muslim Mohalla, Kalat	

205.	NA-205 Khuzdar	Mir Hasil Bizenjo	Vill. Bezinpur Nall Distt. Khuzdar	
206.	NA-206 LasbelacumGwadar	Shahzada Muhammad Yousuf	Lasbela House, Defence Housing Society PhaseV, Karachi	
207.	NA-207 Turbatcum- Panjgur	Mir Bizan Bizenjo	C-28, Darkshan Villas, Defence Housing Society Phase-V Karachi	

LIST OF NON-MUSLIM MEMBERS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
TOTAL-10

Sr. No	Name	Community	Address	Remarks
208	Vacant			
209	Mr. Peter John Sahotra	Christian	P-530, Christian Town Main Bazar, Faisalabad	
210	Mr. Tariq C. Qaiser	Christian	Qasir-e-Qaiser, Nasir Road, Modern Colony Kot Kakh Pat, Lahore	
211	Father Rufin Julius	Christian	48-A, Jail Town, G.T.Road, Gujranwala	
212	Dr. Khatumal Jeewan	Hindu/Sche duled Castes	Post Box No.16500 Lyari Post Code-75660, Karachi	
213	Rana Chandar Singh	Hindu/Sche duled Castes	21-C, Block.6, PECHS, Karachi	
214	Kishin Chand Parwani	Hindu/Sche duled Castes	P.O. Box 49, Mirpur Khas, Sindh	
215	Mr. Bhagwandas K. Chawala	Hindh/Sche duled Castes	Namco Centre, Mezanine Floor, Cample Street, New Challi, Karachi	
216	Mr. Byram D. Awari	Parsi/Sikh/ Budhists and others	Beach Luxury Hotel, M.T.Khan Road, Lalazar, Karachi-2	
217	Mr. Bashiruddin Khalid	Ahmadi	Siyam Street, Maqbool Road, Ichhra, Lahore	

Ist term
Federal Cabinet under the Premiership of Mr.
Mohammad Nawaz Sharif from 6. 11. 1990 to 18. 7. 1993.

S.No.	Portfolio	Period	Remarks
The Prime Minister			
Mr. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, 6. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93			
1. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 9. 11. 90 to 20. 3. 91	Foreign Affairs	9. 11. 90 to 20. 3. 91	
2. Mr. Sartaj Aziz 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Finance & Economic Affairs	9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
3. Chaudhry Shujat Hussain 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Interior Industries	9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
4. Malik Muhammad Naeem Khan 10. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Commerce	10. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
5. Lt. Gen (Retd) Abdul Majid Malik 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Food, Agri. & Cooperatives	9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
6. Mir. Hazar Khan Bijarani 9. 11. 90 to 10. 4. 93	Railways Defence Production Division	9. 11. 90 to 10. 9. 91 10. 9. 91. to 10. 4. 93	
7. Mr. Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Labour, Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis.	9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
8. Maulana Muhammad Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi 9. 11. 90 to 4. 3. 91 (Resigned) 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93 (Re-appointed)	Local Govt. & Rural Dev. Spl. Education & SW(Addl. Charge) Religious Affairs	9. 11. 90 to 4. 3. 91 9. 11. 90 to 4. 3. 91 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
9. Choudhri Hamid Nasir Chattha 9. 11. 90 to 27. 3. 93	Planning and Development Science and Technology (Addl. Charge)	9. 11. 90 to 27. 3. 93 9. 11. 90 to 10. 9. 91	
10. Syed Fakhar Imam 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Education Law Justice & PA (Addl. Charg)	9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 9. 11. 90 to 9. 3. 91	

11.	Syed Tasneem Nawaz Gardezi 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Health	9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
12.	Mr. Ghulam Murtaza Khan Jatoi 9. 11. 90 to 11. 3. 92	Communications	9. 11. 90 to 11. 3. 92	

13.	Syed Ali Gohar Shah 9. 11. 90 to 2. 8. 91	Youth Affairs	9. 11. 90 to 2. 8. 91.	
14.	Syed Tariq Mahmood 9. 11. 90 to 27. 6. 1992	Housing and Works	9. 11. 90 to 27. 6. 1992	
15.	Mr. Islam Nabi 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Production	9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
16.	Sardar Yaqub Khan Nasser 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Environment & Urban Affairs States & Frontier (Addl. Charge)	9. 11. 90 to 10. 9. 91 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
17.	Rana Chandar Singh 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 90	Narcotics Control	9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
18.	Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	Petroleum & Natural Resources	9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93	
19.	Sardar Mehtab Ahmed Khan 17. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 1993	Kashmir Affairs & Northern Affairs Religious Affairs and Minorities Affairs (Addl. Charge)	17. 11 90 to 18. 7. 93 28. 3. 91 to 10. 9. 91	
20.	Syed Ghous Ali Shah 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Defence	10. 9. 91 to 17. 7. 1993	
21.	Mr. Anwar Saifullah Khan 10. 9. 91 to 27. 3. 93	Environment and Urban Affairs	10. 9. 91. to 27. 3. 93	
22.	Shaikh Rashid Ahmad 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Industries and Addl. Charge of Culture	10. 9. 91. to 18. 7. 93	
23.	Mian Abdul Sattar Lalika 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Information and Broadcasting	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
24.	Mr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Inter Provincial Coordination	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	

25.	Ch. Abdul Ghafoor 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Law and Justice	10. 9. 91. to 18. 7. 93	
26.	Ch. Amir Hussain 10. 9. 91. to 18. 7. 93	Parliamentary Affairs Youth Affairs (Addl. Charge)	10. 9. 91. to 18. 7. 93	
27.	Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Bilor 10. 9. 91. to 18. 7. 93	Railways	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	

28.	Mr. Illahi Bukhsh Soomro 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Science and Technology Defence Production	10. 9. 91. to 9. 6. 93 9. 6. 93 to 18. 7. 93	
29.	Shahzada Muhammad Yousaf 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Water and Power	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	

MINISTERS OF STATE

1.	Chaudhry Amir Hussain 9. 3. 91 to 10. 9. 91	Law, Justice & PA	9. 3. 91. to 10. 9. 91	
2.	Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Khan 9. 3. 91. to 18. 7. 93	Sports	9. 3. 91. to 18. 7. 93	
3.	Raja Shahid Saeed Khan 10. 9. 91. to 18. 7. 93	Commerce	10. 9. 91. to 18. 7. 93	
4.	Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Communications	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
5.	Rana Nazir Ahmed Khan 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Cooperative and Forestry Population Welfare (Addl. Charge)	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93 12. 1. 92 to 18. 7. 93	
6.	Mr. Muhammad Siddique Khan Kanjoo 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Foreign Affairs	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
7.	Rai Ahmad Nawaz 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Management Services	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
8.	Mian Muhammad Zaman 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis Science and Technology	10. 9. 91 to 9. 6. 91 9. 6. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
9.	Mr. Peter John Sahorta 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Minorities Affairs	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
10.	Syed Shahid Mehdi Nasim 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Natural Resources	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	

11.	Mr. Naeem Hussain Chatta 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Parliamentary Affairs Women Development	10. 9. 91. to 27. 2. 92 27. 2. 92 to 18. 7. 93	
12.	Mr. Muhammad Abdullah Ghazi 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Political Affairs	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
13.	Jam Mashooq Ali 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Production	10. 9. 91. to 18. 7. 93	

14.	Makhdum Muhammad Javed Hashmi 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Special Education & Social Welfare Housing & Works(Addl. Portfolio Environment & Urban Affairs (Add. Portfolio)	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93 28. 7. 92 to 18. 7. 93 5. 7. 93 to 18. 7. 93	
15.	Mr. Shahzada Mohyuddin 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Tourism	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
16.	Raja Nadir Pervaiz Khan 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Water & Power	10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	
17.	Haji Gulsher Khan 10. 9. 91 to 31. 5. 93	Zakat	10. 9. 91. to 31. 5. 93	
18.	Ch. Asad-ur Rehman 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93	Without Portfolio Parliamentary Affairs	10. 9. 91 to 27. 2. 92 27. 2. 92 to 18. 7. 93	

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ISLAMABAD, SUNDAY, JULY 28, 1991

PART I

Acts, Ordinances, President's Orders and Regulations

SENATE SECRETARIAT

Islamabad, the 28th July, 1991.

The following Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) received the assent of the President on the 27th July, 1991, and is hereby published for general information:—

ACT NO. XIV OF 1991

An Act further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

WHEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the purposes hereinafter appearing;

It is hereby enacted as follows:—

1. **Short title, commencement and duration.**—(1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1991.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

(3) The provisions of this Act, other than those of section 3, shall remain in force for a period of three years and, on the expiration of the said period, Article 212B inserted by it shall cease to form part of the Constitution and shall stand repealed.

(351)

2. **Addition of new Article 212B in the Constitution.**—In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Part VII, in Chapter 4, after Article 212, the following new Article shall be added, namely:—

'212B. Establishment of Special Courts for trial of heinous offences.—(1)

In order to ensure speedy trial of cases of persons accused of such of the heinous offences specified by law as are referred to them by the Federal Government, or an authority or person authorised by it, in view of their being gruesome, brutal and sensational in character or shocking to public morality, the Federal Government may by law constitute as many Special Courts as it may consider necessary.

(2) Where the Federal Government constitutes more than one Special Court, it shall determine the territorial limits within which each one of them shall exercise jurisdiction.

(3) A Special Court shall consist of a Judge, being a person who is, or has been, or is qualified for appointment as, a Judge of a High Court and is appointed by the Federal Government after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court.

(4) A person other than a Judge of a High Court who is appointed as a Judge of a Special Court shall hold office for the period this Article remains in force and shall not be removed from office except in the manner prescribed in Article 209 for the removal from office of a Judge, and, in the application of the said Article for the purposes of this clause, any reference in that Article to a Judge shall be construed as a reference to a Judge of a Special Court.

(5) The law referred to in clause (1) shall make provision for the constitution of as many Supreme Appellate Courts as the Federal Government may consider necessary and for an appeal against the sentence or final order of a Special Court being preferred to a Supreme Appellate Court which shall consist of—

- (a) a Chairman, being a Judge of the Supreme Court to be nominated by the Federal Government after consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan; and
- (b) two Judges of the High Courts to be nominated by the Federal Government after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned.

(6) Where the Federal Government constitutes more than one Supreme Appellate Court, it shall determine the territorial limits within which each one of them shall exercise jurisdiction.

(7) A Special Court and a Supreme Appellate Court shall decide a case or, as the case may be, an appeal within thirty days.

(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, no court shall exercise any jurisdiction whatsoever in relation to any proceedings before, or order or sentence passed by a Special Court or a Supreme Appellate Court constituted under a law referred to in clause (1), except as provided in such law."

3. **Amendment of Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, in the fifth Schedule,—

(1) in the Part relating to the Supreme Court,—

(a) in the first paragraph,—

(i) for the figure "7,900" the figure "9,900", and for the figure "7,400" the figure "9,500", shall be substituted; and

(ii) after the words "per mensem", at the end, the commas and words "or such higher salary as the President may, from time to time, determine" shall be added; and

(b) for the third paragraph the following shall be substituted, namely:—

"3. The pension payable to a retired Judge of the Supreme Court per mensem shall not be less or more than the amount specified in the table below, depending on the length of his service as Judge in that Court or a High Court:

Provided that the President may, from time to time, raise the minimum or maximum amount of pension so specified:—

Judge	Minimum amount	Maximum amount
Chief Justice	Rs. 7,000	Rs. 8,000
Other Judge	Rs. 6,250	Rs. 7,125"; and

(2) in the Part relating to the High Court,—

(a) in the first paragraph,—

(i) for the figure "7,200" the figure "9,400", and for the figure "6,500" the figure "8,400", shall be substituted; and

- (ii) after the words "per mensem", at the end, the commas and words "or such higher salary as the President may, from time to time, determine" shall be added; and
- (b) for the third paragraph the following shall be substituted, namely:—

"3. The pension payable per mensem to a Judge of a High Court who retires after having put in not less than five years service as such Judge shall not be less or more than the amount specified in the table below, depending on the length of his service as Judge and total service, if any, in the service of Pakistan:

Provided that the President may, from time to time, raise the minimum or maximum amount of pension so specified:—

Judge	Minimum amount	Maximum amount
Chief Justice	Rs. 5,640	Rs. 7,050
Other Judge	Rs. 5,040	Rs. 6,300"

AZIZ AHMED QURESHI,
Secretary.

10TH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FROM 1993 TO 1996
LIST OF MEMBERS & ADDRESSES

N.W.F.P-26

S. No	Constituency	Name & Party Affiliation	Permanent Address & Phone Numbers	Remarks
1.	NA-1 Peshawar-I	Syed Zafar Ali Shah (PPP)	Mohallah Rati Pull Pukhta, Peshawar City / 214291, 210332	
2.	NA-2 Peshawar-II	Arbab Muhammad Jahangir Khan (PPP)	Jehangirabad. Peshawar / 9244288	
3.	NA-3 Peshawar-III	Arbab Muhammad Zahir (ANP)	Arbab Bungalow Mara Kachori Tehsil and Distt. Peshawar / 9220466, 271872	
4.	NA-4 Nowshera	Maj. Gen (Retd) Nasirullah Khan Babar (PPP)	Mohallah Babar, Pir Pai, Tehsil and Distt. Nowshera / 841618, 840765	
5.	NA-5 Charsadda	Mr. Asfand Yar Wali (ANP)	Wali bagh, Tehsil and District Charsadda / 29677	
6.	NA-6 Mardan-I	Mr. Khanzada Khan (PPP)	Khan Colony, Par Hoti, Mardan / 62682/68113	
7.	NA-7 Mardan-II	Haji Muhammad Yaqoob (PPP)	Shaheen Colony, Mardan / 64709/60903	
8.	NA-8 Swabi	Qazi Maulana Fazlullah (IJM)	Lahor Rapure, Tehsil and District Swabi / 05732-300062	
9.	NA-9 Kohat	Syed Hussain PML (N) Iftikhar Gillani	1-Civil Lane, New Colony Kohat / 255188	
10.	NA-10 Karak	Maulana Shaheed Ahmed (MDM)	Mumbati Killa, Titter Khel, Karak / 05244/210587	
11.	NA-11 Abbottabad	Sardar Mahtab Ahmed Khan PML (N)	Village Malkot, Post Office Bakot, Abbottabad / 38359/5002	

12.	NA-12 Haripur-I	Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif PML (N)	180/181, H-Block, Model Town, Lahore / 5835000/5836000	
13.	NA-13 Haripur-II	Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan PML (N)	Village and Post Office Rehana, Tehsil and District Haripur / 42730595/610006	

14.	NA-14 Mansehra-I	Sardar Muhammad Yousuf PML (N)	Village Jalgali, Post Office Battal, Tehsil and District Mansehra / 36962	
15.	NA-15 Mansehra-II	Nawabzada Salahuddin Saeed PML (N)	Shergarh, Mansehra	
16.	NA-16 Batgram	Haji Muhammad Ayub Khan Alai PML (N)	Village and Post Office Biari, Tehsil Allai, District Battagram / 0941/903/30100	
17.	NA-17 Kohistan	Malik Said Ahmed (IJM)	Village Kas Dubair, Tehsil Pattan, District Kohistan / 9203582/824911	
18.	NA-18 D.I.Khan	Maulana Fazalur- Rehman (IJM)	Wanda Khan Muhammad, Tehsil and District D.I.Khan / 5885/6161	
19.	NA-19 Bannu	Syed Abbs Shah PML (N)	Bazaar Ahmad Khan, Bannu / 612946/621414	
20.	NA-20 Lakki- Marwat	Mr. Muhammad Kabir Khan PML (N)	Village Ahmad Khel, Tehsil and District Lakki Marwat / 2555/510666/7461722	
21.	NA-21 Swat-I	Miangul Aurangzeb PML (N)	Saidu Sharif, Swat / 720222/828245	
22.	NA-22 Swat- II	Muhammad Afzal Khan (PKQP)	Village and Post Office Durush Khela, Tehsil Matta, District Swat / 795433	

23.	NA-23 Bunair	Mr. Abdul Matin Khan (ANP)	Village and Post Office Bajkata, Tehsil Gagra Daggar District Buner / 206/282-22	
24.	NA-24 Chitral	Maulana Abdur Rahim (PIF)	Jamia Hadeeqatul Uloom G.T.Road, Al-markazul Islami, Peshawar / 264823	
25.	NA-25 Dir-I	Mr. Sahibzada Fatehullah (PIF)	Sahibabad, Tehsil, Wari, Distt. Dir / 0535-840333/0535-840392	
26.	NA-26 Dir-II	Malik Muzaffar Khan (PPP)	Village & P.O Ouch, Distt. Dir / 0536-761122	

THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA (FATA-8)

27.	NA-27 Tribal Area-I	Haji Baroz Khan (IND)	DA Mohmmmand Maina Zaryab Colony, Peshawar	
28.	NA-28 Tribal Area-II	Malik Zulfiqar Ali Khawajak Chamkani (IND)	C/O Town Committee Parachinar, Kuram Agency, Kohat	
29.	NA-29 Tribal Area-III	Al-Haj Muhammad Afzal (IND)	Warasta Road Hangu, Distt. Kohat. C/O Mr. Amin Akbar Cloth Merchant, Lari Adda Hangu Kohat	
30.	NA-30 Tribal Area-IV	Haji Arsala Khan (IND)	Niaz Petrol Pump, Hala Road, Hyderabad Sindh	
31.	NA-31 Tribal Area-V	Mr. Abdul Qayyum Khan (IND)	H.No.141/D Block-7, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi	
32.	NA-32 Tribal Area-VI	Mr. Bismillah Khan (IND)	Bajaur, Nawagai Agency	
33.	NA-33 Tribal Area-VII	Haji Muhammad Shah Afridi (IND)	Zeenat Plaza, Opp. Haji Camp, G.T.Road, Peshawar	
34.	NA-34 Tribal Area-VIII	Malik Muhammad Aslam Khan Afridi (IND)	Darra Adam Khel, Darra Bazar Kohat (F.R)	

FEDERAL CAPITAL-01

35.	NA-35 Federal Capital	Haji Muhammad Nawaz Khokhar PML (N)	10-Nazimuddin Road F- 8/1, Islamabad	
36.	NA-36 Rawalpindi-I	Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi PML (N)	H.No.4, St.No.17, F- 7/2, Islamabad	
37.	NA-37 Rawalpindi-II	Raja Nadir Pervaiz Khan PML (N)	Nadir Street, Adiala Road, Rawalpindi	
38.	NA-38 Rawalpindi- III	Shaikh Rashid Ahmed PML (N)	Lal Havely, Bohar Bazar, Rawalpindi	
39.	NA-39 Rawalpindi-IV	Mr. Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq PML (N)	203/70, Charing Cross Westridge, Rawalpindi	

THE PUNJAB

40.	NA-40 Rawalpindi-V	Ch. Nisar Ali Khan PML (N)	100, Faizabad Murree Road. Behind P.S.O. Petrol Pump. Rawalpindi	
41.	NA-41 Attock-I	Shaikh Aftab Ahmad PML (N)	Near Cantt Board Office Attock	
42.	NA-42 Attock-II	Malik Lal Khan PML (N)	Kamrial Tehsil Pindi Ghen Distt. Attock	
43.	NA-43 Chakwal-I	Lt. Gen (R) Malik Abdul Majeed PML (N)	MNA, H. Talah-Ghang Road Chakwal	
44.	NA-44 Chakwal-II	Sardar Mamta Khan PPP	Vill. Tamman, Tehsil. Talagang, Distt. Chakwal	
45.	NA-45 Jhelum-I	Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan PML (N)	Islamia School Road, Jhelum City	
46.	NA-46 Jhelum-II	Nawabzada Iqbal Mehdi PML (N)	7, Civil Lines, Jhelum	

47.	NA-47 Sargodha-I	Brig (Retd) Ghulam Hussain Cheema PML (N)	H.800, Imran Revenue Road, Scheme No.IV, Rawalpindi	
48.	NA-48 Sargodha-II	Ch. Liaqat Hayat Badrana PPP	Vill. Badar, P.O Midhranjha, Tehsil Bhalwal, Distt. Sargodha	
49.	NA-49 Sargodha-III	Mahr Ahmed Zia-ur-Rehman Lak PML (N)	7-Stadium Road, Sargodha	
50.	NA-50 Sargodha-IV	Ch. Anwar Ali Cheema PML (N)	51, Qasar-e-Sultan Civil Line, Sargodha	
51.	NA-51 Sargodhacum- Khushab	Malik Muhammad Naeem Khan PML (N)	H.No. 79-A, Satellite Town, Sargodha	
52.	NA-52 Khushab	Sardar Shuja Muhammad Khan PML (N)	20/L Civil Line, Jauharabad, Distt. Khushab	
53.	NA-53 Mianwali-I	Mr. Obaid Ullah Khan Shadi Khel IND	131/7-Bahawalpur Road, Multan	

54.	NA-54 Mianwali-II	Dr. Sher Afghan Niazi IND	Hospital Road, Watta Khel, Mianwali	
55.	NA-55 Bhakkar-I	Mr. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan PML (N)	Vill. & P.O Jandanwala, Tehsil Kallurkot, Distt. Bhakhar	
56.	NA-56 Bhakkar-II	Mr. Rashid Akbar Khan IND	Vill. Nawani, P.O Shahani Tehsil & Distt. Bhakhar	
57.	NA-57 Faisalabad-I	Rana Zahid Tuseef PML (N)	Rana Velvet House, Jaranwala Road, Faisalabd	
58.	NA-58 Faisalabad-II	Rai Arif Hussain PPP	Chak No.282, G.B.P.O.Kot Shahmad, Tehsil Jaranwala, Faisalabad	

59.	NA-59 Faisalabad-III	Khan Shahadat Ali Khan Baluch PPP	Chak No.404, Samundri, Faisalabad	Tehsil Distt.
60.	NA-60 Faisalabad-IV	Mr. Shahid Nazir Ahmed PPP	Ch.H.Getwala Chak No.199/RB, Tehsil & Distt. Faisalabad	Park.
61.	NA-61 Faisalabad-V	Ch. Muhammad Ilyas PPP	Chak No.66, J.B.Tehsil & Distt. Faisalabad	
62.	NA-62 Faisalabad-VI	Sardar Dildar Ahmed Cheema PPP	Jaungle Singh Wala Peoples Colony, Faisalabad	
63.	NA-63 FaisalabadVII	Haji Muhammad Akram Ansari PML (N)	H.No.1077/D, Chowk, Muhammad Faisalabad	Bilal Ghulam Abad,
64.	NA-64 FaisalabadVIII	Ch. Sher Ali PML (N)	Khalid Abad Kashmir Faisalabad	St. No.5, House,
65.	NA-65 Faisalabad-IX	Mian. Amjad Yasin PML (N)	P-431, Faisalabad	Abdullahpur,
66.	NA-66 Jhang- I	Sardarzada Zafar Abbas Syed PPP	Rajoya House, Chiniot City	
67.	NA-67 Jhang- II	Makhdoomzada Syed Asad Hayat PPP	47-Main Lahore	Gulberg-II,

68.	NA-68 Jhang- III	Maulana Muhammad Azam Tariq MDM	Masjid Haq Nawaz Shaheed, Jhang Saddar	
69.	NA-69 Jhang- IV	Makhdoom Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat PPP	47, Main Lahore	Gulberg,
70.	NA-70 Jhang- V	Sahibzada Muhammad Nazeer Sultan PPP	17, Zafar Road, Lahore Cantt	

71.	NA-71 T.T.Singh-I	Mr. Khalid Ahmed Khan Kharl PPP	141-B, Shadman-II, Lahore	
72.	NA-72 T.T.Singh-II	Ch. Muhammad Ashfaq PPP	136-Jhang Road, Iqbalnagar, Toba Tek Singh	
73.	NA-73 T.T.Singh-III	Mr. Hamza PML (N)	Eid Gah Road, Gojra, Distt. T.T.Singh	
74.	NA-74 Gujranwala-I	Mr. Hamid Nasir Chattha PML (J)	Ahmed Nagar, Gujranwala	
75.	NA-75 Hafizabad	Ch. Mehdi Hassan PPP	Vill Burj Dara, Tehsil & Distt. Hafizabad	
76.	NA-76 Gujranwala- III	Mr. Ghulam Dastgir PML (N)	H.No.7/A, Satellite Town, Gujranwala	
77.	NA-77 GujranwalaIV	Brig (Retd) Muhammad Asghar PML (J)	H.No.165-D, Satellite Town, Gujranwala	
78.	NA-78 Gujranwala-V	Ch. Muhammad Abdullah PPP	Village Raja, P.O Sadhoke Gujranwala	
79.	NA-79 Gujranwalacum- Hafizabad	Ch. Ejaz Ahmad PML (N)	Qilla Dedar Singh, District Gujranwala	
80.	NA-80 Gujrat-I	Nawabzada Ghazanfar Ali Gul PPP	Kothi Nawab Sahib, Gujrat	
81.	NA-81 Gujrat-II	Ch. Ahmad Mukhtar PPP	Services Officers Colony, G.T Road, Gujrat	
82.	NA-82 Gujrat-cum- Jhelum	Haji Muhammad Asghar Kaira PPP	Kaira House, Lala musa	

83.	NA-83 Mandi Bahauddincum-Gujrat	Mr. Zafarullah Tarar, Advocate PPP	Thana Road, mandi Bahuddin	
84.	NA-84 Mandi Bahauddin	Mr. Nazar Muhammad Gondal PPP	Vill. P.O Gojra, Tehsil Malakwal Distt. Mandi Bahuddin	
85.	NA-85 Sialkot-I	Khawaja Muhammad Asif PML (N)	118, Mahmood Ghaznavi Road, Sialkot Cantt	
86.	NA-86 Sialkot-II	Ch. Akhtar Ali PML (J)	Vill. Vario, Tehsil & Distt. Sialkot	
87.	NA-87 Sialkot-III	Syed Iftikhar-ul-Hassan Shah PML (N)	Vill & P.O Alo Mahar Sharif Distt. Sialkot	
88.	NA-88 Sialkot-IV	Ch. Abdul Sattar PML (J)	Vill. Verio Tehsil & Distt. Sialkot	
89.	NA-89 Sialkot-V	Ch. Muhammad Sarwar Khan PML (N)	Rupo Chak House, Zafarwal Distt. Narowal	
90.	NA-90 Narowal-I	Mr. Ahsan Iqbal Chaudhry PML (N)	4-Fazlia Colony, Ferozpur Road, Lahore	
91.	NA-91 Narowal-II	Mr. Muhammad Ishfaq Taj PML (N)	Village Maingri P.O Nurkot Tehsil Shakargarh Distt. Narowal	
92.	NA-92 Lahore-I	Mian Muhammad Abbas Sharif PML (N)	H.No.180-181, H-Block, Model Town, Lahore	
93.	NA-93 Lahore-II	Mr. Humayun Akhtar Khan PML (N)	114, Sarwar Road Lahore Cantt	
94.	NA-94 Lahore-III	Mian Abdul Waheed PML (N)	Zafar Ali Road behind State Guest House, Lahore	
95.	NA-95 Lahore-IV	Mr. Muhammad Ishaq Dar PML (N)	7-H, Gulberg-III, Lahore	

96.	NA-96 Lahore-V	Makhdoom Muhammad Javaid Hashmi PML (N)	50 Qasim Road, Multan Cantt	
97.	NA-97 Lahore-VI	Mr. Tariq Badarud- Din Bandey PML (N)	13-D/1, Gulberg-III, Lahore	

98.	NA-98 Lahore-VII	Mian Muhammad Munir PML (N)	96-C Windsor Park, Ichhra Lahore	
99.	NA-99 Lahore-VIII	Mehar Zulfiqar Ali PML (N)	45/L Gulberg-III, Lahore	
100.	NA-100 Lahore-IX	Ch. Khalid Javaid Ghurki PPP	H.No.16.F.C.C.Gulberg	
101.	NA-101 Sheikhupura- I	Mr. Nisar Ahmad Pannoun PPP	Qazi Park, Shahdara Town, Lahore	
102.	NA-102 Sheikhupura- II	Haji Munawwar Hussain Manj PPP	Mank House, Housing Colony Sheikhupura	
103.	NA-103 Sheikhupura- III	Ch. Muhammad Berjees Tahir PML (N)	Jamia Masjid Road, Sangla Hill, Distt. Sheikhupura	
104.	NA-104 SheikhupuraIV	Ch. Tawakkal- Ullah Virk PPP	Rafiqi Riad, Civil Lines, Sheikhupura	
105.	NA-105 SheikhupuraV	Rai Bashir Ahmed Khan Bhatti PPP	Vill & P.O Kot Hussain Khan Tehsil Nankana Sahib, Distt. Sheikhupura	
106.	NA-106 Kasur-I	Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali PML (J)	13-A/1, Township, Lahore	
107.	NA-107 Kasur-II	Rao Muhammad Khizar Hayat PML (N)	Rao Khanwala, Distt. Kasur	
108.	NA-108 Kasur-III	Sardar Talib Hassan PML (J)	58, E/1, Gulberg-III, Lahore	

109.	NA-109 Kasur-IV	Sardar Muhammad Ashiq Dogar PPP	Defence Housing Society Lahore Cantt	
110.	NA-110 Okara-I	Rao Sikander Iqbal PPP	Sahiwal Road, Okara	
111.	NA-111 Okara-II	Rai Muhammad Aslam Khan Kharl PPP	Kharal House G.T. Road Okara	
112.	NA-112 Okara-III	Rao Qaisar Ali Khan PML (N)	Mazherabad Farm, Depalpur, Distt. Okara	

113.	Mian Muhammad Yasin Khan Wattoo PML (N)	Mian Muhammad Yasin Khan Wattoo	3, Farid Kot Road, Lahore	
114.	NA-114 Multan-I	Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani PPP	Gillani House, Gous-ul- Azam Road, Multan	Speaker, National Assembly of Pakistan
115.	NA-115 Multan-II	Haji Muhammad Boota PML (N)	Tariq Manzil 920/43, Basti Baghban, Out- side Delhi Gate, Multan	
116.	NA-116 Multan-III	Sh. Muhammad Tahir Rashid PML (N)	21-B, Gulgasht Colony, Multan	
117.	NA-117 Lodhran-I	Rana Mumtaz Ahmed Noon PPP	Village P.O Naukabil Wah Tehsil Kahror Pacca, Distt. Lodhran	
118.	NA-118 Multan-cum- Lodhran	Mirza Muhammad Nasir Baig PPP	4-A, Gulgasht Colony, Multan	
119.	NA-119 Multan-VI	Syed Javed Ali shah PML (N)	Outside Rashid Shah Gate, Tehsil Shujabad Distt. Multan	

120.	NA-120 Multan-cum-Khanewal	Shah Mehmood Qureshi PPP	Babul Quresh, Daulat Gate, Multan	
121.	NA-121 Khanewal-I	Mehr Muhammad Iqbal Hiraj PPP	173, Shamsabad Colony Near Eid-Gah, Multan	
122.	NA-122 Khanewal-II	Mr. Aftab Ahmad Khan Daha PML (N)	H.No.3, Civil Lines, Khanewal	
123.	NA-123 Khanewal-III	Pir Aslam Bodla PPP	Bodla House, Mian Channu	
124.	NA-124 Sahiwal-I	Ch. Nouraiz Shakoor Khan PPP	937-B, Farid Town, Sahiwal	
125.	NA-125 Sahiwal-II	Mehr Ghulam Farid Kathia PPP	29, jamia farridia Roa Sahiwal	
126.	NA-126 Sahiwal-III	Mrs. Shahnaz Javed PPP	49/G, Gulberg-III, Lahore	

127.	NA-127 Sahiwal-IV	Mian Muhammad Amjad Joyia PPP	Chak No.51-E.B. Tehsil Arifwala Distt. Sahiwal	
128.	NA-128 Pakpattan	Rao Muhammad Hashim Khan PPP	H.No.3146, Railway Road, Pakpattan	
129.	NA-129 Vehari-I	Mr. Noor Muhammad Khan Bhaba PPP	h.97, St.12, Cavalry Ground Lahore	
130.	NA-130 Vehari-II	Ms. Tahmina Daultana PML (N)	52/II, " M Block, Main Defence Housing Society, Lahore	
131.	NA-131 Vehari-III	Ch. Qurban Ali Chohan PPP	H.No33, Grain Market, Burewala, Distt. Vehari	
132.	NA-132 D.G.Khan	Khawaja Kamalud-Din Anwar PPP	Multan Public School Road, Multan	

133.	NA-133 D.G.Khancum- Rajanpur	Sardar Mansoor Ahmed Khan Leghari PPP	P.O Box.3003, 12-G, Gulberg-II, Lahore	
134.	Rajanpur	Mir Balakh Sher Mazari IND	House No.100-C/2, Gulberg-3, Lahore	
135.	NA-135 Muzaffargarh -I	Mr. Abdul Qayyum Khan Jatoi PML (N)	Jatoi House Tehsil Jatoi Distt. Muzaffargarh	
136.	NA-136 Muzaffargarh -II	Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan NDA	32-Nikalson, Road Lahore	
137.	NA-137 Muzaffargarh -III	Malik Ghulam Arbi Khan PPP	H.No.22, Nazimuddin Road, F-7/1, Islamabad	
138.	NA-138 Muzaffargarh -IV	Malik Ghulam Muhammad Mustafa Khar PPP	17 Johar Town Kanal Road New Campus Lahore	
139.	NA-139 Layyah-I	Malik Niaz Ahmed Jakhar PPP	Advocate, Layyah Distt. Bar, Layyah	
140.	NA-140 Layyah-II	Mr. Muhammad Jahangir Khan PPP	Seehar House Karor Lalesan Distt. Layyah	

141.	NA-141 Bahawalpur-I	Nawab Salahuddin Abbasi PML (N)	Sadiq Garh Palace, Dera Nawab Sahib, Bahawalpur	
142.	NA-142 Bahawalpur- II	Sahibzada Farooq Anwar Abbasi PML (N)	19-D, Abbasi Road, Model Town-A, Bahawalpur	
143.	NA-143 Bahawalpur- III	Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada PPP	137/A, Model Town-B, Karbla Road, Bahawalpur	

144.	NA-144 Bahawalnagar-I	Mian Sattar PML (N)	Abdul Laila	Laila House, Haroonabad, Bahawalnagar Distt.	
145.	NA-145 Bahawalnagar-II	Mian Ahmad Matiana PPP	Mumtaz	Matiana house Tehsil Chishtian Distt. Bahawalnagar	
146.	NA-146 Bahawalnagar-III	Ch. Ali Wains PPP	Akbar	Advocate Haroonabad Distt. Bahawalnagar	
147.	NA-147 Rahimyar Khan-I	Makhdom Ahmed Anwar PPP	Syed Alam	17-B, Model Town-A, Bahawalpur	
148.	NA-148 Rahimyar Khan-II	Makhdom Shahab-ud-Din Khan PPP		P.O. Mianwali Qureshian Distt. Rahimyar Khan	
149.	NA-149 Rahimyar Khan-III	Ch. Muhammad Jaffar Iqbal PML (N)		Rahimyar Khan	
150.	NA-150 Rahimyar Khan-IV	Makhdom Ahmed Mahmud PPP	Syed	Makhdom House, 81-E-1, Gulberg-III, Lahore	
151.	NA-151 Sukkur-I	Mr. Ahmed Shah PPP	Khurshe	Manzil Gah Road, Sukkur	
152.	NA-152 Sukkurcum-Ghotki	Mr. Muhammad Khan Mahar PPP	A	Vill. Khangarh, P.O Khanpur Mahar, Distt. Ghotki	
153.	NA-153 Ghotki	Mr. Khalid Ahmed Khan Lund PPP		Khalidabad P.O. Jarwar Mir Pur Mathelo, District Ghotki	

SINDH PROVINCE-46

154.	NA-154 Shikarpur-I	Mr. Shahban Mirani PPP	Aftab	23/11 Khayban-e-Ghazi Defence Housing Authority Phase-V, Karachi	

155.	NA-155 Shikarpur-II	Mir Altaf Khan Bhayo PPP	Bhayo House, Shikarpur	
156.	NA-156 Jacobabad-I	Mir Ahmed Nawaz Khan Jakhrani PPP	Jakhrani Muhalla Jacobabad	
157.	NA-157 Jacobabad-II	Mir Mehran Khan Bijarani PPP	Sindh House. Islamabad	
158.	NA-158 Naushehro Feroze-I	Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi NPP	18, Khayaban-eShamsheer, Defence Housing Society Karachi	
159.	NA-159 Naushehro-II	Syed Zafar Ali Shah PPP	P.O Darbelo, Distt. Naushehro Feroze, Sind	Deputy Speaker National Assembly of Pakistan
160.	NA-160 Nawabshah-I	Mr. Asif Ali Zardari PPP	Bilawal House, Karachi	
161.	NA-161 Nawabshah-II	Mr. Hakim Ali Zardari PPP	Deh 6 Dad P.O. Taluka Distt. Nawab Shah	
162.	NA-162 Khairpur	Mr. Manzoor Hussain Wasan PPP	27-B, Circular Street Phase-II Defence Karachi	
163.	NA-163 Khairpurcum- Sukkur	Pir Syed Abdul Qadir Shah Jillani PPP	Village Ranipur Distt. Khairpur	
164.	NA-164 Larkana-I	Begum Nusrat Bhutto PPP	70, Clifton Karachi	
165.	NA-165 Larkana-II	Mr. Shabir Ahmed Khan Chandio PPP	Vakeel Housing Society, Waggan Road, Larkana	
166.	NA-166 Larkana-III	Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto PPP	Prime Minister House, Islamabad	Prime Minister of Pakistan
167.	NA-167 Hyderabad-I	Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Faheem PPP	11-A, 2 nd Sunset Street, Phase-II, Defence Housing Society, Karachi	

168.	NA-168 Hyderabad-II	Sahibzada Shabbir Hassan Ansari PML (N)	G-881 Paret Abad, Hyderabad	
169.	NA-169 Hyderabad-III	Kazi Asad Abid PPP	23, Civil Lines, Cantonment Hyderabad	
170.	NA-170 Hyderabad-IV	Syed Naveed Qamar PPP	233-C, Unit.2, Latifabad, Hyderabad	
171.	NA-171 HyderabadV	Mr. Abdul Sattar Bachani PPP	Sattar Petroleum Service, Tando Allahyar, Distt. Hyderabad	
172.	NA-172 Badin-I	Mr. Abdul Sattar Leghari PPP	H.No.3/A, Block-A, Latifabad No.3, Hyderabad	
173.	NA-173 Badin-II	Dr. Zulfiqar Ali Mirza PPP	H.N.38/I, 23 rd St. Phase-V, Defence Housing Authority, Karachi	
174.	NA-174 Mirpurkhas	Pir Aftab Hussain Shah Jilani PPP	6-B, 7 th Central Street Phase-II, Defence Housing Authority, Karachi	
175.	NA-175 MirpurkhascumUmerkot	Nawab Muhammad Yousaf Talpur PPP	6-A, North Circular Avenue Phase-I, Defence Housing Society, Karachi	
176.	NA-176 Tharparkar	Arbab Ghulam Rahim PPP	P.O Kaloi, Via Naokote, Distt. Tharparkar	
177.	NA-177 Dadu-I	Malik Asad Sikandar PPP	Malik House, Kotri Distt. Dadu	
178.	NA-178 Dadu-II	Haji Muhammad Bux Jamali PPP	Jamali Street, Dadu	
179.	NA-179 Dadu-III	Mr. Rafiq Ahmed Mahesar PPP	Village Gahi Mahesar Tehsil Mehar, Distt. Dadu	

180.	NA-180 Sanghar-I	Haji Khuda Bux Rajar PML (N)	68-A, Housing Society, Distt. Sanghar	
181.	NA-181 Sanghar-II	Mr. Fida Hussain Dero PPP	P.O. Tando Adam, Bacha Para Distt. Sanghar	

182.	NA-182 Thatta-I	Baboo Ghulam Hussain PPP	Soni Mundhi, Mohallah Shahi Bazar, Thatta	
183.	NA-183 Thatta-II	Syed Shafqat Hussain Shah Sheerazi IND	Village Saeedpur Taluka Sajawal, Distt. Thatta	
184.	NA-184 Karachi (West)-I	Mian Ejaz Ahmed Shafi PML (N)	Diamond Industry Enterprises F/210, S.I.T.E. Behind Tele. Exchange, Karachi	
185.	NA-185 Karachi (West)-II	Mr. Muhammad Afaque Khan Shahid PPP	2-26/10-C, Bismillah Colony Sector No.10, Orangi Town, karachi West	
186.	NA-186 Karachi Central-I	Mr. Dost Muhammad Faizi PML (N)	E-4, Block No.10, Gulshan-I-Iqbal, Karachi	
187.	NA-187 Karachi Central-II	Hafiz Muhammad Taqi PML (N)	435-A, Block-5, Gulshan-I-Iqbal, Karachi	
188.	NA-188 Karachi Central-III	Mr. Muzaffar Ahmed Hashmi PIF	b-163, Block "A" North Nazimabad, Karachi	
189.	NA-189 Karachi South-I	Waja Ahmed Karim Dad Baloch PPP	63, Ibrahim Tarrace Qasim hamir Street, Kharadar Karachi-2	
190.	NA-190 Karachi South-II	Mr. Abdul Aziz Memon PPP	Flat No.44-45, 3 rd Floor, Safari View Appartments, Block-7 Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi	
191.	NA-191 Karachi South-III	Capt. Haleem Ahmed Siddiqui PML (N)	39-B, 1 st Central lane, Defence Housing Society, Karachi	

192.	NA-192 Karachi East-I	Mr. Zuhair Akram Nadeem PML (N)	2091, P.I.B. Society, Karachi	
193.	NA-193 Karachi East-II	Mr. Abu Bakar Shaikhani PML (N)	C.A.5, Jawwad Court Chandni Chowk University Road, Karachi	
194.	NA-194 Karachi East-III	Haji Muzafar Ali Shujra PPP	35/II, 31 st Street Phase-V, Ext. Defence Housing Authority, Khayanban Shamsheer, Karachi	
195.	NA-195 Karachi East-IV	Prof. N.D.Khan PPP	101-B, Bon Vista, Block-II, Clifton, Karachi	
196.	NA-196 Karachi East-V	Mr. Sher Muhammad Baloch PPP	Ghazi Dawood Village Near Malir Mohammadan Football Club, Malir City, Karachi-23	

BALUCHISTAN-11

197.	NA-197 Quettacum- Chagai	Mr. Mehmood Khan Achakzai PKMAP	Central Secretariat PMAP, Jinnah Road Quetta	
198.	NA-198 Pishin-cum- Killah Abdullah	Dr. Hamid Khan Achakzai PKMAP	H.4-35/9, Jabbar Colony, Quarry Road, Quetta	
199.	NA-199 Loralai-cum-Musakhel-cum- Barkhan	Haji Muhammad Doomar IJM	H.No.97, Khayab Colony 2-B, Madi Town, Faisalabad	
200.	NA-200 Zhob-cum- Killa Saifullah	Nawab Muhammad Ayyaz Khan Jomezai PKMAP	Central Secretariat PMAP, Jinnah Road Quetta	

201.	NA-201 Jhal Magsi-cum-Bolan (Kachhi)	Sardar Muhammad Rind JWP	Ya C/O Seth Gansham Pasram Dera Murad jamali Distt. Nasirabad	
202.	NA-202 Sibbi-cumKohlu-cumDera Bugticum-Ziarat	Nawab Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti JWP	Bugti House, Ain-ul-Din Quetta	
203.	NA-203 Jaffarabadcum-Nasirabad	Mir Zafarulla Khan Jamali IND	Rojhan Jamali, Distt. Jafarabad	
204.	NA-204 Kalat-cumMastungcum-Kharan	Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haidari IJM	Raees Took, Kalat	
205.	NA-205 KhuzdarcumAwaran	Mr. Muhammad Ayub Jattak BNM (M)	Jattak House Khuzdar, Baluchistan	
206.	NA-206 LasbelacumGwadar	Mr. Ghulam Akbar Lasi PPP	D-11, Block 6, Federal B. Area Karachi	
207.	NA-207 Turbatcum-Panjgur	Dr. Muhammad Yaseen Baloch BNM (H)	Village Kallag. Tehsil & Distt. Turbat Makran	

LIST OF NON-MUSLIM MEMBERS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TOTAL-10

Sr. No	Name	Community	Address	Remarks
208	Mr. J.Salik	Christian	3, Minister Colony, H.No.11, St.45, F.7/1, Islamabad	
209	Mr. George Clement	Christian	Clement House 224.R.B.Warispura Faisalabad	
210	Mr. Tariq C. Qaiser	Christian	241, Rehmat Park, College Raod, Sargodha	

211	Bishop Rufin Julius	Christian	48-A, Jail Town, G.T.Road, Gujranwala	
212	Dr. Khatumal Jeewan	Hindu/Scheduled Castes	P.O. & Village Janhero Sharif Taluka Umerkot, Distt. Umerkot	
213	Rana Chandar Singh	Hindu/Scheduled Castes	21-C, Block.6, PECHS, Karachi	
214	Kishin Chand Parwani	Hindu/Scheduled Castes	P.O. Box 49, Mirpur Khas, Sindh	
215	Mr. Moti Ram Malani	Hindh/Scheduled Castes	Bungalow No.14, Bhittai Nagar, Hyderabad	
216	Mr. Yezdiar H. Kaikobad	Parsi/Sikh /Budhists and others	Piroja Lodge No.30, Haider Road, Rawalpindi Cantt	
217	Mr. Bashiruddin Khalid	Ahmadi	649-Nishtar Block Alama Iqbal Town, Lahore	

**2ND TERM FEDERAL CABINET UNDER THE PREMIERSHIP OF
MOHTRAMA BENAZIR BHUTTO
FROM 19. 10. 1993 TO 05. 11. 1996**

S.No.	Portfolio	Period
The Prime Minister (Second Tenure) Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto 19. 10. 1993 to 5. 11. 1996		
FEDERAL MINISTERS		
1. Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari 19. 10. 1993 to 14. 11. 1993	Foreign Affairs	19. 10. 1993 to 14. 11. 1993
2. Mr. Aftab Shahban Mirani 19. 10. 1993 to 5. 11. 1996	Defence	19. 10. 1993 to 5. 11. 1996
3. Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi 21. 10. 1993 to 5. 11. 1996	Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs Social Welfare & Spl. Education. Human Rights (Additional Charge)	21. 10. 93 to 16. 11. 93 16. 11. 93 to 5. 11. 96 28. 10. 96 to 5. 11. 96
4. Major General (Retd) Nasirullah Khan Babar 21. 10. 1993 to 5. 11. 1996	Interior Narcotics Control Federal Investigation	21. 10. 93 to 5. 11. 96 21. 10. 93 to 1. 8. 96 21. 10. 93 to 5 11. 96
5. Brig. (Retd) Muhammad Asghar 21. 10. 1993 to 5. 11. 1996	Industries & Production Production	21. 10. 93 to 1. 8. 96 1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
6. Mr. Mohammad Afzal Khan 21. 10. 1993 to 5. 11. 1996	States & Frontier regions Kashmir Affairs & Northern Affairs	21. 10. 93 to 27. 10. 93 27. 10. 93 to 5. 11. 96
7. Sardar Asaff Ahmad Ali 16. 11. 93 to 5. 11. 96	Foreign Affairs	16. 11. 93 to 5. 11. 96
8. Syed Iqbal Haider 16. 11. 93 to 20. 12. 94	Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs	16. 11. 93 to 20. 12. 94
9. Mr. Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Fahim 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	(Re-designated as Minister for Housing and Works from 28 th July, 1994	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96

10.	Mr. Anwar Saifullah Khan 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Petroleum and Natural Resources	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
11.	Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Water and Power	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
12.	Ch. Ahmad Mukhtar 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Commerce	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
13.	Mr. Khalid Ahmad Khan Kharal 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Information and Broadcasting	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
14.	Mr. Khurshed Ahmad Shah 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Education	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
15.	Nawab Muhammad Yousif Talpur 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Food, Agriculture & Livestock	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
16.	Mr. Julius Salik 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Population Welfare	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
17.	Prof. N. D. Khan 20. 12. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs	20. 12. 94 to 5. 11. 96
18.	Pir Syed Abdul Qadir Shah Jillani 20. 12. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Minister without portfolio	20. 12. 94 to 5. 11. 96
19.	Mr. Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khan 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Narcotics Control	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
20.	Rao Sikandar Iqbal 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Sports and Tourism	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
21.	Haji Muhammad Nawaz Khokhar 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Science and Technology	31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96
22.	Mr. Jehangir Badar 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Political Affairs & Religious Affairs	31.7. 96 to 5. 11. 96
23.	Ch. Abdul Sattar 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Industries	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
24.	Sayed Iqbal Haider 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Human Rights	1. 8. 96 to 28. 10. 96
25.	Mr. Asif Ali Zardari 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Investment	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96

26.	Syed Naveed Qamar 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Privatization Finance	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96 28. 10. 96 to 5. 11. 96

MINISTERS OF STATE

1.	Ch. Ahmad Mukhtar 21. 1. 93 to 26. 1. 94	Commerce	21. 10. 93 to 26. 1. 94
2.	Mr. Ghulam Akbar Lasi 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Labour and Manpower	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
3.	Mr. Makhdoom Shahabuddin 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Finance	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
4.	Mr. Abdul Qayum Khan 26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96	States and Frontier Regions	26. 1. 94 to 5. 11. 96
5.	Mian Raza Rabbani 20. 12. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Law and Justice	20. 12. 94 to 5. 11. 96
6.	Mr. Shah Mahmood Qureshi 20. 12. 94 to 5. 11. 96	Parliamentary Affairs	20. 12. 94 to 5. 11. 96
7.	Haji Muhammad Ayub Khan 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Local Government & Rural Development	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
8.	Mir. Muhammad Ayub Jattak 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Food	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
9.	Mr. Sahibzada Muhammad Nazeer Sultan 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Foreign Affairs	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
10.	Ch. Nauraiz Shakoor Khan 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Youth Affairs	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
11.	Mirza Muhammad Nasir Baig 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Sports	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
12.	Mr. Muhammad Afaq Khan Shahid 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Works	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96
13.	Mr. Manzoor Hussain Wassan 31. 7. 96 to 5. 11. 96	Water	1. 8. 96 to 5. 11. 96

**FEDERAL CARE TAKER CABINET UNDER THE PREMIERSHIP
OF MALIK MERAJ KHALID FORM 05.11. 96 TO 17. 02. 97**

S.No.	Portfolio	Period	Remarks
The Prime Minister Malik Meraj Khalid, 5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97			

FEDERAL MINISTERS WITH TENURE

1.	Mr. Shahid Hamid 5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	Ministry of Defence Establishment Division Additional Charge Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights and Parliamentary Affairs	5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97 - do- 19. 12. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
2.	Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan 5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	5. 11. 96 to 17. 7. 97	
3.	Mr. Omar Khan Affridi 5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	Ministry of Interior, Narcotics Control and Federal Investigation Ministry of States & Frontier Regions and Kashmir Affairs	5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97 -do-	
4.	Syeda Abida Hussain 5. 11. 96 to 15. 12. 96 Addl: Charge	Ministry of Education Ministry of Science and Technology Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism Ministry of Social Welfare & Special Education Ministry of Women Development & Youth Affairs	5. 11. 96 to 15. 12. 96 -do- 12. 11. 96 to 15. 12. 96 -do- -do-	

5.	Mr. Shafqat Mehmood 5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97 Addl: Charge	M/o Food, Agriculture and Livestock M/o Environment, Urban Affair Forestry and Wildlife M/o Environment, Local Government and Rural Development	5. 11. 96 to 15. 12. 96 12. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97 25. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
6.	Mr. Irshad Ahmed Haqqani 5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	Ministry of Information and Broadcasting	5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
7.	Mr. Sadiq N. K. Awan 5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	M/o Industries and Production	5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
8.	Dr. Muhammad Zubair Khan 5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	M/o Commerce	5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
9.	Mr. Javed Jabbar 5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	M/o Petroleum and Natural Resources	5. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
10.	Mr. Fakhuruddin G. Ebrahim 6. 11. 96 to 19. 12. 96	M/o Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs M/o Human Rights	6. 11. 96 to 19. 12. 96 -do-	
11.	Mr. Faridullah Khan 6. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	M/o Religious Affairs and Minorities Affairs	6. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
12.	Mr. Abdullah J. Memon 6. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	M/o Water and Power	6. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
13.	Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Jatoi 12. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	M/o Communications	12. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
14.	Mr. Muhammad Afzal Khan 12. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97 Additional Charge	M/o Health M/o Population Welfare M/o Railway	12. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97 -do- -do-	
15.	Mr. Subedar Khan Mandokhel 12. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	M/o Housing and Works	12. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	
16.	Mr. Amanullah Gichki 14. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97 Additional Charge	M/o Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistani M/o Local Government and Rural Development	14. 11. 96 to 17. 02 97 14. 11. 96 to 25. 11. 96	

ADVISERS/SPECIAL ASSISTANTS TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1.	Mr. Shahid Javed Burki 11. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	Adviser to the Prime Minister for Finance & Economic Affairs and Planning and Development with the status of Federal Minister		
2.	Mr. Najam Aziz Sethi 16. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	Adviser to the Prime Minister for Political Affairs and Accountability with the status of Federal Minister.		
3.	Dr. Hafiz A Pasha 30. 12. 96 to 17. 2. 97	Adviser to the Prime Minister with the status of Federal Minister		
4.	Mr. M. S. Baqir 11. 2. 96 to 17. 2. 97	Special Assistant to the Prime Minister with the status of Minister of State		
5.	Mr. Pervaiz Shah 13. 11. 96 to 17. 2. 97	Special Assistant to the Prime Minister with the status of Minister of State		
6.	Mr. Tikka Khan 11. 1. 97 to 17. 2. 97	Special Assistant to the Prime Minister with the status of Minister of State		

11TH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FROM 1997 TO 1999
LIST OF MEMBERS & ADDRESSES

N.W.F.P-26

S. No	Constituency	Name & Party Affiliation	Permanent Address & Phone Numbers
1.	NA-1 Peshawar-I	Haji Ghulam Ahme Bilour ANP	Bilour House, Pesh Cantt
2.	NA-2 Peshawar-II	Arbab Muhama Jahangir Khan ANP	Jehangir Abad, Peshawar
3.	NA-3 PeshawarcumNowshera	Arbab Saadullaah Khan (ANP)	Banglow Arbab Nasirpur, Peshawar
4.	NA-4 Nowshera	Mr. Wali Muhammad Khan ANP	Misri Banda, Akorakhattak Tehsil District Nowshera
5.	NA-5 Charsadda	Mr. Asfand Yar Wali (ANP)	Wali bagh, Tehsil District Charsadda
6.	NA-6 Mardan-I	Mr. Nasimur Rahman ANP	Defence Colony St. No.2 Mardan
7.	NA-7 Mardan-II	Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan Hoti ANP	Near Kayber Tob Company Mardan
8.	NA-8 Swabi	Haji Rehmanullah ANP	P.O. Nawakilli, Tehsil and Distt. Swabi
9.	NA-9 Kohatcum-Hangu	Mr. Javed Ibrahi Paracha PML (N)	Main Badshah Street Kohat
10.	NA-10 Karak	Mr. Shams-ur-Rehman Khattak ANP	Village & P.O makori Tehsil & Banda Dend Shah Distt. Karak
11.	NA-11 Abbottabadcum-Haripur-I	Vacant	

12.	NA-12 Abbottabadcum-Haripur-II	Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister of Pakistan PML (N)	180/181, H-Block, Model Town, Lahore
13.	NA-13 Haripur	Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan PML (N)	5-Liaqat Road, Abbottabad

14.	NA-14 Mansehra-I	Sardar Muhammad Yousuf PML (N)	Akhtar Abad near Post Graduate Colloge, Mansehra
15.	NA-15 Mansehracum- Haripur	Nawabzada Salahuddin Saeed PML (N)	Shergarh, Distt. Mansehra
16.	NA-16 Batgramcum- Mansehra	Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Allai PML (N)	Village P.O biari Allai Tehsil Allai Distt. Battagram
17.	NA-17 Kohistan	Mr. Aurangzeb IND	Village Dubair Baila Tehsil Pattan Distt. Kohistan
18.	NA-18 D.I.Khancum- Tank	Al-Haj Umar Khan Sardar Farooq PML (N)	Rang Mahal Mian Khel House, Dera Ismail Khan
19.	NA-19 Bannu	Malik Nasir Khan PML (N)	482-E, Rank Street, Bannu
20.	NA-20 LakkiMarwat- cumBannu	Haji Muhammad Kabir Khan PML (N)	Muhallah Saidkhel, Tehsil & Distt. Lakki Marwat
21.	NA-21 Swat-I	Miangul Aurangzeb PML (N)	Saidu Sharif, Swat
22.	NA-22 Swat- II	Mr. Shujaat Ali Khan PML (N)	Swat
23.	NA-23 Bunair-cum- Shangla	Mr. Abdul Matin Khan (ANP)	Village and Post Office Bajkata, Tehsil Gagra Daggar District Buner
24.	NA-24 Chitral	Shahzada Mohiuddin PML (N)	House No. 1 Zargaran Deh Chitral
25.	NA-25 Upper Dir-cumLower Dir	Haji Inayat Khan PML (N)	Vill. Shalga Tehsil Wari, Distt. Dir
26.	NA-26 Malakandcum- Dir	Al-Haj Muhammad Khan PML (N)	Timber Market, Dargai, Malakand Agency

THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA

(FATA-8)

27.	NA-27 Tribal Area-I	Haji Baroz Khan (IND)	DA Mohmmmand Maina Zaryab Colony, Peshawar
28.	NA-28 Tribal Area-II	Haji Mangal IND	Zarin Vill. Tree Mangal & P.O Para Chinar, Masjid Road, Kuram Agency
29.	NA-29 Tribal Area-III	Syed Sayed IND	Munir Orakzai Agency Village Kallay
30.	NA-30 Tribal Area-IV	Maulana Muhammad Dindar IND	Vill. Hassukhel P.O & Tehsil Mirali North Waziristan Agency
31.	NA-31 Tribal Area-V	Maulana Muhammad IND	Noor Village Moughal Khail, South Waziristan Agency Wana
32.	NA-32 Tribal Area-VI	Haji Lal Karim IND	Vill. & P.O Nawagai, Tehsil Nawagai, Bajor Agency
33.	NA-33 Tribal Area-VII	Mr. Abdul Lateef Afridi IND	Maira Mushogagur P.O. Badabar Tehsil & Distt. Peshawar
34.	NA-34 Tribal Area-VIII	Haji Afridi IND	Bazgul Gul Haji Palaza, University Road, Peshawar

FEDERAL CAPITAL-01

35.	NA-35 Federal Capital	Syed Zafar Shah PML (N)	Ali House No.3, Sector G-7/4, Islamabad

THE PUNJAB

36.	NA-36 Rawalpindi-I	Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi PML (N)	Village Dewal, Tehsil Murree, Distt. Rawalpindi
37.	NA-37 Rawalpindi-II	Ch. Muhammad Khurshid Zaman PML (N)	F-749 6 th Road, Zaman House, Setllite Town, Rawalpindi
38.	NA-38 Rawalpindi-III	Shaikh Rashid Ahmed PML (N)	Lal Havely, Bohar Bazar, Rawalpindi
39.	NA-39 Rawalpindi-IV	Mr. Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq PML (N)	203/70, Chairing Cross Westridge, Rawalpindi
40.	NA-40 Rawalpindi-V	Ch. Nisar Ali Khan PML (N)	100, Faizabad Murree Road. Behindh P.S.O. Petrol Pump. Rawalpindi
41.	NA-41 Attock-I	Shaikh Aftab Ahmad PML (N)	Near Cantt Board Office Attock
42.	NA-42 Attock-II	Malik Lal Khan PML (N)	Kamrial Tehsil Pindi Ghen Distt. Attock
43.	NA-43 Chakwal-I	Lt. Gen (R) Malik Abdul Majeed PML (N)	MNA, H. Talah-Ghang Road Chakwal
44.	NA-44 Chakwal-II	Sardar Mansoor hayat Tamman PML (N)	Vill. & P.O Tamman Tehsil Talagang Distt. Chakwal
45.	NA-45 Jhelum-I	Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan PML (N)	10 Civil Lines Jhelum City
46.	NA-46 Jhelum-II	Nawabzada Iqbal Mehdi PML (N)	7, Civil Lines, Jhelum
47.	NA-47 Sargodha-I	Malik Adnan Hayat Khan PML (N)	Al-Viqar, Noon Avenue, Muslim Town, Lahore
48.	NA-48 Sargodha-II	Mr. Ghias Ahmad Mela PML (N)	4, Club Road, Civil Lines, Sargodha

49.	NA-49 Sargodha-III	Ch. Abdul Hameed PML (N)	Block No.25, Sargodha
50.	NA-50 Sargodha-IV	Ch. Anwar Ali Cheema PML (N)	51, Qasar-e-Sultan Civil Line, Sargodha
51.	NA-51 Sargodhacum- Khushab	Malik Umar Khan PML (N)	79-A, Satellite Town, Sargodha
52.	NA-52 Khushab	Sardar Shuja Muhammad Khan Baloch PML (N)	20/L Civil Line, Jauharabad, Distt. Khushab
53.	NA-53 Mianwali-I	Mr. Muhammad Maqbool Ahmad Khan Niazi PML (N)	H.No.47, St No.42, F-6/1, Islamabad
54.	NA-54 Mianwali-II	Mr. Inamullah Khan Niazi PML (N)	23-K Gulberg-III, Lahore
55.	NA-55 Bhakkar-I	Khan Muhammad Asghar Khan IND	26-Gulberg-V, Zafar Ali Road Lahore
56.	NA-56 Bhakkar-II	Mr. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan Dhandla PML (N)	Dhandla House, Bhakhar
57.	NA-57 Faisalabad-I	Rana Zahid Tuseef PML (N)	Rana Velvet House, Jaranwala Road, Faisalabd
58.	NA-58 Faisalabad-II	Rai Salah-ud-Din PML (N)	Village Kot Kabir Khan, Chak No. 353 G.B. Tehsil Jaranwala Distt. Faisalabad
59.	NA-59 Faisalabad-III	Mian Nasir Ali Baluch PML (N)	Kanjwani, Distt. Faisalabad
60.	NA-60 Faisalabad-IV	Chaudhary Safdar Rehman PML (N)	129/C Peoples Colony, Faisalabad
61.	NA-61 Faisalabad-V	Mian Muhammad Farooq PML (N)	Chak No.247/R.B. Miani, Tehsil & Distt. Faisalabad

62.	NA-62 Faisalabad-VI	Raja Nadir Pervaiz Khan PML (N)	Chak No. 279 R.B.Faisalabad
63.	NA-63 FaisalabadVII	Haji Muhammad Akram Ansari PML (N)	H.No.1077/D, Bilal Chowk, Ghulam Muhammad Abad, Faisalabad
64.	NA-64 FaisalabadVIII	Ch. Sher Ali PML (N)	Khalid Abad St. No.5, Kashmir House, Faisalabad
65.	NA-65 Faisalabad-IX	Mian Abdul Mannan PML (N)	22-Latif Park Officers colony No.2 Madina Town, Faisalabad
66.	NA-66 Jhang- I	Mr. Qaiser Ahmad Shaikh IND	23-FCC, D-I Marina House Syed Maratib Ali Road Gulberg-IV
67.	NA-67 Jhang- II	Maulana Muhammad Rehmatullah PML (N)	Jamia Muhammadi Sharif Jhang
68.	NA-68 Jhang- III	Nawab Amanullah Khan Sial PML (N)	Dera Nawaban, Jhang City
69.	NA-69 Jhang- IV	Syeda Abida Hussain PML (N)	Shah Jewana, Jhang
70.	NA-70 Jhang- V	Sahibzada Muhammad Tahir Sultan PML (N)	Darbar Hazrat Sultan Bahu Tehsil Shorkot Distt. Jhang
71.	NA-71 T.T.Singh-I	Ch. Asad- urRehman PML (N)	Chak Berum Kamalia, Tehsil Kamaalia, Distt. Toba Tek Singh
72.	NA-72 T.T.Singh-II	Ch. Abdul Sattar PML (N)	1-G Maratub Ali Road, Gulberg-II, Lahore
73.	NA-73 T.T.Singh-III	Mr. Hamza PML (N)	Eid Gah Road, Gojra, Distt. T.T.Singh
74.	NA-74 Gujranwala-I	Col. (Retd) Ghulam Sarwar Cheema PML (N)	Village P.O. Khanki H/W Tehsil Wazirabad Distt. Gujranwala
75.	NA-75 Hafizabad Gujranwala-II	Mr. Afzal Hussain Tarrar PML (N)	Kalol Tarrar, Tehsil & Distt. Hafizabad

76.	NA-76 Gujranwala-III	Mr. Ghulam Dastgir Khan PML (N)	H.No.7/A, Satellite Town, Gujranwala
77.	NA-77 GujranwalaIV	Ch. Mahmood Bashir Virk PML (N)	50 D.C. Road, Gujranwala
78.	NA-78 Gujranwala-V	Rana Nazir Ahmed Khan PML (N)	G.T. Road Kamoke, Distt. Gujranwala
79.	NA-79 Gujranwalacum- Hafizabad	Ch. Ejaz Ahmad PML (N)	Qilla Dedar Singh, District Gujranwala
80.	NA-80 Gujrat-I	Mr. Mubasher Hussain PML (N)	Zahoor Palace Circular Road, Gujrat
81.	NA-81 Gujrat-II	Ch. Shujat Hussain PML (N)	Zahoor Palace Circular Road, Gujrat
82.	NA-82 Gujrat-cum- Jhelum	Syed Manzoor Hussain Shah PML (N)	Dar Goods Forwarding Agency, Lala Musa, Gujrat
83.	NA-83 Mandi Bahauddincum- Gujrat	Mr. Mumtaz Ahmed Tarar PML (N)	Govt. Hostel Islamabad
84.	NA-84 Mandi Bahauddin	Ch. Muhammad Iqbal Bosal PML (N)	Tibaba Manik Bosal, Distt. Mandi Bahauddin
85.	NA-85 Sialkot-I	Khawaja Muhammad Asif PML (N)	118, Mahmood Ghaznavi Road, Sialkot Cantt
86.	NA-86 Sialkot-II	Ch. Amir Hussain PML (N)	534, Block G-1, M.A. Johar Town, Lahore
87.	NA-87 Sialkot-III	Syed Iftikhar-ul- Hassan Shah PML (N)	Vill & P.O Alo Mahar Sharif Distt. Sialkot
88.	NA-88 Sialkot-IV	Ch. Sikandar Hayat Malhi PML (N)	2-B, Canal Park, Gulberg-II Lahore
89.	NA-89	Ch. Muhammad	Rupo Chak House, Zafarwal Distt.
	Sialkot-cum- Narowal-V	Sarwar Khan PML (N)	Narowal

90.	NA-90 Narowal-I	Mr. Ahsan Iqbal PML (N)	4-Fazlia Colony, Ferozpur Road, Lahore
91.	NA-91 Narowal-II	Mr. Daniyal Aziz IND	H-8, Sector-V LCCHS (Defence) Lahore
92.	NA-92 Lahore-I	Mian Muhammad Azhar PML (N)	103-Abu Bakar Block, Garden Town, Lahore
93.	NA-93 Lahore-II	Mian Abdul Waheed PML (N)	Zafar Ali Road Behind State Guest House, Gulberg, Lahore
94.	NA-94 Lahore-III	Mian Tariq Aziz PML (N)	157-Garden Block, Gardan Town Lahore
95.	NA-95 Lahore-IV	Vacant	
96.	NA-96 Lahore-V	Vacant	
97.	NA-97 Lahore-VI	Mr. Muhammad Ishaq Dar PML (N)	7-H, Gulberg-III, Lahore
98.	NA-98 Lahore-VII	Mian Muhammad Munir PML (N)	96-C Windsor Park, Ichhra Lahore
99.	NA-99 Lahore-VIII	Sardar Kamil Omar PML (N)	65 B-2, Gulberg-III, Lahore
100.	NA-100 Lahore-IX	Ch. Muhammad Ashiq Dayal PML (N)	Dayal House P.O. Batapur, Lahore
101.	NA-101 Sheikhupura-I	Rana Tanveer Hussain PML (N)	318, Upper Mall Lahore
102.	NA-102 Sheikhupura-II	Mr. Mahmood Akbar Khan PML (N)	Vill. Jandila Sher Khan Distt. Sheikhupura
103.	NA-103 Sheikhupura-III	Ch. Muhammad Berjees Tahir PML (N)	Jamia Masjid Road, Sangla Hill, Distt. Sheikhupura
104.	NA-104 SheikhupuraIV	Ch. Naeem Hussain Chattha PML (N)	101, Civil Lines Chattah House, Sheikhupura
105.	NA-105 SheikhupuraV	Rai Mansab Ali Khan PML (N)	Ward No.15, Nankana Sahib Distt. Sheikhupura

106.	NA-106 Kasur-I	Mian Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri PML (N)	6-A, Gulberg-II, Main Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore
107.	NA-107	Ch. Muhammad	Green Kot, Tehsil & Distt. Kasur

	Kasur-II	Hanif Khan PML (N)	
108.	NA-108 Kasur-III	Rana Muhammad Hayat Khan PML (N)	Phool Nagar Tehsil Patooki Distt. Kasur
109.	NA-109 Kasur-IV	Maulana Moinud- Din Lakhvi PML (N)	Jamia Mohammadia Okara
110.	NA-110 Okara-I	Mian Muhammad Zaman PML (N)	I-Tehsil Road Okara
111.	NA-111 Okara-II	Syed Sajjad Haider PML (N)	P.O Renala Khurd Distt. Okara
112.	NA-112 Okara-III	Rao Qaisar Ali Khan PML (N)	Mazherabad Farm, Depalpur, Distt. Okara
113.	Okara-IV	Mian Muhammad Yasin Khan Wattoo PML (N)	3, Farid Kot Road, Lahore
114.	NA-114 Multan-I	Mr. Sikandar Hayat Khan Bosan PML (N)	31-A, Gulgasht Colony, Multan
115.	NA-115 Multan-II	Haji Muhammad Boota PML (N)	920/43, Tariq Manil, Basti Baghban, Out-side Delhi Gate, Multan
116.	NA-116 Multan-III	Sheikh Muhammad Tahir Rashid PML (N)	21-B, Gulgasht Colony, Multan
117.	NA-117 Lodhran-I	Mr. Ghulam Qasim Khan PML (N)	Vill. P.O. Jhandir Distt. Lodhran
118.	NA-118 Multan-cum- Lodhran	Mr. Muhammad Siddiq Khan Kanju PML (N)	Ali Pur Kanju, Distt. Lodhran

119.	NA-119 Multan-VI	Syed Javed Ali shah PML (N)	Outside Rashid Shah Gate, Tehsil Shujabad Distt. Multan
120.	NA-120 Multan-cum- Khanewal	Mr. Javed Hashmi PML (N)	50-Qasim Road, Multan Cantt
121.	NA-121 Khanewal-I	Vacant	
122.	NA-122 Khanewal-II	Mr. Aftab Ahmad Khan Daha PML (N)	H.No.3, Civil Lines, Khanewal
123.	NA-123 Khanewal-III	Begum Majida Wayne PML (N)	Begul Ghulam Haider Wayne H.No.5/13, Mian Channu Distt. Khaniwal
124.	NA-124 Sahiwal-I	Mian Anwarul Haq Ramy PML (N)	230-U, Farid Town, Sahiwal
125.	NA-125 Sahiwal-II	Ch. Muhammad Ashraf PML (N)	439-M, Farid Town, Sahiwal
126.	NA-126 Sahiwal-III	Rai Ahmed Nawaz Khan PML (N)	I, Railway Road, Chichawatni
127.	NA-127 Pakpattan-I	Raja Shahid Saeed Khan PML (N)	427-K Block, Model Town, Lahore
128.	NA-128 Pakpattan-II	Mr. Mahmud Ahmed Khan PML (N)	97-B-1/1, Nisar Road Lahore Cantt
129.	NA-129 Vehari-I	Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Khan alies Dilawar Khan Khichi PML (N)	Khichi House, Fadda Mailsi, Distt. Vehari
130.	NA-130 Vehari-II	Ms. Tahmina Daultana PML (N)	8-B, Phase-I, Defence Lahore
131.	NA-131 Vehari-III	Syed Shahid Mehdi Nasim PML (N)	16/17 Block-I, Civil Lines, Burewala
132.	NA-132 D.G.Khan	Mr. Muhammad Amjad Farooq PML (N)	Bahadar Garh House D.G.Khan

133.	NA-133 D.G.Khancum- Rajanpur	Sirdar Muhammad Jaffar Khan Laghari IND	24 Main Gulberg, Lahroe

134.	Rajanpur	Sardar Muhammad Nasrullah Khan Dreshak IND	252-A, Gulberg-III, Lahore
135.	NA-135 Muzaffargarh -I	Syed Jamil Ahmad Hussain Bokhari PML (N)	Bokhari House, Alipur Distt. Muzaffargarh
136.	NA-136 Muzaffargarh -II	Mian Atta Muhammad Qureshi PML (N)	Tanveer Petroleum Service, Vehari Road Mumtaz Abad, Multan
137.	NA-137 Muzaffargarh -III	Malik Ghulam Muhammad Noor Rabani Khar PML (N)	Khar Gharbi Tehsil Kot Adu Muzaffargarh
138.	NA-138 Muzaffargarh -IV	Mian Ghulam Abbas PML (N)	P.O Sheikh Umar Tehsil Kot Adu, Distt. Muzaffargarh
139.	NA-139 Layyah-I	Malik Ghulam Haider Thind PML (N)	Al-Bilal Thind House Layyah
140.	NA-140 Layyah-II	Sahibzada Faizul- Hassan PML (N)	Chak No. 102, TDA Darbar Sawag Sharif Tehsil Karor Distt. Layyah
141.	NA-141 Bahawalpur-I	Nawab Salahuddin Abbasi PML (N)	Sadiq Garh Palace, Dera Nawab Sahib, Bahawalpur
142.	NA-142 Bahawalpur- II	Sahibzada Farooq Anwar Abbasi PML (N)	19-D, Abbasi Road, Model Town-A, Bahawalpur
143.	NA-143 Bahawalpur- III	Mr. Muhammad Aqeel-ur- Rehman PML (N)	Rehman Villa. Bahar Gate, Multan Road, Bahawalpur

144.	NA-144 Bahawalnagar-I	Prof. Dr. Noor Muhammad Ghifari PML (N)	Vill. & P.O Punnan Wali P.O Box No.3, Distt. Bahawal Nagar
145.	NA-145 Bahawalnagar-II	Mr. Abdul Sattar Laleka PML (N)	Laleka House, Haroonabad. Distt. Bahawalnagar
146.	NA-146 Bahawalnagar-III	Ch. Abdul Ghafoor PML (N)	2-D, Model Town, Lahore
147.	NA-147 Rahimyar Khan-I	Makhdum Syed Ahmad Mahmood PML (N)	81 E-1, Mukhdum House, Gulberg- III, Lahore
148.	NA-148 Rahimyar Khan- II	Makhdoom Imad-ud-Din PML (N)	P.O. Mianwali Qureshian Tehsil & Distt. Rahimyar Khan
149.	NA-149 Rahimyar Khan- III	Ch. Muhammad Jaffar Iqbal Deputy Speaker National assembly of Pakistan PML (N)	Rahimyar Khan
150.	NA-150 Rahimyar Khan-IV	Vacant	

SINDH PROVINCE-46

151.	NA-151 Sukkur-I	Syed Khurshed Ahmed Shah PPP	Manzil Gah Road, Sukkur
152.	NA-152 Sukkurcum- Ghotki	Mr. Ali Muhammad Khan Mahar PPP	Vill. Khangarh, P.O Khanpur Mahar, Distt. Ghotki
153.	NA-153 Ghotki	Mr. Khalid Ahmed Khan Lund PPP	Khalidabad P.O. Jarwar Mir Pur Mathelo, District Ghotki
154.	NA-154 Shikarpur-I	Mr. Aftab Shahban Mirani PPP	23/11 Khayban-e-Ghazi Defence Housing Authority Phase-V, Karachi

155.	NA-155 Shikarpur-II	Mr. Ghaus Bux Khan Maher PML (N)	Vill Wazirabad, Taluka Lakhi Distt. Shikarpur
156.	NA-156 Jacobabad-I	Mr. Illahi Bukhsh Soomro Speaker National Assembly PML (N)	H.No.1, St. No.14-A, F-7/2, Islamabad
157.	NA-157 Jacobabad-II	Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani PPP (SB)	12-B, 10 th South St. Ext. Defence Housing Authority Phase-II, Karachi
158.	NA-158 Naushehro Feroze-I	Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi NPP	18, Khayaban-e-Shamsheer, Defence Housing Society Karachi
159.	NA-159 Naushehro-II	Mr. Asghar Ali Shah PML (N)	Village Darbelo, Tehsil Kandiaro, Distt. Nausharo Feroz
160.	NA-160 Nawabshah-I	Syed Shaukat Hussain Shah PML (N)	Gharibabad, Nawab Shah
161.	NA-161 Nawabshah-II	Syed Shabbir Ahmad shah PML (N)	B-27 K.D.A. Scheme No.1, Miran Muhammad Shah Road, Karachi
162.	NA-162 Khairpur	Justice (Retd) Syed Ghous Ali Shah PML (N)	34/I, Khayaban Mujahid Defence Housing Authority, Karachi
163.	NA-163 Khairpurcum- Sukkur	Pir Syed Fazal Ali Shah Jillani PPP	P/O Ranipur Tehsil Sobhodero Distt. Khair Pur
164.	NA-164 Larkana-I	Begum Nusrat Bhutto PPP	70, Clifton Karachi
165.	NA-165 Larkana-II	Mr. Shabir Ahmed Khan Chandio PPP	Vakeel Housing Society, Waggan Road, Larkana
166.	NA-166 Larkana-III	Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto PPP	Bilawal House, Karchi

167.	NA-167 Hyderabad-I	Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Faheem PPP	11-A, 2 nd Sunset Street, Phase-II, Defence Housing Society, Karachi
168.	NA-168 Hyderabad-II	Mr. Tariq jawaid HPG	1207/15, F.B.Area, Karachi

169.	NA-169 Hyderabad-III	Dr. Maqbool HPG	Khalid Siddiqui 243-C Block B, Unit Latifabad, Hyderabad
170.	NA-170 Hyderabad-IV	Syed Naveed Qamar PPP	233-C, Unit.2, Latifabad Hyderabad
171.	NA-171 HyderabadV	Vacant	
172.	NA-172 Badin-I	Mr. Abdul Sattar Leghari PPP	H.No.3/A, Block-A, Latifabad No.3, Hyderabad
173.	NA-173 Badin-II	Dr. Fahmida Mirza PPP	H.N.38/I, 23 rd St. Phase-II Defence Housing Society Karachi
174.	NA-174 Mirpurkhas	Pir Aftab Hussain Shah Jilani PPP	6-B, 7 th Central Street Phase-II, Defence Housing Society Karachi
175.	NA-175 MirpurkhascumUmerkot	Pir Noor Muhammad Shah Jillani PML (N)	Vill. Pir Noor Muhammad Shah Tehsil Tando Allahyar Distt. Hyderabad
176.	NA-176 Tharparkar	Dr. Arbab Ghulam Rahim IND	P.O Kaloi, Via Naokote, Distt. Tharparkar
177.	NA-177 Dadu-I	Vacant	
178.	NA-178 Dadu-II	Haji Muhammad Bux Jamali PPP	Jamali Street, Dadu
179.	NA-179 Dadu-III	Mr. Abdul Hamid Jatoi PML (N)	P.O. Mehar Distt. Dadu
180.	NA-180 Sanghar-I	Haji Peer Bakhsh Junejo IND	Junejo House, Mirpur Khas Road, Sanghar

181.	NA-181 Sanghar-II	Jam Mashooq Ali IND	P.O Jam Nawaz Ali Distt. Sanghar
182.	NA-182 Thatta-I	Baboo Hussain PPP	Ghulan Soni Mundhi, Mohallah Bazar, Thatta

183.	NA-183 Thatta-II	Syed Shafqat Hussain Shah Sheerazi PPP	Sheerazi Mohalla, Thatta
184.	NA-184 Karachi (West)-I	Mian Ejaz Shafi PML (N)	Diamond Industry Enterprises F/210, S.I.T.E. Behind Tele. Exchange, Karachi
185.	NA-185 Karachi (West)-II	Prof. A.K. Shams HPG	B-52, Block-H, 1 st Floor, North Nazimabad, Karachi
186.	NA-186 Karachi Central-I	Kunwar Khalid Yunus HPG	B.81. P North Nazimabad Karachi
187.	NA-187 Karachi Central-II	Mr. Muhammad Farooq Ahmad HPG	855/1, Federal B Area, Karachi
188.	NA-188 Karachi Central-III	Mr. Hasan Musanna Alvi HPG	B-626, Block 13, Federal B. Area, Gulberg, Karachi
189.	NA-189 Karachi South-I	Waja Ahmed Karim Dad Baloch PPP	63, Ibrahim Tarrace Qasim hamir Street, Kharadar Karachi-2
190.	NA-190 Karachi South-II	Vacant	
191.	NA-191 Karachi South-III	Capt. Haleem Ahmed Siddiqui PML (N)	39-B, 1 st Central lane, Defence Housing Society, Karachi
192.	NA-192 Karachi East-I	Mr. Ajaz Mahmood HPG	D-50, Block 7/4, Islamabad
193.	NA-193 Karachi East-II	Dr. Nishat Mallick HPG	B-306, Block-13, Federal B.Area Karachi
194.	NA-194 Karachi East-III	Mr. Muhammad Arif Khan Advocate HPG	Flate no.3 & 4 Al-Furqan Cottage Block No.14, Federal B. Area, Karachi

195.	NA-195 Karachi East-IV	Shaikh Hussain HPG	Liaquat	A/21 Khudadad Colony Kashmir Road Karachi
196.	NA-196 Karachi East-V	Mr. Farukh Siddiqui HPG	Muhammad Naeem	H-105/13-Malir Colony Karachi

BALUCHISTAN-11

197.	NA-197 Quettacum- Chagai	Sardar Atif Sanjarani PML (N)	A	Killi Mir Khan Jan Dalbadin Distt. Baluchistan
198.	NA-198 Pishin-cumKillah Abdullah	Al-Haj Maulana Abdul Ghani JUI (F)		New Abadi chaman Ghora Hospital Road, Chaman
199.	NA-199 LoralaicumMusakhelcum- Barkhan	Sardar Muhammad Yaqub Khan Nasir PML (N)		House No.12, St.No.2, Sector F- 5/3, Islamabad
200.	NA-200 Zhob-cum- Killa Saifullah	Maulana Muhammad Khan Sheerani JUI (F)		
201.	NA-201 Jhal Magsi-cum- Bolan (Kachhi)	Sardar Muhammad Rind JWP	Ya	C/O Seth Gansham Pasram Dera Murad jamali Distt. Nasirabad
202.	NA-202 Sibbi-cumDera Bugticum- Kohlucum-Ziarat	Nawab Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti JWP		Bugti House, Ain-ud-Din Quetta
203.	NA-203 Jaffarabadcum- Nasirabad	Mir Faridulla Khan Jamali IND		Village Rojhan Jamali P.O. Jhat Pat, Distt. Jafarabad Baluchistan
204.	NA-204 Kalat-cumMastungcum- Kharan	Vacant		

205.	NA-205 KhuzdarcumAwaran	Mir Hasil Kha Bazenjo BNP	Nul distt. Khuzdar Baluchistan
206.	NA-206 LasbelacumGwadar	Shahzada Muhammad Yousaf PML (N)	F.31-B, Block, North Nazimabad Lasbella House, Karachi
207.	NA-207 Turbatcum- Panjgur	Shakeel Ahmad BNP	Turbat Baluchistan

LIST OF NON-MUSLIM MEMBERS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
TOTAL-10

Sr. No	Name	Community	Address
208	Mr. Tariq C. Qaiser	Christian	Qasr-e-Qaiser 241, Rehmat Park, College Road, Sargodha Cantt
209	Bishop Rufin Julius	Christian	48-A, Jalil Town, G.T.Road, Gujranwala
210	Mr. Peter John Sahotra	Christian	Sahotra House, Daud Nagar, Warispura, Faisalabad
211	Mr. Simon Jacob	Christian	114-Rehmat Park, College Road, Sargodha
212	Mr. Kishan Chand Parwani	Hindu/Sche duled Castes	P.O Box. 49, Mirpurkhas
213	Dr. Khatu Mal Jewan	Hindu/Sche duled Castes	21-C, Block.6, PECHS, Karachi
214	Rana Chandar Singh	Hindu/Sche duled Castes	Rana Jagir, Distt. Umerkot, Karachi
215	Mr. Kirshan Bheel Advocate	Hindh/Sche duled Castes	Rehman Town, Mirpurkhas
216	Mr. Yezdiar H. Kaikobad	Parsi/Sikh/B udhists and others	23-C, Island Apartments Chaudhry Rahmat Ali Road, Bath Island. Karachi
217	Mr. Bashiruddin Khalid	Ahmadi	649-Nishtar Block Alama Iqbal Town, Lahore

2nd term

**FEDERAL CABINET UNDER THE PREIMIER SHIP OF
MR. MOHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF FROM 17. 2. 97 TO 12. 10.
99**

S.No.	Portfolio	Period	Remarks
Prime Minister Mr. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif (17. 2. 97 to 12. 10. 99)			
FEDERAL MINISTERS WITH TENURE			
1. Mr. Muhammad Ishaq Dar 25. 2. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Commerce M/o Industries and Investment M/o Finance, Economic Affairs Statistics and Revenue	25. 10. 97 to 12. 10. 99 25. 2. 97 to 11. 7. 97 6. 11. 98 to 12. 10. 99	
2. Mr. Sartaj Aziz 25. 2. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Finance, Economic Affairs and Statistics. M/o Foreign Affairs M/o Planning and Development	25. 2. 97 to 6. 8. 98 6. 8. 1998 25. 2. 97 to 6. 8. 98	
3. Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan 25. 2. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Foreign Affairs M/o Water and Power M./O Kashmir Affairs & Northern Area and States & Frontier Regions	25. 2. 97 to 6. 8. 98 6. 8. 98 to 12. 10. 99 25. 2. 97 to 11. 7. 97	
4. Ch. Shujaat Hussain, 25. 2. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Interior M/o Railways M/o Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis.	25. 2. 97 to 12. 10. 99 25. 2. 97 to 11. 7. 97 25. 2. 97 to 11. 7. 97	

5.	Syeda Abida Hussain 25. 2. 97 to 10. 4. 99	M/o Population Welfare M/o Women Development, Social Welfare and Special Education Ministry of Environment, Local Government and Rural Development. M/o Food , Agriculture and Livestock M/o Science and Technology	25. 2. 97 to 10. 4. 99 25. 2. 97 to 11. 7. 97 25. 2. 97 to 11. 7. 97 13. 3. 97 to 11. 7. 97 10. 9. 97 to 10. 4. 99	
6.	Ch. Nisar Ali Khan 25. 2. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Water and Power M/o Petroleum and Natural Resources M/o Petroleum and Natural Resources Inter Provincial Coordination	25. 2. 97 to 11. 7. 97 25. 2. 97 to 11. 7. 99 11.7.97 to 12.10.99 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	
7.	Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan Hoti, 20. 3. 97 to 4. 6. 98	M/o Communications	20. 3. 97 to 4. 6. 98	
8.	Sheikh Rashid Ahmed 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Culture, Sports, Tourism and Youth Affairs M/o Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis	11. 7. 97 to 6. 8. 98 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	
9.	Syed Ghous Ali Shah, 11. 7. 97 to 17. 6. 99	M/o Education	11. 7. 97 to 17. 6. 99	
10.	Makhdoom Muhammad Javed Hashmi 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Health	11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	
11.	Raja Nadir Pervaiz Khan 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Water and Power. M/o communications	11. 7. 97 to 6. 8. 98 6. 8. 98 to 12. 10. 99	
12	Lt. Gen. (Retd) Malik Abdul Majeed 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Kashmir Affairs & Northern Areas and States & Frontier Regions	11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	

1.	Sardar Muhammad Yaqub Khan Nasar, 11. 7. 97 to 6. 8. 98	M/o Railways	11. 7. 97 to 6. 8. 98	

2.	Mian Muhammad Yaseen Khan Wattoo 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	Parliamentary Affairs Division	11. 7. 97 to 12 .10.99	
3.	Mian Abdul Sattar Laleka, 11. 7, 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Food, Agriculture and Livestock	11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	
4.	Raja Mohammad Zafar -ul-Haq, 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10.99	M/o Religious Affairs, Zakat and Ushr and Minorities Affairs	11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99.	
5.	Dr. Khalikd Maqbool Siddiqui, 11. 7. 97 to 31. 8. 98	M/o Industries and Production	11. 7. 97 to 31. 8. 98	
6.	Mr. Mushahid Hussain Syed 11. 8. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Information and Media Development M/o Culture Sports, Tourism & Youth Affairs	11. 8. 97 to 12. 10. 99 30. 1. 99 to 12. 10. 99	
7.	Mr. Khalikd Anwar 11. 8. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Law, Justice and Human Rights	11. 8. 97 to 12. 10. 99	

MINISTERS OF STATE

1.	Mr. Asghar Ali Shah 25. 2. 97 to 12. 10. 99	M/o Housing and Works M/o Education	25. 2. 97 to 12. 10. 99 25. 2. 97 to 11. 7. 97	
2.	Syed Ahmed Mehmud 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	Environment Local Government and Rural Development	11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	
3.	Mr. Muhammad Siddique Khan Kanju 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	Foreign Affairs	11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	
4.	Capt. Haleem Ahmed Siddiqui 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	Water and Power M/o Communications	11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99 17. 7. 98 to 6. 8. 98	
5.	Tahmina Daultana 11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	Women Development, Social Welfare and Special Education	11. 7. 97 to 12. 10. 99	

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ISLAMABAD, FRIDAY, APRIL 4, 1997

PART I

Acts, Ordinances, President's Orders and Regulations

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SECRETARIAT

Islamabad, the 4th April, 1997

The following Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) received the assent of the President on the 3rd April, 1997, and is hereby published for general information :—

ACT No. I OF 1997

An Act further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Whereas it is expedient further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the purposes hereinafter appearing ;

It is hereby enacted as follows :—

1. **Short title and commencement.**—(1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1997.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

(379)

Price Rs. 02.00

[720(97) Ex. Gaz.]

2. **Amendment of Article 58 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 58, in clause (2) sub-clause (b) shall be omitted.

3. **Amendment of Article 101 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, in Article 101, in clause (1) for the words “after consultation with” the words “on the advice of” shall be substituted.

4. **Amendment of Article 112 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, in Article 112, in clause (2) sub-clause (b) shall be omitted.

5. **Amendment of Article 243 of the Constitution.**—In the Constitution, in Article 243, in clause (2) in sub-clause (c) the words “in his discretion” shall be omitted.

KHAN AHMAD GORAYA,
Secretary.

The Gazette of Pakistan

EXTRAORDINARY
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY

ISLAMABAD, FRIDAY, JULY 4, 1997

PART I

Acts, Ordinances, President's Orders and Regulations

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SECRETARIAT

Islamabad, the 4th July, 1997

No. F. 22(104)/97-Legis.—The following Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) received the assent of the President on the 3rd July, 1997, and is hereby published for general information:—

ACT NO. XXIV OF 1997

An Act further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

WHEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in order to prevent instability in relation to the formation or functioning of government;

It is hereby enacted as follows :—

1. **Short title and commencement.**—(1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, 1997.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

(1495)

Price : Rs. 3.00

[1021(97)/Ex. Gaz.]

2. **Addition of new Article 63A in the Constitution.**—In the Constitution of the Islamic republic of Pakistan after Article 63 the following new Article shall be inserted, namely :—

“63A *Disqualification on ground of defection, etc.*—(1) If a member of a Parliamentary Party defects, he may be means of a notice in writing addressed to him by the Head of the political party, or such other person as may be authorized in this behalf by the Head of the political party, be called upon to show cause, within not more than seven days of such a notice, as to why a declaration under clause (2) should not be made against him. If a notice is issued under this clause, the presiding officer of the concerned House shall be informed accordingly.

Explanation.—A member of a House shall be deemed to defect from a political party if he, having been elected as such, as a candidate or nominee of a political party, or under a symbol of political party or having been elected otherwise than as a candidate or nominee of a political party, and having become a member of a political party after such election by means of a declaration in writing.

- (a) commits a breach of party discipline which means a violation of the party Constitution, code of conduct and declared policies, or
 - (b) votes contrary to any direction issued by the Parliamentary Party to which he belongs or,
 - (c) abstains from voting in the House against party policy in relation to any Bill.
- (2) Where action is proposed to be taken under the Explanation to clause (1), sub-clause (a), the disciplinary committee of the party, on a reference by the Head of the party, shall decide the matter, after giving an opportunity of a personal hearing to the member concerned within seven days. In the event the decision is against the member, he can file an appeal, within seven days, before the Head of the Party, whose decision thereon shall be final. In cases covered by the Explanation to clause (1), sub-clause (b) and (c), the declaration may be made by the Head of the party concerned after examining the explanation of the member and determining whether or not that member has defected.

- (3) The Presiding Officer of the House shall be intimated the decision by the Head of the Political Party in addition to an intimation which shall also be sent to the concerned member. The Presiding Officer shall within two days transmit the decision to the Chief Election Commissioner. The Chief Election Commissioner, shall give effect to such decision, within seven days from the date of the receipt of such intimation by declaring the seat vacant and announcing the schedule of the bye-election.
- (4) Nothing contained in this Article shall apply to the Chairman or Speaker of a House.
- (5) For the purpose of this Article.—
 - (a) "House" means the National Assembly or the Senate, in relation to the Federation, and the Provincial Assembly in relation to the Province, as the case may be;
 - (b) "Presiding Officer" means the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Chairman of the Senate or the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly, as the case may be.
- (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, no court including the Supreme Court and a High Court shall entertain any legal proceedings, exercise any jurisdiction, or make any order in relation to any action under this Article."

KHAN AHMAD GORAYA,
Secretary.